CRITICAL  REALISM 

A  STUDY  OF  THE  NATURE  AND 
CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


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CRITICAL  REALISM 


CRITICAL   REALISM 

A  STUDY  OF  THE  NATURE  AND  CONDITIONS 
OF  KNOWLEDGE 


By 
ROY  WOOD   SELLARS,   Ph.D. 

Assistant  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the 
University  of  Michigan 


RAND   McNALLY  &   COMPANY 

CHICAGO  NEW  YORK 

94751 


Copyright,  1916. 
By  Rand  McNally  St  Company 


\G  \ 

THE  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    The  Setting  of  the  Problem:    Natural  Realism  .  i 

II.     Natural  Realism  and  Science 22 

III.  The  Advance  of  the  Personal 49 

IV.  The  Field  of  the  Individual's  Experience        .      .  79 
V.    Distinctions  within  the  Field  .      .      .     .     .     .      .  104 

VI.    An  Examination  of  Idealism .135 

VII.    The  Insufficiency  of  Mental  Pluralism      .     .'    .  154 

VIII.    Mediate  Realisms 182 

IX.    Is  Consciousness  Alien  to  the  Physical?     .      .      .  204 

X.    Truth  and  Knowledge 254 


THE   PREFACE 

The  present  work  is  an  attempt  to  state  systematically  the 
essential  problems  of  epistemology.  These  problems  are  real;  they 
can  be  stated  clearly,  and  they  can,  I  am  convinced,  be  solved. 
What  do  we  mean  when  we  say  that  we  know  a  thing?  What  are 
the  conditions  of  such  knowledge?  These  questions  and  the  numer- 
ous other  questions  to  which  they  lead  are  as  empirical  as  any 
questions  to  be  foimd  in  the  special  sciences  and,  so  far  as  I  can  see, 
just  as  susceptible  of  being  answered  in  a  satisfactory  way.  But 
the  individual  thinker  who  approaches  them  must  rid  his  mind  of 
prejudices  and  be  prepared  to  spend  some  time  in  a  preliminary 
survey  of  the  facts.  He  must,  moreover,  be  willing  to  regard  his 
conclusions  as  tentative  and  of  the  nature  of  hypotheses.  Such 
is  the  spirit  which  I  have  tried  to  maintain  throughout  the  present 
work. 

The  positions  which  I  am  setting  forth  in  the  following  pages 
are  the  summary  of  many  years  of  teaching  and  of  hard  and  pretty 
constant  thinking,  inside  the  class-room  and  without.  As  time 
passed,  I  found  myself  drifting  ever  more  decidedly  toward  realism 
and  natiu-alism.  I  became  increasingly  aware  of  the  realistic 
structure  of  the  individual's  experience  and  noted  those  distinctions 
and  meanings  in  which  this  structure  was  expressed.  Whether 
these  distinctions  and  meanings  could  be  justified  was  the  question 
uppermost  in  my  mind.  While  the  pressure  of  my  reflection  was 
evidently  toward  realism,  I  was  dissatisfied  with  the  customary 
realisms  and  felt  that  idealism  had  the  better  of  the  argument  so 
far  as  generally  accepted  principles  were  concerned.  It  was  at  the 
very  best  a  drawn  battle  between  them. 

Every  realist  who  wishes  to  justify  the  faith  that  is  in  him  must 
meet  the  argtmients  of  Berkeley,  not  only  his  more  formal  principle 
that  to  be  for  the  sensible  world  is  to  be  perceived,  but  also  his 
argument  from  content  that  all  objects  can  be  analyzed  into  sensa- 
tions. Himie,  and  in  our  own  day,  F.  H.  Bradley,  have  also  driven 
home  to  philosophy  the  psychical  character  of  everything  which  is 
directly  present  in  the  field  of  experience.  My  knowledge  of  psy- 
chology and  of  logic  made  me  realize  the  pervasive  influence  of 
mental  activity;  made  me  able  to  bear  in  mind  the  processes  which 
made  possible  those  apparently  stable  products  which  presented 
themselves  to  me  so  ready-made  and  external.     The  problem  which 


vi  THE  PREFACE 

was  formulating  itself  was  to  reach  a  position  which  would  do  justice 
to  both  the  idealistic  motives  in  experience  and  the  realistic  structure 
and  meanings.  Was  there  not  some  way  out?  Could  not  some 
more  adequate  standpoint  be  reached?  I  determined  to  analyze 
the  nature  of  scientific  knowledge  to  see  whether  it  would  give  me 
a  clue. 

A  careful  study  of  modem  science  in  the  light  of  my  episte- 
mological  problem  did  give  me  a  clue  which  it  took  some  time  to 
work  out.  Do  not  both  Locke  and  Berkeley  have  essentially  the 
same  view  of  knowledge?  For  each  of  them  —  if  there  is  to  be 
knowledge  of  the  physical  world  —  it  must  be  of  the  nature  of  direct 
or  indirect  apprehension.  Either  the  physical  world  itself  or  a 
substitute  copy  must  be  present  to  the  understanding  when  we 
think.  Berkeley  meets  Locke  on  this  ground  and  overcomes  him. 
The  physical  world  cannot  be  like  our  ideas;  hence,  we  cannot 
know  it.     Therefore,  there  is  no  good  reason  to  assimie  its  existence. 

But  is  actual  scientific  knowledge  an  attempt  to  achieve  images 
which  faithfully  copy  the  physical  world?  Does  not  this  knowledge 
consist,  instead,  of  propositions  which  claim  to  give  tested  knowledge 
about  the  physical  world?  I  want  the  reader  to  get  dearly  in  mind 
the  difference  of  outlook  which  this  suggestion  involves.  //  involves 
a  relinquishment  of  all  attempts  to  picture  the  physical  world.  Science 
offers  us  measurements  of  things  and  statements  of  their  properties, 
i.e.,  their  effects  upon  us  and  upon  other  things,  and  of  their  structure; 
but  it  imconsciously  swings  ever  more  completely  away  from  the 
assimiption  that  physical  things  are  open  to  our  inspection  or  that 
substitute  copies  are  open  to  our  inspection. 

This  result  of  the  study  of  actual  scientific  knowledge  was  illu- 
minating. I  immediately  saw  how  Berkeley's  arguments  could  be 
out-flanked.  They  were  based  on  a  conception  of  knowledge  which 
did  not  hold  for  science.  The  scientist-as-such  was  not  aware  of 
the  problem,  nor  was  he  in  a  position  to  see  the  exact  bearing  of  his 
own  results  upon  epistemology.  That  was  the  task  of  the  philos- 
opher. The  systematic  development  of  this  new  point  of  view  was 
the  problem  I  set  myself.  Gradually  a  full-fledged  theory  of  knowl- 
edge formulated  itself  in  my  mind.  For  want  of  a  better  name,  I 
have  called  it  Critical  Realism. 

To  be  understood  properly,  Critical  Realism  must  be  connected 
with  a  non-apprehensional  view  of  knowledge.  Scientific  knowledge 
about  the  physical  world  consists  of  propositions  which  do  not 
attempt  to  picture  it.  It  is  upon  this  principle  that  I  take  my 
stand.  These  propositions  must  be  tested  immanently  or  within 
experience,  but,  after  being  so  tested,  they  are  considered  as  being 


THE  PREFACE  vii 

knowledge  about  that  which  can  never  be  Hterally  present  within  the 
field  of  experience,  although  it  controls  the  elements  in  the  field. 
But  the  reader  will  understand  this  position  better  as  he  follows 
the  detailed  argument.  This  much  of  anticipation  may,  however, 
act  as  a  guide. 

My  thesis  is,  then,  that  idealism  and  realism  have  had  essentially 
the  same  view  of  knowledge  and  that  the  large  measure  of  sterility 
which  has  accompanied  philosophical  controversy  is  due  to  this 
constant  assumption  that  knowledge  always  involves  the  presence  of 
the  existent  known  in  the  field  of  experience.  Philosophy  limited 
itself  to  a  controversial  study  of  the  subject-object  duality  and  did 
not  lift  its  eyes  to  the  triad  consisting  of  subject,  idea-object  (in 
science  analyzable  into  propositions),  and  physical  existent.  It  is  to 
this  triad  that  Critical  Realism  calls  attention.  It  is  my  persuasion 
that  this  more  complex  form  of  realism  does  justice  to  the  truth 
contained  on  both  sides  in  the  old  antithesis.  And  it  is  this  inclusive- 
ness  as  much  as  anything  else  that  convinces  me  that  I  am  on  the 
right  track. 

But  my  thinking  has,  from  the  first,  been  very  much  influenced 
by  the  mind-body  problem.  I  have  always  thought  that  this  age-old 
problem  would  be  the  crucial  test  of  any  philosophical  system. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  constant  brooding  over  this  tantalizing 
question  exerted  a  pressure  on  me  in  the  direction  of  realism  and, 
at  the  same  time,  controlled  my  thinking.  How  could  I  obtain  a 
realism  without  a  dualism?  Chapter  IX  gives  my  solution.  Con- 
sciousness is  a  variant  within  those  highly  evolved  parts  of  the  physical 
world  which  we  call  organisms.  Perhaps  the  most  novel  idea  in  the 
chapter  is  that  consciousness  is  actually  extended.  I  feel  certain 
that  the  reader  will  find  many  parts  of  the  chapter  extremely  interest- 
ing. I  have  no  doubt  that  many  critics  will  speak  of  the  position 
as  Materialism;  I  prefer  to  call  it  Naturalism.  The  reason  for  this 
preference  is  that  Materialism  has  never  had  an  adequate  theory  of 
knowledge  back  of  it  and,  therefore,  has  misleading  associations  in 
regard  to  the  nature  of  the  physical  world.  If  the  critic  desires  to 
follow  the  present  liking  for  the  word  "new"  he  is  at  Uberty  to  call 
my  position  Neo-Materialism  or  the  New  Materialism.  What  I 
partictilarly  desire  both  critic  and  general  reader  to  do,  however, 
is  to  see  the  solution  of  the  mind-body  problem  in  the  light  of  Critical 
Realism  as  a  theory  of  knowledge. 

The  reader  may,  perhaps,  be  helped  to  grasp  the  rather  long  and 
intimately  coimected  argtmient  of  the  book  if  I  point  out  its  general 
movement. 

Chapter  I  begins  with  a  description  of  the  plain  man's  outlook, 


/ 


viii  THE  PREFACE 

which  is  called  Natural  Realism.  The  plain  man  believes  that  the 
physical  thing  itself  is  present  in  his  field  of  vision.  I  try  first  to  show 
how  natural  this  belief  is  and  then  to  point  out  fatal  objections  to  it. 
The  conclusion  arrived  at  is  that  we  perceive  percepts,  or  thing- 
experiences,  and  not  physical  things.  The  physical  world  retreats 
into  the  background  and  the  perceptual  experience  is  thought  of  as 
imder  two  controts,  the  physical  thing  and  the  body.  We  begin  to 
suspect  that  perception  and  knowledge  are  not  the  same,  but  do 
not  yet  know  what  knowledge  is. 

Chapter  II  examines  Nattu-al  Realism  in  the  Ught  of  science  and 
points  out  the  growth  of  what  may  be  called  scientific  realism.  The 
percept  and  the  physical  thing  are  pretty  well  distinguished,  but  the 
reach  of  scientific  knowledge  remains  vague.  When  the  problem 
of  knowledge  is  raised,  reflective  scientists  divide  themselves  into 
at  least  three  groups,  but  there  is  no  clear  consensus  of  opinion. 
The  tendency  to  picture  the  physical  world  still  lingers. 

Chapter  III  concerns  itself  with  the  Advance  of  the  Personal. 
Both  percepts  and  concepts  are  seen  to  be  p>ersonal,  and  the  meaning 
"commonness"  gives  way  to  "correspondence."  We  have  corre- 
spondent percepts  and  concepts;  we  do  not  sec  the  same  things  nor 
have  the  same  ideas.  This  residt  is  entitled  mental  pluralism,  and 
is  considered  a  reflective  level  of  an  empirical  sort  to  be  sharply 
opposed  to  idealism  which  is  a  theory. 

Chapters  IV  and  V  contain  analyses  of  the  field  of  the  individual's 
experience.  The  essential  distinctions  of  what  I  call  the  coexistcntial 
dimension  of  the  field  are  seen  in  the  light  of  the  temporal,  or  process, 
dimension.     These  chapters  complete  the  empirical  foundation. 

Chapter  VI  includes  an  examination  of  both  subjective  and 
objective  idealism.  The  principles  of  these  systems  are  shown  to 
be  fallacious.  I  would  especially  call  the  attention  of  the  reader  to 
the  criticism  of  the  assertion,  characteristic  of  the  objective  idealist, 
that  the  causal  category  has  validity  only  within  experience.  This 
assertion  is  shown  to  be  ambiguous.  If  knowledge  has  a  reference 
to  that  which  is  outside  of  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience, 
the  causal  category,  which  is  a  part  of  the  framework  of  that  knowl- 
edge, must  follow  this  reference.  The  error  of  idealism  turns  out 
to  be  the  assumption  that  knowledge  demands  the  presence  in 
experience  of  that  which  is  known.  Here  I  make  appeal  to  the 
triad  referred  to  above. 

Chapter  VII  exhibits  the  inadequacy  of  mental  pluralism.  Seven 
problems  are  developed  in  some  detail  to  demonstrate  the  pressure 
within  experience  to  the  acceptance  of  an  External  control  of  expe- 
rience and   a  continuous  medium  within  which   minds   live  and 


THE  PREFACE  ix 

move  and  have  their  being.  The  thought  of  the  physical  world 
comes  back  with  renewed  force. 

Chapter  VIII  discusses  certain  epistemological  problems  of 
particular  interest.  I  would  call  the  attention  of  the  reader  to  the 
criticism  of  the  assumption,  characteristic  of  panpsychism,  that  the 
mental  cannot  contain  knowledge  of  the  non-mental.  This  assump- 
tion is  shown  to  rest  on  the  idea  of  knowledge,  cherished  by  Natural 
Realism,  that  knowledge  involves  the  presence  of  the  existent 
known,  so  that  the  very  material  of  the  existent  must  be  revealed. 
Here,  again,  the  new  meaning  of  knowledge  stands  us  in  good  stead. 
Scientific  knowledge  is  not  an  intuition  of  the  stuff  of  the  physical 
world.  Thus  Critical  Realism  establishes  itself  as  the  only  satis- 
factory hypothesis  which  will  solve  the  problems  raised  by 
reflection. 

Chapter  IX  concerns  itself  with  the  mind-body  problem  as  a 
crucial  test  of  Critical  Realism.  As  we  have  already  referred  to 
the  conclusions  drawn,  we  can  omit  any  further  summary. 

Chapter  X  is  given  to  a  study  of  the  new  meaning  of  knowledge 
and  the  experiential  structure  which  makes  extra-experiential 
reference  possible.  The  reader  will  find  the  discussion  of  denotation 
particularly  important.  I  have  tried  to  show  that  there  "is  nothing 
mysterious  in  the  mechanism  of  reference;  that  it  depends  upon 
the  realistic  structure  of  the  field  of  experience.  The  new  meaning 
of  knowledge  is  now  seen  to  contain  two  elements:  the  idea-object 
which  is  accepted  or  believed,  and  the  moment  of  reference.  The 
idea-object  is  knowledge  and  also  knowledge-about.  And  this  knowl- 
edge is  just  the  kind  of  knowledge  which  it  purports  to  be.  We 
can  eliminate  from  science  all  attempt  to  intuit  or  picture  the  physical 
world.  Any  such  tendency  is  a  hold-over  from  Natural  Realism. 
We  have  out-flanked  Berkeley.  One  more  point  is  taken  up  in 
this  chapter  —  the  meaning  of  truth.  I  try  to  show  that  truth  is  a 
contrast-meaning  whose  opposite  is  error.  Both  presuppose  knowl- 
edge, but  they  arise  as  a  consequence  of  the  experience  of  disappoint- 
ment. Some  idea-objects  accepted  as  knowledge  turn  out  later 
not  to  be  knowledge.  Truth  is  thus  a  purely  empirical  meaning 
connected  with  idea-objects.  The  criteria  of  truth  have  been 
worked  out  in  scientific  method.  The  study  of  these  criteria  is  the 
work  of  the  logician  who  really  knows  his  science.  Pragmatism 
had  considerable  meaning  as  a  criticism  of  the  vaguenesses  of  the 
traditional  idealisms,  but  it  has  encouraged  looseness  of  thought. 
The  reason  for  this  is  that  it  was  not  founded  on  an  adequate  theory 
of  knowledge. 

The  present  work  was  completed  in  the  spring  of  19 13.     Since 


X  THE  PREFACE 

then  I  have  been  at  work  on  the  Categories.  These  Categories 
represent  the  framework  of  our  knowledge  about  the  universe  in 
which  we  live,  and  their  study  will  constitute  what  is  traditionally 
called  Metaphysics. 

I  wish  to  make  acknowledgment  to  my  wife  for  her  assistance  in 
proof-reading  and  for  many  helpful  suggestions  in  regard  to  the 
literary  side  of  the  work.  Every  philosophical  system  depends 
upon  the  thinkers  of  the  past  and  of  the  present.  Where  I  have  been 
able,  I  have  freely  acknowledged  my  indebtedness.  I  owe  much 
to  the  intellectual  atmosphere  in  which  I  have  lived  while  doing 
this  work  and  to  the  stimulus  given  by  my  colleagues  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Michigan  although  none  of  them  must  be  held  responsible 
for  any  of  the  views  herein  expressed. 

Roy  Wood  Sellars 
Ann  Arbor 

November^  IQ15 


r 


CRITICAL    REALISM 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  SETTING  OF  THE   PROBLEM: 
NATURAL  REALISM 

PHILOSOPHY  properly  begins  in  a  description  of  human 
experience.  It  must  give  close  attention  to  the  distinc- 
tions, meanings,  and  attitudes  which  are  characteristic  of 
man's  natural  view  of  the  world  in  which  he  lives.  Such  a 
preliminary  study  prepares  a  foundation  upon  which  the 
thinker  may  work.  He  is  aware  that  it  presents  an  organiza- 
tion of  experience  and  an  outlook  which  is  the  expression 
of  habits  and  judgments  slowly  formed  through  ages.  It  is 
the  part  of  wisdom,  then,  to  examine  this  gradually  developed 
view  of  nature  and  of  man  with  great  care  in  order  to  see  what 
its  principles  and  pre-suppositions  are  and  to  determine  how 
far  these  are  tenable.  Without  this  empirical  basis  and  with- 
out the  respect  for  the  accumulated  insight  of  multitudes  of 
human  beings  to  which  it  testifies,  the  thinker,  with  individ- 
ual perspective  founded  on  particular  problems  and  facts,  is 
very  apt  to  be  led  astray.  Reason  often  creates  difficulties 
instead  of  solving  them,  and  the  history  of  philosophy  bears 
witness  to  the  blind  vortices  into  which  genius  has  at  times 
thrown  thought.  The  advance  of  philosophy,  like  that  of 
science,  must  be  gradual,  and  the  starting-point  must  be  the 
experience  of  everyday  life. 

The  outlook  of  the  plain  man  on  the  world  is  realistic. 
He  perceives  what  he  calls  physical  things  and  reacts  to  them 
in  appropriate  ways.  He  believes  that  these  physical  things 
are  experienced  in  much  the  same  manner  by  all  normal  hiunan 
beings  and  that  they  are  evidently  independent,  for  their 
properties  and  existence,  of  man's  experience  of  them.  All 
workers  see  and  handle  the  tools  which  are  necessary  for  co- 
operation.    Sailors  pull  on  the  same  rope;  the  farmer  and  his 


2  CRITICAL  REALISM 

helpers  load  the  same  wagon  with  sheaves  of  wheat  or  barley 
grown  on  a  field  which  has  been  tilled  by  them  year  after  year; 
factory  "hands"  who,  for  a  pittance,  tend  the  whirring 
machinery  day  after  day,  would  laugh  at  the  suggestion  that 
it  is  less  real  than  they  who  are  its  servants.  But  why 
multiply  examples?  To  none  of  us  does  this  outlook  seem 
strange.  Stars,  rivers,  moimtains,  tenements,  street-cars, 
books — to  enimierate  things  at  haphazard — are  all  con- 
sidered objects  which  exist  in  a  common  world  to  which  we 
must  adapt  ourselves.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
these  general  distinctions  are  universal  with  the  himian  race, 
although  the  properties  assigned  to  particular  classes  of  things 
vary  greatly  from  age  to  age. 

The  physical  world  is,  then,  regarded  not  only  as  common 
to  the  experiencing  of  all  individuals  but  also  as  independent, 
for  its  existence  and  nature,  of  the  individuals  who  experience 
it.  It  is  probable  that  the  commonness  of  the  objects  is  con- 
sidered a  result  of  their  independent  existence.  You  and  I 
perceive  the  same  tree  because  it  is  there  to  be  perceived. 
Commonness  is  the  inevitable  consequence  of  a  relation  of 
two  persons,  capable  of  perceiving,  to  the  selfsame  existence. 
This  would  be,  at  least,  the  plain  man's  explanation  of  the 
fact  of  commonness.  As  we  shall  have  occasion  to  note  in 
another  connection,  commonness  and  independence  have, 
from  the  genetic  point  of  view,  a  more  intimate  relation  than 
this  explanation  indicates ;  they  grow  up  together  and  reenf orce 
each  other.  But  common  sense  is  not  necessarily  aware  of 
the  motives  and  processes  which  lie  back  of  its  outlook  and 
make  it  possible.  Within  the  world  of  common  sense,  it  is 
more  natural  to  make  the  commonness  of  things  a  result  of 
their  independence  than  their  independence  a  result  of  their 
commonness.  When  I  am  alone  in  my  study  I  see  things 
which  I  regard  as  independent  and  as  real  as  I  myself.  At 
the  time,  they  are  not  common,  for  others  do  not  see  them. 
Commonness  thus  seems  to  be  a  secondary  characteristic  of 
objects  added  to  their  independence.  When  we  examine 
what  the  plain  man  means  by  "seeing"  or  "perceiving,"  we 
find  that  this  is  of  the  nature  of  an  event  in  which  the  object 
is  revealed  to  the  individual.     And  when  we  ask  what  is  meant 


NATURAL  REALISM  3 

by  the  term  "independence,"  we  find  that  it  signifies  that 
physical  things  are  as  real  as  the  individual  who  perceives 
them  and  that  he  can  affect  them  only  by  overt  action, 
much  as  one  thing  affects  anotherj 

That  the  point  of  departure  is  tlie  supposedly  independent 
thing,  is  made  still  more  evident  when  we  examine  the  plain 
man's  explanation  of  the  changes  which  occur  in  his  expe- 
riences of  the  same  thing.  These  are  accounted  for  by  changes 
in  his  relations  to  these  objects.  His  experiences  are  func- 
tions of  the  unvarying  object  in  its  varying  relations  to  him- 
self as  a  perceiver.  Again,  when  an  object  is  no  longer  seen, 
it  is  not  supposed  that  it  has  ceased  to  exist.  Physical  things 
are  thought  of  as  permanent,  just  as  individuals  are,  to  the 
degree  determined  by  their  nature  and  causal  connections. 
It  is  from  these  assumptions  as  a  basis  that  we  explain  their 
appearance  and  disappearance  in  our  field  of  vision.  When 
I  leave  my  study,  I  take  it  for  granted  that  the  desk  will 
remain  such  as  it  was  while  I  was  there  to  perceive  it.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  everything  countenances  this  belief,  which 
is  at  the  bottom  of  the  plain  man's  view  of  the  world,  that 
things  are  existences  which  we  perceive  but  which  are  quite 
independent  of  this  event.  Berkeley  may  consider  this 
belief  the  height  of  abstraction,  but  even  the  most  mediocre 
mind  so  views  nature.  We  start  from  independent  things, 
and  not  from  percepts. 

This  attitude  toward  the  physical  world,  in  which  it  is 
considered  independent  of  the  event  of  perceiving  and  hence 
common,  may  be  called  that  of  Natural  Realism.  Natural 
Realism  is  a  growth,  as  we  shall  see  later,  but  the  plain  man 
is  not  aware  of  the  logical  and  factual  motives  which  have  led 
him  to  this  position.  The  view  is  based  on  the  exigencies  of 
biological  and  practical  life  and  is  as  natural  to  us  as  are  our 
instincts.  Man  is  outward-looking:  perception  as  an  event 
or  act  has  an  immediate  object,  and  this  is  the  physical  thing 
which  exists  in  a  common,  independent  sphere  whose  general 
characteristics  are  fairly  well  known.  While  the  conditions 
of  this  act  or  event  are,  to  some  extent,  matters  of  general 
information,  they  are  seldom  reflected  upon,  and  the 
event  itself  remains  unique.     This  uniqueness  and  apparent 


4  CRITICAL  REALISM 

directness  of  perception  is  expressed  in  common  parlance  in 
the  phrase,  "Open  your  eyes  and  you  cannot  help  seeing."  It 
is  evident  that  the  object  with  its  associated  meanings  and  the 
attitude  which  it  evokes  dominates  the  individual.  This 
dominant  role  played  by  the  object  is  all  the  more  inevitable 
that  perception  does  not  usually  involve  a  consciously  strained 
attention.  Accordingly,  grant  the  nature  of  the  physical 
thing  perceived,  in  the  context  of  normal  tendencies  and 
dispositions,  and  any  working  view  other  than  Natural 
Realism  is  improbable.  The  individual  perceives  things,  and 
not  percepts. 

This  general  description  is  true  of  Natural  Realism  in  the 
primary  or  uncritical  form  in  which  it  is  the  matrix  of  realistic 
theories  of  all  sorts.  No  reflective  theory  of  the  nature  of  the 
event  which  is  called  perceiving,  or  experiencing,  an  object  is 
as  yet  developed.  Certainly,  there  is  no  intuition  of  a  peculiar 
ego  or  subject  as  the  seat  of  this  event.  What  would  be 
insisted  upon,  first  of  all,  is  the  presence  of  the  object  to  the 
individual.  We  see  what  is  around  us  and  the  we,  who  see 
these  things,  are  concrete  individuals.  There  is  nothing 
recondite  or  mysterious  about  the  individual  who  perceives. 
To  these  things  we  can  assume  various  attitudes  accord- 
ing to  our  interests.  We  may  simply  observe  them  or  we 
may  handle  them;  but,  all  the  while,  they  are  out  there  as  real 
as  ourselves.  Furthermore,  their  relations  and  properties 
are  unchanged  by  our  perception  of  them.  We  take  them 
unawares,  so  to  speak.  We  are  to  them  as  Fortunatus  in  the 
fairy  story  with  his  cap  of  darkness.  They  enter  into  no 
peculiar  relation  to  the  perceiver  but  are  rather  flooded  with 
light  and  rendered  visible.  Natural  Realism,  in  the  form 
in  which  it  is  a  true  description  of  our  ordinary  outlook  on 
nature,  is  a  flat  epistemological  dualism  in  which  there  is  no 
peculiar,  non-physical  relation  between  the  individual  and 
the  object — the  two  terms  of  the  dualism.  And  the  term, 
epistemological,  can  be  used  here  only  by  courtesy,  since 
the  personal  pole  is  the  concrete  individual  and  not  an  abstract 
subject  or  centre  of  awareness.  The  individual,  as  one  thing 
among  others,  has  simply  the  ability  to  take  in  these  other 
things  along  with  himself.     We  shall  find  these  facts,   the 


NATURAL  REALISM  5 

absence  of  any  peculiar  ego  and  of  any  unique  perceptual  or 
cognitive  relation,  of  great  significance  for  theory  of  knowl- 
edge. Let  us  remember,  however,  that  we  possess  in  descrip- 
tive Natural  Realism,  not  a  theory  of  what  takes  place,  but  a 
statement  of  what  appears  to  take  place. 

It  is,  perhaps,  at  this  point  that  we  can  best  understand  the 
objections  which  the  plain  man — and  I  hope  others — takes 
to  Berkeley's  principles.  Does  not  Berkeley  assume  a  stand- 
point different  from  the  natural  one  and  argue  from  it  as 
though  it  were  the  natural  one?  In  other  words,  is  he  not 
perilously  near  what  is  called  begging  the  question?  He 
admits  {Principles  oj  Human  Knowledge,  sees.  4  and  5) 
that  it  is  "an  opinion  strangely  prevailing  amongst  men  that 
houses,  mountains,  rivers,  and,  in  a  word,  all  sensible  objects 
have  an  existence,  natural  or  real,  distinct  from  their  being 
perceived  by  the  understanding. ' '  This  is  a  correct  description 
of  what  we  have  designated  Natural  Realism.  Berkeley 
asserts,  however,  that  this  position  involves  a  manifest  con- 
tradiction. "For  what  are  the  fore-mentioned  objects  but 
the  things  we  perceive  by  sense?  And  what  do  we  perceive 
besides  our  own  ideas  or  sensations?"  Evidently,  Berkeley 
assumes  it  beyond  question  that  we  perceive,  not  things,  but 
sensations  or  psychical  elements  concreted  together.  It 
follows  that  he  has  substituted  idealism  for  the  meanings  and 
attitude  of  Natural  Realism,  and  has  argued,  with  this 
substitution  as  a  basis,  that  things  cannot  exist  apart  from  the 
act  of  perception.  Thus,  he  creates  a  contradiction  in  the 
plain  man's  outlook  which  did  not  exist  in  it  before.  It  may 
be  that  idealism  is  right,  that  objects  are  nothing  but  our 
ideas;  but  do  we  so  consider  them?  Berkeley's  claim  that 
things  are  nothing  but  sensations  forces  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge upon  us.  It  does  not,  however,  prove  idealism,  for  the 
reason  that  it  disregards  the  demands  of  cognition  because  they 
seem  to  him  to  involve  abstraction.  His  fear  of  abstractions 
prevented  him  from  examining  thoroughly  the  structure  and 
distinctions  characteristic  of  cognition. 

We  have  already  given  reasons  for  the  belief  that  the  thinker 
should  start  from  the  standpoint  of  Natural  Realism.  Let  us 
look  at   this   point   a  little   more   closely.     Philosophy   is   a 


6    •  CRITICAL  REALISM 

product  of  reflection.  Consequently,  it  arises  in  an  experience 
already  organized.  Its  task  is,  therefore,  set  by  the  diffi- 
culties, within  this  characteristic  organization,  which  have 
called  it  forth.  To  separate  these  conflicts  from  the  context 
in  which  they  have  arisen  is  assuredly  bad  method.  If  they 
lead  us  beyond  the  standpoint  in  which  they  developed,  good; 
but  we  have  no  right  to  cut  ourselves  loose  from  this  stand- 
point in  any  arbitrary  fashion.  Our  aim  should  be  to  remodel 
it  and  not  simply  to  negate  it.  It  is  in  this  respect  that 
Berkeley's  method  must  fall  under  our  condemnation.  Instead 
of  an  immanent  criticism  of  the  structure  and  meanings  of 
experience,  he  offers  an  airy  hypothesis  of  a  theological  char- 
acter. We  shall  see  that  his  criticism  of  Locke's  notion  of 
substance  was  valuable,  although  he  drew  the  wrong  con- 
clusion from  it.  His  sensationalism,  the  influence  of  Locke, 
and  his  dislike  of  naturalism  amply  account  for  the  direction 
which  his  own  construction  took.  He  did  not  distinguish 
clearly  enough  between  perception  and  knowledge  and  was, 
therefore,  led  to  regard  his  critique  of  Natural  Realism  and  of 
the  Lockian  notion  of  substance  as  completely  covering  all 
forms  of  realism.  Time  has  brought  a  more  adequate  analysis 
of  the  structure  and  implications  of  experience  and  has  at 
last  made  possible  a  more  critical  form  of  realism  than  any 
of  those  which  Berkeley  attacked. 

Natural  Realism  as  a  description  of  the  plain  man's  out- 
look on  nature  is  beyond  dispute.  We  have  seen  the  idealist, 
Berkeley,  testify  unwillingly  to  its  presence.  It  would  be  an 
easy  matter  to  point  out  passages  in  Hume  which  also  bear 
witness  to  it.  {Treatise,  p.  202,  Selby-Bigge  edition.)  It 
may  be  that  we  have  spent  too  much  time  in  making  its 
general  tenets  clear,  since  it  is  supposed  to  be  the  ordinary 
view  of  the  world,  dominant  even  among  philosophers  when 
they  are  not  in  a  reflective  mood.  But  the  justification  of 
Natural  Realism  as  a  theory  of  knowledge  is  another  affair, 
and  appeal  to  the  experience  of  the  ordinary  man  is  beside 
the  point.  Many  facts  must  be  organized  in  relation  to  one 
another  and  many  conflicts  settled;  much  that  common  sense 
has  left  vague  and  in  obscurity  must  be  brought  into  the 
light  and  carefully  examined.     Accordingly,  the  task  is  one' 


NATURAL  REALISM  7 

for  the  trained  thinker.  It  is  a  mere  begging  of  the  question 
to  reassert  the  fact  to  be  explained  and  to  ignore  the  difficulties 
which  arise. 

It  is  not  without  bearing  upon  the  problem  to  note  how 
quickly  Natural  Realism  was  attacked  by  reflective  thought. 
Were  there  no  fundamental  difficulties  for  it  to  face,  this 
would  surely  not  have  occurred — unless,  indeed,  it  be  assumed 
that  man's  mind  has  a  tendency  to  go  astray.  The  relativism 
of  Protagoras,  for  instance,  was  evidently  a  protest  against  the 
belief  that  objects  are  in  themselves  as  we,  the  individuals  or 
the  race,  perceive  them. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  more  weighty  reasons  which  have 
led  the  majority  of  modern  thinkers  to  assert  that  perception  is 
a  mediate  process  and  not  an  event  in  which  the  thing  is 
revealed  as  it  is.  Since  our  purpose  is  entirely  disinterested, 
the  method  we  shall  adopt  will  be  to  hear  what  the  critics  of 
Natural  Realism  have  to  say  in  attack  andTwhat  its  defenders 
can  say  in  defense.  The  result  should  at  least  be  a  realization 
of  the  problem  involved  in  perception. 

The  difficulties  which  I  wish  to  weigh  concern,  not  realism 
as  such,  but  Natural  Realism.  This  point  is  important  and 
should  be  marked,  because  idealists  persuade  themselves  very 
often  that  they  have  refuted  realism  when  they  have  only 
indicated  inadequacies  in  the  matrix  out  of  which  more 
critical  realisms  develop  under  the  pressure  of  facts  whose 
significance  is  realized  by  reflection.  These  inadequacies  and 
contradictions  concern  (i)  the  fact  that  perception  has  con- 
ditions which  do  not  appear  in  that  which  is  immediately 
perceived;  (2)  the  distinction  between  appearance  and  reality, 
a  distinction  which  is  held  by  the  plain  man  along  with  the 
immediacy  of  perception,  although  the  two  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled; (3.)  the  lack  of  concomitant  variation  between  things 
and  that  which  is  actually  perceived;  (4)  the  difference 
between  the  perceptions  of  individuals;  (5)  the  explanation  of 
images,  dream-life,  and  memory;  (6)  the  synthetic  or  com- 
posite character  of  that  which  is  perceived  and  the  presence 
in  it  of  inferential  elements.  We  shall  take  up  these  topics 
in  the  foregoing  order. 

Perception  has  conditions  which  do  not  appear  in  that  which 


8  CRITICAL  REALISM 

is  immediately  perceived.  Can  we  reconcile  the  existence  of 
these  conditions  with  the  plain  man's  view  that  the  object 
reveals  itself  as  it  is  in  spite  of  intervening  space?  Perception 
seems  to  involve  mediatory,  causal  processes,  yet  it  claims  to 
be  immediate.  Now  the  most  natural  division  of  these 
mediatory  processes  can  be  made  with  reference  to  the  body. 
They  are  external  to  the  body,  or  internal.  Although  these 
processes  are  continuous,  it  will  be  best  to  consider  them 
separately. 

External  mediation  of  perception  is  quite  evident  in  the 
case  of  seeing,  of  hearing,  of  smelling,  and  of  the  sense  of 
temperature.  Even  common  sense  has  long  been  aware  of 
this  fact,  although  the  knowledge  has  not  led  it  to  alter  its 
assumption  that  the  object  itself  is  perceived.  Science  has 
so  completely  studied  the  nature  of  these  mediatory  processes 
which  lead  to  the  stimulation  of  the  sense-organs  that  skepti- 
cism of  their  existence  seems  misplaced.  We  must  remember 
that  science  is  itself  based  on  perception  and  that  its  observa- 
tions are  more  systematic  than  those  of  common  life.  The 
object  appears  to  be  one  of  the  conditions  of  its  own  percep- 
tion. As  we  shall  see,  this  position  gets  us  into  spatial  and 
temporal  difficulties  which  are  insoluble  so  long  as  we  identify 
the  object  with  that  which  is  perceived.  How,  then,  can  that 
view  be  right  which  assumes  that  objects  display  themselves 
to  the  individual  immediately  and  as  they  are?  Let  us 
remember  that  the  plain  man  does  not  assert  a  duplication  of 
object  and  corresponding  percept,  but  believes  that  he  is 
aware  directly  of  the  physical  thing.  Hume  was  alive  to  this 
fact,  and  his  criticism  of  the  "philosophical  hypothesis"  is 
based  in  large  measure  on  it .  This  ' '  philosophical  hypothesis , ' ' 
it  will  be  remembered,  consists  in  the  assumption  that  thing 
and  percept  are  numerically  different  yet  resemble  each  other. 
{CJ.  Treatise,  p.  202.) 

The  internal  medium  must  also  affect  that  which  is  per- 
ceived. What  the  observer  perceives  depends  on  the  focaliza- 
tion  of  the  eye  and  is  to  that  extent  its  function.  The  part 
played  by  the  retina  and  the  nervous  system  must  also  be 
considered,  so  that,  to  the  external  conditions,  these  internal 
ones  must  be  added.     The  defender  of  Natural  Realism  may 


NATURAL  REALISM  9 

seek  to  discount  the  internal  factors  by  a  theory  of  passive 
transmission.  But  where  is  the  scientific  basis  for  such  a 
view?  Are  not  the  optic  nerve  and  brain  as  real  as  other 
physical  things?  If  atmospheric  conditions  affect  color,  why 
should  not  they  likewise?  We  do  not  notice  their  influence 
and  are  not  able  to  discount  it  because  they  are  always  with  us. 

What  the  critical  protagonist  of  Natural  Realism  seems 
forced  to  admit  is  that  he  sees  a  portion  of  the  world  selected 
by  the  position  of  his  body  and  the  focalization  of  his 
eyes  and  somehow  brought  to  a  focus  by  the  brain. 
However,  this  is  not  what  the  plain  man  believes  that 
he  perceives.  He  would  certainly  not  thank  his  defender 
if  that  individual  told  him  that  what  he  actually  per- 
ceived were  temporary  "sets"  in  the  brain.  And  I  am  sure 
that  we  could  not  blame  common  sense  for  rejecting  /this 
conclusion.  It  is  diametrically  opposed  to  the  outlook  on  the 
world  which  it  has  built  up.  Far  from  being  that  which  is 
perceived,  the  brain  is  a  physical  thing  which  is  seldom,  if 
ever,  perceived  by  the  mass  of  men.  In  truth,  the  majority 
of  men  hardly  know  of  its  existence ;  they  secure  their  informa- 
tion of  it  indirectly  and  on  the  basis  of  other  things.  To 
affirm  that  men  pass  their  time  observing  the  condition 
caused  in  their  brain  by  the  rest  of  the  physical  world  is  hardly 
less  palatable  than  idealism,  and  yet,  to  what  other  conclusion 
can  we  come  if  we  persist  in  holding  the  view  that,  in  per- 
ception, physical  objects  are  immediately  revealed?  We 
begin  with  the  belief  that  the  physical  object  seen  is  out- 
side the  body  and  we  end  with  the  proof,  if  not  the  conviction, 
that  what  we  do  actually  perceive  immediately  is  the  brain  as 
it  is  affected  by  the  outside  world  through  the  sense-organs 
and  nerves.  And  such  a  conclusion  has  all  the  marks  of  a 
reductio  ad  absurdum.  The  physical  world  with  which  the 
plain  man  starts  with  such  assurance  disappears  into  the  part 
of  it  with  which  he  is  least  acquainted. 

We  may  be  told,  however,  that  this  conclusion  does  not  at 
all  follow  unless  it  be  assumed  that  the  complex  or  object-in- 
its-setting  which  is  immediately  perceived  be  located  in  the 
brain.  There  is  another  possibility.  The  terminus  ad  quern 
of  the  complex  may  be  the  object,  and  not  the  brain.    What  we 


lo  CRITICAL  REALISM 

perceive  is  the  object  in  its  surroundings,  and  the  body  enters 
as  simply  an  important  part  of  these  surroundings.  Un- 
fortunately, science  has  shown  that  the  object  which  common 
sense  assumes  is  perceived  is  the  terminus  a  quo,  and  not  the 
terminus  ad  quem.  Light  passes  from  the  object  to  the  eye 
and  takes  time  in  its  passage;  the  same  is  true  of  sound.  We 
shall  have  occasion  to  show  that  this  time-interval  proves 
beyond  doubt  that  the  percept  arises  not  in  the  object  but  at 
the  brain.  In  line  with  this  direction  of  the  mediatory  proc- 
esses is  the  fact  that  the  body  is  concerned  in  perception,  not 
simply  as  a  body,  but  as  a  body  having  sense-organs  and  a 
peculiar  internal  structure.^  Other  things  influence  the  result 
because  they  reflect  light  or  intercept  it,  and  so  on;  but  the 
perceiver's  body  contributes  imique  internal  processes  of 
mediation,  and  this  internal  structure  seems  to  have  no  meaning 
unless  the  brain  be  the  terminus  ad  quem  of  the  total  conditions 
of  which  the  percept  is  a  fimction.  This  way  of  escape  does 
not  seem  open  to  the  Natural  Realist;  we  shall  not,  however, 
be  dogmatic,  but  shall  await  confirmation  from  a  study  of  the 
other  difficulties  which  confront  Natural  Realism. 

The  distinction  between  a  physical  thing  and  its  appearance 
to  the  individual  is  almost,  if  not  quite,  as  primitive  as  the 
view  that  perception  is  an  event  in  which  the  physical  thing 
reveals  itself;  yet  the  two  are  hostile  to  each  other.  The 
distinction  between  the  thing  and  its  appearance  meets  us  on 
every  hand.  When  examined  closely,  it  is  found  to  be  a 
popular  recognition  of  the  fact  that  objects  are  perceived 
differently  at  different  times  and  that  the  difference  is  not 
assignable  to  the  object.  When  I  approach  a  house,  what  I 
perceive  changes  continuously;  the  house  grows  larger  and 
I  can  see  details  which  were  not  at  first  apparent.  As  I  go 
away,  the  reverse  series  of  changes  occurs  in  what  I  perceive. 
Now  I  know  that  it  took  at  least  a  year  to  build  this  house 
and  that  it  has  a  stability  which  contradicts  these  changes. 
Moreover,    I    can    apply    a    test    through    my    ability    to 

1  It  is  this  direction  of  the  stimulus  which  makes  it  impossible  for  me  to  accept  the  position, 
held  by  Bergson  and  in  another  form  by  the  "  New  Realists."  that  the  i)ercept  is  a  selected  part 
of  the  physical  world.  I  am  unable  to  see  that  they  have  made  clear  the  mechanism  of  the  external 
reach  of  the  "selective  response"  to  which  they  appeal.  Is  this  not  the  reappearance  in  disguise 
of  the  mythological  doctrine  of  projection  which  they  rightly  condemn?  The  use  of  a  simile  like 
that  of  the  searchlight  is  surely  not  sufficient. 


NATURAL  REALISM  ii 

communicate  with  other  individuals.  They  inform  me  that 
the  house  did  not  change  at  all  either  while  I  was  approach- 
ing or  while  I  was  departing.  These  motives  reenforce  those 
already  present  in  my  natural  attitude  toward  physical 
things.  Hence,  instead  of  saying  that  things  change,  I  assert 
that  their  appearance  to  me  changes.  But  how  can  I  reconcile 
this  assertion  with  my  other  natural  belief  that,  in  perception, 
things  reveal  themselves  as  they  are?  When  is- the  moment  in 
my  approach  or  my  departure  that  the  thing  supplants  the 
appearance,  and  the  appearance  the  thing.  Since  I  am  aware 
of  no  such  mysterious  moment,  I  may  well  be  skeptical  of  its 
existence.  If  it  be  stated  that  there  is  a  standard  position  at 
which  this  occurs,  I  must  ask  if  it  is  the  same  for  all  and,  if 
not,  why  not?  Upon  investigation,  I  find  that  the  standard 
position  is  rather  arbitrary  and  is  not  founded  upon  any  change 
from  thing  to  appearance  but  upon  practical  advantages. 
The  suspicion  arises,  as  a  consequence,  that  the  individual 
perceives  only  the  appearances  of  a  thing  and  never  the  thing 
itself.  When  this  suspicion  meets  the  information  which 
science  has  gathered  in  regard  to  the  mediatory  processes  which 
are  the  conditions  of  perception,  it  is  confirmed  in  its  skepticism 
of  Natural  Realism, 

Before  we  pass  on  to  the  other  inadequacies  in  Natural 
Realism,  let  us  consider  a  problem  which  arises  at  this  point. 
Are  appearances  physical  ?  If  so,  there  are,  at  least  in  potentia, 
an  infinite  number  of  appearances  for  each  physical  thing. 
Strictly  speaking,  each  thing  when  connected  with  an  indi- 
vidual can  beget  a  multitude  of  appearances,  and  this  multitude 
can  be  multiplied  by  the  number  of  individuals  who  perceive 
the  object.  Again,  are  these  appearances  temporary  or 
permanent  ?  If  temporary  and  physical,  we  have  the  develop- 
ment of  a  dualism  within  the  physical  world.  We  can  divide 
physical  things  into  two  classes:  those  which  are  relatively 
permanent  and  those  which  are  transient.  And  these  transient 
physical  things  seem  not  to  possess  any  causal  efficacy  nor 
to  be  able  to  enter  into  spatial  relations  with  the  other  class 
of  physical  things.  We  need,  I  think,  hardly  consider  the 
possibility  that  appearances  are  physical  and  permanent. 
They  cannot  be  in  the  space  where  they  appear  to  be,  for 


12  CRITICAL  REALISM 

that  is  already  preempted  by  the  primary  physical  thing.  To 
hold  that  they  exist  outside  the  body  is  not  possible  unless 
we  assume  that  two  physical  bodies  can  occupy  the  same 
space  at  the  same  time.  To  hold  that  they  exist  in  the  body 
seems  impossible  for  the  same  reason.  Appearances  are  thus 
rejected  by  the  physical  world.  When  we  remember  the 
facts  which  point  to  the  belief  that  percepts  are  functions 
of  the  brain  in  dynamic  relation  to  stimulating  complexes, 
the  suggestion  comes  to  mind  that  appearances  are  these 
percepts  and  that  they  must,  therefore,  be  connected  with 
the  brain.  But  how?  They  are  usually  larger  than  the 
brain,  and,  if  physical,  cannot  be  thought  of  as  inside  it,  for 
that  would  involve  a  geometrical  absurdity.  Either  the 
defender  of  Natural  Realism  must  play  fast  and  loose  with 
his  conception  of  the  physical,  or  appearances  cannot  be 
physical.  On  the  other  hand,  if  appearances  are  not  physical, 
do  we  not  have  new  difficulties?  Can  that  which  is  not 
physical  be  in  space  ?  And,  if  not  in  space,  can  it  be  connected 
with  physical  processes  as  their  function? 

Let  us  use  the  more  common  name  for  these  appearances 
and  call  them  percepts.  By  "percept"  we  shall  mean  only 
that  which  is  immediately  perceived  by  the  individual  and  we 
shall  not  allow  any  psychological  prejudice  to  creep  into  the 
term.  Another  expression  which  we  shall  use  as  synonymous 
with  * '  percept' '  is  * '  thing-experience. ' '  We  shall  also  continue 
to  assume  with  Natural  Realism  that  there  are  things  of 
which  these  percepts  are  somehow  the  appearances,  and  we 
shall  not  as  yet  inquire  too  curiously  how  we  can  know  about 
these  things  if  what  we  perceive  directly  are  percepts.  Evi- 
dently, Natural  Realism  is  breaking  down  as  regards  its  view 
that  perception  is  an  event  in  which  things  directly  reveal 
themselves.  That  there  are  things  we  have  not,  however, 
found  reason  to  doubt.  Our  arguments  to  show  the  inade- 
quacy of  Natural  Realism  are  based  upon  their  assumption. 

The  lack  of  concomitant  variation  between  percepts  and 
things  likewise  militates  against  the  supposition  that  they  are 
identical.  Professor  Stout  formulates  the  principle  thus:  "If 
anything  X  exhibits  variations  which  are  not  shared  by 
Y,  X  and  Y  must  be  distinct  existences."     Now  appearances 


NATURAL  REALISM  13 

do  vary  when  we  have  every  reason  to  beHeve  that  the  thing 
itself  does  not.  "This  table  appears  to  me  oblong,  while  I 
know  that  it  is  square.  All  that  is  required  in  order  to  notice 
variations  in  the  percept  which  we  judge  are  not  shared 
by  the  thing  is  a  little  training  in  introspection  or,  rather, 
the  ability  to  distinguish  between  what  we  actually  perceive 
and  what  we  judge  we  ought  to  see.  The  relative  proportions 
of  the  sides  of  objects  as  they  appear  to  us  in  our  percepts 
are  decidedly  different  from  the  proportions  as  determined 
by  measurement.  Now  this  divergence  can  be  explained 
by  the  laws  of  optics  if  we  grant  that  the  percept  is  not  identical 
with  the  thing.  The  position  of  the  body  and  its  distance 
from  the  object  to  which  we  refer  the  percept,  enter  as  the 
essential  factors  to  account  for  this  lack  of  concomitant 
variation.  We  are  confirmed  in  this  belief  when  we  note 
that  the  perspective  of  the  image  on  the  ground-glass  window 
of  a  camera  is  similar  to  that  of  our  percept  which  we  obtain 
by  looking  in  the  same  direction  as  that  in  which  the  camera 
is  pointed.  Many  other  variations  in  regard  to  color,  size, 
and  position  could  be  noted,  but  these  will  occur  readily  to 
the  mind  of  the  reader.  We  constantly  have  to  discount 
our  percepts  by  means  of  past  experience  in  order  not  to  be 
misled.  As  a  rule,  this  correction  comes  to  us  so  naturally 
that  we  are  hardly  conscious  of  it,  and  believe  that  we  perceive 
what  is  really  a  combination  of  percept  and  judgment.  Once 
our  attention  is  called  to  this  state  of  things,  however,  we 
can  separate  the  part  due  to  present  perceptual  factors  and 
the  part  due  to  past  experience.  More  and  more,  we  are 
forced  to  refuse  to  identify  thing  and  percept. 

In  our  account  of  concomitant  variation  we  have  thus  far 
paid  attention  mainly  to  spatial  and  qualitative  differences  be- 
tween the  thing  and  its  appearance ;  but  temporal  variations 
are  at  least  as  interesting  and  even  more  suggestive.  We  are 
informed  by  astronomers,  for  example,  that  a  star  which  we 
just  now  perceive  may  have  been  destroyed  years  ago,  so 
long  does  it  take  for  its  light  to  travel  to  us  through  inter- 
stellar space.  How,  then,  can  we  possibly  identify  our  percept 
with  the  star  itself  or  even  with  a  selected  part  of  it?  And 
science  is  led  to  this  calculation  by  experiences  which  cannot 


14  CRITICAL  REALISM 

otherwise  be  harmonized.  Again,  the  relations  between  our 
percepts  are  very  frequently  not  the  same  as  the  relations 
between  the  objective  occurrences  themselves.  Thunder 
succeeds  lightning  for  us,  but  we  are  certain  that  they  have 
their  birth  at  the  same  time.  These  differences  in  temporal 
order  can,  like  those  of  spatial  character,  be  accounted  for 
easily  by  reference  to  the  existence  of  mediatory  processes 
in  space  which  take  a  measurable  time  to  occur.  Always 
we  come  back  to  the  position  of  the  individual  in  relation  to 
other  things.  Since  Natural  Realism  cannot  be  skeptical  in 
regard  to  the  reality  of  spatial  position,  it  is  forced  to  testify 
against  its  own  possibility  and  to  furnish  the  basis  for  an 
explanation  of  that  which  occurs.  The  result  is  the  suggestion 
of  a  compromise :  things  are  there  where  we  judge  them  to  be, 
but  we  do  not  perceive  them.  Instead,  we  perceive  the 
percepts  causally  connected  with  them,  and  these  percepts 
are  spatially  and  temporally  more  directly  related  to  the 
brain  than  to  the  things  with  which  we  ordinarily  identify 
them. 

To  get  the  results  of  our  examination  of  the  facts  of  media- 
tion and  variation  at  their  lowest,  we  may  say  that  we  have 
shown  the  inadequacy  of  the  plain  man's  view  of  perception 
as  a  revelation  or  intuition.  If  we  still  hold  to  things,  we 
can  no  longer  identify  them  with  their  appearances  to  us  in 
perception.  Furthermore,  the  belief  is  arising  in  us  that 
the  appearances  of  things,  although  physically  mediated  and 
I  conditioned,  are  not  themselves  physical. 
^Z-  The  difference  between  the  perceptions  of  individuals  also 
/  -^points  to  the  individual  who  perceives  as  an  important  factor 
in  the  determination  of  what  is  perceived.  Yet  Natural  Real- 
ism in  its  pure  form  cannot  admit  this.  What  is  perceived 
is  for  Natural  Realism  a  thing,  and  not  a  function  of  various 
factors  which  achieve  their  pregnant  focus  in  the  individual. 
But  we  are  convinced  by  now  that  the  view  of  perception  as 
an  event  in  which  the  individual  is  essentially  passive  cannot 
be  maintained.  Thus  the  differences  between  the  percepts 
of  individuals  only  accentuate  a  conclusion  which  reflection 
forces  upon  us.  There  are  many  facts  besides  color  blindness 
which  lead  us  to  supoose  that  things  appear  differently  to 


NATURAL  REALISM  is 

individuals.  We  shall  have  occasion  to  enumerate  these  in  a 
later  chapter  and  to  consider  their  import;  at  present,  a 
general  indication  is  all  that  is  necessary.  For  instance,  the 
testimonies  of  witnesses  in  court  in  regard  to  an  event  of  which 
they  were  spectators  practically  always  conflict.  In  fact, 
too  great  agreement  is  looked  upon  by  the  judge  as  suspicious. 
These  conflicts  cannot  be  explained  away  as  merely  errors  in 
memory.  In  truth,  past  experience  and  the  interests  of  the, 
individual  seem  to  play  a  large  part  in  the  determination  of 
the  percept.  Hence,  we  are  forced  to  make  the  percept  a 
function  not  only  of  physical  conditions,  but  also  of  what,  in 
contrast,  are  usually  termed  mental  conditions.  Accidental 
associations,  even,  enter  as  determinants. 

When  these  personal  elements  in  perception  are  first 
recognized,  external  nature  seems  to  retreat  into  the  distance. 
Like  Narcissus,  we  see  our  own  reflections  and  are  not  aware 
that  they  are  oiu:  own.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  we  must 
go  beyond  present  physical  stimuli  to  account  for  percepts. 
The  past  is  somehow  active,  and  the  past  is  personal.  We 
cannot  account  for  many  of  the  characteristics  of  our  percepts 
by  appeal  to  the  ordinary,  physical  thing.  In  a  parallelogram 
of  forces,  physics  cannot  introduce  a  moment  which  was  but 
is  no  longer.  The  individual  stands  out  ever  more  clearly 
as  a  most  important  precondition  of  the  percept. 

But,  if  there  be  a  mental  element  in  the  percept,  how  can 
this  be  combined  with  what  Natural  Realism  must  regard  as 
the  physical  core  of  the  thing  ?  We  have  already  seen  definite 
reasons  to  doubt  the  physical  character  of  the  appearances  of 
things;  this  further  difficulty  will  surely  confirm  us  in  the 
doubt.  To  combine  what  Natural  Realism  itself  admits  to  be 
mental  with  the  physical,  and  reach  a  product  which  appears 
to  be  a  seamless  unity,  is  certainly  an  impossible  task.  The 
inner  sphere  of  consciousness  asserts  itself  as  a  constitutive 
element  in  what  at  first  claimed  to  be  physical.  And  I  do  not 
see  how  the  plain  man's  view  of  the  physical — or  the  scientist's 
either,  for  that  matter — can  admit  such  a  coalescence.  Yet 
the  presence  of  the  mental  factor  is  so  undeniable  that 
M.  Bergson,  for  instance,  speaks  of  the  union  of  memory  with 
the  pure  percept.    Training  and  insight  are  necessary  before  the 


i6  CRITICAL  REALISM 

pure  percept  can  be  recovered  from  the  sediment  deposited 
on  it  by  the  flow  of  the  spirit.  Truth,  so  far  as  the  percept 
is  concerned,  Ues  behind  us  instead  of  before  us.  I  fear  that 
the  antiquarian  often  constructs  as  well  as  recovers,  and 
M.  Bergson's  outlook  on  inorganic  nature  shows  evident  signs 
of  a  knowledge  of  mathematical  rationalism.  We  must, 
however,  again  remind  ourselves  that  he  does  not  start  with 
the  plain  man's  realism  but  with  a  realism  strangely  tinctured 
with  idealism.  He,  therefore,  experiences  less  difficulty  with 
the  coalescence  of  the  object  and  of  memory  elements  than 
would  otherwise  be  possible.  If,  however,  there  exist  insuper- 
able difficulties  for  the  view  that  percepts  are  in  things,  as  we 
have  tried  to  show,  his  compromise  does  not  seem  to  have 
an  adequate  basis. 
I  How  can  Natural  Realism  account  for  the  existence  of  images 
and  oj  memory?  If  perception  be  merely  an  event  in  which  the 
thing  reveals  itself,  can  it  be  supposed  to  leave  a  trace  of  its 
revelation  behind  ?  I  do  not  see  that  such  a  position  furnishes 
the  basis  for  an  explanation  of  memory  or  of  the  presence, 
under  the  individual's  control,  of  images.  If  percepts  are 
physical,  are  images  so  likewise?  And  where  can  they  exist? 
Now,  the  plain  man  does  not  for  a  moment  consider  images  to  be 
physical.  Here,  then,  is  another  inadequacy  in  his  position  of 
which  he  is  not  aware.  He  accepts  images  much  as  he  accepts 
physical  things  and  does  not  ask  too  curiously  how  they  are 
causally  or  existentially  related.  It  is  the  cognitive  value  of 
images  to  which  attention  is  almost  exclusively  paid.  So  far 
as  the  question  is  asked  in  his  hearing,  he  acquiesces  in  the 
view  usually  advanced  that  images  are  the  effects  of  the  action 
of  things  upon  the  mind.  But  this  involves  the  acceptance  of 
mediatory  processes,  as  we  have  already  indicated,  and  turns  us 
in  the  direction  of  no  longer  considering  perception  as  a  mere 
event  in  which  the  individual  is  passive.  There  is,  moreover, 
no  reason  to  assume — and  again,  common  sense  does  not 
assimie — that  images  and  memories  are  dimmer  presences 
when  objects  are  far  off.  They  are  too  much  under  our 
control  and  too  variable.  Berkeley,  who  claimed  to  represent 
the  plain  man,  saw  this  difference  and  emphasized  it  as  a  basic 
principle  in  his  philosophy.     He  does  not.  however,  give  a 


NATURAL  REALISM  17 

satisfactory  explanation  of  the  existence  of  images;  instead, 
he  takes  them  for  granted.  But  he  can  appeal  to  the  con- 
tinuity of  the  spirit  as  a  basis  for  memory.  So  long  as  per- 
ception is  merely  an  event,  and  the  thing,  physical,  this  cannot 
be  done.  Again,  if  we  suppose  images  to  be  under  the  direct 
control  of  physical  things  as  some  defenders  of  Natural  Realism 
do,  how  can  we  harmonize  this  with  the  well-known"  laws  of 
association,  retention,  and  reproduction? 

Again,  if  images  are  looked  upon  as  physical  creations 
which  linger  after  the  object  to  which  they  correspond  has 
disappeared  from  our  horizon  and  even  has  ceased  to  exist, 
they  must  be  subject  to  physical  laws.  Yet  it  seems  absurd 
to  apply  such  laws  as  those  of  gravitation  to  them.  Instead, 
psychological  laws  describe  their  behavior  and  control.  They 
are  essentially  private  and,  in  this  respect,  differ  from  primary 
physical  things.  Furthermore,  imagination  is  productive  as 
well  as  reproductive:  we  possess  and  create  synthetic  objects 
which  have  no  counterpart  in  nature.  Do  images,  like  chem- 
ical elements  combine  to  produce  something  new?  I  take  it 
to  be  obvious  that  common  sense  and  psychology  have  adopted 
the  simpler  classification  when  they  have  adjudged  images  to 
be  mental  and  personal.  The  query  which  then  remains  as  a 
stumbling-block  to  Natural  Realism  when  it  becomes  reflective 
is.  How  can  they  be  explained  unless  a  new  view  of  perception 
be  developed? 

Now,  common  sense  accepts  results  and  does  not,  as  a 
rule,  ask  how  they  are  possible.  For  instance,  perception  is 
somehow  clearer  each  time  that  we  see  an  object  and  the 
more  that  we  know  about  it — and  that  is  all.  Again,  the 
plain  man  gets  along  very  nicely  with  the  assumption  that  he 
can  somehow  pass  back  and  forth  between  things  and  ideas, 
between  the  world  out  there  and  thoughts  referred  more  or  less 
vaguely  to  the  body.  Dualism  there  is,  but  a  dualism  with 
no  terrors.  These  factors  are  somehow  present  together,  and 
they  can  be  attended  to  simultaneously  or  successively. 
Their  coexistence,  and  the  fact  that  the  attention  can  pass 
from  one  sphere  to  the  other,  does  not  itself  prove  that  they 
are  of  one  fundamental  kind;  rather,  it  suggests  what  other 
difficulties  have  forced  us  to  assume.     But  togetherness  is  not 


i8  CRITICAL  REALISM 

the  whole  story;  these  types  melt  into  one  another  and  merge 
their  being.  Ideas  join  with  that  which  is  perceived,  and  the 
new  body  which  arises  from  their  conjugation  faces  the 
individual  with  all  the  old  pride  of  independence.  Such 
effrontery  on  the  part  of  bodies  which  we  know  to  be  hybrids 
arouses  in  us  grave  doubts  of  the  primitive  character  of  the 
rest.  And  this  brings  us  to  the  last  contradiction  which 
confronts  Natural  Realism. 
/  Percepts  show  the  results  of  education  and  inference;  th,ey 

are  constructs  instead  of  passive  intuitions.  They  are  modifi- 
able in  new  situations  and  thus  keep  in  touch  with  things  under 
whose  control  they  always  remain  to  some  extent;  but  they 
have  a  history,  and  the  time-factor  is  necessary  for  their 
comprehension,  as  it  would  not  be  were  they  intuitions.  The 
sensational  nucleus,  namely,  that  which  can  be  accounted  for 
largely  by  the  immediate  relation  of  the  individual  to  the 
physical  complex  outside  the  body,  is  often — one  might 
venture  to  say  always  for  the  adult — a  minimum.  The 
percept  may  even  be  contrary  to  what  should  be  seen,  granted 
— what  Natural  Realism  admits — the  permanence  of  things. 
It  is  because  of  the  silent  and  unobtrusive  presence  of  these 
inferential  elements  in  the  percept  that  we  do  not  notice  the 
different  ways  in  which  the  same  thing  appears  to  us  at 
different  times  and  from  different  positions.  The  inferential 
elements  are  the  true  levelers  in  perception  and  thrust  the 
discordant  aspects  into  the  background  where  only  the  trained 
mental  eye  of  the  psychologist  can  discern  them.  To  see 
things  as  they  would  appear,  could  the  inferential  elements 
themselves  be  discounted,  is  the  task  also  of  the  painter.  What 
strange  stories  he  relates  of  the  "real"  appearances  of  land- 
scapes or  of  the  hurrying  throng  moving  through  the  narrow 
city  streets  lighted  by  sputtering  gas  jets!  He  removes  the 
pressure  towards  uniformity  and  definiteness  exerted  by  past 
experience  and  presents  to  us  what  he  asserts  we  could  see 
were  our  mental  vision  not  cramped  and  conventionalized. 
These  facts  prove  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  perception 
cannot  be  an  actus  purus  or  a  mere  unmediated  event.  The 
plain  man's  immediacy  breaks  down  before  the  analysis  which 
coordinated    reflection    on    the    facts    develops.     The    only 


NATURAL  REALISM  19 

rejoinder  which  the  defender  of  Natural  Realism  can  offer 
to  this  and  the  other  conflicts  which  arise  to  overwhelm  it 
is  that  the  internal  medium  is  more  effective  than  is  usually 
supposed.  To  admit  this  is,  however,  to  give  up  the  imme- 
diacy upon  which  Natural  Realism  prides  itself.  Even 
though  the  percept  be  physical,  it  cannot  be  identified  with  the 
object  which  only  partly  conditions  it. 

It  may  be  well  to  attack  the  immediacy  of  perception  from 
another  angle  in  order  to  discredit  it  completely;  otherwise, 
some  unacknowledged  belief  may  linger  to  act  as  traitor  to 
the  movement  of  the  argument.  Suppose  it  to  be  asserted 
that  an  inner  core  of  the  percept  can  be  rescued  from  its 
swathing  of  mental  factors  and  be  taken  as  a  part  or  aspect  of 
the  physical  thing,  what  shall  we  reply  to  such  an  assertion? 
We  need  only  repeat  the  arguments  in  regard  to  spatial  and 
temporal  differences,  mediation,  lack  of  concomitant  variation, 
and  individual  divergences,  which  we  have  examined  at  length, 
and  add  to  these  the  further  fact  that  the  physical  object  as 
we  believe  it  to  exist  and  as  the  plain  man  believes  it  to  exist 
cannot  be  reconstructed  from  a  physical  piecing  together  of 
the  percepts.  It  takes  but  little  reflection  to  realize  that,  if 
percepts  are  functions  of  the  position  of  the  individual,  they 
cannot  be  put  together  to  form  the  object  without  taking  this 
perspective  into  account.  The  percepts  which  I  obtain  by 
moving  around  a  house  would  not  fit  together  like  blocks  to 
form  the  house.  They  are  uncombinable  in  this  mechanical 
sense;  and  since,  if  they  are  physical,  a  spatial  combination  is 
the  only  one  conceivable,  we  can  infer  that  they  are  not  in  any 
literal  sense  parts  of  the  object.  Again,  as  we  move  from  a 
house,  we  obtain  a  very  large  number  of  successive  percepts  of 
the  same  side  of  the  house,  and  these  differ  from  one  another 
and  are  also  uncombinable.  No  object  in  the  world  could  be 
identical  with  them  and  harmonize  their  fundamental  dif- 
ferences in  contour,  size,  internal  relations,  and  shades  of  color. 
The  percept  hovers  between  the  individual  and  the  thing  and 
can  be  identified  with  neither;  it  seems  to  be  in  a  world  of  its 
own  which  has  other  laws  than  those  which  physical  things 
obey.  For  this  reason  it  is  called  mental.  Let  us  see  whether 
this   classification   lessens   the   difficulties.     If    percepts    are 


20  CRITICAL  REALISM 

mental,  they  are  not  spatially  coexistent,  nor  are  they  per- 
manent. Hence,  all  question  of  a  literal  combination  drops. 
If  organization  there  be,  it  is  of  that  non-physical  kind  which 
we  called  standardization,  and  which  is  historical  and  not 
spatial.  Questions  there  are  a-plenty  in  regard  to  the  nature 
and  laws  of  this  temporal  mediation,  but  they  are  not  flatly 
absurd,  as  are  those  which  confront  the  union  of  physical 
percepts.  Experience  is  cumulative  and  organic,  and  synthesis 
in  the  mental  world  admits  adaptations  which  the  physical 
could  not  permit. 

Our  study  of  the  inadequacies  and  conflicts  which  confront 
Natural  Realism  is  completed.  While  the  points  have  been 
taken  up  only  in  outline,  their  cumulative  effect  is,  I  believe, 
irresistible.  Perception  cannot  be  an  event  in  which  physical 
things  are  present  to  the  individual  as  they  are.  That  which 
is  present  to  the  individual  is  a  function  of  many  conditions 
and  must  be  considered  ment^P  and  not  physical.  What, 
then,  shall  we  do?  Because  the  theory  of  perception  implicit 
in  Natural  Realism  is  found  to  be  erroneous,  must  we  give  up 
the  realistic  distinctions  and  meanings  which  accompany  it? 
When  we  come  to  examine  our  results  from  this  standpoint, 
we  find  that  the  physical  thing,  while  no  longer  present  in 
perception,  is  assumed  as  one  of  the  conditions  of  that  which 
is  perceived.  But  that  which  conditions  must  be  as  real  as 
that  which  is  conditioned.  The  physical  thing  is  still  there; 
if  it  is  not  perceived,  how  is  it  known?  We  have  in  no  sense 
freed  ourselves  from  the  realistic  distinctions  and  meanings. 
The  question  which  we  must  seriously  ask  ourselves  is  this: 
Can  a  theory  of  knowledge  be  achieved  which  will  do  justice 
to  these  realistic  distinctions  and  meanings  and  yet  not  be  open 
to  the  objections  which  have  proved  fatal  to  Natural  Realism  ? 
Evidently,  a  theory  of  knowledge  and  not  merely  of  perception 
would  be  required  to  accomplish  this  result.  In  some  sense, 
perception  would  have  to  be  subordinate  to  knowledge. 
Too  often  the  bankruptcy  of  Natural  Realism  has  been 
regarded  as  merely  the  opportunity  of  idealism.  This  attitude 
has  prevented  systematic  and  persevering  attempts  at  the 
formation  of  a  theory  of  knowledge  which  would  admit  the 

1  To  clear  up  the  various  meanings  of  this  term  will  be  an  important  part  of  our  task. 


NATURAL  REALISM  21 

mental  nature  of  the  percept  and  yet  maintain  that  knowledge 
uses  the  percept  for  its  own  greater  purposes.  The  task  which 
yet  remains  in  our  critical  examination  of  Natural  Realism 
is  to  consider  the  modifications  in  it  introduced  by  science. 
This  inquiry  will  be  found  to  further  our  larger  design. 


CHAPTER   II 

NATURAL   REALISM   AND   SCIENCE 

SCIENCE,  so  long  as  it  is  not  influenced  by  any  phil- 
osophy save  its  own  half -conscious  sort,  does  not  differ 
markedly  in  its  outlook  from  common  sense.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  the  beginner  in  science  is  unaware  of  any  revo- 
lutionary change  in  his  attitude  toward  nature.  The  ideal 
of  knowledge  is  higher,  the  methods  used  are  more  exact, 
the  information  obtained  fuller,  the  purpose  more  complex 
and  impersonal;  but,  when  all  is  said,  the  object  of  reference 
arid  our  attitude  toward  it  have  not  changed.  We  still  regard 
nature  as  common  and  as  independent  of  our  consciousness 
of  it. 

When  the  science  whose  study  is  taken  up  is  concrete, 
the  passage  to  it  from  the  attitude  and  distinctions  of  common 
sense  is  most  markedly  without  a  break.  Scarcely  any  read- 
justment of  outlook  is  necessary;  the  material  is  richer  and 
new  facts  and  principles  are  added,  but  the  familiar  context  is 
developed  rather  than  revolutionized.  Common  sense  has  its 
explanations  and  theories,  but  these  are  distanced  by  the 
patient  investigations  of  science,  and  their  inadequacies  are 
pointed  out.  Nature  is  put  under  a  microscope  and  we  are 
prepared  to  see  its  appearance  transformed.  We  expect  to 
discover  relations  and  processes  more  fundamental  than  those 
which  reveal  themselves  to  the  naked  eye.  Still,  this  analysis 
goes  on  within  the  outlines  of  what  remains  to  us  a  world 
perceivable  by  all.  When  the  sciences  studied  are  more 
abstract, — physics  and  chemistry  for  example, — the  customary 
view  of  nature  tends  to  tmdergo  certain  very  interesting 
modifications.  The  basic  meanings  which  characterize  nature 
persist  —  things  are  still  looked  upon  as  common  and  inde- 
pendent; but  nature  itself  is  stripped  of  many  of  its  qualities 
and  presents  a  new  appearance  to  the  mental  eye.  Strictly 
speaking,  it  has  become  more  a  correlate  of  conception  than  of 
perception.  It  is  extremely  interesting,  in  the  case  of  students, 
to  observe  the  gradual  way  in  which  the  secondary  qualities 

22 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  23 

move  from  nature.  Long  after  they  have  understood  the 
readjustment  which  seeks  to  account  for  the  secondary  quaH- 
ties,  like  color  and  sound  and  fragrance,  as  sensation-qualities 
causally  connected  with  disturbances  in  the  air  or  the  ether, 
or  with  chemical  processes  set  up  in  the  nerves,  the  real  world 
remains  colored  and  sonorous  to  them.  Atoms  and  electrons 
and  ether  vibrations  differ  too  radically  from  the  world  as 
they  have  been  accustomed  to  perceive  and  to  conceive  it 
to  have  power  to  substitute  themselves  at  once  for  the  every- 
day view.  The  new  outlook  does  not  readily  acquire  a 
reality-feeling.  The  mind  experiences  a  sort  of  homesickness 
in  the  presence  of  this  new  nature.  It  is  because  of  this 
temporary  alienness  that  the  modifications  in  Natural  Realism 
introduced  by  the  physical  sciences  are  not  more  acutely 
realized.  However,  even  through  these  changes  to  which 
the  more  abstract  sciences  have  been  led  from  motives  and 
problems  which  have  arisen  inevitably  in  their  growth,  the 
skeleton  of  Natural  Realism  persists.  Nature  is  still  bathed 
in  the  meanings  of  independence,  commonness,  perdurableness 
and  causal  relation.  Moreover,  the  attitude  of  intuition  still 
lingers;  the  scientist  is  often  nearly  as  outward-looking  as 
the  plain  man. 

Let  us  glance  at  the  distinctions  common  to  science  and 
enlightened  common  sense.  These  may  be  stated  as  follows: 
(i)  There  are  two  fields  of  experience,  the  external,  or  physical, 
and  the  inner,  or  psychical.  (2)  The  external  world  is  composed 
of  things  and  processes  in  space  and  time.  (3)  These  processes 
and  things  are  describable  and  behave  according  to  knowable 
laws.  (4)  The  external  world  is  known  by  the  plurality  of  minds 
which  constitute  the  inner,  or  psychical,  world.  (5)  These  minds 
are  joined  to  bodies  which  are  parts  of  the  external  world. 

These  distinctions  which  form  the  framework  of  scientific 
realism  are  evidently  vague  and  only  roughly  worked  out 
as  they  stand.  They  are  like  glimpses  of  a  mountainous 
country  seen  through  a  wind-broken  mist.  The  how  of  the 
knowledge  of  the  physical  realm  possessed  by  these  minds  is 
not  clear.  Undoubtedly,  the  old  intuitionalism  of  common 
sense  lingers;  the  fact  of  knowledge  dominates  over  its  nature 
and    means    of    attainment.     For    instance,    one    writer    on 


24  CRITICAL  REALISM 

science,  who  is  also  a  scientist  of  some  standing,  speaks  of  the 
senses  as  channels  through  which  information  is  somehow 
poured. 

Again,  there  are  usually  rather  imclear  ideas  as  to  what 
laws  of  nature  are.  Are  they  descriptions  or  governing 
forces?  Thus  we  could  continue  to  point  out  problems,  taking 
these  distinctions  as  our  text,  and  find  that  neither  common 
sense  nor  science  has  very  definite  notions  of  its  assumptions. 
But  I  do  not  wish  to  leave  the  impression  that  science  is  on 
the  same  level  as  common  sense;  its  ideas  are  much  more 
developed  and  it  has  worked  out  points  of  view  and  made 
analyses  which  the  plain  man  cannot  understand.  Probably 
the  science  of  mechanics  illustrates  this  divergence  better  than 
the  more  concrete  sciences  which  keep  nearer  to  perception. 
Let  us  briefly  examine  the  history  and  the  axioms  of  mechan- 
ics in  order  to  bring  out  the  advance  of  scientific  analysis 
over  that  of  common  sense. 

Everyone  admits  to-day  that  geometry  had  its  origin  in 
experience.  Many  of  the  propositions  which  geometricians 
prove  deductively  on  the  basis  of  certain  axioms  and  postulates 
were  discovered  empirically.  It  was  taught  at  Babylon  that 
the  side  of  a  regular  hexagon  is  equal  to  the  radius  of  the  circle 
in  which  it  is  inscribed.  This  was  not  proved  in  the  strict 
mathematical  sense  until  the  Greeks  rationalized  geometry; 
it  was  merely  found  to  be  the  case  by  observation  and  measure- 
ment. Now,  geometry  became  a  rational  science  long  before 
mechanics.  The  reason  for  this  is  interesting  and  concerns 
our  problem.  The  axioms  of  geometry  arise  from  mankind's 
experience  with  solids.  Distances  and  contours  are  passive 
and  measurable  and  recur  constantly  in  our  perception  of  the 
external  world.  Spatial  relations,  because  of  their  universality 
and  definiteness,  crystallize  out  from  the  qualitative  mani- 
fold in  which  they  are  embedded.  Soon,  under  the  guidance 
of  abstraction  and  idealization,  they  become  the  framework, 
or  skeleton,  of  our  conception  of  the  physical  universe.  There 
is  no  break  with  perception,  and,  consequently,  the  axioms  of 
geometry  which  represent  the  most  universal  characteristics 
of  this  resultant  space  seem  to  have  a  basis  of  an  almost 
instinctive  nature.     The  axioms  of  mechanics,  on  the  other 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  25 

hand,  as  M.  Painleve  points  out,  gave  rise  to  the  most  im- 
passioned controversies  as  late  as  two  and  a  half  centuries 
ago,  are  unknown  to  the  mass  of  men  even  to-day,  and  are 
often  wrongly  understood  by  those  who  use  them.  Mechanics 
deals  mainly  with  movement,  and  movement  is  not  easily 
seized  and  analyzed.  "Far  from  imposing  themselves  on 
our  senses  as  the  properties  of  solids  do,  the  fimdamental 
laws  of  movements  could  be  reached  only  by  an  already 
developed  technique,  experimental  and  mathematical  in 
character."  (Painleve,  De  la  Methode  dans  les  Sciences, 
p.  369.)  The  controversy  between  the  scholastics  and  the 
disciples  of  Copernicus  illustrates  very  well  the  conceptual 
level  upon  which  modem  mechanics  is  founded.  The  scho- 
lastics held  to  the  principle  of  inertia.  They  argued  that  any 
material  element  at  an  infinite  distance  from  other  elements 
is  necessarily  at  rest.  The  Copemicans,  on  the  contrary, 
maintained  that  such  an  element  would  keep  its  velocity. 
Another  point  of  importance  is  the  fact  that  mechanics  seeks 
to  work  out  a  system  of  absolute  references  and  standards  of 
measurements  to  enable  it  to  overcome  the  relativity  of 
perception.  The  result  is  a  reordering  of  immediate  experi- 
ence which  the  plain  man  can  by  no  means  follow.  Any 
teacher  of  physics  will  inform  one  how  hard  it  is  to  get  the 
students  to  understand  the  definitions  and  distinctions  which 
are  so  basic  in  his  science.  Thus  science  makes  definite 
advances  over  common  sense  while  it  retains  the  realistic 
structure  characteristic  of  man's  natural  outlook  upon  his 
world. 

When,  however,  science  turns  back  on  itself  and  begins 
to  reflect  on  the  methods  by  which  its  knowledge  of  the 
physical  world  is  achieved,  it  is  forced  to  reject  the  intui- 
tionalism of  Natural  Realism.  The  part  played  by  the  mind 
and  the  indirect  way  in  which  knowledge  is  gradually  built 
up  awaken  skepticism,  and  the  difficulties  encountered  in  the 
solution  of  problems  reenforce  the  awakened  doubt  of  the 
passive  view  of  cognition  held  by  common  sense.  Science 
itself  seldom  allows  this  skepticism  to  bulk  too  large;  its 
interest  is  too  positive  and  controlled  too  immediately  by  its 
material  and  its  traditions  to  permit  the  problem  of  knowledge 


26  CRITICAL  REALISM 

to  deflect  its  attention.  Individual  scientists  are,  however, 
moved  by  these  critical  motives  to  react  drastically  toward 
the  simpler  theories  of  cognition  which  they  inherit  from 
Natural  Realism.  Not  infrequently,  the  reaction  is  so  violent 
as  to  carry  the  reflective  scientist  to  idealism  of  a  sensation- 
alistic  sort,  but  usually  a  compromise  position  is  taken  which 
seeks  to  retain  as  much  as  possible  of  the  realistic  basis  from 
which  science  has  grown.  Chief  among  the  distinctions  which/ 
make  this  working  compromise  effective  are  those  between 
the  j)rimary  and  the  secondary  qualities,  and  between  sensa- 
tions, on  the  one  hand,  and  objective  bodies  and  processes 
in  space  and  time,  on  the  other  hand.  In  the  preceding 
chapter,  we  had  occasion  to  note  how  this  latter  distinction 
is  forced  upon  us.  We  saw  that  the  question  which  is  raised 
by  it  is  this:  If  percepts  cannot  be  identified  with  physical 
bodies,  how  can  knowledge  of  these  be  obtained?  Now, 
science  does  not  doubt  that  it  possesses  knowledge,  but  it 
is  aware  that  it  has  attained  unto  this  knowledge  through 
effort  and  by  adoption  of  methods  of  experiment  and  analysis. 
Why  these  methods  enable  us  to  secure  knowledge  it  is  not 
prepared  to  say,  nor  is  it  certain  of  the  limits  and  extent  of 
its  knowledge.  Engrossed  in  particular  problems  and  pressed 
onward  by  its  technique  and  practical  success,  it  allows  the 
problems  of  knowledge  to  remain  in  the  background,  so  to 
speak,  of  its  consciousness.  The  result  is  a  modus  vivendi  in 
which  the  reflective  and  the  positive  tendencies  are  free  to 
develop  themselves  without  let  or  hindrance  from  each  other. 
Physical  science  organizes  its  facts  in  space  and  time  by  means 
of  impersonal  principles,  while  psychology  and  logic  seek  to 
show  that  the  world  is  in  some  sense  a  construct.  This 
antagonism  which  works  beneath  the  surface  of  experience 
and  which  can  not  be  assuaged,  except  momentarily,  by  the 
compromise  referred  to  above,  is  due  to  the  inadequate  adjust- 
ment of  the  psychological  and  logical  motives  in  experience  to 
the  realistic  meanings  and  impersonal  organization  built  up 
in  science. 

Under  the  pressure  of  the  facts,  then,  Natural  Realism  gives 
place  to  a  more  critical  form  which  may  be  designated  scientific 
realism.     Science   commences,    as   we    have    noted,    in    full 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  27 

agreement  with  the  outlook  of  common  sense.  Things  are 
obviously  objective  and  independent  of  the  individual's 
awareness  of  them.  Investigation,  however,  begins  to  indicate 
that  the  qualities  of  things  are  not  on  the  same  level.  Certain 
attributes  are  functions  of  complex  conditions  which  can  be 
stated  in  terms  of  other  attributes  which  seem  basic.  These 
aspects  are  measurable,  and  secure  an  independence  of  percep- 
tual perspective  through  the  direct  or  indirect  application  of 
standard  units  to  the  objects  or  processes  under  observation. 
The  influence  of  the  position  of  the  observer  is  thus  eliminated. 
By  this  procedure,  commonness  and  independence  are  again 
recovered.  The  thing  is  standardized  and  can  be  contrasted 
with  the  variety  of  the  personal  experiences  of  it.  A  large 
part  of  the  technique  of  the  laboratory  is  concerned  with  this 
problem  of  measurement;  instrument  after  instrument  is 
evolved  to  make  the  purely  perceptual  element  as  insignificant 
as  possible.  What  are  cathetometers  and  micrometers  but 
instruments  for  the  minimizing  of  perception?  All  that  is 
needed  is  the  identification  of  a  mark.  Contrast  the  result 
thus  obtained  with  the  variation  in  the  size  of  a  percept  as 
we  approach  the  thing  to  which  we  refer  it.  Now,  we  have 
in  these  two  classes  of  attributes  which  require  different 
techniques  the  historical  division  into  primary  and  secondary 
qualities.  This  is  not  the  place  to  give  in  detail  all  the  reasons 
which  have  led  to  this  distinction ;  but  a  brief  summary  of  some 
of  the  motives  will  throw  light  upon  the  character  of  the 
movement  in  science  towards  a  restatement  of  the  physical. 
The  point  for  us  to  note  is  the  attempt  to  go  beyond  perceptual 
observation  with  its  perspective  and  to  make  perception 
subordinate  to  the  determination  of  what  science  calls  facts. 

The  primary  dimensions  of  things  and  processes,  such 
as  extension,  movement,  mass  and  energy,  can  be  used 
for  the  purposes  of  exact  description  and  explanation 
because  they  are  measurable  and  lend  themselves  to 
mathematical  and  physical  analysis.  For  this  reason,  results 
can  be  obtained  which  are  not  variable  from  moment  to 
moment  as  is  the  case  with  the  secondary  qualities.  If  these 
aspects  of  an  object  change,  the  changes  can  be  reduced  to 
law  and   referred   to   other  changes  of   like   character.     In 


28  -      CRITICAL  REALISM 

other  words,  the  primary  aspects  of  things  form  a  system 
of  a  closed  character  in  which  changes  can  be  partially 
calculated  beforehand.  The  color,  the  taste,  the  odor  of 
an  object  cannot  develop  this  systematic  character;  a  rela- 
tion to  the  percipient  always  dominates  them;  they  cannot 
free  themselves  from  what  we  have  called  perceptual  per- 
spective. In  other  words,  the  secondary  qualities  are  relative 
to  the  individual,  while  the  primary  qualities  can  be  freed 
from  this  relativity.  But  other  differences  supplement  those 
already  advanced.  The  primary  aspects  of  things  are  com- 
mon to  all  physical  things  under  all  conditions  thus  far 
known ;  this  universality  is  not  true  of  the  secondary  char- 
acteristics. These  are  more  capricious  and  are  frequently 
absent  altogether.  There  are  substances  which  are  odorless 
and  others  which  are  colorless.  Objects,  when  struck,  may 
give  off  sound,  but  they  are  not  always  emitting  sound. 
They  are,  however,  always  extensive.  Thus  the  discreteness 
of  the  secondary  qualities,  their  lack  of  continuity,  their 
relativity,  their  occasional  absences,  all  make  them  cancel  out 
when  a  general  outlook  on  the  physical  world  is  sought.  They 
are  relegated  to  the  percept  side  and  related  to  the  individual 
as  a  percipient.  This  justifiable  tendency  to  their  elimination 
is  strengthened  by  two  other  motives.  First,  they  can  in  part 
be  explained  and  predicted  as  mathematically  expressed  func- 
tions of  the  primary  qualities  as  long  as  the  organism  remains 
a  constant;  and,  secondly,  the  activities  in  nature  can  be 
stated  only  in  terms  of  the  primary  qualities.  It  seems 
difficult  to  conceive,  for  instance,  how  the  odor  or  color  of  one 
physical  object  can  affect  another  object.  Thus  the  motives 
toward  a  separation  of  the  aspects  of  things  into  those  which 
are  relative  to  the  percipient  and  are  perceptual  and  those 
which  are  absolute  and  objective  reenforce  each  other.  Even 
from  this  brief  treatment  of  the  distinction  between  the 
primary  and  the  secondary  qualities,  it  is  clear  that  the  former 
have  gradually  developed  into  meanings  connected  with  the 
necessary  structure  and  behavior  of  things,  whereas  the  latter, 
remaining  passive  and  relative,  have  kept  nearer  to  their 
primitive,  sensational  character.  The  reason  for  this  seems 
grounded  deep  in  the  nature  of  experience;  it  must  have  an 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  29 

epistemological  significance.  Science  meets  the  motives  which 
effectually  challenge  Natural  Realism  in  this  way  and  retains 
the  thing  in  contrast  to  the  percept.  The  result  is  what  we 
have  called  scientific  realism,  which  is  a  purified  Natural 
Realism.  Such  are  the  general  considerations  which  have 
led  to  the  relegation  of  the  secondary  qualities  to  the  personal, 
perceptual  side,  as  effects  on  the  conscious  individual  of  real 
processes  at  work  in  the  physical  world.  Whether  these 
real  processes  can  be  adequately  stated  in  terms  of  mass, 
movement,  and  energy  is  a  further  question  which  we  shall 
not  take  up  at  present. 

After  the  separation  of  the  primary  from  the  secondary- 
qualities  has  been  achieved  by  science  as  a  result  of  its  tech- 
nique and  its  problems,  the  way  is  prepared  for  a  marked 
change  in  man's  outlook  on  the  physical  world.  Perception 
is  gradually  displaced  by  conception,  much  as,  in  petrifaction, 
the  wood  fibre  is  displaced  by  minerals.  Theoretically,  atoms 
and  molecules  are  perceivable,  but,  were  they  perceived, 
reason  must  remove  from  them  their  veil  of  color  even 
were  it  the  drabest  grey.  This  can  be  done  only  because 
we  no  longer  picture  them,  but,  instead,  think  them.  They 
are  objects  of  conception  rather  than  of  perception.  The 
skeleton  of  Natural  Realism  remains,  while  the  content  has 
undergone  a  fundamental  alteration.  It  is  the  gradual 
character  of  this  change,  which  is  not  fully  realized,  that 
enables  the  matter  of  the  scientist  to  be  at  once  semi- 
perceptual  and  semi-conceptual.  So  long  as  science  is 
absorbed  in  its  particular  problems  and  in  its  method  and 
technique,  the  problem  of  knowledge  is,  we  have  seen,  quies- 
cent. The  view  of  perception  held  by  common  sense  lingers  in 
spite  of  the  corrections  which  science  is  forced  to  make  in  con- 
nection with  that  which  is  perceived.  Hence,  atoms  are  thought 
of  as  perceivable.  I  doubt  not  that  electrons  are  likewise  held 
to  be  susceptible  of  being  perceived  were  our  sense-organs  fit 
for  the  task.  To  be  real  is  to  be  susceptible  of  being  perceived 
or  of  affecting  that  which  is  susceptible  of  being  perceived. 
What  does  this  assertion  signify  ?  If  we  are  forced  to 
distinguish  between  thing  and  percept,  as  science  acknowl- 
edges and  as  our  critique  of  Natural  Realism  led  us  to  grant, 


30  CRITICAL  REALISM 

what  does  the  expression,  "susceptible  of  being  perceived," 
mean?  The  only  meaning  I  can  assign  to  it  is  the  following: 
Things  and  processes  can  be  known  but  they  can  be  known  only 
on  the  foundation  of  perception.  A  percept  and  a  physical  thing 
are  not  the  same,  but  the  latter  can  be  known  to  the  degree  it  is 
known  in  science  only  because  it  conditions  percepts.  Now 
science  is  aware  of  this  principle,  but  only  in  a  confused  way 
because  of  its  lack  of  reflective  interest  in  the  problem  of 
knowledge.^  Strictly  speaking,  then,  atoms  are  not  perceivable 
nor  are  physical  things  perceivable;  they  could  not  present 
themselves  to  perception  as  an  event.  Instead,  they  are 
known  by  means  of  percepts  which  they  condition.  The 
error  of  which  the  scientific  investigator  is  guilty  is  the 
continuance  of  the  use  of  the  term  perception  as  synony- 
mous with  knowledge,  after  his  subject-matter  has  outgrown 
the  outlook  implied  by  the  term. 

Let  us  examine  Berkeley's  refutation  of  the  cognitive  signifi- 
cance of  the  distinction  between  primary  and  secondary 
qualities  from  the  present  standpoint.  It  must  be  remembered 
that,  because  we  defend  the  distinction,  it  does  not  follow  that 
we  defend  the  view  of  matter  held  by  Locke.  The  position 
that  the  primary  qualities  inhere  in  an  inert  substance  is  surely 
quite  separable  from  the  belief  that  science  can  gain  information 
about  physical  things  and  that  this  information  is  not 
penetrated  by  the  relativity  to  the  human  organism  char- 
acteristic of  percepts.  With  this  suggestion  in  mind,  let 
us  analyze  the  arguments  advanced  by  Berkeley. 

The  first  argument  of  importance  concerns  the  impos- 
sibility of  separating,  even  in  thought,  the  primary  qualities  ^ 
from  the  secondary.  "But  I  desire  anyone  to  reflect  and  try 
whether  he  can,  by  any  abstraction  of  thought,  conceive  the 
extension  and  motion  of  a  body  without  all  other  sensible 
quaHties.     For  my  own  part,  I  see  evidently  that  it  is  not  in 

1  The  term,  knowledge,  is  ambiguous  since  it  covers  both  the  system  of  propositions  accepted 
by  the  mind  and  the  fact  that  these  propositions  are  regarded  as  somehow  giving  knowledge  about 
a  real  world  independent  of  the  mind.     No  one  doubts  that  we  have  knowledge  in  the  first  sense. 

2  The  critical  realist  does  not  hold  that  extension  is  a  thing  which  exists  outside  the  mind; 
instead,  he  maintains  that  the  physical  world  is  extended,  i.e.,  measurable.  Extension  and  the 
other  primary  qualities  are  for  science  really  categories  characteristic  of  our  knowUdne  about 
nature,  not  qualities  inherent  in  nature  in  the  Lockian  sense  or  possibly  perceivable  aspects  i)f  the 
physical  world.  Berkeley,  as  usual,  is  right  in  what  he  denies,  not  in  what  he  affirms.  I  shall  have 
more  to  say  in  regard  to  this  point  in  a  forthcoming  work  on  the  Categories, 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  31 

my  power  to  frame  an  idea  of  a  body  extended  and  moving, 
but  I  must  withal  give  it  some  color  or  other  sensible  quality 
which  is  acknowledged  to  exist  only  in  the  mind.  {Prin- 
ciples, sec.  10.)  Now,  when  Berkeley  speaks  of  framing  an 
idea,  he  means  an  image  or  picture.  The  task  he  sets  for  us  to 
accomplish  is  like  that  of  having  a  percept  which  has  no 
secondary  qualities.  This  I  acknowledge  to  be  impossible. 
All  the  good  visualizers  in  my  classes  have  always  shaken 
their  heads  at  any  attempt  to  separate  the  two  classes  of 
properties  and  have  agreed  with  Berkeley.  And  I  feel  sure 
that  this  agreement  rests  upon  the  same  grounds  as  the 
original  assertion.  But  the  space  and  motion  which  science 
measures  are  not  perjceptual  space  and  perceptual  motion. 
The  scientist  ascertains  the  fact  that  a  wave  length  is  such  a 
part  of  a  millimeter.  The  information  conveyed  can  be  ex- 
pressed only  in  number  symbols,  and  any  attempt  to  visualize 
the  extension  is  beside  the  point.  We  have  to  do  here  with 
concepts  whose  significance  cannot  be  separated  from  the 
system  of  units  employed.  And  I  feel  sure  that,  when  I  am 
told  that  a  body  has  a  certain  mass  and  a  certain  extension, 
I  have  no  idea  of  color  connected  with  these  quantitative  facts ; 
yet  I  understand  what  is  meant.  Even  were  I  concrete  in 
my  imagery  and  tended  to  see  a  body  of  a  definite  size  and 
extent  and  possessed  of  a  color,  I  am  sure  that  I  should  regard 
this  imagery  as  inadequate  to  express  what  I  had  in  mind.  In 
short,  science  deals,  not  with  sensible  qualities,  but  with 
quantitiniTi  nffcrominal  relations;  and  these  are  propositions  of 
a  complex  character  understood  only  by  those  trained  in 
mathematics  and  physical  measurements.  The  symbols  for 
these  are  verbal  or  numerical,  and  images  of  any  other  kind 
are  adventitious.  It  is  only  when  the  primary  dimensions  of 
physical  bodies  are  thought  of  in  terms  of  perceptual  or  sen- 
sible qualities  that  the  argument  of  Berkeley  is  relevant.  The 
point  which  I  wish  to  make  can,  perhaps,  be  best  brought 
out  by  contrast  with  what  I  do  not  wish  to  maintain.  The 
attitude  of  science  toward  the  primary  qualities  must  not  be 
identified  with  materialism.  This  seems  to  be  the  feature  of 
the  problem  which  Mr.  Bradley  has  most  in  mind.  "That 
doctrine  [materialism]  of  course  holds  that  the  extended  can 


32  CRITICAL  REALISM 

be  actual  entirely  apart  from  every  other  quality.  But 
extension  is  never  so  given.  If  it  is  visual,  it  must  be  colored; 
and  if  it  is  tactual,  or  acquired  in  the  various  other  ways 
which  may  fall  under  the  head  of  the  "muscular  sense,"  then 
it  is  never  free  from  sensations,  coming  from  the  skin,  or  the 
joints,  or  the  muscles,  or,  as  some  would  like  to  add,  from  a 
central  source.  {Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  17.)  All  this  is 
very  true,  but  irrelevant  to  the  present  problem;  and  its 
irrelevance  is  what  I  wish  to  show.  When  the  scientist 
asserts  that  the  moon  is  two  hundred  and  thirty  eight  thou- 
sand eight  hundred  and  forty  miles  from  the  earth,  he  does 
not  seek  to  consider  a  sensible  quality  drawn  from  eye-move- 
ment or  joint-sensation  as  occupying  this  space.  He  asserts 
a  fact  revealed  by  his  astronomical  technique,  and  this  fact 
has  definite  meaning.  He  is  stating  facts  about  things  which 
seem  to  be  free  from  the  relativity  which  overwhelms  per- 
cepts and  their  constituents.  He  must  perceive  in  order 
to  measure,  but  what  he  perceives  is  merely  a  sign  for  a  concep- 
tual interpretation.  Of  course,  this  interpretation  is  founded 
upon  certain  postulates  and  upon  definite  theories  and  is  no 
stronger  than  they  are.  We  shall  have  occasion  to  examine 
this  mediate  character  of  a  scientific  fact  later ;  but  at  present 
our  main  task  is  to  get  a  clear  idea  of  the  objectivity  of  the 
dimensions  in  terms  of  which  science  states  its  knowledge  about 
physical  things — and  by  objectivity  I  mean  their  freedom 
from  perceptual  perspective. 

Our  conclusion  in  regard  to  the  first  argument  raised  by 
Berkeley  throws  light  upon  another  objection  of  his.  He 
condemns  Locke's  claim  that  the  primary  qualities  are  patterns 
of  things  "which  exist  without  the  mind,  in  an  unthinking 
substance  which  they  call  Matter."  So,  certainly,  would  I 
condemn  such  a  view.  To  have  knowledge  about  the  phyiji- 
cal  world  does  not  imply  the  possession  of  patterns  of  entities 
existing  outside  the  mind.  Science  makes  no  such  claim,  and 
the  distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities  is 
not  based  on  such  a  hope.  For  this  reason,  it  is,  perhaps, 
better  to  employ  the  term  "dimensions"  in  place  of  qualities. 
What  the  reach  and  nature  of  the  knowledge  achieved  by 
science  is  must  be  investigated  in  due  time.     This  much  we 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  33 

may  say,  however,  that  the  naive  views  found  in  Locke's 
version  are  gone  forever. 

Another  argument  urged  by  Berkeley  is  interesting  in 
this  connection.  It  is  the  argument  from  what  I  have  desig- 
nated perceptual  perspective.  "Again,  great  and  small,  swift 
and  slow,  are  allowed  to  exist  nowhere  without  the  mind, 
being  entirely  relative,  and  changing  as  the  frame  or  position 
of  the  organ  of  sense  varies.  The  extension  therefore  which 
exists  without  the  mind  is  neither  great  nor  small,  the  motion 
neither  swift  nor  slow,  that  is,  they  are  nothing  at  all" 
(sec.  11).  Evidently  Berkeley  argues  from  the  relativity  of 
perception  to  the  impossibility  of  our  knowledge  about  motions 
or  extensions  not  relative  to  the  individual  yet  possessed  of 
degrees.  And  so  long  as  we  keep  within  perception  as  such, 
this  argument  is  unanswerable.  The  size  which  we  assign 
to  an  object  is  simply  a  standard  size  and  is  relative  to  a 
(more  or  less  arbitrarily  adopted)  standard  distance.  The 
motives  which  lead  me  to  consider  an  object  a  certain  size 
are  essentially  practical.  The  perceptual  size  of  my  type- 
writer, for  instance,  is  determined  by  my  position  as  I  use  it. 
But  what  reason  of  a  theoretical  nature  have  I  to  advance 
for  a  belief  that  this  standard  perceptual  size  is  the  real  size? 
The  typewriter  cannot,  however,  be  all  sizes  at  once;  hence, 
we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  perceptual  extent  is 
purely  relative.  How,  then,  does  'science  elude  the  difficulty  ? 
As  we  have  seen,  it  eludes  it  by  measurement  in  terms  of 
standard  units.  Science  does  not  trust  to  perception  when 
it  wishes  to  determine  the  relative  sizes  of  physical  things; 
it  resorts  to  the  superposition,  direct  or  indirect,  of  objects 
upon  one  another.  And  an  intimate  knowledge  of  physical 
measurements  and  the  technique  they  involve  is  necessary 
to  an  appreciation  of  how  different  the  results  thus  obtained 
are  from  those  of  mere  unaided  perception.  The  result  is 
elimination  of  the  perceptual  perspective  or  the  reference 
to  the  position  of  the  percipient,  upon  which  Berkeley  lays 
so  much  stress.  "Suppose  this  to  be  admitted,"  the  idealist 
replies,  "still  the  interpretation  of  the  unit  of  measurement 
must  be  in  terms  of  perception."  To  use  a  simple  illustra- 
tion which  can  yet  be  regarded  as  typical  of  more  complex 


34  CRITICAL  REALISM 

measurements,  I  measure  a  tree,  which  has  fallen,  by  means 
of  a  yardstick.  In  this  way,  I  obtain  a  knowledge  of  the 
length  of  the  tree  in  terms  of  the  unit;  but  the  unit  itself  is 
given  to  me  in  perception.  To  measure  it  in  terms  of  a  smaller 
unit  does  not  help  me  to  escape  the  difficulty,  since  this  smaller 
unit  must  itself  be  given  in  perception,  and  so  on.  Thus  my 
estimate  of  the  real  dimensions  of  things  is  finally  founded 
upon  my  perceptual  experience.  And  I  see  no  way  of  avoiding 
this  foundation.  Science  can  give  us  ratios  relative  to  units, 
not  a  stark  vision  of  intrinsic  and  absolute  dimensions. 
The  point  which  Berkeley  does  not  note  is  important  never- 
theless. These  ratios  are  not  relative  to  the  individual  per- 
cipient, but  relative  to  the  unit  of  measurement.  We  can 
assert  that  one  thing  is  greater  than  another  by  a  certain 
proportion,  and  that  one  motion  is  swifter  than  another.  The 
fact  that  the  individual's  interpretation  of  these  fixed  ratios 
is  necessarily  in  terms  of  his  standardized  idea  of  the  unit 
does  not  impugn  the  independence  of  the  ratios  as  such. 
There  are  different  kinds  of  relativities,  and  these  must  not 
be  confused. 

The  conclusion  which  can  be  drawn  from  this  critical 
analysis  of  the  arguments  advanced  by  Berkeley  against  the 
separation  of  the  primary  and  secondary  qualities  may  be 
stated  thus.  The  objectivity  assigned  to  the  so-called  pri- 
mary qualities  of  things,  as  these  are  determined  by  measure- 
ment, is  that  of  knowledge.  The  knowledge  thus^  obtained  is 
in  terms  of  conceptual  ratios  and  does  not  signify  the  reifica- 
tion  of  sensible  qualities,  such  as  perceptual  extent,  or  the 
view  that  such  sensible  qualities  are  patterns  of  entities 
existent  in  nature.  In  this  way,  science  works  beyond  the 
intuitionalism  of  Natural  Realism  so  far  as  it  is  able,  and  gains 
knowledge  about  things.  But  what  this  knowledge  is  and 
its  exact  reach  are  seldom,  if  ever,  completely  clear  to  it. 
Berkeley's  argument,  like  that  of  Bradley,  is  valid  only 
against   a   false   realism. 

Once  on  this  road,  science  pushes  onward  to  a  conceptual 
interpretation  of  observations  in  terms  of  quantities,  ratios, 
definitions,  relations,  and  laws.  Laws  are  statements  in  as 
definite  form  as  possible  of  supposedly  invariable  relations. 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  35 

In  the  abstracter  sciences,  those,  namely,  of  inorganic  nature, 
these  statements  are  in  mathematical  form  and  express 
relations  between  quantities.  The  quantities  are  themselves 
measurable  aspects  of  physical  processes  expressed  in  units 
which  are  arbitrary  qua  units,  but  otherwise  natural  as  selected 
portions  of  some  primary  dimension.  Given  this  basis,  science 
works  from  observation  to  theory  and  from  theory  to  observa- 
tion and  formulates  its  results  as  concisely  as  possible.  The 
discovery  of  causal  connections,  which  accompanies  the 
quantitative  description  of  the  facts,  carries  science  nearer 
to  its  goal.  What  is  this  goal  ?  Were  science  agreed  in  regard 
to  this  point,  our  investigation  would  be  indeed  easier. 

Especially  in  the  abstracter  sciences,  nature  is  now  re- 
garded as  a  series  of  processes  rather  than  as  a  collection  of 
things.  Things  are  no  doubt  still  essential  elements  in  many 
of  the  events  which  occur  in  the  external  world,  but  detailed 
analysis  has  bereft  them  of  their  primacy.  They  are  now 
seen  in  a  context  of  relations  which  common  sense  failed  to 
note.  With  things,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  has  gone  in  large 
part  the  older  conception  of  the  primary  qualities.  Impene- 
trability, for  example,  is  no  longer  considered  an  ultimate 
and  imanalyzable  characteristic  of  the  physically  real.  In 
its  place,  we  have  energy  relations  and  the  concept  of  conser- 
vation. The  original  attribute  was  too  passive  and  sensational, 
it  could  not  be  applied  in  an  explanatory  way  to  the  detailed 
behavior  of  things  and  processes;  it  could  not  be  treated  by 
mathematics — which,  perhaps,  amounts  to  the  same  thing. 
For  these  reasons,  it  has  lost  its  former  status  and  is  now 
treated  as  derived.  This  change  in  attitude  toward  a  primary 
quality,  once  in  high  favor,  illustrates  the  work  of  conceptual 
reconstruction  performed  by  science  in  its  effort  to  become 
objective.  In  ever  greater  degree,  the  passive  attitude  of 
common  sense  with  its  uncritical  mixture  of  perception  and 
conception  and  its  inability  to  analyze  changes  and  relations 
is  replaced  by  an  active  rationalism  which  seeks  to  know  what 
occurs  in  nature  as  fully  as  it  can  be  known.  When  this  level 
is  attained,  the  primary  qualities  as  used  by  science  are  no 
longer  sensations,  as  Berkeley  held  them  to  be,  but  categories 
tested  by  their  organizing  value. 


36  CRITICAL  REALISM 

Before  this  further  level  is  reached,  however,  the  deviation 
of  science  from  common  sense  becomes  so  apparent  that  the 
problem  of  the  nature  and  reference  of  the  knowledge  gained 
by  science  is  unavoidably  raised.  The  results  achieved  are 
so  indirect  and  so  obviously  depend  on  the  constructive 
activity  of  the  human  mind  working  with  inductive  and  deduc- 
tive methods  and  guided  in  its  observations  and  experiments 
by  general  ideas,  that  the  rather  passive,  intuitionalistic  view 
from  which,  as  we  have  seen,  science  arises,  refuses  longer  to 
stand  sponsor  for  them.  The  deeply  rooted  feeling-reactions 
which  vitalize  physical  things  for  the  plain  man  and  endow 
them  with  a  reality-feeling,  decline  to  bolster  up  what  are 
seemingly  creations  of  the  mind.  Things  I  know;  but  what 
are  mass  and  energy  and  ether? — thus  would  the  plain  man 
state  his  position.  Consequently,  reflection  arises  and  the 
cognitive  import  of  science  becomes  matter  for  investigation 
and  often  for  dispute.  The  situation  which  ensues  is  more 
complex  and  perplexing  than  is  usually  realized.  The  scientist 
who  seeks  to  solve  it  is  facing  a  difficult  question ;  none  other, 
in  fact,  than  the  nature  and  reference  of  the  knowledge  attained 
by  science.  If  he  remain  a  natural  realist,  he  must  ask  him- 
self how  the  concepts  by  means  of  which  he  organizes  his  data 
are  moored  to  the  things  he  perceives.  And  the  question, 
once  asked,  gives  its  own  negative  answer.  If  the  scientist 
hold  to  realism,  it  cannot  be  Natural  Realism.  This  conclu- 
sion, which  follows  from  the  analysis  we  have  so  far  made  of 
science,  reenforces  the  result  arrived  at  in  the  first  chapter. 
Thus  the  choice  before  science  is  no  longer  simple ;  the  frame- 
work of  experience  has  ceased  to  be  distinct,  and  the  old 
meanings  of  Natural  Realism,  once  challenged  as  to  their 
validity  and  applicability,  lose  their  assurance.  Which,  indeed, 
are  real — laws,  concepts,  things,  or  facts? 

Several  positions  can  be  and  actually  have  been  taken  by 
scientists  when  they  become  conscious  of  the  problem  of 
knowledge;  and  all  these  are  instructive.  It  will  repay  us  to 
glance  at  these  positions  briefly. 

In  many  cases,  there  has  been  a  complete  reaction  against 
Natural  Realism  and  the  adoption  of  what  is,  to  all  intents,  a 
sensationalistic  idealism.     Science,  for  this  outlook,  is  nothing 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  37 

more  than  a  more  accurate  and  extended  description  of  man's 
perceptual  experience.  It  is  a  conceptual  summary  of  per- 
ceptual facts,  richer  and  more  exact  than  that  furnished  by 
common  sense.  It  pays  particular  attention  to  invariable 
sequences  in  experience  and  analyzes  them  out  wherever 
possible.  By  this  means,  it  makes  the  prediction  of  future 
events  feasible,  especially  as  it  lays  stress  upon  exact  quanti- 
tative relations  which  have  held  in  the  past.  Karl  Pearson 
and  Ernst  Mach  are  probably  the  two  best  representatives 
of  this  view.  There  is  a  divergence  in  their  positions,  however, 
which  is  interesting  for  our  problem.  It  is  necessary,  for  this 
reason,  to  discuss  them  separately  yet  with  this  comparison 
in  mind. 

Pearson  definitely  limits  the  field  of  science  to  constructs 
which  are  the  union  of  sense-impressions  with  associated, 
stored  impressions.  "The  outer  world  is  for  science  a  world 
of  sensations,  and  sensation  is  known  to  us  only  as  sense- 
impression."  The  ego  is  shut  up  within  the  brain  terminals 
of  the  sensory  nerves,  and  is  thus  limited  in  its  experience  to 
the  sense-impressions  which  flow  in  from  that  "outside  world." 
These  the  scientist  analyzes,  classifies,  and  reasons  about, 
but  he  can  know  nothing  about  the  nature  of  the  "things-in- 
themselves"  which  may  exist  at  the  other  end  of  the  brain 
terminals.  As  many  other  thinkers  have  pointed  out,  Pearson 
assumes  constantly  the  real  existence  of  the  physical  world 
in  order  to  account  for  sense-impressions.  "The  same  type  of 
physical  organ  receives  the  same  sense-impressions  and  forms 
the  same  constructs."  {Grammar  of  Science,  p.  47,  third 
edition.)  The  result  is  a  contradiction;  what  right  have  we 
to  assume  physical  organs  of  the  same  type  if  our  knowledge 
is  limited  to  sense-impressions?  Evidently,  we  have  in  the 
foregoing  assertion  the  proof  of  the  stubborn  persistence  of 
Natural  Realism  within  the  shifting  of  view-point  due  to 
reflection.  Pearson  is  often  called  a  sensationalist,  but  such  a 
characterization  is  hardly  just.  He  distinctly  states  that  he 
uses  the  word  "sensation"  instead  of  sense-impression,  "to 
express  our  ignorance,  our  absolute  agnosticism,  as  to  whether 
sense-impressions  are  'produced'  by  unknowable  things-in- 
themselves,  or  whether  behind  them  may  not  be  something  of 

94731 


38  CRITICAL  REALISM 

their  own  nature"  (p.  68).  Thus  reaHsm  lurks  behind  his 
empiricism  and  renders  it  ill  at  ease.  His  frequent  outbursts 
against  metaphysics  are  but  symptomatic  of  this  lack  of 
assurance. 

The  position  adopted  by  Ernst  Mach  is  even  more  interest- 
ing than  that  of  Pearson,  because  it  attempts  to  account  for 
the  distinction  between  the  external  and  the  inner  world  in 
terms  of  relations  between  elements  which  he  calls  sensations. 
"Let  those  complexes  of  colors,  sounds,  and  so  forth,  com- 
monly called  bodies,  be  designated,  for  the  sake  of  simplicity, 
A  B  C;  the  complex,  known  as  our  own  body,  which  con- 
stitutes a  part  of  the  former,  may  be  called  KLM;  the 
complex  composed  of  volitions,  memory-images,  and  the  rest, 
we  shall  represent  by  ahc.  Usually,  now,  the  complex  abc 
KLM,  as  making  up  the  ego,  is  opposed  to  the  complex 
A  BC,  2iS  making  up  the  world  of  substance ;  sometimes,  also, 
abc  is  viewed  as  ego,  and  K  LM  ABC  Ots  world  of  substance. 
[This  is  essentially  a  description  of  Natural  Realism.]  Now, 
at  first  blush,  ABC  appear  independent  of  the  ego,  and 
opposed  to  it  as  a  separate  existence.  But  this  independence 
is  only  relative,  and  gives  way  upon  closer  inspection.  Pre- 
cisely viewed,  however,  it  appears  that  the  group  ABC  is 
always  co-determined  by  K  L  M.  A  cube  of  wood  when  seen 
close  at  hand  looks  large;  when  at  a  distance,  small;  it  looks 
different  with  the  right  eye  from  what  it  does  with  the  left. 
But  where,  now,  is  that  same  body,  which  to  the  appearance  is 
so  different  ?  All  that  can  be  said  is,  that  with  different  K  L  M 
different  ABC  axe  associated."  (Mach,  The  Analysis  of  the 
Sensations,  pp.  8-9.)  In  other  words,  Mach  argues  from  the 
facts  of  perceptual  perspective  to  an  empiricism  of  a  Humean 
character.  If  we  imagine  physical  things  back  of  these 
percepts,  they  are  "deprived  of  their  entire  sensory  contents, 
and  converted  into  mere  mental  symbols.  The  assertion  is 
correct,  then,  that  the  world  consists  only  of  our  sensations." 
But  these  sensations  are  not  psychical  in  their  own  nature; 
they  are,  as  it  were,  neutral.  When  we  consider  the  reciprocal 
relations  of  the  elements  of  the  complex  ABC  without 
regarding  KLM  (our  body),  we  deal  with  what  we  call  the 
external  world.     All  physical  investigations  are  of  this  sort. 


NATURAL  Rk:ALISM  AND  SCIENCE  39 

But  the  elements  ABC  are  connected  not  only  with  one 
another,  but  also  with  KLM.  "To  this  extent,  and  to  this 
extent  only,  do  we  call  ABC  sensations,  and  regard  ABC 
as  belonging  to  the  ego"  (p.  14).  The  value  of  this  analysis 
must  be  recognized,  and  it  is  especially  interesting  because 
made  by  a  physicist.  It  is,  however,  incomplete.  The 
physicist  not  only  disregards  the  complex,  K  L  M,  but  seeks  to 
abstract  from  those  aspects  oi  ABC  which  are  inseparably 
connected  with  KLM  and  to  correct  the  perspective  due  to 
the  position  oi  K  L  M.  But  we  have  investigated  the  problem 
which  results  sufficiently  in  the  first  part  of  the  present  chapter 
and  in  the  first  chapter.  We  saw,  for  instance,  that  it  is  not 
the  body  as  such  from  which  the  scientist  wishes  to  abstract, 
but  the  sense-organs  and  the  nervous  system  as  somehow  the 
basis  for  percepts.  The  scientist  believes  that  he  can  make 
percepts  his  tools  for  a  knowledge  which  is  non-perceptual. 
He  develops  methods  and  a  technique  in  which  instruments 
play  a  dominant  role  for  the  purpose  of  the  discovery  of  ratios 
and  relations.  The  scientist  always  passes  from  the  crude 
fact  of  actual  observation  to  the  scientific  fact  which  is  its 
conceptual  interpretation.  Mach's  analysis  does  not  siiffi- 
ciently  take  account  of  this  movement. 

Another  attitude  is  more  prevalent  than  the  one  just 
discussed.  The  majority  of  scientists  experiment  and  theorize 
in  their  respective  fields  and,  in  the  endeavor  to  explain  the 
facts  which  they  ascertain,  have  recourse  to  essentially  con- 
ceptual objects  which  are,  nevertheless,  on  the  same  level 
as  the  more  tangible  things  which  we  ordinarily  speak  of  as 
being  perceived.  In  this  way,  systems  are  constructed  which 
are  conceptual  through  and  through.  Their  parts  have  been 
tested  inductively  and  deductively,  and  it  is  almost  impossible 
to  separate  fact  from  theory  and  theory  from  fact.  The 
system  as  a  whole  is  a  growth  which  is  coherent.  In  many 
cases,  the  conceptual  factors  worked  into  the  system  are 
supposed  to  be  verae  causae,  hidden  from  perception  for  one 
reason  or  another,  yet  efficient.  But  every  such  vera  causa 
reached  by  analytic  theory  must  be  capable  of  affecting  the 
organism  directly  or  indirectly.  The  result  is  a  realism  which 
is  ripe  to  break  with  Natural  Realism  and  to  regard  perception 


40  •  CRITICAL  REAjJSM 

as  a  basis  for  knowledge  and  not  a  knowledge  in  itself.  Critical 
as  these  thinkers  are  and  aware  that  science  has  often  been 
forced  to  discard  theoretical  elements  which  seemed  assured, 
they  do  not  see  how  science  can  forego  such  constructions. 
Truth  is  a  slowly  achieved  product  attained  by  conquering 
error  and  correcting  inadequacies.  Furthermore,  science  has 
realized  that  all  error  is  relative  and  is  often  of  great  assistance 
in  the  progressive  creation  of  more  adequate  ideas.  Hence, 
these  scientists  continue  to  keep  a  realistic  attitude  toward  the 
physical  world.  It  is,  however,  a  sophisticated  realism  of  a  crit- 
ical character  quite  different  from  the  immediacy  of  Natural 
Realism.  Knowledge  is  no  longer  a  gift  of  perception  which 
needs  no  testing,  but  an  achievement  liable  to  error. 
And  a  little  reflection  shows  us  that  the  existences  and  processes 
known  are  not  and  cannot  be  literally  present  in  or  to  the 
mind  knowing  them.  What  is  scientific  knowledge  then? 
The  group  of  scientists  who  persist  in  scientific  realism  do  not 
answer  this  question;  they  only  hold,  by  the  faith  that  is  in 
them,  to  the  success  of  their  methods  and  technique.  This 
attitude  represents  the  outlook  of  the  main  body  of  scientists, 
and  deserves  more  serious  consideration  from  philosophy  than 
that  characteristic  of  those  scientists  who  have  given  a  reflective 
theory  of  knowledge  upon  the  basis  of  a  too  meagre  acquaint- 
ance with  logic  and  psychology.  We  shall  have  occasion  to 
return  to  it  when  we  come  to  sum  up  our  own  positive 
conclusions. 

Many  scientists  who  have  become  reflective  accept  the 
historical  distinction  between  phenomena  in  space  and  time 
and  things-in-themselves.  Here  we  undoubtedly  have  the 
influence  of  philosophy.  Even  though  the  technical  terms 
be  not  used,  the  contrast  between  that  which  is  present  in 
experience  and  that  which  is  real  apart  from  experience  is 
analogous  to  the  Kantian  distinction.  And,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  many  distinguished  scientists  have  been  avowed 
Neo-Kantians.  For  instance,  a  large  number  of  scientists 
hold  that  matter  is  an  unknown,  perhaps  an  unknowable, 
cause  of  phenomena.  It  is  supposed  to  elude  their  investiga- 
tions much  as  life  escapes  the  analysis  of  the  biologist.  They 
demand  the  existence  of  matter,  but  acknowledge  that  they 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  41 

must  content  themselves  with  the  study  of  phenomena.  They 
are  not  even  certain  that  the  study  of  phenomena  gives 
knowledge  of  reality.  There  is,  however,  no  unanimity  in  the 
use  of  terms.  Some  are  evidently  followers  of  Locke,  others 
employ  the  Kantian  terminology.  Some  speak  of  mass  as  an 
attribute  of  matter,  while  others  regard  it  as  the  quantitative 
aspect  of  phenomena.  But  we  must  not  be  misled  by  this  varia- 
tion into  the  belief  that  the  positions  are  essentially  different. 
The  terminologies  simply  represent  different  traditions.  The 
point  to  be  noted  is  the  agreement  by  members  of  this  group 
in  the  acceptance  of  the  distinction  between  things  as  they 
appear  and  the  reality  which  somehow  lies  back  of  them. 
The  position  is  realistic,  yet  it  is  far  removed  from  the  intuition- 
alism of  Natural  Realism.  It  contains  a  strong  agnostic  note. 
Idealistic  motives  have  made  themselves  felt  so  extensively 
and  persistently  that  the  "what,"  or  content,  is  assigned 
to  the  side  of  experience,  while  the  "that"  remains  outside 
of  experience.  The  latter  passes  into  the  shadows,  as  it  were, 
where  it  is  seized  upon  by  religious  motives.  The  reason  for 
this  separation  is,  as  we  shall  see  later,  the  retention  in  large 
measure  of  the  intuitional  view  of  knowledge  which  char- 
acterizes Natural  Realism.  • 

The  consideration  of  the  three  main  groups  into  which 
scientists  may  be  divided  as  they  become  reflective  makes  it 
evident  that  science,  although  it  begins  with  that  outlook 
which  we  have  called  Natural  Realism,  outgrows  it  in  part 
and  is  led  into  difficulties  which  it  is  unable  to  master.  A 
theory  of  knowledge  becomes  a  crying  necessity.  The  wider 
information,  the  more  accurate  tracing  of  relations,  the  proof 
of  the  minuteness  and  complexity  of  the  processes  which  occur 
in  nature,  which  science  accords  us,  are  essential  to  the  final 
verdict  to  be  passed  upon  the  world;  but  a  decision  as  to  the 
nature  and  reach  of  knowledge  is  equally  essential.  The  very 
fact  that  there  are  these  three  groups  would  seem  to  indicate 
that  science  itself  has  no  means  to  solve  this  latter  problem. 
It  is  not  well  enough  acquainted  with  the  instrument,  thought, 
which  it  uses.  The  statement  made  by  some  scientists  that  the 
task  is  to  describe  certain  recurrent  clusters  of  sensations,  strikes 
me  as  sufficient  proof  of  this  conclusion.      The  implication 


42  CRITICAL  REALISM 

of  cognition  cannot  be  ignored  in  this  cavalier  fashion.  I 
feel  convinced  that  much  of  the  apparent  idealism  current 
among  scientists  who  have  attempted  to  develop  a  theory  of 
knowledge  is  due  to  this  ignorance  of  the  instrument.  Until 
it  is  bewildered  by  the  rdle  played  by  consciousness  in  the 
achievement  of  its  results,  science  is  realistic.  This  is  an 
important  fact  which  we  must  bear  in  mind. 

But  the  attitude  of  the  physical  sciences  cannot  be  fully 
appreciated  before  the  complementary  position  of  the  psychical 
sciences  is  understood.  Both  take  their  departure  from  the 
distinctions  of  everyday  life.  These  distinctions  are,  however, 
dual  in  character  and  involve  contrasts  between  antithetic 
terms  such  as  "outer"  and  "inner,"  "thing"  and  "percept." 
While  things  are  common,  persistent,  and  spatial,  feelings 
and  ideas  are  private,  fleeting,  and  out  of  space.  The 
physical  sciences  deal  with  extended  objects  causally  con- 
nected in  a  closed  system,  whereas  psychology  is  the 
science  of  consciousness.  This  term  is  a  generic  name  for 
the  sensations,  images,  pains,  pleasures,  meanings,  acts  of 
memory,  etc.,  of  individual  minds.  Psychology  seeks  to 
analyze  and  describe  these  and  to  determine  their  con- 
ditions. In  so  doing,  it  takes  for  granted  the  results  of 
the  physical  sciences  and  is  often  able  to  bring  them  into 
relation  with  its  own  conclusions.  These  two  classes  of 
data  are  usually  called  the  physical  and  the  psychical  respec- 
tively, and  in  accordance  with  this  usage  consciousness  is 
considered  synonymous  with  the  psychical.  The  point  which 
should  be  kept  in  mind  is  that  these  are  contrast  terms  which 
always  retain  a  shading,  at  least,  of  their  relativity.  This 
fact  is  especially  important  because  of  its  bearing  on  the 
mind-body  relation.  We  shall  see  that  this  contrast  is  often 
taken  out  of  its  scientific  context  and  made  absolute.  In 
this  act  lurks  a  possibility  of  error. 

As  a  natural  science,  psychology  begins  with  certain 
postulates  back  of  which  it  does  not  seek  to  go.  It  assumes 
the  reality  of  the  physical  and  of  the  psychical  and  their 
distinctness.  The  further  postulates  of  psychology  have 
been  well  stated  by  James  as  characters  of  the  stream  of 
thought.     {Principles    of    Psychology,   Vol.    I,   p.    225.)     We 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  43 

shall  have  occasion  to  consider  these  in  more  detail  when  we 
come  to  analyze  the  mind-body  relation.  It  is  beyond  ques- 
tion the  fact  that  science  believes  that  the  psychical  is  in  the 
same  world  as  the  physical,  although  it  does  not  know  the 
nature  of  their  connection.  They  are  domains  with  quite 
different  laws  which  yet  have  commerce  with  one  another. 
The  points  of  contact  are  two  in  number  and  both  are  equally 
ultimate.  The  psychical  somehow  knows  the  physical  and 
is  in  some  manner  connected  with  it  by  means  of  the  organism. 
It  is  evident  that  this  outlook  is  only  a  development  of  Natural 
Realism.  The  question  which  interests  us  is  this,  How  long 
does  this  adjustment  between  the  two  domains  last?  We 
have  already  noted  the  difficulties  which  confront  the  physical 
sciences  as  they  become  more  complex  and  reflective.  Will 
not  similar  difficulties  concerning  the  relations  between  these 
domains  arise  when  both  groups  of  the  sciences  become  con- 
scious of  their  assumptions  and  overhaul  their  postulates? 
If  we  may  believe  Ward,  the  adjustment  between  psychology 
and  the  physical  sciences  continues  until  the  problem  of 
external  perception  is  broa-ched.  "Psychology  and  the  phys- 
ical sciences,  work  on  the  level  of  this  uncritical  thinking, 
take  each  their  own  half  of  what — if  they  think  about  it  at 
all  —  they  suppose  to  be  a  consistent  and  complete  whole." 
(Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  Vol.  II,  p.  173.)  We 
have  already  noted  how  Mach  seeks  to  adjust  the  standpoint 
of  the  physicist  with  that  of  the  psychologist.  The  same 
elements  are  taken  in  different  relations.  We  pointed  out 
that  this  solution  does  not  do  justice  to  what  the  physicist 
attemps  to  accomplish.  The  psychologist  remains  on  the 
perceptual  level  far  more  than  the  physicist  or  chemist,  when 
he  marshals  the  facts  of  perception.  It  is  only  by  reaching 
another  level  that  the  scientist  is  able  to  eliminate  perceptual 
perspective.  I  shall  not  repeat  my  analysis  of  scientific 
methods  and  technique,  but  shall  only  refer  back  to  the  exami- 
nation of  the  distinction  between  the  primary  and  secondary 
qualities  and  forward  to  the  next  chapter  for  further 
confirmation.  Now,  present-day  psychology  is  in  working 
harmony  with  the  physical  sciences,  even  though  the  problem 
of  perception  and  its  relation  to  knowledge  of  nature  has  not 


44  CRITICAL  REALISM 

been  solved.  Two  points,  accordingly,  call  for  elucidation: 
Why  is  the  problem  of  external  perception  considered  so 
crucial?  What  modus  vivendi  has  enabled  psychology  to 
remain  in  working  harmony  with  the  physical  sciences?  We 
shall  take  up  these  questions  in  some  detail. 

Physical  science,  working  at  first  within  the  distinctions 
of  common  sense,  considers  perception  an  act  or  an  immediate 
event  which  somehow  brings  us  into  direct  contact  with  the 
physical  world.  Psychology,  on  the  other  hand,  has  for  its 
subject-matter  the  supposedly  private  domain  of  the  psychical. 
In  this  domain,  also,  immediacy  rules. ^  So  long  as  we  are 
outward-looking,  perception  seems  to  be  an  event  in  which 
things  are  revealed;  when  we  are  introspective  and  lay  stress 
on  the  conditions  which  mediate  perception,  the  same  thing- 
experience  is  considered  psychical.  When  this  new  attitude 
intervenes,  the  object  loses  its  substantiality  and  independence 
and  gains  a  new  context.  It  is  surprising  how  little  these 
two  standpoints  conflict,  i.e.,  how  they  can  alternate  in  an 
individual's  mind  without  his  realizing  their  common  posses- 
sion, the  percept  or  qualitative,  concrete  thing.  The  common 
element  is  submerged  by  the  inferential  differences,  by  the 
divergent  characteristics  of  the  systems  or  domains  to  which 
it  is  referred.  I  have  known  graduate  students  in  psychology 
not  to  realize  the  intimate  connection  of  percept  and  thing 
perceived.  They  seemed  to  regard  the  percept  as  something 
experienced  in  the  head  and  were  surprised  when  I  pointed 
out  that  percept  and  thing  were  experientially  the  same 
objectivum  qualified  by  different  meanings.  Small  wonder  is 
it,  then,  that  the  two  groups  of  sciences,  each  working  within 
its  determinate  standpoint  with  its  own  technique,  find  no 
difficulty  in  the  relation  of  percept  to  thing.  Dominated  by 
their  postulates,  outlook  and  problems,  the  two  groups  of 
sciences  do  not  ask  whether  their  material  is  in  any  sense 
common. 

But  the  difficulties  which  we  have  already  noted  as  con- 
fronting physical  science  when  it  becomes  reflective  inevitably 
raise  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  percept  to  thing.  If  the 
percept  be  the  object  of  which  we  are  immediately  aware  in 

1  The  data  of  both  psychology  and  the  physical  sciences  are  given  with  the  same  immediacy. 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  45 

perception,  how  do  we  come  to  know  the  thing?  When  this 
question  is  once  asked,  the  suspicion  is  awakened  that  the 
thing  may  be  the  percept.  And  we  have  seen  that  this  is  in  a 
large  measure  true.  Natural  Realism  falls  permanently  with 
the  realization  of  this  situation.  Either,  then,  knowledge  of 
physical  processes  is  different  from  perception,  although  based 
upon  it,  or  some  form  of  idealism  must  be  adopted.  We 
have  noted  how  Pearson  adopts  the  second  alternative,  while 
Mach  seeks  to  go  back  of  perception  to  something  more 
primitive.  Pearson's  position  has  always  seemed  to  me  the 
less  disingenuous.  The  difficulty  which  Mach  does  not 
sufficiently''  realize  rests  in  the  fact  that  we  do  not  seem  to  be 
able  to  get  at  the  elements  oi  A  B  C  (the  physical  world) 
except  through  their  relations  to  KLM  (our  body).  But, 
when  so  taken,  according  to  Mach,  they  are  to  be  called  our 
sensations.  Thus  sensations  are  basic,  and  the  problem  is. 
How  is  it  possible  to  study  the  relations  of  the  elements  of 
ABC  among  themselves,  ie.,  to  study  A  B  C  as  physical 
objects?  I  have  tried  to  show  how  this  feat  is  possible,  but 
it  does  not  appear  possible  of  solution  on  the  foundation 
offered  by  Mach.  ABC  are  not  given  as  primitive  or  neutral 
elements;  they  are  given  as  sensations.  However  this  may 
be,  the  percept  enters  the  purview  of  the  physical  sciences 
as  something  to  be  reckoned  with.  The  external  sphere  is 
thus  attacked  by  the  inner  sphere  which  threatens  to  extend 
its  boundaries.  Percepts  have  an  assurance,  due  to  their 
immediacy,  which  makes  them  powerful  antagonists  of  the 
previously  sovereign  things.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the 
problem  of  external  perception  is  crucial.  Any  satisfactory 
delimitation  of  the  spheres  of  the  physical  and  the  psychical 
sciences  must  be  based  on  a  theory  of  the  relation  of  percepts 
to  things,  causally  and  cbgnitively.  The  significance  of 
Berkeley  has  lain  in  his  recognition  of  this  fact  and  in  his 
emphatic  championship  of  the  percept  in  opposition  to  the 
physical  real  of  science.  To  be  is  to  be  a  percept,  expresses 
his  attitude  toward  the  physical  world  better  than  the  phrase 
which  he  adopted.    . 

Let  us  now  consider  the   second  question.  What  modus 
Vivendi  has  enabled  psychology  to  remain  in  working  harmony 


46  CRITICAL  REALISM 

with  the  physical  sciences  even  though  the  problem  ot  Knowl- 
edge was  not  solved  ?  We  have  virtually  indicated  the  answer 
to  this  question  in  our  discussion  of  the  first.  The  harmony 
is  secured  by  retention  and  development  of  the  distinctions 
characteristic  of  Natural  Realism  on  the  basis  of  a  duplication 
of  what  is  immediately  experienced  into  percept  and  thing. 
The  percept  is  taken  over  by  the  inner  sphere  and  qualified 
in  a  way  to  accord  with  its  new  position.  Let  us  call  the 
primitive  thing  perceived  the  thing-experience.  This  thing- 
experience  is,  as  it  were,  the  matrix  from  which  the  more 
specialized  percept  and  physical  object  of  science  develop. 
In  the  sections  devoted  to  the  distinction  between  the  primary 
and  the  secondary  qualities,  so-called,  we  became  acquainted 
with  some  of  the  motives  which  lead  to  this  differentiation 
and  fission. 

Only  after  the  percept  of  psychology  and  the  physical 
thing  of  the  other  natural  sciences  have  been  achieved  does 
the  reflective  problem  of  perception  arise.  The  thing- 
experience,  upon  which  the  external  sciences  build  their 
superstructure  of  measurement  and  theory,  tends  to  be  drawn 
into  the  psychical  sphere  as  fundamentally  a  percept  and  the 
physical  thing  is,  as  it  were,  left  suspended  in  air.  And  so 
long  as  knowledge  is  identified  with  perception  and  is  supposed 
to  involve  the  actual  presence  of  the  physical  process,  it  must 
be  left  thus  dangling.  The  best  that  even  objective  idealism 
can  do  for  it  is  to  give  it  the  support  of  the  categories  and  the 
virtual  image  of  the  ego.  Alas !  a  virtual  image,  like  a  painted 
hook,  will  support  nothing. 

The  other  theory  of  the  relation  of  percept  to  physical 
thing  which  will  repay  consideration  is  that  of  Ward.  He 
begins  with  the  individual's  experience  as  analyzed  by 
psychology,  and  points  out  that  there  is  here  no  dualism  but 
a  duality  of  subject  and  object.  To  use  the  terminology 
with  which  we  are  as  yet  more  familiar,  percepts  are  inseparable 
from  the  percipient  and  are  essentially  private.  In  a  general 
way,  I  think  that  we  can  grant  this  contention.  Upon  this 
position  as  a  basis,  he  seeks  to  show  that  the  constructions 
built  up  by  science,  the  generalized  or  universal  Experience 
with  which  it  is  immediately  concerned  has  grown  out  of, 


NATURAL  REALISM  AND  SCIENCE  47 

depends  upon,  and  is  really  but  an  extension  of  our  primary, 
individual,  concrete  experience.  {Naturalism  and  Agnos- 
ticism, Vol.  II,  p.  153.)  The  conclusion  which  Ward  draws 
is  that  the  independence  which  science  assigns  to  its  objects 
is  a  mistake  founded  upon  a  misunderstanding  of  intersub- 
jective  intercourse.  The  "object"  of  science  is  a  construction 
in  which  conceptual  elements  dominate,  but  the  possessor 
of  this  construct  is  still  the  concrete  individual.  There  can 
be  no  other  subject  of  experience  except  such  an  individual. 
With  this  last  assertion  we  shall  agree  and  shall  give  definite 
reasons  for  our  agreement  in  a  chapter  where  we  shall  deal 
with  the  Advance  of  the  Personal.  But,  if  our  analysis  of 
the  rise  of  reflection  be  correct,  the  independence  assigned  by 
science  to  the  physical  thing  is  not  due  to  a  mistake  foimded 
upon  a  misunderstanding  of  intersubjective  intercourse.  It 
is  more  primitive  than  the  standpoint  of  psychology  and  is 
natural  to  the  individual's  experience.  We  shall  have  occasion 
to  say  more  about  this  problem  later;  at  present,  we  can  only 
fall  back  on  the  examination  made  in  the  first  chapter.  Per- 
cepts are  thought  of  as  in  a  relation  of  onesided  causal 
dependence  upon  physical  things.  Thus  percept  and  thing 
differentiate  themselves  from  the  thing-experience  and  in 
the  course  of  this  differentiation  retain  as  essential  the  contrast 
relation  of  things  and  their  appearances  to  individuals.  The 
exact  nature  of  their  cognitive  relation  is  left  obsciire,  although 
the  implication  is,  that  knowledge  of  physical  things  is  some- 
how based  upon  percepts.  The  sciences  take  the  causal 
relation  between  them  seriously.  And  I  have  as  yet  seen  no 
good  reason  not  to  do  likewise.  The  difficulty  does  not  lie 
in  the  concept  of  such  a  relation,  but  in  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge; if  we  know  percepts  alone,  immediately,  how  can  we 
know  independent  physical  things?  Whenever  this  problem 
is  raised,  the  impulse  is  to  deny  the  possibility  of  such  real 
knowledge  and  to  lapse  into  idealism.  This  is  what  Ward 
does.     Are  not  physical  things,  after  all,  constructs? 

It  is  evident  that  the  working  adjustment  between  psy- 
chology and  the  physical  sciences  is  one  that  has  grown  up 
on  the  basis  of  the  contrast-meanings  of  common  sense  and 
has  been  strengthened  by  the  respective  methodologies  of 


48  CRITICAL  REALISM 

the  two  groups.  It  is  not  one  that  has  a  systematic  episte- 
mology  on  which  to  rest.  Hence,  it  is  helpless  in  the  face  of 
a  determined  attack.  This  we  have  seen  from  a  study  of  the 
typical  groups  into  which  scientists  divide  themselves  when 
they  become  reflective  in  regard  to  their  postulates.  The 
central  group,  which  does  not  despair  of  scientific  realism,  may 
feel  that  it  is  right  or,  at  least,  on  the  right  road,  but  it  is 
unable  to  give  very  cogent  and  definite  reasons  for  the  faith 
which  is  in  it.  If  percepts  are  personal  and  we  know  only 
these  immediately,  how  can  our  knowledge  be  other  than 
personal?  is  a  question  which  rocks  science  to  its  foundation. 
Because  of  this,  it  falls  an  easy  prey  to  idealism,  although 
its  natural  tendency  is  realistic. 

To  conclude,  science  begins  its  development  within  the 
distinctions  of  common  sense,  but  is  forced  to  deviate  more 
and  more  from  the  standpoint  of  Natural  Realism.  Mind 
and  mental  control  become  an  ever  greater  factor,  and  percep- 
tion a  mere  means  to  the  knowledge  of  physical  processes. 
Hence,  when  reflection  upon  the  nature  and  reach  of  the 
knowledge  achieved  by  science  arises,  Natural  Realism  is 
rejected  as  an  outgrown  standpoint.  With  the  relinquishment 
of  this  primitive  attitude,  science  becomes  a  prey  to  doubt. 
While  the  realistic  outlook  still  dominates,  idealistic  motives 
increase  in  number  and  in  influence.  A  compromise  i^v^hich 
consists  in  the  contrast  between  percept  and  physical  thing 
ensues,  but  is  left  vague  on  the  cognitive  side.  Consequently, 
the  problem  of  knowledge  becomes  ever  more  insistent;  until 
this  is  settled,  it  is  felt  that  the  facts  and  theories  of  science 
cannot  be  interpreted.  Doubt  arises  even  in  regard  to  the 
objective  import  of  its  conclusions.  How  can  objects  be 
known  if  they  are  not  perceived?  Thus  science  forces  the 
human  mind  once  for  all  beyond  its  primitive  outlook  and 
gives  the  setting  and  materials  for  the  unavoidable  struggle 
between  idealism  and  a  critical  restatement  of  realism. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   ADVANCE   OF   THE   PERSONAL 

WE  HAVE  seen  how,  upon  reflection,  Natural  Realism 
breaks  down.  The  common,  external  world,  supposedly 
open  to  the  inspection  of  all,  loses  its  definiteness  and  certainty 
and  becomes  more  and  more  hypothetical,  while  the  personal 
element  gains  in  strength  and  assurance.  It  is  the  movement 
of  the  inner,  personal  sphere  upon  the  outer,  common  sphere 
which  we  shall  call  the  Advance  of  the  Personal.  The  Advance 
of  the  Personal  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  idealism,  but  it 
does  result  in  the  recognition  of  the  personal  element  in  knowl- 
edge and  raises  questions  which  cannot  be  answered  without 
a  thorough  analysis  of  the  individual's  experience. 

With  the  Advance  of  the  Personal,  the  old  contrast — 
cherished  in  the  heart  of  Natural  Realism  — between  the  physi- 
cal world,  which  directly  fronts  the  individual,  and  the  inner 
sphere  of  images,  ideas,  and  feelings,  is  reduced  to  a  working- 
distinction  within  the  individual's  experience;  that  is,  within 
the  personal.  The  personal  in  this  large  sense  covers  both 
those  experiences  which  are  usually  considered  personal,  or 
private,  and  those  which  are  regarded  as  common.  The  one 
comraon  world  accordingly  transforms  itself  into  as  many 
worlds  as  there  are  individuals.  Yet  at  this  new  level,  the 
question  as  to  the  nature  of  knowledge  becomes  ever  more 
pressing.  It  alone  offers  to  lead  the  individual  into  a  common 
and  independent  world,  transcending  the  isolation  which  the 
Advance  of  the  Personal  threatens  to  bring  in  its  wake. 

The  application  of  the  term  "personal,"  in  this  generic 
sense,  to  all  experiences  needs  further  examination.     We  hear 
so  much  of  "experience-as-such,"  or  "experience-in-general," 
that  the  assertion  that  experience  is  always  personal,  common- , 
place  as  it  is  from  one  point  of  view,  becomes  radical  if 
pushed  to  its  logical  result.     In  the  following  pages,  I  shall 
seek  to  justify  the  analysis  given  below: 
Personal  Experiences 
Outer  sphere  Inner  sphere 

Social  Private  Social  Private 

49 


so  CRITICAL  REALISM 

Such  a  division,  representing  as  it  does  the  triumph  of  the 
personal  meaning  over  the  social,  or  common,  in  the  outer 
sphere  as  well  as  in  the  inner  sphere,  stands  for  a  pluralism 
which  holds  that  no  two  minds  can  share  the  same  experiences, 
whether  these  be  ideas  or  things,'  This  position  may  be  desig- 
nated mental  pluralism.  It  should  be  noted,  first  of  all,  that 
this  position,  which  logically  succeeds  Natural  Realism,  is  not 
metaphysical  in  character — although  it  may  be  identified  with 
idealism  by  hasty  thinkers  who  are  anxious  to  arrive  at  a 
conclusion ;  it  is,  rather,  a  necessary  and  interesting  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  meanings  in  an  individual's  experience,  preparing 
him  for  a  more  fundamental  attack  on  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge. The  position  involves  a  vital  change  in  one's  outlook  on 
the  world  and  on  the  nature  of  interpersonal  relations.  Again, 
this  reorientation  demands,  not  a  denial  of  the  social  nature 
of  the  individual's  experience,  but  a  reinterpretation  of  the 
social,  which  cuts  it  loose  from  its  customary  associations  with 
Natural  Realism. 

With  these  qualifications  in  mind,  let  us  pass  to  the  reasons 
which  justify  the  division  above.  How  does  the  outer  sphere, 
that  of  physical  objects  as  perceived,  become  characterized 
as  personal?  By  the  aid  of  what  motives  is  this  meaning 
able  to  conquer  in  the  face  of  the  strong  forces  which  work 
for  the  dominance  of  the  social,  or  common,  and — through 
this — of  the  impersonal  and  scientific?  We  must  admit  that 
the  usual  result  of  the  conflict  of  the  two  opposed  meanings 
is  a  drawn  battle  and  a  compromise.  Points  of  view,  quite 
antagonistic,  are  able  to  alternate  in  minds  which  are  not 
critically  reflective.  Because  of  this  lack  of  reflection,  the 
conflict  between  the  personal  and  the  common  is  either  wholly 
unrealized  or  veiled.  It  is  surprising  how  often  even  the 
reflective  resort  to  subterfuges  to  gloss  over  its  existence. 
Logicians,  who  of  all  men  ought  to  know  better,  are  led  by  this 
pressure  towards  the  impersonal  and  common  to  take  its 
existence  in  a  literal  sense  for  granted.  We,  on  the  contrary, 
believe  that  the  reality  of  the  conflict  between  the  personal  and 
the  common  should  be  brought  out  clearly  and  emphasized  as 

1  This  is  another  point  at  issue  between  Critical  Realism  and  the  New  Realism.  It  is  partly 
for  this  reason  that  I  have  developed  the  topic  so  fully. 


THE  ADVANCE  OF  THE  PERSONAL  51 

of  singular  importance.  The  whole  superstructure  of  epis- 
temology  may  turn  upon  the  attitude  taken  toward  this 
question. 

Let  us  examine  again  the  distinction  between  the  thing  and 
its  appearance  to  the  individual.  We  say  that  the  thing 
appears  under  certain  conditions  in  such  and  such  a  way,  i.e., 
it  is  modified  by  factors  as  real  as  itself,  and  we  tend  to  con- 
sider this  appearance  as  almost,  if  not  quite,  as  real  as  the 
thing  itself.  There  seems  to  be  some  vague  notion  of  trans- 
mission or  of  modified  presence.  Consequently,  the  appear- 
ance is  inseparable  from  the  thing  which  appears  and  has, 
supposedly,  the  same  sort  of  reality.  Now  the  characteristic 
attitude  toward  the  thing  is  that  of  realism;  and  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  the  meanings  of  this  attitude  qualify  the 
appearance  also  in  a  hesitant  fashion.  They  meet  and 
mingle  with  the  personal  factor,  although  they  do  not 
coalesce  with  it.  The  term  "appearance"  js  thus  ambiguous; 
it  swings  between  the  common  and  independent,  and  the 
personal.  Accordingly,  to  the  dualism  of  Natural  Realism — 
the  event  of  perceiving  and  the  physical  thing — is  added  this 
third  element,  the  appearance  of  the  thing,  which  seems  to 
intervene  between  the  other  two.  The  appearance  implies 
the  thing,  but  that  which  is  immediately  given  is  the  appear- 
ance and  not  the  thing.  Have  we  good  reason  to  beHeve 
that  appearances  are  necessarily  personal? 

In  discussing  the  appearance  and  its  conditions,  we  must 
perforce  review  some  of  the  groimd  covered  in  the  critique  of 
Natural  Realism.  The  point  of  interest  is  now  somewhat 
different,  however.  We  are  concerned  with  the  personal 
character  and  connection  of  the  appearances  of  things.  We 
must  not  forget,  however,  that  the  method  of  approach 
connects  the  appearance  with  physical  factors  in  a  causal  way 
and,  therefore,  it  must  be  as  real  as  they  are.  And  the 
reverse  is  also  true ;  physical  things  must  be  as  real  as  appear- 
ances. One  cannot  be  accepted  without  the  other.  We  need 
not  recapitulate  the  many  reasons  which  led  us  to  hold  that 
percepts  or  appearances  are  psychical.  We  also  leave  it  as  a 
later  problem,  to  be  met  frankly,  to  define  in  a  definite  way 
what  we  must  mean  by  the  psychical. 


52  CRITICAL  REALISM 

We  have  already  warned  the  reader  against  the  misuse  of 
the  Advance  of  the  Personal  characteristic  of  the  idealist. 
Because  appearances  are  personal  and  intervene  between  the 
individual  percipient  and  the  physical  thing,  it  does  not 
follow  that  we  have  any  less  reason  to  believe  in  the  existence 
of  the  physical  thing.  An  effect  cannot  be  more  real  than  the 
cause.  So  long  as  we  retain  the  contrast,  we  must  remain 
realists.  The  interesting  thing  is  that  we  are  no  longer  certain 
how  we  can  become  aware  of  physical  objects.  We  supposed 
that  we  were  immediately  aware  of  them,  but  we  now  realize 
that  such  an  apprehension  is  impossible.  The  common-sense 
antithesis  between  a  thing  and  its  appearance  is  now  seen  to 
hold  between  a  standard  appearance  and  a  secondary  appear- 
ance. It  is  thus  a  contrast  within  the  individual's  experience 
which  masquerades  as  one  between  an  independent  real  and 
its  appearance  to  the  individual.  Yet  these  couples  have  this 
much  in  common,  that  they  are  connected  internally  by  a 
causal  relation.  That  which  is  immediately  apprehended  does 
not  prove  to  be  self-sufficient.  The  baffling  fact  is  that 
its  conditions  as  soon  as  we  apprehend  them  turn  out  to  be 
conditioned.  Perception  can  never  reach  the  thing,  but  only 
its  appearances;  and  the  attempt  to  get  beyond  appearance 
in  this  sense  by  means  of  perception  is  quite  as  futile  as  the 
effort  of  Tantalus  to  obtain  water  to  quench  his  thirst.  If 
we  are  to  arrive  at  physical  things,  it  must  be  by  means  of 
knowledge,  and  knowledge  must  be  other  than  perception. 
We  do  not  as  yet  know  what  knowledge  is,  and,  until  we  do, 
the  doubt  will  not  down  whether  it  is  right  to  assume  that 
there  are  things  of  which  our  thing-experiences  are  appearances. 
Is  not  the  contrast  purely  empirical,  and  have  we  any  sufficient 
reason  to  regard  it  important  for  epistemology  ?  With  the 
breakdown  of  Natural  Realism,  this  doubt  is  bom.  Its 
strength  lies  in  the  identification  of  knowledge  with  presenta- 
tion, which  it  inherits  from  the  older  view.  So  long  as  the 
theory  of  knowledge  characteristic  of  the  lower  level  is  accepted, 
it  is  impossible  to  understand  how  we  could  ever  know  things 
in  contrast  to  their  appearances.*     The  apparent  strength  of 

'  So  far  as  I  am  able  to  grasp  his  position,  this  is  the  conclusion  to  which  Fullerton  has  come 
in  his  inadequate,  yet  charmmgly  written  book,  "The  World  We  Live  In."  Hence  he  denies 
the  existence  of  anything  but  appearances. 


THE  ADVANCE  OF   THE  PERSONAL  53 

Natural    Realism   turns   out   to   be   its   greatest   weakness. 

In  order  to  leave  no  weak  point  in  our  argument  for  mental 
pluralism,  we  shall  first  seek  out  all  the  reasons  for  the  belief 
that  individuals  cannot  share  in  any  literal  sense  the  same 
thing-experiences.  The  most  natural  view  in  regard  to  the 
affiliations  of  percepts,  and  that  which  has  been  generally  held 
in  both  philosophy  and  psychology,  is  that  percepts  are 
inseparable  from  the  inner  sphere  of  organic  sensations,  images, 
ideas,  and  merriories.  There  are  specific  reasons  for  this 
position,  such  as  we  shall  detail  later,  and  it  is  also  supported 
by  the  feeling  that  an  individual's  experience  is  imitary.  No 
evident  line  of  demarcation  runs  through  our  experience  and 
divides  it  into  that  which  is  common  and  that  which  is  personal. 
We  pass  from  thing-experiences  to  memories  without  sensing 
any  boundary  between  them.  When  we  regard  them  as 
experiences  they  seem  to  stand  on  the  same  footing.  They 
occupy  the  focus  of  our  attention  successively  and  are  qualita- 
tively different  in  content,  but  they  possess  no  labels  which 
mark  them  off  as  private  and  social  respectively.  Inferences 
and  meanings  and  classifications  mingle  so  intimately  with  our 
experiences  that  it  is  not  always  easy  to  separate  the  secondary 
from  the  primary.  But  when  this  is  done  by  dint  of  effort,  it 
is  realized  that,  at  first,  the  individual's  experiences  come 
neither  as  common  nor  as  personal,  i.e.,  that  they  do  not 
possess  either  qualification  as  an  indelible  and  primitive 
attribute.  Hence,  the  conclusion  that  the  division  of  the 
individual's  experience  into  spheres,  one  of  which  is  consid- 
ered private  and  the  other  common,  is  the  result  of  judgment 
and  may,  therefore,  be  wrong  or  wrongly  interpreted.  Let  us 
examine,  then,  the  reasons  for  regarding  percepts  as  per- 
sonal and  intimately  connected  with  the  inner  sphere  of 
feelings  and   dispositions. 

Percepts  are  judged  to  be  dependent  on  the  position  of  the 
individual's  body.  When  A  stands  ten  feet  away  from  an 
object  and  B  only  two  feet,  they  have  decidedly  different 
thing-experiences.  This  difference  in  the  content  of  their 
experiences  they  become  aware  of  by  conversation  or  by 
interchange  of  place.  The  percept  is,  accordingly,  considered 
a  function  of  the  position  of  the  body;  and  since  no  two 


54  CRITICAL  REALISM 

individuals  can  have  exactly  the  same  position,  their  percepts, 
or  thing-experiences,  must  differ. 

Again,  percepts  are,  in  some  sense,  functions  of  the  sense- 
organs  involved.  Physiology  and  psychology,  by  means  of 
their  detailed  studies,  have  made  this  mediation  undeniable; 
yet  common  sense,  also,  is  aware  of  this  dependence.  We 
need  not  enlarge  on  this  connection  since  we  have  discussed 
it  already  in  another  context.  But  the  sense-organs  of 
individuals  are  as  distinct  numerically  as  their  bodies.  Must 
not,  then,  their  percepts  be  numerically  distinct?  Once 
Natural  Realism  is  given  up  and  mediation  is  accepted,  thing- 
experiences  multiply  until  they  equal  the  percipients  in  num- 
ber. Even  were  they  alike  in  content,  they  would  be  numeri- 
cally separate.  And  it  is,  besides,  very  improbable,  to  say  the 
least,  that  the  sense-organs  of  even  two  individuals  would  be 
functionally  identical;  rather  is  the  similarity  which  exists 
between  the  percepts  of  individuals  to  be  considered  remarkable 
and  explainable  only  by  the  delicacy  of  heredity. 

Furthermore,  percepts  are  functions  not  only  of  the  position 
of  the  body  and  of  the  activity  of  the  sense-organs  but  also 
of  the  nervous  system.  The  statement  that  percepts  are 
functions  of  the  brain  need  not  be  interpreted  to  mean  that 
a  causal  relation  exists  between  them.  Experiment  and 
observation  have  rendered  undeniable  simply  the  fact  that 
percepts  are  functions  of  the  brain,  using  the  term,  function, 
in  its  mathematical  sense.  If  so,  percepts  must  be  as  distinct 
numerically  as  individuals  are. 

Psychology  teaches  us  that  percepts  are  conditioned  not 
only  by  purpose  and  interest,  but  also  by  the  past  experience 
of  the  individual  percipient.  It  is  at  this  point  that  the 
modem  idealist  must  modify  Berkeley's  doctrine  of  the  origin 
of  percepts  (ideas).  They  cannot  be  merely  passive  effects 
produced  in  finite  spirits  by  external  agency;  effects,  in  a 
qualified  sense,  of  external  agency  they  must  be,  but  the 
individual's  mind  is  a  co-factor  in  their  production.  The 
stimulus  passes  into  this  new  and  denser  medium  and  is  trans- 
formed. A  percept,  in  other  words,  is  an  achievement  and 
not  a  mere  gift.  It  is  the  product  of  past  attempts  to  har- 
monize more  or  less  conflicting  data  and  can  be  understood 


THE  ADVANCE  OF   THE  PERSONAL  55 

only  when  treated  historically.  The  recognition  that  a  per- 
cept involves  the  time-factor  led  formerly  to  the  view  that  it 
was  a  concretion  of  sensations  and  images.  Such  a  theory 
does  not  do  justice  to  the  unity  and  the  purposive  character 
of  the  percept.  So  far  as  the  situation  permits,  they  are 
standardized  and  moulded  upon  the  dominant  meanings 
which  rule  the  physical  world  as  man  thinks  it.  Percepts, 
in  short,  imitate  things;  they  absorb  inferential  elements  and, 
as  they  do  so,  pass  progressively  from  the  transiency  of  sen- 
sation to  the  apparent  perdurableness  of  objects.  Because 
of  this  standardization,  however,  the  type  tends  to  override 
divergencies  and  peculiarities.  The  percipient  both  omits 
and  adds.  Impressionistic  art  represents  a  revolt  against 
this  inevitable  tendency  to  perceptual  habits,  much  as  realism 
in  literature  seeks  to  force  attention  to  life  as  it  is  in  con- 
tradistinction to  what  complacent  optimism  dreams  that  it 
is.  Our  conclusion  must  be  that  percepts  are  constructions 
which  have  a  history,  and  this  history  makes  their  abstraction 
from  individual  minds  factually  impossible.^ 

Once  more,  the  capacity  for  fine  motor  adjustments  and 
manipulations  varies  widely.  This  fact  is  so  patent  and  so 
generally  recognized  that  I  need  not  defend  it  in  detail.  Now, 
percepts  are  more  intimately  related  to  the  motor  side  of 
experience  than  is  supposed  by  those  who  have  not  given  atten- 
tion to  the  problem.  Percepts  are  sensori-motor  products. 
Even  Kant  saw  that  our  perception  of  space  could  not  be 
separated  from  the  fact  of  movement.  What  may  be  called 
the  sensory  content  of  our  percepts  is  important, — I  do  not 
wish  to  be  understood  to  belittle  it, — but  so  are  the  meanings 
which  arise  in  connection  with  our  bodily  activities  and  motor 
adjustments  to  stimuli.  Here  again,  we  are  face  to  face  with 
individual  factors  in  perception  which  even  the  idealist  must 
recognize  and  somehow  explain.  Evidently,  perception  is 
not  a  mere  passive  presentation,  but  a  construction  whose 
genetic  elements  can  be  partially  traced. 

Finally,  let  us  call  to  mind  that  percepts  are  continuous 
with  feelings  and  with  the  so-called  organic  sensations.     The 

1  Bergson's  value  as  a  thinker  rests  in  large  measure  upon  his  recognition  of  the  personal  in 
experience. 


56  CRITICAL  REALISM 

impressive  growth  of  the  impersonal  mechanical  view  of 
physical  nature  has  operated  in  the  direction  of  an  expulsion 
of  feeling.  Once  vaguely  objective,  feeling  is  now  considered 
subjective  or  personal.  Science  regarded  it  as  a  fog  which 
the  sun  of  reason  must  drive  from  the  face  of  things.  Artist 
and  poet  have  protested  in  vain  against  this  rejection  of  the 
veil  of  feeHng- values  which  for  so  long  draped  nature.  We 
are  not  concerned  at  present  with  the  truth  of  either  side, — in 
a  sense  both  views  are  true, —  but  with  the  relation  of  the 
problem  to  perception.  Is  not  the  distinction  of  the  scientist 
a  logical  one  ruled  by  a  purpose?  Do  not  inference  and 
cognitive  meanings  dominate  in  it?  Can  it,  therefore,  be 
retroactive  and  dictate  to  perception  as  such?  To  answer  the 
last  question  in  the  affirmative  is  to  be  non-empirical.  Per- 
cepts are  certainly  suffused  with  the  individual's  feelings.  The 
winds  sound  cold  in  March  even  while  we  are  in  well 
heated  houses.  But  how  can  this  be  if  there  exists  a  chasm 
between  percept  and  feeling?  Yet  feelings,  although  objec- 
tive so  far  as  immediate  experience  is  concerned,  are  universally 
accounted  personal.  Again,  an  argument  from  continuity  can 
be  employed  from  the  side  of  the  organic  sensations  to  indicate 
the  personal  character  of  percepts.  In  a  sense,  this  mode  of 
approach  supplements  the  argument  from  feeling  because 
of  the  .seeming  closeness  of  organic  sensation  and  feeling. 
Granted  that  the  clearness  and  discriminative  distinctness  of 
the  sense-basis  of  percepts  increases  as  we  pass  from  organic 
sensation  to  the  olfactory,  gustatory,  auditory,  and  visual 
fields,  is  there  a  psychological  or  a  biological  reason  to  assert 
a  discontinuity  in  the  series?  When  used  cognitively  they 
may  give  us  information  about  different  objects,  but  that  is 
not  the  point  in  question.  If  there  is  no  break,  then  one 
end  of  the  series  cannot  be  personal  while  the  other  is  common. 
The  closer  examination  of  perception  has  thus  confirmed 
the  Advance  of  the  Personal.  Every  percept  has  unique 
conditions  which  cannot  be  duplicated.  The  position  of  the 
individual,  the  distance  from  the  object,  the  structure  of  the 
sense-organs,  the  activity  of  the  nervous  system  are  some  of 
the  physical  conditions  of  the  percept  which  render  it  unique. 
Here   we   evidently    advance   from   the   impersonal    to   the 


THE  ADVANCE  OF   THE  PERSONAL  57 

personal,  from  nature  as  it  is  in  itself  to  nature  as  it  appears 
to  the  individual.  The  past  history  of  the  individual,  his 
dominant  interests,  the  particular  purpose  and  mental  context 
of  the  time  also  play  their  part  as  conditions  which  he  who 
is  skeptical  of  the  external  factors  must  admit.  A  glance  at 
both  sets  of  conditions  brings  into  prominence  the  individual 
reference.  Psychology  has  long  recognized  the  personal  char- 
acter of  the  percept  and  so,  usually,  has  philosophy,  except 
where  the  problem  of  common  knowledge  has  made  it 
timorous.  We  may  conclude,  therefore,  that  percepts  are 
personal  and  that  the  external  world,  so  far  at  least  as  it  is 
immediately  experienced,  differs  from  individual  to  individual. 
No  two  individuals  can  possibly  have  numerically  the  same 
thing-experiences,  even  though  it  works  ordinarily  to  make 
that  assumption,  as  we  have  seen  in  our  descriptive  study 
of  Natural  Realism. 

A  further  question  might  be  raised  at  this  point  because 
of  its  epistemological  interest  and  because  of  a  curiosity  we 
all  feel  in  regard  to  the  experiences  of  other  persons.  How 
far  are  the  thing-experiences  of  individuals  similar  when  had 
under  like  conditions?  Probably  the  natural  tendency  is 
to  assume  a  greater  similarity  than  actually  exists.  This  is 
because  we  are  outward-looking  and  ruled  by  general  terms 
and  interests.  We  live  in  a  world  of  meanings  and  indications 
rather  than  in  a  world  of  concrete  content.  The  merely  per- 
ceptual is  incommunicable  in  much  the  way  that  feeling  is, 
and  drops  into  the  background  when  the  situation  stresses 
the  social.  General  terms  and  purposes  are  like  coarse  sieves: 
they  allow  the  finer,  more  individual,  phases  to  escape.  The 
greater  part  of  our  lives  we  are,  perhaps,  unaware  of  this 
waste  in  transmission  from  self  to  self,  yet  a  little  reflection 
would  surely  make  us  conscious  of  it.  The  poet  delights  us 
because  he  can  transmit  his  experience  better  than  we  can 
ours,  and  also  because  his  experience  is  fuller  and  more  varied. 
His  words  absorb,  as  it  were,  the  delicate  nuances  of  feeling 
and  perception  and  make  them  capable  of  transference.  But 
even  while  rendering  his  experiences,  in  a  sense  common 
property,  he  convinces  us  of  their  uniqueness.  The  artist 
gives  humanity  a  voice,  but  at  the  same  time  deepens  its 


58  CRITICAL  REALISM 

isolation.  Now  what  the  artist  accomplishes  without  pur- 
posing it,  the  philosopher  must  do  reflectively.  He  must 
force  upon  mankind  a  sense  of  the  personal  source  of  knowledge. 
We  have  seen  that  the  external  conditions  of  perception  can 
be  only  partially  duplicated.  This  approximation  is  much 
less  attainable  as  regards  the  internal,  or  historical,  conditions. 
To  what  degree  are  the  brains  of  individuals  similar?  Their 
past  history?  Their  dominant  interests?  Their  purposes? 
Were  all  the  effective  conditions  similar,  we  should  be  forced 
to  postulate  the  similarity  of  the  results.  But  how  can  this 
be?  The  universe  appears  to  focus  itself  in  a  multiplicity  of 
centres  qualitatively  different  in  character — how  different  it 
is  for  experience  to  say.  Since  we  cannot,  if  our  argument 
for  the  Advance  of  the  Personal  hold,  place  two  percepts  side 
by  side  to  compare  them  when  they  exist  in  separate  minds, 
we  are  left  with  only  indirect  means,  such  as  language  and 
conduct,  to  judge  their  similarity.  How  far  such  instruments 
carry  us  towards  a  solution  of  this  problem  must  remain  an 
open  question. 

Thus  far  the  Advance  of  the  Personal  upon  the  outer 
sphere  has  been  successful.  It  is  true  that  the  common, 
or  impersonal,  has  retreated  in  good  order  and  taken  up  its 
position  in  the  physical  world  of  which  the  individual  is 
supposed  to  have  percepts,  but  such  a  retreat  is  an  irretrievable 
disaster  for  Natural  Realism.  If  realism  is  to  be  saved,  it 
must  disembarass  itself  of  its  immediatism;  i.e.,  the  physical 
object  can  no  longer  be  regarded  as  immediately  present  in 
perception.  Unfortunately,  idealism  has  too  often  considered 
the  Advance  of  the  Personal  a  final  stage  instead  of  a  reflective 
movement  which  clears  the  ground  for  the  real  struggle 
between  idealism  and  a  mediate  realism.  The  problem  passes 
from  perception  to  conception.  The  query  will  no  longer  down 
whether  the  things  of  the  physical  world  of  which  science  speaks, 
in  which  the  meanings  "common"  and  "independent "  take  ref- 
uge, are  not  ideals,  types  even  more  of  the  nature  of  constructs 
than  our  percepts  are.  Science,  as  we  saw,  is  inclined  more 
and  more  to  admit  that  its  objects  are  conceptual  and  not 
perceptual;  but  it  asserts  that,  if  they  are  constructs  they  are 
constructs  controlled  by  facts  and  necessary  methods.     The 


THE  ADVANCE  OF   THE  PERSONAL  59 

more  consciously  and  fearlessly  science  moves  to  this  new 
standpoint  away  from  common  sense,  the  more  it  disagrees 
with  the  statement  of  Hume,  "We  do  not,  generally  speaking, 
suppose  external  objects  to  be  different  from  our  perceptions; 
but  only  attribute  to  them  different  relations,  connections  and 
durations."  {Treatise,  p.  68.)  We  do,  in  science,  assign  to 
things  relations,  connections,  and  durations  different  from 
those  we  assign  to  our  percepts;  but  we  also  judge  that  they 
are  different  in  other  regards.  The  Advance  of  the  Personal 
upon  the  world  as  perceived  has,  therefore,  done  two  things: 
It  has  brought  out  in  a  tensional  way  the  distinction  between 
the  impersonal  process  of  nature  and  the  individual's  personal 
percepts;  and  it  has  made  idealism  a  possibility. 

The  level  at  which  we  have  arrived  can  be  illustrated 
very  well  by  the  following  example.  "When  ten  men  look  at 
the  sun  or  moon,"  said  Reid,  "they  all  see  the  same  individual 
object."  "But  not  so,"  Hamilton  replies,  "the  truth  is  that 
each  of  these  persons  sees  a  different  object."  (Quoted  from 
V^ 0x6! s  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  Vol.  II,  p.  165.)  Evidently, 
the  two  Scottish  philosophers  occupy  different  standpoints. 
How  shall  we  characterize  them?  Ward's  interpretation 
follows  his  theory  of  the  relation  between  the  individual  expe- 
rience and  the  common  empirical  knowledge  of  the  race — 
"Experience"  with  a  capital  E.  Individual  experience  is 
primary  and  antedates  intersubjective  intercourse,  but  is 
corrupted  by  the  latter.  Psychology  deals  with  experience 
in  the  first  sense,  the  living  experience  of  a  given  individual; 
natural  science  with  Experience-in-general.  Let  us  now  note 
his  application  of  this  theory  to  the  divergent  positions  of 
Hamilton  and  Reid.  "It  is  obvious  that  they  are  here  at 
different  standpoints:  Reid  at  that  of  universal,  Hamilton 
at  that  of  individual,  experience.  In  Hamilton's  sense,  not 
one  of  the  ten  sees  the  sun;  in  Reid's,  'the  same  individual 
object'  which  all  mean  is  not  equivalent  to  the  immediate 
experience  of  any  one.  Hamilton  is  right  in  so  far  as  each 
concrete  experience  has  its  own  concrete  object;  Reid  in  so 
far  as  common  experience  relates  all  these  concrete  objects  to 
one  phenomenon."  Is  this  interpretation,  which  chimes  in 
with  his  own  distinctions,  the  right  one  ?    Hamilton's  position 


6o  CRITICAL  REALISM 

is  correctly  assigned,  it  represents  what  we  have  designated 
the  Advance  of  the  Personal.  But  does  Reid's  statement 
reflect  the  attempted  foundation  of  a  realism  which  admits  the 
multiplicity  of  individual  thing-experiences  and  seeks  to 
transcend  them?  Or  is  it  more  expressive  of  Natural  Realism? 
Now  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Hamilton's  position  represents 
a  step  in  advance  of  Reid;  he  saw  the  complexity  of  the 
problem  of  perception  as  the  philosopher  of  common  sense  did 
not.  Hence,  the  more  plausible  explanation  of  these  two 
contradictory  statements  is  to  regard  them  as  representing 
two  levels  in  reflective  development  instead  of  individual  and 
universal  experience  respectively.  Man  begins  with  a  realism, 
and  only  afterwards,  as  a  result  of  the  contradictions  which 
arise,  does  he  realize  that  thing-experiences  are  unique  for 
each  individual.  Ward  begins  with  the  organic  character 
of  the  individual's  experience  and  seeks  to  explain  the  rise 
of  dualism  by  a  misconception..  His  argument  seems  to 
us  ungenetic.  The  isolation  of  the  fields  of  experience  of 
individuals  is  a  fact  of  which  knowledge  is  only  slowly 
achieved. 

A  large  share  of  the  difficulty  experienced  in  discussions  of 
perception  is  due  to  the  associations  of  the  term.  There  is  a 
reference  to  that  which  perceives,  to  an  act  or  event  called 
perception  and  to  that  which  is  perceived.  Common  sense 
assumes  that  it  is  the  individual  who  perceives,  and  that  it 
is  something  as  real  as  the  individual  which  is  perceived. 
Perception  is  thus  an  act  which  holds  of  the  individual  as  a 
whole.  But  the  psychologist  thinks  of  perception  as  a  process 
which  goes  on  in  the  mind  of  the  individual,  and  this  process 
includes  the  self  which  perceives  and  the  presentation  which  is 
perceived.  The  self  is  no  longer  to  be  identified  with  the 
individual  as  a  whole.  Such  a  process  is  the  event  of  percep- 
tion which  is  caused  by  the  interaction  of  the  psycho-physical 
organism  and  a  stimulus  from  the  physical  world.  The 
question  which  confronts  us  is  this :  Must  we  give  up  the  view 
of  perception  encouraged  by  Natural  Realism  and  adopt  that 
held  by  psychology? 

Suppose  we  now  take  it  as  proved  that  two  individuals 
cannot  have  the  same  thing-experiences;  how  do  they  discover 


THE  ADVANCE  OF   THE  PERSONAL  6i 

a  correspondence  between  them,  and  why  do  they  tend  to 
regard  them  as  identical? 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  question  presupposes  interpersonal 
intercourse  although  it  does  not  prejudice  its  nature  and 
extent,  which  remains  a  purely  empirical  problem.  We  have 
already  emphasized  the  fact  that  individuals  are  not  in  a 
position  to  ascertain  how  extensive  the  divergence  in  texture 
of  their  thing-experiences  may  be,  except  in  extreme  cases  like 
color-blindness,  because  they  cannot  place  their  experiences 
side  by  side  for  comparison  as  they  can  two  of  their  own. 
Hence,  they  are  compelled  to  resort  to  tests  of  grouping  and  of 
arrangement  in  series.  Ultimately,  these  tests  base  them- 
selves on  perceived  spatial  relations  whose  correspondence  is 
taken  for  granted.  These  spatial  relations  themselves  are, 
however,  founded  on  organic  activities.  When  two  people  walk 
together  or  lift  up  their  hands  together,  they  cannot  doubt 
the  correspondence  of  these  movements.  Correspondence 
along  this  line  has,  moreover,  its  pragmatic  tests.  Movements 
are  overt,  and  people  can,  therefore,  come  to  an  agreement 
in  regard  to  them.  Interpreted  activities  are  the  primary 
source  of  communication.  The  commimication  of  adults  is 
ordinarily  so  satisfactorily  mediated  by  language  that  we  are 
likely  to  forget  this  fact,  but  observation  of  young  children 
brings  it  home  to  us.  To  return,  then,  to  other  than  broad 
spatial  correspondences:  if,  for  example,  the  sound,  b,  is 
experienced  by  one  individual  as  higher  in  pitch  than  the 
sound,  a,  and  the  corresponding  sound,  h'  is  experienced  by 
another  individual  as  higher  than  a\  this  serial  relation  is 
considered  a  test  for  the  absolute  quality  of  the  sounds  in  their 
experience.  Likewise,  if  the  colors  in  the  spectrum  are 
grouped  for  me  in  an  order  correspondent  to  their  arrangement 
for  you,  our  terminology  will  agree.  Theoretically,  at  least, 
the  name  is  determined  by  the  spatial  order  and  not  by  the 
colors.  If  I  saw  green  where  another  saw  yellow  and  yellow 
where  he  saw  green,  we  would  be  unable  to  discover  the 
exchange.  What  reason,  then,  have  we  to  believe  that  nature 
is  clothed  for  different  individuals  in  the  same  colors?  So 
long  as  the  corresponding  thing-experiences  had  always  the 
corresponding  color,  no  matter  what  this  color  might  be,  the 


62  CRITICAL  REALISM 

difference  in  the  color-quality  could  not  be  detected.  Now, 
correspondences  are  only  roughly  examined  in  practical  life. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  color-blindness  remained  unremarked 
for  so  long  a  time.  More  accurate  examination,  accompanied 
by  attempts  at  reproduction  as  in  painting  and  in  music, 
usually  discloses  differences  that  had  not  been  noticed.  The 
world  of  the  artist  has  more  and  finer  gradations  than  that 
of  the  ordinary  man  who  has  neither  his  training  nor  his 
natural  capacity  for  distinguishing  delicate  tones.  But  lack 
of  fine  chromatic  and  auditory  distinctions  represents  only  one 
extreme.  It  is  quite  possible  that  the  color,  sound,  and  taste 
experiences  of  individuals  do  differ  in  nuances  that  no  tests  are 
capable  of  revealing  because  they  presuppose  these  experiences 
as  ultimate  starting-points.  The  principle  to  bear  in  mind  is 
that  individuals  can  test  the  content  of  their  perceptions  to 
determine  their  correspondence  only  indirectly  by  means  of 
relations  in  series  or  by  attempts  at  reproduction,  and  that  the 
latter  method  furnishes  a  test  for  discrimination  only.  Such 
tests  rest  upon,  and  are  bound  up  with,  movement  for  which 
passive  content  is  unimportant.  The  perception  of  movement 
is  a  perception  of  a  relation  or  a  successive  series  of  relations. 
Hence,  we  seek  correspondence  and  not  similarity.  In  other 
words,  order  dominates  over  passive  quality.  Recent 
works  on  genetic  psychology  have  rightly  emphasized  the 
importance  of  imitation  in  the  establishment  of  communica- 
tion between  child  and  nurse.  Likewise,  the  behavior  of 
parents,  where  it  fits  in  with  and  continues  the  child's  own 
efforts,  furnishes  a  basis  for  the  child's  interpretation  of  the 
experiences  of  others.  (Cf.  Stout,  Groundwork  of  Psychology, 
Chap.  XIV.)  Our  conclusion  must,  consequently,  be  that 
sameness  or  commonness  as  applied  to  our  thing-experiences  is 
a  meaning  which  grows  up  in  each  individual's  consciousness 
naturally  but  mistakenly.  Since  men  are  not  philosophers, 
any  other  more  reflective  view  could  not  be  expected.  At 
first,  men  believe  that  they  indicate  things  to  each  other 
when  they  point.  It  is  only  much  later — for  the  majority, 
never — that  they  realize  that  they  indicate  by  means  of  a 
gesture  perceived  by  another  the  place  in  that  other's  experience 
of  the  percept  which  corresponds  to  their  own. 


THE  ADVANCE  OF   THE  PERSONAL  63 

At  the  level  of  Natural  Realism,  then,  at  which  we  all 
ordinarily  live,  our  thing-experiences,  which  we  mistakenly 
regard  as  independent  things,  possess  the  meaning  of  same- 
ness. The  very  nature  of  interpersonal  communication, 
as  we  have  seen,  renders  this  attribution  inevitable.  With 
the  Advance  of  the  Personal  over  the  field  of  outer  experience, 
sameness  is  forced  to  give  way  to  correspondence.  When  the 
problem  of  the  nature  of  an  individual's  knowledge  of  other 
selves  comes  up  for  discussion,  the  manner  in  which  a  percept 
is  duplicated  and  treated  as  in  two  consciousnesses  at  the 
same  time  will  be  found  very  interesting.  My  percept  must 
be  substituted  for  yours  in  my  thought  of  your  experiences. 
In  this  sense  only,  are  my  thing-experiences  at  once  personal 
and  common.  Always  they  are  personal, — that  is  the  genus, — 
but  sometimes  these  personal  experiences  are  considered 
common,  sometimes  private.  These  are,  as  it  were,  species 
thrust  upon  us  by  the  social  character  of  our  life.  Let  us  now 
pass  to  a  similar  examination  of  concepts,  or  meanings. 

Developed  thing-experiences  are  full  of  meanings.  These 
meanings  concern  not  only  their  own  individual  content  but 
their  relations  to  other  things  and  to  the  individual  who  is 
said  to  perceive  them.  We  have  examined  the  more  impor- 
tant generic  meanings  which  are  characteristic  of  Natural 
Realism.  It  is  the  presence  of  these  which  made  Reid  regard 
perception  as  an  act  involving  judgment.  In  fact,  no  hard- 
and-fast  line  can  be  drawn  between  perception  and  conception. 
Interpretation  plays  its  part,  but  not  always  consciously  and 
reflectively.  Thus  meanings  mingle  with,  and  form  an  integral 
component  of,  thing-experiences.  Hence,  the  same  question 
which  came  up  for  discussion  in  regard  to  percepts  must  be 
asked  in  regard  to  meanings.  Are  meanings  personal?  If  so, 
the  content  of  knowledge  must  be  personal. 

Let  us  begin  our  investigation  with  space,  which  seems 
to  lie  so  tantalizingly  between  perception  and  conception. 
It  is  this  hybrid  character  which  has  led  to  so  many  fallacies 
in  the  treatment  of  space.  It  is  this  fact  which  has  made  it 
so  easy  to  regard  space  as  common,  even  after  it  has  been  ad- 
mitted that  individuals  cannot  possess  the  same  percept. 
The  late  Professor  James  fell,  at  least  temporarily,  into  this 


64  CRITICAL  REALISM 

error.  And  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Kant  confused  per- 
ceptual and  conceptual  space  in  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic. 
Perceptual  space  is  reenforced  by  active  motor  experiences 
of  relations.  Cooperative  movements  furnish  continual  tests 
of  agreement  so  that  spatial  standardization  and  acknowl- 
edged correspondence  reach  a  high  development.  Space 
becomes  less  a  passive  attribute  of  thing-experiences  than  a 
meaning,  a  tool  for  their  mutual  organization  and  a  scheme 
to  aid  in  mutual  reference.  The  fact  of  its  use  as  a  means  to 
secure  cooperation  stresses  its  assumed  commonness.  Added 
to  this  is  its  lack  of  vivid  content,  the  absence  of  features 
interesting  in  and  for  themselves.  At  the  level  of  Natural 
Realism,  these  semi-perceptual  space  meanings  form  the  web 
of  physical  things.  Because  of  the  profoundly  cooperative 
nature  of  such  a  space,  it  seems  even  more  primary  and 
impersonal  than  thing-experiences  and,  consequently,  resists 
the  Advance  of  the  Personal  with  more  success.  Moreover, 
measurement  enters  to  lift  spatial  relations  beyond  perceptual 
perspective  into  what  science  claims  to  be  knowledge.  We 
must  remember,  however,  that  knowledge  about  distances  is 
not  the  same  as  either  perceptual  or  conceptual  space.  Thus 
a  little  reflection  convinces  us  that  the  hypothesis  of  the 
actual  common  possession  of  space  as  experienced  is  not  re- 
quired. Besides,  when  we  examine  the  spatial  estimates  of 
individuals,  we  are  immediately  struck  by  differences  which 
usually  pass  unnoticed.  Form,  size,  and  distance  are  experi- 
enced differently.  Science  long  ago  discovered  the  fact  of 
individual  variations  in  the  estimation  of  perceptual  space 
and  seeks  to  overcome  it  by  the  superposition  of  objects. 
Furthermore,  psychology  informs  us  that  the  spatial  con- 
tent which  functions  in  an  object  varies  greatly  from 
individual  to  individual.  The  visual  may  dominate  in  one, 
the  kinaesthetic  in  another. 

The  Advance  of  the  Personal  to  the  realm  of  meanings 
involves  an  alteration  in  outlook  at  least  as  profound  as  that 
which  has  occurred  for  the  outer  world.  Meanings  are  even 
more  social  and  standardized  than  percepts,  since  they  are  the 
products  of  cooperation  and  of  communication.  They  imply 
the  past  activity  of  the  race  as  well  as  the  intercourse  of 


THE  ADVANCE  OF   THE  PERSONAL  65 

contemporaries  and  thus  seem  to  possess  an  immortality  not 
granted  to  the  individual.  We  shall  find  the  same  natural 
tendency  to  realism  at  the  level  of  thought  as  at  that  of 
perception.  We  say  that  we  have  the  same  meaning  in  mind, 
much  as  we  speak  of  seeing  the  same  thing. 

The  truth  is  that  we  are  as  dualistic  and  realistic  in  con- 
ceiving as  in  perceiving.  Both  attitudes  are  modeled  on  the 
same  realistic  persuasion  and  have  the  same  genetic  basis. 
Perception  and  conception,  percept  and  concept  are  less 
separated  than  is  sometimes  supposed.  The  distinctness  of 
the  terms  is  not  paralleled  by  like  distinctness  of  the  material 
denoted.  Objects  which  we  perceive  are  at  the  same  time 
conceived.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  object  conceived 
is  looked  upon  as  identical  with  the  object  perceived.  It  is 
only  our  relation  to  it  which  has  changed  markedly — how,  we 
should  probably  be  unable  to  say.  In  one  instance,  we  assert 
that  we  perceive  Mars;  in  the  other  instance,  we  claim  to 
know,  conceive,  or  judge  about  Mars. 

Simple  demonstrative  judgments  like  the  assertion,  "That 
is  a  field  of  rye,"  are  expressed  within  the  realistic  outlook 
of  common  sense.  The  attention  is  riveted  on  a  part  of  the 
landscape,  a  field  covered  with  greenish  growth.  Perhaps 
my  companion  and  I  have  been  unable  to  decide  from  a  dis- 
tance whether  the  vegetation  is  rye  or  wheat.  We  go  nearer 
and  note  the  rankness  of  the  growth  and  its  specific  color  and 
decide  that  it  is  rye.  The  growth  is  now  known  as  a  certain 
kind  of  grain  with  distinctive  characteristics.  These  mean- 
ings cohere  with  the  thing-experience  and  develop  it.  Judg- 
ment is  evidently  not  a  process  which  is  referred  to  the  head, 
but  is  staged  in  the  world  of  things.^  When  once  accepted, 
meanings  are  as  objective  and  common  as  the  thing-experiences 
with  which  they  coalesce  and  which  are  taken  as  common. 
They  are  absorbed  by  the  outer  sphere.  To  use  our  example, 
the  field  is  now  experienced  as  a  field  of  rye.  Reflection, 
having  accomplished  its  function,  drops  out  of  sight,  and  the 
external  world  settles  down  to  a  new  immediacy. 

Communication  so  qualifies  ideas  or  meanings  that  they 
are  from  the  first  suffused  with  the  sense  of  commonness  and 

1  Ideas  are  no  more  and  no  less  to  be  referred  to  the  head  than  the  world  as  perceived. 


66  CRITICAL  REALISM 

social  objectivity.  It  is  our  idea  of  God  or  of  virtue  rather 
than  my  idea.  The  mass  of  people  think  not  as  individuals 
but  as  groups,  the  greater  part  of  their  lives.  At  the  lowest 
level  the  personal  note  does  not  intrude  at  all.  Ideas  are 
vaguely  objective,  and  their  social  currency  is  taken  for 
granted.  We  suppose  ourselves  to  have  the  same  meanings 
and  to  think  the  same  thing.  And  we  do  not  see  any  ambiguity 
in  the  word  "same." 

Thus  concepts  and  ideas  are  standard  objects  of  a  peculiar 
land,  gradually  developed  in  social  intercourse  and  function- 
ally connected  with  a  supposedly  common  world.  It  is  not 
strange,  then,  that  the  attitude  which  we  have  called  Nati^ral 
Realism  is  transferred  to  them  as  a  part  of  their  birth-portion. 
We  are  not  aware  of  any  mysterious  passage  from  an  inner 
to  an  outer  sphere  of  existence  in  judgment.  A  theorist  who 
despairingly  asks  how  an  idea  in  his  head  can  qualify  a  thing 
in  the  real  world  has  distorted  the  assumptions  of  judgment 
by  the  injection  of  false  distinctions.  Things  and  meanings 
must  be  on  the  same  level.  But  we  have  been  led  to  assert 
that  thing-experiences  are  numerically  distinct  and  even  dif- 
ferent in  texture  for  individuals.  Is  it  not  probable  that  this 
distinctness  holds  for  meanings  also?  Cannot  the  meaning 
"personal"  subordinate  the  meaning  "social"  in  the  sphere 
of  concepts  as  it  did  in  that  of  thing-experiences? 

In  the  first  place,  the  matrix  of  meanings  is  perception. 
Of  course  this  latter  term  must  be  taken  in  a  broad  way  to 
include  relatively  immediate  experiences,  inner  as  well  as 
outer.  It  seems,  therefore,  absurd  to  expect  a  change  in 
existential  nature  between  the  plant  and  the  flower.  If  one 
is  personal  the  other  also  must  be.  There  is  no  need  for  us 
to  enter  into  the  genetic  history  of  concepts  and  to  show  how 
analysis,  abstraction,  and  synthesis  play  their  part  in  the 
development  of  concepts.  Logic  and  psychology  have  been 
engaged  in  examining  and  stating  the  steps  and  factors  in 
the  process.  Suffice  it  to  state  that  empiricism  has  won  an 
overwhelming  victory  over  any  dualistic  rationalism.  To 
some,  perhaps,  this  statement  may  appear  dogmatic,  but, 
surely,  only  if  they  confuse  empiricism  with  sensationalism. 
Few,    I   take  it,   would   to-day  defend   innate  ideas.     They 


THE  ADVANCE  OF   THE  PERSONAL  67 

would  accept  Hume's  test,*  with  the  qualification  that  con- 
cepts are  not  mere  copies  of  impressions  but  presuppose  com- 
plex processes  of  analysis  and  of  interpretative  inference. 
Even  so,  the  personal  character  of  the  matrix  must  tinge 
the  product.  We  shall  have  occasion  to  examine  adversely 
the  belief  that  individuals  can  achieve  numerically  the  same 
meanings  when  we  consider  the  postulates  of  logic.  Words 
come  between  us  and  our  meanings  and  lead  us  to  assume  a 
greater  agreement  and  definiteness  than  exists.  That  holds 
here  which  we  found  in  the  case  of  perception;  our  everyday 
purposes  require  only  a  general  identity  and,  therefore,  assume 
a  complete  identity.  This  means  that  their  tests  are  not 
exacting  and  that  there  is  a  natural  tendency  to  assume 
a  literal  commonness. 

Again,  meanings,  like  percepts,  are  in  a  sense  functions  of 
the  interests  of  the  individual;  i.  e.,  they  are  in  active  relation 
with  that  which  is  most  characteristically  personal.  In 
other  words,  meanings  are  teleological  and  reflect  the  point 
of  view  and  dominant  purpose  of  the  thinker.  While  one 
aspect  of  an  object  may  appeal  to  me,  another  feature  or 
relation  of  it  may  engross  your  attention.  When  any  recent 
important  event  is  up  for  discussion  in  a  group  of  men  repre- 
senting different  professions,  it  is  illuminating  to  note  from 
what  different  angles  they  view  the  occurence.  Diversity 
rather  than  agreement  prevails  in  their  counsels.  That 
such  disagreement  is  usually  a  surprise  to  them  brings  out  the 
point  which  we  are  seeking  to  make,  that  commonness  is 
simply  a  natural  assumption  which  men  make  because  they 
are  at  once  outward-looking  and  self-centred.  What  we 
found  to  be  true  in  the  case  of  perception  holds  for  concep- 
tion. Constructs  do  not  develop  of  themselves;  interests 
and  purposes,  usually  of  the  most  practical  character,  furnish 
the  vital  force  and  guide  the  growth.  Those  individuals 
whose  occupations  and  habits  of  mind  are  most  nearly 
alike  achieve  most  similar  results.  Each  trade  and  pro- 
fession has  its  special  concepts  made  upon   the   model  of 

1  "When  we  entertain,  therefore,  any  suspicion  that  a  philosophical  term  is  employed  with- 
out any  meaning  or  idea,  as  is  but  too  frequent,  we  need  but  to  enquire.  From  what  impression 
is  that  supposed  idea  derived?"  ("An  Enquiry  Concerning  Human  Understanding,"  p.  19,  Open 
Court  edition.) 


68  CRITICAL   REALISM 

mutual  interests.  But  the  specialization  of  classes  must  not 
be  thought  to  exclude  those  experiences  and  activities  which 
are  universal  and  give  a  common  bond  of  agreement,  yet  the 
error  of  common  sense  is  to  be  blind  to  the  diversity  and  to 
regard  the  unity  as  a  gift,  not  an  achievement. 

Diversity  and  agreement  are,  then,  limits  between  which 
men  fluctuate.  Common  sense — and  I  fear  she  is  often 
followed  in  this  by  philosophy — overemphasizes  the  agree- 
ment, while  the  poetic  and  the  non-conformist  temperaments 
realize  the  diversity.  The  introspective  and  reflective  per- 
son is  only  too  fully  aware  of  the  isolation  of  mind  from  mind 
and  of  how  unique  and  inimitable  are  the  peculiar  shades  of 
meaning  which  pass  before  his  consciousness.  He  is  less 
dominated  by  terms  with  their  formal  identity  and  persistence 
and  seeks  back  of  the  superficial  uniformity  for  the  living  and 
individualized  movement  of  ideas.  Here  he  comes  in  touch 
with  the  currents  and  eddies  of  consciousness  in  which  concepts 
are  bom  or  in  which  they  are  transmuted.  But  we  must  not 
be  led  into  mystical  lengths.  Men  do  understand  one  another, 
— this  is  shown  by  their  cooperation  and  by  science, — 
although  comprehension  does  not  require  the  toneless  identity 
of  ideas. 

Commonness  in  its  defense  appeals  to  logic,  and  to  logic  it 
shall  go.  Logic,  like  any  other  discipline,  works  within  certain 
postulates  which  require  careful  interpretation.  The  investi- 
gation of  these  presuppositions  is  usually  assigned  to  epis- 
temology.  However,  many  writers  take  logic  in  so  inclusive 
a  sense  that  its  more  theoretical  part  concerns  itself  with  an 
examination  of  the  assumptions  of  formal  and  empirical  logic. 
Recent  usage  favors  this  enlargement  of  outlook.  Let  us, 
then,  in  a  critical  way  investigate  such  of  the  postulates  of 
logic  as  are  relevant  to  our  present  problem. 

According  to  Venn  {Empirical  Logic,  Chap.  I),  the  world 
must  be  postulated  as  being  essentially  the  same  for  all  ob- 
servers. Now  the  detailed  examination  of  the  nature  and 
conditions  of  the  perceptual  world  of  the  individual  which  we 
have  already  made  precludes  the  possible  truth  of  this  postulate, 
unless  the  phrase  "essentially  the  same"  be  interpreted  very 
liberally.     "The  same"  cannot  mean  here  numerical  identity; 


THE  ADVANCE  OF   THE  PERSONAL  69 

it  may  mean  "correspondent  to  the  degree  suggested  by  inter- 
course." The  postulate  becomes,  thereupon,  the  expression  of 
an  ideal  founded  upon  a  purpose,  that  of  intellectual  co- 
operation. It  is,  in  a  sense,  a  fiction  and  must  be  so  regarded  if 
taken  absolutely.  Logic  is  a  normative  science,  and  its  norms 
express  the  perfect  fulfillment  of  hesitating  fact.  This  postu- 
late is,  furthermore,  not  self -interpretative.  Venn  assumes 
that  logic  works  within  the  outlook  of  common  sense,  and  this 
assumption  determines  the  meaning  to  be  given  the  word, 
same,  but  the  break-down  of  Natural  Realism  forces  a  new 
point  of  view  and  with  it  a  new  interpretation  of  the  term. 
The  forward  movement  of  experience,  stimulated  by  the  need 
for  consistency,  can  alone  be  the  interpreter.  Logic,  like 
psychology,  can  aid  this  movement,  but  it  cannot  dictate  to  it. 

After  the  foregoing  discussion,  a  second  postulate  can  be 
treated  more  briefly.  Logic  takes  for  granted  an  identity  of 
significance  amongst  those  who  intercommunicate.  This 
identity  may  be  a  minimum  actually,  and  logic  as  an  art  seeks 
to  increase  its  extent,  especially  by  its  emphasis  on  definition. 
When  analyzed,  this  postulate  dwindles  down  to  the  demand 
that  individuals,  comprehend  one  another.  Such  a  compre- 
hension is  an  empirical  fact  and  must,  therefore,  be  explained; 
but  the  assumption  made  by  some  logicians  that  an  identity  of 
significance  involves  a  numerical  identity^  of  concepts  is  a 
hypothesis  and,  as  we  have  seen,  unwarranted.  It  is  a  crude 
realism  which  refuses  to  entertain  other  possibilities. 

But  the  problem  is  more  complicated  than  at  first  appears. 
The  assumption  of  reference,  or,  in  other  words,  the  question  of 
knowledge,  hovers  in  the  background  and  supports  a  realistic 
interpretation  of  identity.  The  objects  known  must  be  the 
same  for  all ;  else  there  is  no  common  knowledge  and  no  common 
universe.  The  Advance  of  the  Personal  upon  the  field  of 
perception  secured  only  an  outpost,  for  the  independent  object 
separated  itself  from  perception  and  linked  its  fortimes  with 
knowledge;  otherwise  idealism  must  have  resulted.  If, 
however,  knowledge  is  based  upon  concepts,  and  these  are 
personal  and  not  numerically  identical,  what  becomes  of  the 

1  Logic  has  concern,  not  with  existential  or  numerical  sameness,  but  with  sameness  as  exact 
similarity  of  content.     These  two  meanings  of  sameness  are  often  disastrously  confused. 


70  CRITICAL  REALISM 

independent  object  ?  And  how  is  common  knowledge  possible  ? 
It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  reaHstic  tendencies  and 
meanings  of  the  human  mind  have  rallied  round  judgment  and 
intrenched  themselves  in  the  implications  of  knowledge. 

We  do  not  as  yet  know  what  knowledge  is.  Hence  we  do 
not  know  that  it  involves  the  actual  presentation  to  different 
minds  of  numerically  the  same  objects.  Unless  this  be 
assured,  logic  has  no  right  to  insist  that  the  identity  it  sets  up 
as  an  ideal  is  a  numerical  identity.  Either  knowledge  is 
mediated  by  concepts  or  it  is  a  unique  gift  independent  of 
those  constructive  processes  of  interpretation  with  which  it 
has  usually  been  connected.  Once  percepts  are  considered 
personal,  the  intuitional  view  of  knowledge  loses  its  plausibility 
and  must  be  adjudged  a  leap  in  the  dark,  justified  only  by  the 
failure  of  mediate  theories.  And  thinkers  should  not  be  too 
easily  convinced  of  the  impossibility  of  mediate  theories  of 
knowledge. 

We  have  seen  every  reason  to  believe  that  concepts  are 
constructions  of  individual  minds  and  numerically  distinct  for 
different  individuals.  There  are  thinkers  who  oppose  this 
view,  yet  I  am  sure  that  their  opposition  is  based  on  a 
misunderstanding.  Let  me  give  some  further  reasons  for 
my  belief. 

It  is  usually  admitted  that  the  empirical  idea  which  arises 
in  a  mind  when  a  word  is  understood  cannot  be  exactly  du- 
plicated in  another  mind  because  of  the  difference  in  outlook 
due  to  past  experience.  Thus  far  many  of  these  thinkers 
would  agree  with  the  position  advocated  by  me.  But  the  case 
is  different,  they  would  maintain,  with  the  logical  idea,  or 
meaning;  this  is  the  same  for  all  and  is  relatively  independent 
of  any  particular  thinker.  In  other  words,  they  suppose  that 
the  ideal  of  logic  is  realized.  Lotze  went  to  the  extreme  of 
asserting  the  "eternally-self -identical  significance  of  ideas 
which  always  are  what  they  are,  whether  or  no  .  .  .  there 
are  spirits  which  by  thinking  them  give  them  the  reality 
of  a  mental  event.**  (Logic,  sec.  317;  quoted  from  Wolf, 
Studies  in  Logic.)  We  have  here  a  very  good  example  of  a  logi- 
cal realism  which  is  not  much  less  naive  than  Natural  Realism 
itself.     The  nature  of  logical  meaning  has  been  a  disputed 


THE  ADVANCE  OF  THE  PERSONAL  71 

point.  The  basis  offered  by  associational  psychology  was  so 
inadequate  that  strange  theories  like  that  of  Bradley  arose 
— theories  for  which  "meaning  consists  of  a  part  of  the  con- 
tent cut  off,  fixed  by  the  mind  and  considered  apart  from  the 
existence  of  the  sign."  Recent  psychology  has  departed  from 
its  nominalism  and  now  regards  meanings  as  primary.  Mean- 
ings are  empirical  ideas  controlled  and  standardized  by  intel- 
lectual interests.  They  are  products  of  analysis  and  synthesis 
and  are  as  much  mental  objects  as  thing-experiences  are.  To 
consider  meanings  as  psychical  existences  involves  a  change 
of  attitude  and  outlook  which  is  secondary.  Strictly  speaking, 
the  world  of  things  which  they  qualify  becomes  mental  at  the 
same  time.  These  points  of  view  do  not  conflict,  and  the  idea 
as  meaning  does  not  need  to  be  quarried  out  of  the  idea  as 
existence.  Rebel  though  he  was  against  psychology,  Bradley 
could  not  escape  the  tyranny  of  its  special  point  of  view. 
Hence,  meanings  are  considered  homeless,  mere  wandering 
adjectives  which  have  no  abiding  place.  Quite  the  contrary  is 
true.  Meanings  are  unique  personal  experiences  which  are  bom 
in  the  minds  of  individuals  and  function  there.  Ordinarily, 
we  do  not  view  them  as  personal  nor  consider  them  as  mental . 
Why,  we  have  already  explained.  We  move  from  meanings 
to  their  existence,  not  from  existence  to  meanings  released  from 
all  existential  bonds.  Much  of  the  trouble  logicians  have  found 
in  their  treatment  of  meanings  has  been  due  to  their  separation 
of  thing-experiences  from  meanings,  and  to  the  tendency  of 
the  older  psychology  to  keep  mind  to  the  level  of  images  of  a 
bare  and  uninterpreted  sort.  The  remedy  is  a  more  adequate 
empiricism. 

Bradley's  position,  untenable  as  it  is,  is  certainly  an  advance 
on  the  older  tendency  to  hypostatize  ideas.  Such  a  hypos- 
tasis of  concepts  results  from  a  misunderstanding.  Because 
a  concept,  such  as  that  of  beauty,  does  not  concern  itself  with 
time;  it  is  supposed  to  be  timeless.  But  a  thing-experience 
is  experienced  as  relatively  permanent,  although  we  know  that 
it  is  transient.  A  concept,  as  an  object  of  attention,  may 
disregard  time  and  yet  be  as  temporal  as  a  feeling.  When 
we  say  that  we  can  have  the  same  concepts  over  again, 
this   does   not   mean   that   we   have  numerically  the  same 


72  CRITICAL  REALISM 

concepts.  The  truth  is,  that  we  do  not  concern  ourselves  with 
any  identity  other  than  that  of  the  content  which  we  conceive. 
Suppose  we  are  thinking  of  the  abstract  quaUty  whiteness ;  it  is 
an  object  of  a  specific  character  which,  as  such,  has  neither 
spatial  nor  temporal  relations.  We  can  think  of  this  object 
again  and  again  just  as  we  can  think  of  a  particular  house  or 
of  an  event  in  history.  The  "sameness"  applies  to  the  object 
as  content  which  we  conceive.  The  primary  fact  upon  which 
the  supposed  sameness  rests  is  that  the  idea-object  is  not  quali- 
fied by  any  relation  to  what  is  called  the  act  of  conception. 
The  mechanism  of  the  logical  realism  which  we  are  criticising 
is  exactly  the  same  as  that  of  Natural  Realism.  But  just  as 
that  which  is  perceived  is  qualified  as  permanent  and  common 
although  it  is  only  a  transient  thing-experience  of  an  individual, 
so  a  conceptual  object,  of  whatever  character,  is  also  only  the 
concept  of  an  individual  at  some  moment  of  time.  The 
evanescent  character  of  the  idea-object  does  not  appear  as 
part  of  its  content.  We  shall  better  understand  this  appar- 
ent paradox  later  on.  These  conceptual  objects  may  be  class- 
concepts  or  imiversals,  abstract  ideas,  relations,  events,  or 
particular  things.  The  difference  between  them  lies  in  their 
nature,  in  what  they  are  experienced  as.  As  concepts,  as  per- 
sonal, they  are  on  the  same  level  of  existence.  There  is,  as 
we  have  seen,  adequate  reason  to  regard  them  as  mental. 
If  so,  as  existences  they  would  be  as  temporary  as  thing- 
experiences  on  which  they  are  genetically  based.^  We  must 
call  attention  to  the  fact  that,  here  again,  the  problem  of 
identity  is  complicated  by  that  of  knowledge.  The  social 
motive  is  especially  strong.  Because  these  conceptual  objects 
are  qualified  as  common,  the  tendency  is  to  view  them  as 
independent  of  all  individuals  because  they  are,  when  so  quali- 
fied, looked  upon  as  independent  of  each. 

Another  point:  the  concepts  of  which  the  logician  speaks 
are  abstractions  which  are  seldom  realized  in  thought  under 
ordinary  conditions.  The  sentence,  or  judgment,  is  the  actual 
unit  of  thought,  and  even  this  more  natural  unit  is  bound  up 
with  the  universe  of  discourse.     The  universals  of  which  the 

1  It  will  be  evident  to  the  reader  that  I  am  opposing  all  forms  of  logical  or  Platonic  realism. 
The  "New  Realism"  on  both  sides  of  the  ocean  seems  to  me  guilty  of  believing  that,  because  the 
content  of  a  concept  contains  no  reference  to  time,  the  concept  must  be  timeless.     Does  it  follow? 


THE  ADVANCE  OF  THE  PERSONAL  73 

rationalist  talks  are  too  often  fossils  or,  better,  artifacts  due  to 
a  special  point  of  view.  They  correspond  to  the  objects  of 
living  thought  in  individual  minds  much  as  museum  specimens 
do  to  the  free,  live  animal.  Universals  are  supposed  to  be 
changeless  entities  which  subsist  out  of  space  and  time. 
Nothing  could  be  less  true.  Universals  grow  through  the 
activity  of  minds  in  society,  and  the  concept  of  beauty  of  one 
generation  is  not  that  of  another  age. 

Let  us,  then,  accept  what  the  facts  indicate  and  push 
bravely  ahead.  It  is  obvious  that  our  argument  requires 
of  us  the  frank  acceptance  of  mental  pluralism,  that  no  two 
minds  can  have  numerically  identical  concepts  or  percepts. 
Since  the  problem  of  knowledge  is  not  yet  solved,  this  position 
cannot  be  called  idealistic.  Both  epistemological  idealism  and 
realism  remain  as  possibilities  between  which  a  decision  must 
finally  be  made  after  experience  in  all  its  distinctions  and 
implications  is  understood.  Thus  far  the  result  of  the  Advance 
of  the  Personal  has  been,  epistemologically  speaking,  negative 
more  than  positive.  It  has  tended  to  discredit  the  view  that 
knowledge  of  the  physical  world  is  the  actual  presence  of  a 
real  and  that  the  same  impersonal  real  may  be  present  to 
different  minds.  In  short,  it  has  been  antagonistic  to  Natural 
Realism  and  to  naive  realism.  Still  another  point :  how  shall 
we  restate  the  postulate  of  logic  which  refers  to  the  social 
identity  of  our  meanings  and  judgments?  It  is  a  fact  that 
when  I  make  a  judgment  I  expect  others  who  have  like 
materials  to  agree  with  me.  My  judgment  lays  claim  to 
universality.  Let  us  assert  that  the  judgments  of  individuals 
correspond.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  they  understand  one 
another.  The  degree  of  correspondence  realized  differs  widely 
from  individual  to  individual  and  exact  correspondence  is  a 
norm,  or  ideal,  rather  than  a  fact.  Furthermore,  the  tests 
of  agreement  are  empirical,  and  simmer  down  to  language 
and  action.  Let  us  examine  this  conception  of  correspondence 
a  little  more  fully. 

In  his  larger  Logic  Bosanquet  suggests,  as  a  simile  which 
will  help  us  to  realize  the  paradox  of  reference,  the  follow- 
ing point  of  view.  Suppose  we  assume  that  the  world 
as    known    to    each    is    constructed    and    sustained    by    his 


74  CRITICAL  REALISM 

individual  consciousness  and  that  this  holds  true  for 
each  individual.  "Thus  we  might  think  of  the  ideas  and 
objects  of  our  private  worid  rather  as  corresponding  to,  than 
as  from  the  beginning  identical  with,  those  which  our 
fellow-men  are  occupied  in  constructing,  each  within  his  own 
sphere  of  consciousness."  Unfortunately,  he  is  inclined 
to  regard  as  a  simile  what  we  regard  as  a  fact.  Elsewhere 
Bosanquet  seems  to  consider  the  position  that  the  many 
private  worlds  of  individuals  correspond,  a  conception  from 
which  logic  must  start.  {The  Essentials  of  Logic,  p.  17.) 
He  believes,  however,  that  a  real  system  appears,  differently 
"though  correspondingly,  in  the  centres  of  consciousness  which 
are  ourselves."  Just  here  vagueness  overtakes  him,  and  we 
are  left  with  questionings  as  to  the  nature  of  this  real  system 
and  how  it  "appears"  in  these  private  worlds.  Neverthe- 
less, his  frank  recognition  of  the  uniqueness  of  each  individual's 
world  is  to  be  regarded  a  support  of  the  argument  developed 
in  the  present  chapter. 

The  Advance  of  the  Personal  has,  then,  led  us  to  mental 
pluraHsm.  Minds  have  correspondent  meanings  constructed 
by  their  own  efforts  though  aided  by  cooperation,  imitation, 
language.  From  this  reflective  standpoint,  concepts  must 
be  considered  existentially  personal;  that  is,  always  the  con- 
cept of  some  individual,  even  while  they  are  qualified  as 
common.  Remembering  our  natural  tendency  to  realism  and 
the  secondary  character  of  the  present  critical  perspective, 
we  should  not  be  surprised  that  meanings  are  treated  as  com- 
mon and  rather  impersonal  objects  of  thought  just  as  things 
are.  The  pressure  of  society,  our  knowledge  of  the  social 
origin  of  many  of  our  concepts,  our  dependence  on  the  inherited 
instrument  called  language  with  its  dictionaries  and  authorita- 
tive usages,  the  intimate  mingling  of  thoughts  with  things — 
all  these  factors  work  together  to  suffuse  our  concepts  with 
the  character  of  commonness.  Those  meanings  which  are 
evidently  unique  creations  of  our  own  do  not  obtain  this 
sanction  and  are  held  apart  as  private.  This  subjective 
realm  consists  very  largely  of  those  experiences  which  will 
not  fit  into  the  socially  accepted  objective  domain.  Errors, 
misconceptions,  privately  cherished  ideas,  personal  ideals,  etc., 


THE  ADVANCE  OF   THE  PERSONAL  75 

are  adjudged  private,  while  truths,  estabHshed  theories, 
and  acknowledged  standards  of  right  and  wrong  are  con- 
sidered common  and  objective.  Critical  logic,  then,  as  well 
as  psychology,  is  compelled  to  accept  the  division  of  the 
individual's  experiences  into  those  which  are  considered 
common  and  those  adjudged  private.  From  the  reflective 
standpoint,  these  are  simply  species  of  the  personal. 

A  very  prevalent  confusion  between  social  production  and 
social  existence  is  to-day  to  be  found  in  both  philosophy  and 
sociology.  Perhaps  this  misconception  is  due  to  a  reaction 
against  the  ethical,  economic,  and  political  individualism  of 
the  eighteenth,  and  early  part  of  the  nineteenth,  century. 
It  is  also,  beyond  doubt,  the  result  of  the  objective  monism 
of  science  in  which  individuality  is  lost  in  the  causal  nexus 
of  the  whole.  Assuredly,  however,  a  fallacious  inference 
has  been  drawn.  Social  production  does  not  necessarily 
involve  social  existence.  Because  my  conceptions  are  unthink- 
able apart  from  my  relations  with  my  fellow-men,  it  surely 
does  not  follow  that  they  are  social  possessions  in  the  sense 
that  a  municipal  lighting-plant  is.  Looked  at  genetically, 
my  cerebral  language-centre  is  a  social  product,  but  it  has 
not  a  social,  or  common,  existence.  Genetic  psychology  and 
social  ethics  have  made  a  commonplace  of  the  fact  that  indi- 
viduals develop  within  a  social  environment;  but  it  does  not 
follow  from  this  that  individuals  do  not  exist  or  that  indi- 
vidual and  society  are  aspects  of  the  same  thing.  What  is 
required  is  a  clear  understanding  of  the  position  opposed  by 
these  social  enthusiasts.  One  cannot  but  have  the  suspicion 
at  times  that  they  are  uncertain  what,  precisely,  this  may  be. 
Is  it  egoism  in  the  ethical  sense  of  the  term?  But  egoism  is 
antithetic  to  altruism,  not  to  mental  pluralism.  Is  it  indi- 
vidualism in  political  affairs?  Individualism  has  socialism 
for  its  contrast-term;  and  I  am  sure  that  the  present  position 
does  not  undermine  socialism.  Is  it  solipsism  that  they  fear? 
Mental  pluralism  by  very  definition  denies  solipsism.  What 
is  needed  is  not  vague  statements  to  the  effect  that  individuals 
cannot  be  separated  or  that  they  are  aspects  of  one  another, 
but  definitions  and  analyses. 

Individuals  develop  in  active  relationship  with  one  another 


76  CRITICAL  REALISM 

in  that  organization  which  we  call  society.  Society  is  but  a 
name  for  these  individuals  in  relations  determined  by  their 
needs,  interests,  and  inherited  institutions.  Hence,  to  deny 
the  relations  of  individuals  or  the  part  played  by  social  prod- 
ucts, such  as  language  and  political  and  industrial  institutions, 
is  evidently  absurd ;  but  to  refuse  existence  to  the  individuals 
who  are  in  relation  is  equally  nonsensical.  We  must  study 
the  nature  of  social  relations  to  see  how  far  the  individual  is 
separable  from  them.  While  man  is  by  nature  a  political 
animal,  this  does  not  mean  that  he  perishes  as  soon  as  removed 
from  society,  as  a  fish  does  when  taken  from  its  native  element. 

Let  us  examine  the  terms  "society"  and  "the  individual" 
to  see  how  far  they  are  relative.  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose 
that  terms  have  the  same  degree  of  relativity.  A  subject 
implies  a  sovereign  and  a  sovereign  a  subject.  A  parent  sup- 
poses a  child,  and  a  child  a  pai:ent ;  but  the  implication  is  not 
so  mutual.  The  parent  may  be  dead,  and  the  child  remains 
a  child.  Shepherd  implies  sheep,  but  sheep  do  not  always 
have  a  shepherd.  It  may  be  said  that  the  sheep  enter  tem- 
porarily into  a  unique  relation  with  the  shepherd  but  that 
this  does  not  affect  their  nature  sufficiently  to  warrant 
a  special  term.  Correlative  to  the  shepherd  would  be  the 
sheep-as-shepherded.  In  the  case  of  the  man,  the  occupation 
is  significant  enough  to  receive  a  name.  But  the  man  can 
ttun  to  another  occupation.  The  point  which  this  example 
brings  home  is  the  relative  externality  of  relations.  In  like 
manner,  society  stands  essentially  for  a  system  of  relations 
into  which  the  individuals  enter  from  their  birth  and  in  which 
they  can  best  fulfill  their  being.  But  they  can  be  removed 
from  such  group  connections  and  exist  like  so  many  Crusoes. 
This  isolation  is  possible  because  social  relations  are  secondary 
and  depend  on  biological  and  psychological  individuality. 
But  the  individuals  are  changed  by  their  isolation?  No 
doubt;  their  identity,  however,  is  not  destroyed  by  the 
separation  from  their  fellows.  The  degree  of  alteration 
remains  an   empirical   question. 

The  individual  and  society  must  be  adjudged  only  semi- 
correlatives.  This  result  supports  the  Advance  of  the  Personal 
against  the  objection  that  the  individual  is  an  abstraction 


THE  ADVANCE  OF   THE  PERSONAL  ^^ 

when  considered  apart  from  society.  Such  objections,  which 
are  so  prevalent  as  to  excuse  what  may  seem  to  some  the 
defense  of  the  obvious,  depend  on  the  influence  exerted  by 
abstract  monistic  principles  and  the  confusion  of  social  causa- 
tion with  social  existence.  Certain  pragmatists  who  wish 
to  escape  all  suspicion  of  solipsism  are  the  worst  offenders  at 
present.  The  following  passage  illustrates  very  well  what 
I  mean.  "Not  only  in  its  origin,  but  in  its  continued  develop- 
ment and  operation  must  it  [the  individual  consciousness] 
always  be  a  function  of  the  whole  social  situation  of  which 
it  is  born.  However  'private'  or  'individual'  consciousness 
may  be,  it  is  never  to  be  regarded  as  wholly  or  merely 
the  function  of  an  individual  mind  or  soul  or  of  a  single 
organism  or  brain."  Note  the  phrase  "wholly  or  merely" 
which  beclouds  the  issue.  The  confusion  between  social 
causal  production  and  social  existence  is  apparent  in  this 
quotation  from  Dewey. 

The  realization  that  individuals  are  conditioned  in  their 
development,  physical  and  mental,  by  their  relations  to  other 
individuals  and  to  the  products  of  the  cooperation  of  indi- 
viduals in  the  past,  is  but  the  recognition  that  nothing  in  the 
universe  stands  alone.  Individuality  does  not  imply  isolation 
and  complete  self-sufficiency.  The  individual  is  conditioned 
by  innumerable  factors,  yet  he  is  a  centre  of  relations  and  so 
highly  organized  and  full  of  initiative  that  these  relations  lose 
significance  when  he  is  denied.  In  a  word,  individuality  in- 
volves distinctness  and  relative  autonomy,  but  not  separation. 

The  results  of  the  foregoing  analysis  of  the  relation  of  the 
individual  to  society  agree  with  the  more  introspective  con- 
clusions which  preceded.  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the 
facts  stressed  by  social  ethics,  sociology,  and  social  psychology 
are  incompatible  with  the  existential  uniqueness  and  personal 
ownership  of  percepts,  concepts,  and  feelings.  The  Advance 
of  the  Personal  has,  we  may  therefore  conclude,  met  no  objec- 
tion which  is  able  to  stay  it.*  The  worlds  of  individuals  are 
microcosms,  or  small  universes,  which  evolve  side  by  side,  yet 
never  mingle  in  a  literal  sense.     Each  individual  is,  however, 

1  When  we  come  to  realize  that  the  individual  is  more  than  his  changing  field  of  experience, 
this  conclusion  will  be  strengthened  and  at  the  same  time  seen  in  clearer  light. 


78  CRITICAL  REALISM 

sure  there  are  other  minds  and  that  he  can  communicate  with 
them.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  beHef  is  justified  and 
that  the  facts  which  support  it  are  very  intimate  and  tre- 
mendously important  for  the  higher  reaches  of  the  individual's 
experience.  But  the  theory  of  knowledge  implicit  in  Natural 
Realism  is  too  simple  to  account  for  the  essential  uniqueness 
of  the  content  of  the  world  as  experienced  by  different  persons. 
Commonness  is  forced  to  give  way  to  correspondence.  What, 
then,  is  knowledge?  We  have  already  begun  to  suspect  that 
knowledge  is  not  the  actual  presence  of  identical  elements  to 
different  minds. 

Evidently  mental  pluralism  is  a  reflective  advance  upon 
Natural  Realism,  but  is  not  a  final  position.  It  should  be 
regarded  as  a  new  and  higher  outlook  which  enables  us  to 
propound  the  proper  questions  to  epistemology.  Hence, 
mental  pluralism,  as  here  presented,  must  not  be  confused 
with  pluralistic  idealism.  I  shall  now  proceed  to  examine 
in  detail  the  structure  of  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience 
for  the  light  it  will  throw  on  the  nature  of  knowledge. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE   FIELD    OF   THE    INDIVIDUAL'S 
EXPERIENCE 

THE  mental  pluralism  at  which  we  have  arrived  as  a 
result  of  the  Advance  of  the  Personal  is  purely  empirical 
in  character.  One  point  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others  was 
attended  to,  viz.,  the  uniqueness  and  numerical  distinctness 
of  an  individual's  experiences.  Problems  concerning  the 
structure  of  the  total  field  of  the  individual's  experience  must 
now  be  taken  up  and  closely  studied. 

Let  us,  first  of  all,  examine  the  interrelations  of  the  dis- 
tinguishable elements  of  the  field.  Does  any  element  play 
a  dominant  role  so  that  it  can  be  regarded  as  a  sort  of  king 
among  the  others?  In  the  past,  philosophers  have  nearly 
always  selected  the  self  and  given  it  such  preeminence.  For 
idealism,  as  a  rule,  the  rest  of  experience  depends  upon  the 
self  as  the  dynamic  centre  of  experience.  Berkeley,  for 
example,  makes  the  self  the  active  and  creative  pole  of  expe- 
rience; and  Kant  traces  back  the  unity  characteristic  of 
experience  to  the  Transcendental  Ego.  Of  late,  this  type  of 
theory  has  been  severely  criticised  as  untrue  to  the  facts 
and  founded  on  a  priori  notions  rather  than  on  empirical 
analysis.  The  "self"  of  these  theories  is  too  much  of  a 
metaphysical  entity  external  to,  although  supposedly  explan- 
atory of,  the  actual  field  of  experience.  Emphasis  has  shifted 
from  substances  to  processes  within  experience.  There  is 
even  the  suspicion  that  the  unity  of  experience  depends  as 
much  on  the  objects  as  on  the  self.  The  old,  monarchical 
simplicity  has  given  way  before  the  realization  of  the  demo- 
cratic organization  of  that  which  is  actually  given.  The  view 
which  we  wish  to  champion  can  be  brought  out  most  clearly 
by  means  of  a  historical  approach.  This  will  be  made  as 
brief  as  possible  pursuant  to  our  object. 

"What,"  asks  Berkeley,  "do  we  perceive  besides  our  own 
ideas  or  sensations?  and  is  it  not  plainly  repugnant  that 
any   of   these,  or   any    combination    of   them,  should   exist 

79 


8o  CRITICAL  REALISM 

unperceived?"  {Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  sec. /^.)  For 
him,  perception  is  an  operation  which  involves  an  active 
being  variously  called  mind,  spirit,  soul,  and  self.  When 
we  examine  these  terms  more  closely,  we  are  struck  by  the 
vagueness  with  which  they  are  used.  Berkeley  does  not 
distinguish  clearly  enough  between  what  is  immediately 
experienced  and  what  is  inferred,  between  fact  and  theory. 
As  a  result  of  centuries  of  reflection,  the  modem  scientist 
has  become  convinced  that  a  sharp  separation  of  fact  and 
theory  is  a  prerequisite  of  advance.  Otherwise  theory  usurps 
the  place  of  fact,  and  prejudices  dictate  a  closed  dogmatic 
system.  The  philosopher  must  harken  to  this  conclusion  of 
science  and  seek  patiently  for  the  facts  before  he  erects  his 
theory.  Let  us  note  in  what  way  Berkeley  falls  short  of  this 
method.  To  be  just  to  him  we  must,  of  course,  remember 
the  time  in  which  he  wrote. 

Sometimes  a  semi-empirical  view-point  dominates  in  Berke- 
ley, and  the  self  is  spoken  of  as  an  active  agent  of  which  the 
individual  has  an  intuition  or  notion.  Yet  he  does  not  say 
whether  we  always  have  an  intuition  of  the  self  while  we  are 
perceiving.  At  other  times,  his  outlook  is  metaphysical, — in 
the  precritical  sense  of  that  term, — and  the  mind  is  held  to  be 
an  active  spiritual  substance  in  which  ideas  exist.  In  this 
connection,  we  -catch  glimpses  of  Platonic  and  scholastic 
psychology.  Were  we  asked  to  give  a  cross-section  of  the 
field  of  the  individual's  experience  according  to  Berkeley's 
system,  we  should  find  difficulty  in  deciding  what  to  include. 
He  does  not  seem  to  assert  that  the  notion  of  the  spirit  always 
accompanies  the  operation  of  perceiving  and  the  spirit  itself  is 
Essentially  an  entity  which  God  acts  upon  to  produce  "ideas." 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Principles  at  least,  he  maintains 
that  the  notion  of  the  mental  operation  is  always  present  and 
cannot  be  abstracted  from.  "To  have  an  idea,"  he  asserts, 
"is  all  one  as  to  perceive."  We  shall  see  later  that  he  is  not 
quite  certain  what  he  means  by  this  statement.  Is  he 
referring  to  an  experienced  connection  or  to  an  explanatory 
relation?  Again,  there  is  a  realistic  note  in  his  treatment  of 
the  self  and  its  activities.  The  notion  of  the  operation  of 
the  mind  is  evidently  not  identical  with  the  operation  itself. 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE  8i 

To  be  is  not,  in  this  case  or  in  the  case  of  the  self,  to  have  a 
notion  of.  He  takes  a  reahstic  attitude  toward  the  self  and 
its  activities  quite  different  from  the  idealistic  attitude  he 
takes  toward  the  ideas.  We  have  examined  Berkeley  in 
this  detail  in  order  to  bring  out  certain  ambiguities  in  his 
teaching. 

The  extrusion  of  a  dominant,  substantive  self  or  spirit 
and  its  operations  from  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience 
prepares  the  way  for  an  empirical  analysis  of  that  field  as 
free  as  possible  from  presuppositions.  We  are  not  begging 
the  question  of  whether  there  is  a  relatively  permanent  self 
which  acts  and  which  we  can  know,  but  are  only  desirous  of 
starting  with  what  is  actually  experienced.  The  first  ques- 
tion which  logically  presents  itself  concerns  the  empirical 
unity  of  the  field.  That  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience 
has  a  unity,  nearly  everyone  admits;  there  is,  however,  no 
general  agreement  as  to  what  this  unity  is  due  or  as  to  its 
extent  and  nature.  To  explain  the  unity  of  experience  was 
part  of  Kant's  task;  but  it  cannot  be  said  that  he  accomplished 
it.  The  Transcendental  Ego  to  which  he  makes  appeal  is 
an  element  without  experience;  hence,  the  imity  is  a  gift 
from  outside.  Many  present-day  writers  hold  that  the  unity 
of  the  field  is  due  to  synthetic  processes  within  its  own  borders. 
Such  continuities  and  relations  as  are  experienced  are  not 
contributed  by  a  self  which  exists  independently,  but  arise 
naturally  within  what  is  a  continuum  from  the  first.  The 
chaos  of  sense-material  with  which  Kant  started  is  looked 
upon  by  these  thinkers  as  mythological.  But,  if  this  be  the 
case,  the  relations  which  the  understanding,  as  a  separate 
faculty,  is  supposed  to  contribute  are  empirical.  The  result 
is  that  the  individual's  experience  is  regarded  as  self-evolving 
and  as  requiring  no  contributions  from  outside.  This  does 
not  mean  that  experiencing  is  self-sustaining  but  that  it  is 
more  like  an  organism  than  like  a  tapestry  manufactured  by 
activities  alien  to  its  content.  In  other  words,  the  processes 
which  lead  to  the  more  complex  forms  of  unity  are  immanent, 
and  their  essential  features  can  be  traced.  The  tendency 
toward  unity  in  judgment  and  in  reasoning  is  on  a  level 
which   makes   it   open   to  observation.     When   we  examine 


82  CRITICAL  REALISM 

these  closely  we  find  that,  instead  of  dictation  by  a  self,  the 
characteristic  of  these  processes  is  determination  by  the  objects. 
The  truth  is  that  Kant  started  with  a  dualism  between  sense 
and  reason  and  was  never  able  to  see  the  growth  of  experience 
as  it  actually  is.  His  theory  got  between  him  and  the  facts. 
The  only  way  to  do  is  to  make  a  clean  slate  of  his  distinctions 
and  to  trace  the  growth  of  experience  from  stage  to  stage  in 
order  to  discover  what  processes  arise  and  to  decide  whether 
they  require  the  assumption  of  a  synthetic  ego. 

There  are  two  directions  or  dimensions  in  experience 
which  demand  examination.  The  one  may  be  called  the  co- 
existential,  the  other  the  temporal.  The  coexistential  dimen- 
sion concerns  the  structure  of  the  field  at  any  one  time  and 
the  character  of  the  relations  which  connect  those  elements 
which  are  somehow  present  together.  When  we  scrutinize 
the  coexistential  dimension^  of  an  individual's  experience, 
we  have  to  do  with  a  cross-section.  Its  stability  may  be  of  a 
dynamic  sort,  like  that  of  a  wave  whose  material  is  constantly 
changing.  Hence,  the  information  we  gain  from  the  co- 
existential front  offered  by  the  individual's  experience  must 
be  supplemented  by  a  study  of  the  temporal  dimension. 
Elements  and  structures  which  present  themselves  as  primi- 
tive or  ultimate  in  the  coexistential  field  may,  when  so  studied, 
be  revealed  as  products. 

In  the  preceding  chapters  we  have  had  frequent  occasion 
to  emphasize  the  close  connection  which  reflection  indicates 
between  purpose  and  the  object  perceived.  This  dependence 
is  not  perceptually  apparent  and,  therefore,  escapes  the 
practical  man.  A  definite  end  to  be  achieved  dominates  his 
outlook  and  crowds  aside  any  latent  tendency  to  observe 
concomitant  variations  within  the  field  of  consciousness.  Not 
the  selecting  nor  the  factors  which  do  the  selecting,  but  the 
result,  occupies  the  focus  of  attention.  We  are  naturally 
outward-looking  and  this  means  result-seeking.  The  factors 
which  control  the  perceptual  field  consist  of  ideas  and  of 
interests  which  function  more  or  less  unconsciously.  We  do 
not   always   know   why   certain   features   of   the   landscape 

1  Temporalists,  such  as  Bergson,  have  done  fair  justice  to  the  temporal  dimension  of  expe- 
rience, while  the  "New  Realists'  have  emphasized  the  coexistential  dimension.  What  neither 
group  has  adequately  realized  is  that  these  two  dimensions  must  be  taken  together. 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUALS  EXPERIENCE    83 

attracted  our  attention  while  others  remained  practically 
unnoticed.  We  seem  to  move  within  a  world  of  objects  some 
of  which  capture  our  regard  while  others  do  not  and, 
consequently,  remain  in  the  background  like  obscure  persons 
in  an  audience-room.  But  to  describe  the  apparent  exter- 
nality and  givenness  of  the  individual's  thing-experiences  is 
to  repeat  what  Natural  Realism  claims  to  be  ultimate  fact. 
It  is  ultimate  fact  as  a  description  of  the  position  and  status 
of  objects  in  the  coexistential  field.  This  status  involves 
the  presence  of  meanings  and  of  a  structure  comparable  to 
that  which  velocity  of  rotation  gives  to  a  vortex.  The  Kantian 
seeks  to  derive  these  meanings  and  this  structure  from  the 
self.  But  the  derivation  is  as  verbal  as  that  of  consciousness 
from  the  soul.  When  experiencing  is  connected  with  an 
organism  seeking  to  adapt  itself  to  its  environment,  a  more 
plausible  basis  for  these  meanings  and  distinctions  presents 
itself.     Of  this  we  shall  have  more  to  say  later. 

It  has  been  a  mistake  of  the  convinced  idealist  to  read  into 
the  coexistential  field  relations  and  dependencies  which  are 
the  conclusions  of  reflective  analysis.  To  discover  that 
objects  are  thing-experiences,  or  percepts,  and  therefore 
within  the  unity  of  the  individual's  field  of  experience,  and  to 
assert,  upon  this  discovery  as  a  foundation,  that  a  imique 
relation  between  the  self  and  these  objects  is  actually  expe- 
rienced, is  an  example  of  what  I  mean.  Such  an  a  priori 
account  of  the  field  is  to  be  sharply  distinguished  from  the 
result  of  an  empirical  examination.  No  object,  it  is  said,  can 
be  experienced  without  a  subject,  and  no  subject  without  an 
object.  It  is  further  maintained  that  a  unique  relation 
connects  subject  and  object.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  indi- 
vidual's field  of  experience,  imder  ordinary  conditions  at  least, 
approaches  the  form  of  a  "frequency-surface"  in  statistics. 
Cne  part  dominates  the  rest  for  the  time  being  and  the 
other  elements  slope  off  in  a  spatial  or  semi-spatial  coexistence. 
When  the  field  is  predominantly  perceptual  in  character,  the 
object  attended  to  is  seen  in  its  spatial  relations  to  the  sur- 
rounding objects  and  to  the  percipient's  body,  while  other 
non-physical  elements  cluster  vaguely  around  as  somehow 
"together"  with  the  body;  yet,  the  whole  field  is  experienced 


84  CRITICAL  REALISM 

as  present  together,  and  space  seems  to  offer  no  barrier  to  this 
simultaneity.  The  attention  can  hold  in  unity  thing  and 
idea,  or  thing  and  thing  indifferently.  The  basic  form  of  unity 
of  coexistence  in  the  field  is  togetherness.  Within  this  com- 
prehensive, or  elementary,  continuity  more  specialized  relations 
develop.  Certain  of  these  we  must  study  with  care  after  we 
have  considered  the  teaching  of  the  temporal  dimension. 

The  coexistential  dimension  of  experience  must  be  con- 
fronted with  the  teaching  of  the  temporal  dimension.  A 
critical  examination  which  deals  with  process  rather  than 
with  mere  result  has  forced  thinkers  to  qualify  the  foregoing 
description  of  the  empirical  imity  of  the  field  of  experience. 
More  disinterested  inspection  in  which  comparison  between 
different  moments  of  time  is  employed,  has  brought  out  the 
fact  that  the  relations  between  elements  in  experience  are 
not  so  external  as  they  appear  to  the  individual.  He  pays 
attention  only  to  the  finished  result.  Correlations  and 
concomitant  variations  in  consciousness  escape  attention  just 
as  easily  as  they  do  in  what  science  calls  the  physical  world. 
Psychology  traces  the  process,  while  common  sense  looks  to 
the  result.  Now  psychology  has  formulated  and  proved  to 
its  satisfaction  certain  of  these  genetic  or  internal  relations. 
The  law  of  relativity  as  applied  within  the  field  of  consciousness 
is  a  good  example  of  what  I  have  in  mind.  ' '  From  the  moment 
of  its  first  coming  into  being,  the  existence  and  properties  of  a 
sensation  are  determined  by  its  relation  to  other  sensations." 
(Hoffding,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  114.)  What  I  have 
called  perceptual  perspective  is  another  instance.  It  is 
wrong  to  appeal  from  these  inductions  to  the  formal  externality 
and  togetherness  of  things  in  the  plain  man's  field  of  experience. 
What  is  needed  is  an  outlook  which  comprehends  both  dimen- 
sions, process  as  well  as  result. 

It  is  not  our  purpose  to  ask  at  this  point  whether  psychol- 
ogy is  realistic  like  the  other  sciences  and  assumes  that  factors 
are  at  work  which  are  not  revealed  on  the  surface.  This  much, 
however,  is  certain,  that  reflection  and  analysis  are  necessary 
to  the  discovery  and  formulation  of  the  synthetic  tendencies 
and  processes  which  underlie  the  coexistential  field.  We  have 
hinted  that  correlations  of  variables  can  be  found  within  this 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUALS  EXPERIENCE    85 

concrete  togetherness.  Psychology,  for  example,  stresses  ever 
more  strongly  the  selective  nature  of  what  it  calls  attention. 
When  this  term  is  used  empirically  and  not  facultatively,  it 
stands  for  variations  in  the  clearness  of  objects  and  even  for 
their  presence  or  absence  in  accordance  with  changes  in 
interests. 

In  attention  we  have  to  do  with  a  selective  and  inhibitive 
process  in  which  things  are  held  in  systematic  relation  under 
the  dominance  of  a  purpose  or  plan.  The  internal  relations 
of  such  a  system  reveal  themselves  both  in  the  clearness  of  the 
parts  and  in  the  aspects  distinguished.  It  is  only  as  the 
progressive  movement  of  a  system  which  contains  and  generates 
its  own  control  that  attention  can  be  understood.  At  least, 
this  is  true  of  voluntary  and  non- voluntary  attention.  In 
involuntary  attention,  there  is  felt  to  be  determination  by  a 
part  of  the  field  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  flow  of  the 
field  has  had  another  direction.  In  voluntary  attention,  the 
individual  experiences  a  control  according  to  the  ends  which 
he  sets  for  himself.  There  is  thus  a  feeling  of  spontaneity 
which  is  connected  with  the  self.  Working  along  this  temporal 
line,  the  psychologist  has  become  convinced  that  the  whole 
past  experience  of  the  individual  somehow  conditions  the 
coexistential  dimension  of  the  field  of  any  moment.  Does 
not  this  conclusion  suggest  that  the  externalities  which  impose 
upon  common  sense  are  results  and  are  illusory  when  taken  as 
Natural  Realism  understands  them  ?  The  field  of  the  individ- 
ual's experience  is  a  palpitating  unity  of  which  the  only  overt 
and  constantly  present  sign  is  that  which  I  have  designated 
the  togetherness  of  the  elements.  This  result  is  important  not 
only  for  its  own  sake  but  also  from  the  fact  that  it  corrobo- 
rates the  Advance  of  the  Personal  and  thus  strengthens  the 
empirical  basis  of  mental  pluralism. 

Let  us  compare  the  position  at  which  we  have  arrived 
with  the  view  of  the  unity  of  experience  championed  by 
psychologists.  The  dualism  of  their  terminology  must  be 
interpreted  and  discounted,  but,  with  the  analysis  of  science 
and  the  compromise  entertained  in  regard  to  perception  fresh 
in  mind,  this  interpretation  need  offer  no  insuperable  difficulty. 
James  points  out  that  the  actual  object  of  thought  is  very 

7 


86  CRITICAL  REALISM 

complex  and  yet  a  unity.  "But  the  Object  of  your  thought  is 
really  its  entire  content  or  deliverance,  neither  more  nor  less. 
It  is  a  vicious  use  of  speech  to  take  out  a  substantive  kernel 
from  its  content  and  call  that  its  object;  and  it  is  an  equally 
vicious  use  of  speech  to  add  a  substantive  kernel  not  articu- 
lately included  in  its  content,  and  to  call  that  its  object," 
{Principles  oj  Psychology,  Vol .  I . ,  p .  275.)  Common  sense  always 
tends  to  harden  and  to  simplify  the  field  of  experience.  Other 
thinkers  have  noted  and  stressed  the  organization  of  the  field. 
James  Ward,  for  instance,  asserts  that  all  concrete  experience 
manifests  a  centrality  and  an  organization.  To  account  for 
this  synthetic  unity,  he  calls  attention  to  the  part  played  by 
practical  interests;  the  individual's  consciousness  is  conative 
as  well  as  cognitive.  Many  other  references  to  the  advocacy 
of  similar  doctrines  could  be  given,  but  these  are,  I  think, 
sufficient.  They  must  not  be  understood  by  the  reader  as 
appeals  to  authority;  they  are  only  statements  of  opinion 
which  are  worthy  of  consideration. 

The  formal,  or  elementary,  unity  of  togetherness  is  the  pre- 
condition of  the  superposed  unities  of  all  grades  which  arise 
within  the  total  field.  These  rest,  as  it  were,  on  the  surface 
of  this  elementary  unity.  With  the  consideration  of  these, 
we  enter  upon  the  problem  of  the  self  as  the  knower  of  the 
elements  in  the  formal  unity  of  experience.  But  we  must 
first  examine  the  distinctions  which  are  characteristic  of  the 
coexistential  field. 

Within  the  field  of  his  experience,  the  individual  con- 
trasts two  types  of  existence.  These  may  be  called  the  sphere 
of  objects  known  and  the  psychical,  or  mental,  sphere  respec- 
tively. Because  the  plain  man  is  dominated  by  practical 
interests,  the  sphere  of  objects  known  consists  for  him  chiefly 
of  physical  things.  However,  he  is  realistic  and  looks  upon 
these  physical  things  as  independent  of  the  event  or  act  of 
perception.  We  have  seen  that  he  is  mistaken  in  this  view 
when  it  is  taken  literally,  and  we  are  therefore  compelled  to 
regard  this  contrast  as  an  empirical  one,  \vhich,  for  discoverable 
reasons,  has  developed  within  the  field  of  experience.  The 
scientist  carries  the  analysis  and  organization  of  the  sphere  of 
objects  known  to  its  maximum;  but  each  scientist  as  he  does 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE    87 

this  remains  within  the  personal.  The  attitude  taken  toward 
this  sphere  of  objects  known  is  that  of  cognition  or  acknowl- 
edgment; it  is  considered  independent  of  the  mind  of  the 
individual  knower.  When  the  attitude  of  cognition  is  taken 
toward  a  part  of  the  field,  that  part  is  supposed  by  the 
individual  to  be  removed  from  subjective  influences  and  is 
so  qualified.  In  the  preceding  chapters,  we  have  already  noted 
certain  difficulties  which  arise. 

What  is  the  "mind"  as  contrasted  with  the  sphere  of 
objects  known?  And  what  are  subjective  influences?  We 
are  convinced  that  this  contrast  is  one  within  the  field  of  the 
individual's  experience.  Psychology,  logic,  and  philosophy 
have  spent  much  time  in  the  attempt  to  get  a  clear  idea  of 
mind ;  yet  the  term  remains  vague.  Let  us  see  if  we  can  master 
the  confusion  of  standpoints  and  draw  definite  conclusions 
from  the  analyses  made  by  these  disciplines. 

For  the  plain  man,  "mind"  is  a  term  for  the  inner  sphere, 
and  the  contents  of  the  inner  sphere  are  rather  heterogeneous. 
There  are  ideas  and  feelings  and  processes  and  acts ,  and  these 
run  parallel  with  the  world  of  things  known.  The  psychologist 
starts  with  the  mind  as  thus  conceived  and  is  soon  led  to  extend 
it  to  percepts  and  concepts.  Immediately,  it  runs  foul  of 
the  problem  of  knowledge.  The  result  is  a  compromise 
(c/.  Chap.  II).  Psychology  at  its  best  divides  the  mind  into 
processes,  attitudes,  objects,  and  content.  An  example  of  a 
mental  process  is  reasoning,  of  an  attitude  is  belief,  of  an 
object  is  an  idea,  of  content  is  sensation.  By  means  of  intro- 
spection, aided  by  retrospection  or  a  quick  reviewing  memory, 
such  processes,  attitudes,  objects,  and  content  can  be  analyzed. 
It  is  not  our  purpose  to  study  the  methods  adopted  by  psy- 
chology to  achieve  its  ends,  but  to  use  the  results  so  far  as  they 
appeal  to  us  as  sound. 

Now,  psychology  analyzes  that  which  occurs  in  the  mind 
during  the  event  of  perceiving  or  of  thinking  about  an  ob- 
ject. The  scientist,  or  the  epistemologist  even, may  be  inclined 
to  hold  that  there  is  a  unique  mental  act  to  be  called  cognition 
which  terminates  on  the  object  known.  This  is  the  case 
because  his  interest  lies  in  the  object,  and  the  mental  side 
escapes  attention.    The  psychologist  introspects  and  discovers 


88  CRITICAL  REALISM 

that  the  act  is  more  a  process  staged  within  the  structure  of 
an  attitude  than  an  actus  purus  of  an  entity  called  the  mind. 
The  coexistential  dimension  is  blurred,  as  it  were,  at  the 
mental  pole.  It  is  ordinarily  dominated  by  meanings  of  a 
realistic  character,  and  these  assist  in  throwing  the  inner 
sphere  into  the  background.  When  the  method  of  intro- 
spection is  employed  to  correct  this  tendency,  the  scope  of 
attention  must  be  enlarged  beyond  its  customary  limits; 
and   training  is   required  to  make  this  possible. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  answer  the  questions  we  asked 
a  while  ago.  "Mind"  and  "mental"  have  a  broader  and  a 
narrower  meaning.  The  mental  is  that  which  is  opposed  to 
the  object  known  and  is  usually  thought  of  as  an  act  of  the 
self.  Presentative  realists  who  look  upon  the 'object  known 
as  independent  of  the  mind  take  the  mind  and  the  mental 
in  this  narrower  sense.  Because  the  object  is  one,  they 
tend  to  regard  the  mental  as  an  act  of  intuition  simple  in  its 
nature  somehow  terminating  on  or  apprehending  the  object. 
There  are  really  two  reasons  for  this  conclusion.  First,  the 
simplicity  of  the  function  is  reflected  into  the  act  which  is 
supposed  to  perform  it;  and,  secondly,  the  lack  of  introspec- 
tive content  permits  reflection  to  be  guided  by  a  word.  We 
apprehend  an  object;  must  not  the  act  be  one  just  as  the 
term  is?  Presentative  realism  represents  the  testimony  of  the 
coexistential  field  as  this  is  narrowed  to  a  brief  time-interval. 
It  corresponds  to  a  snap-shot  in  which  the  sphere  of  objects 
known  is  emphasized.  When  the  temporal  dimension  is 
introduced  more  fully,  the  mental  act  is  seen  to  be  a  process 
involving  an  attitude  toward  an  object  which  secures  defini- 
tion at  the  same  time.  We  rest  satisfied  with  the  process 
when  this  definition  is  attained,  and  it  is  at  this  stage  that 
presentative  realisms  always  take  a  cross-section  of  the  field. 
We  shall  take  up  this  problem  of  the  character  of  appre- 
hension from  another  standpoint  in  the  next  chapter. 

But  the  object  known,  desired,  or  chosen  exists  in  the 
field  of  the  individual's  experience  if  our  previous  arguments 
are  valid.  Hence,  these  also  can  be  regarded  as  mental  in  a 
broader  use  of  that  term.  When  the  mental  is  enlarged  to 
include  objects  as  well  as  the  psychical  processes  or  acts  which 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE    89 

are  inseparable  from  them,  we  see  the  logical  result  of  the 
Advance  of  the  Personal.  Objects  are  products  of  mental 
processes  toward  which  certain  attitudes  are  taken.  We 
have  no  hesitation  in  extending  the  term  "mental"  to  the 
whole  field.  The  psychologist,  also,  is  inclined  to  do  this, 
but  respect  for  the  postulates  and  achievements  of  the  other 
special  sciences  holds  him  back.  We  may  conclude,  then, 
that  the  objects  which  are  contrasted  with  the  subjective,  or 
mental,  processes  which  terminate  on  them  are  constructs 
and  exist  in  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience  only, 
although  the  individual  regards  them  as  independent.  Inde- 
pendence of  psychical  processes  is  interpreted  as  independence 
of  mind;  but  these  objects  are  still  mental  in  the  broader 
sense  of  the  term. 

It  is  evident  that  the  term  "mental  process"  is  used  in 
two  different  senses  just  as  the  term  "mental"  is.  A  thing- 
experience,  for  instance,  is  the  product  of  processes  such  as 
association,  since  past  experience  adds  itself  to  the  sensational 
nucleus  due  to  the  stimulation  of  the  sense-organs.  A  con- 
cept is  likewise  a  product;  it  involves  the  organization  of  a 
wide  range  of  experience.  But  these  mental  processes  are 
not  experienced  by  the  individual  as  processes.  It  is  the 
product  alone  that  presents  itself  to  view.  Now,  this  product 
offers  itself  as  an  object  of  those  subjective  processes,  such  as 
thinking  and  choosing,  which  are  directly  experienced  as 
along  with  it  in  the  field.  Both  are  mental,  but  they  are 
different  species  of  the  mental.  It  is  because  of  this  differ- 
ence in  character  that  the  object  is  taken  by  common  sense 
to  be  non-mental. 

We  are  at  last  able  to  decide  the  nature  and  the  extent  of 
the  imity  of  the  field  of  experience.  Our  study  of  the  temporal 
dimension  convinced  us  that  active  processes  condition  the 
whole  field.  Whatever  presents  itself  in  the  coexistential 
dimension  is  a  product,  even  though  it  masquerades  as  an 
independent  object.  Some  of  these  active  processes  are 
immediately  experienced,  while  others  are  so  simple  and 
habitual  that  they  occur  below  the  threshold  of  observation 
and  can  be  known  about  only  indirectly.^     Perceptual  objects 

1  We  may  call  these  processes  reflective  and  subreflective  respectively. 


90  CRITICAL  REALISM 

are  products  of  processes  of  this  latter  character.  Processes 
of  a  character  open  to  inspection  thus  develop  within  a  total 
field  which  is  already  organized.  The  consequence  is  a 
contrast  which  is  instinctively  taken  as  absolute.  These 
conscious  processes  work  within  a  field  whose  elements  are 
relatively  external  one  to  another.  Now,  togetherness  is  the 
dominant  note  of  this  lower  level,  yet  I  doubt  whether  the 
total  field  ever  sinks  to  the  level  of  mere  felt  coexistence.  In 
adult  life,  at  least,  plans,  purposes,  and  problems  dominate  the 
field  and  determine  more  internal  relations;  yet  these  more 
internal  relations  consequent  upon  conscious  processes  are 
experienced  as  arising  naturally  from  the  field.  The  ideal 
of  thought  is  to  let  the  material  speak  for  itself,  and  it  is  sur- 
prising to  what  an  extent  this  actually  occurs.  By  means  of 
such  synthetic  processes  as  judgment  and  inference,  the 
various  parts  of  the  field  secure  more  intimate  commerce 
with  one  another  than  perception  alone  makes  possible. 
Thus  higher  unities  are  built  up  on  the  lower  unity  of  to- 
getherness as  a  basis. 

It  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  there  are  different  levels  in 
the  field  of  experience  and  that  these  act  as  controls  of  one 
another.  The  synthesis  which  results  in  thing-experiences  is 
unconscious  for  the  individuaf,  and  any  further  addition  is 
guided  more  by  trial  and  error  than  by  reflective  thought. 
The  more  conscious  processes  of  the  higher  levels,  such  as 
reasoning,  work  within  this  situation  and  hold  themselves 
responsible  to  the  distinctions  found  there.  The  emphasis 
laid  by  science  upon  observation  illustrates  this  fact.  The 
current  view  that  the  laws  of  thought  are  also  laws  of  things 
also  exemplifies  the  point  we  are  seeking  to  make. 

When  we  come  to  examine  those  conscious  processes  which 
are  called  mental  or  psychical,  we  find  that  they  fall  roughly 
into  two  classes.  Certain  mental  procesess,  such  as  reasoning, 
are  more  distinctly  temporal.  They  concern  themselves  with 
the  interpretation  and  reconstruction  of  the  objects  in  the 
field  and  are,  as  it  were,  immersed  in  the  sphere  of  objects 
known.  Other  mental  processes  belong  more  definitely  to 
the  coexistential  field.  These  processes  are  called  subjective  • 
and  involve  an   attitude   toward   objects  supposedly  given. 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUALS  EXPERIENCE    91 

I  wish  an  object  or  think  about  it  or  believe  in  its  existence. 
These  processes,  because  they  are  shorter  in  duration  and  are 
outward-looking  in  direction  are  more  apt  to  be  considered 
acts. 

Let  us  compare  the  results  of  our  analysis  with  the  position 
championed  by  Hume.  We  shall,  with  Hume,  take  physical 
objects  as  typical  of  the  sphere  of  objects  known.  The  plain 
man,  as  Hume  points  out,  regards  physical  things  as  independ- 
ent of  one  another.  "But  this  table,  which  is  present  to  me, 
and  that  chimney,  may  and  do  exist  separately.  This  is 
the  doctrine  of  the  vulgar  and  implies  no  contradiction."  In 
other  words,  spatial  relations  are  considered  external.  We 
must  remember  that  the  scientist  would  qualify  this  externality 
by  the  assertion  of  the  presence  of  gravitational  and  other 
connective  energies.  What  Hume  had  in  mind  can  be  best 
understood  by  an  examination  of  the  section  he  devotes  to 
relations.  The  philosopher  calls  distance  a  relation;  the 
plain  man  identifies  it  with  lack  of  relation.  Now,  argues 
Hume,  the  philosophers  have  shown  that  this  table  and  that 
chimney  are  only  particular  perceptions.  Therefore,  we  can 
extend  the  doctrine  of  separate  existence  to  all  perceptions. 
(C/.   Treatise,  Appendix.) 

Hume's  mistake  consists  in  the  confusion  of  the  character- 
istics of  the  sphere  of  objects  known  with  the  characteristics 
of  the  total  field  within  which  those  objects  exist.  He  wishes 
to  reduce  the  total  field  to  the  domain  of  objects  and  thus  to 
universalize  the  features  of  this  domain.  The  truth  is  that 
Hume  attacks  the  position  that  objects  inhere  in  a  subject 
or  substance,  and  he  falls  into  the  other  extreme  of  denying 
the  unity  of  the  field  of  experience.  ("In  general,  the  follow- 
ing reasoning  seems  satisfactory.  All  ideas  are  borrowed 
from  preceding  perceptions.  Our  ideas  of  objects,  therefore, 
are  derived  from  that  source.  Consequently  no  proposition 
can  be  intelligible  or  consistent  with  regard  to  objects,  which 
is  not  so  with  regard  to  perceptions.  But  'tis  intelligible  and 
consistent  to  say  that  objects  exist  distinct  and  independent 
without  any  common,  simple  substance  or  subject  of  inhesion. 
This  proposition,  therefore,  can  never  be  absurd  with  regard 
to    perceptions."     Treatise.)     We,    also,    hold    that    there 


92  CRITICAL  REALISM 

is  no  subject-object  of  inhesion,  but  that  objects  coexist 
with  psychical  processes  in  a  field  which  is  sustained  by  tem- 
poral processes  of  a  fundamental  character.  It  is  a  mistake, 
moreover,  to  extend  the  attributes  of  the  object  to  the  total 
field  of  which  they  are  only  a  part.  This  is  what  Hume 
does,  although  he  rightly  regards  these  objects  as  mental. 
The  total  field  of  the  individual's  experience  is  the  complex 
unity  of  which  we  must  catch  a  clear  vision.  The  principles 
which  describe  the  growth  and  interdependency  of  the  ele- 
ments of  this  concrete  unity  are  developed  by  logic  and 
psychology.  The  laws  which  concern  any  particular  system 
of  "objects  known"  which  is  built  up  within  the  field  are 
treated  by  a  special  science.  The  systems  of  objects  thus 
found  in  the  coexistential  field  as  contrasted  with  the  attitude 
taken  by  the  individual  toward  them,  have  their  own  mean- 
ings and  characteristic  relations,  which  are  quite  different 
from  those  that  hold  for  the  whole  field.  Not  to  recognize 
this  fact  was  Hume's  error.  A  system  of  mathematical 
knowledge  is  one  thing;  a  system  of  chemical  knowledge  is 
another.  In  the  former  we  have  relations,  in  and  between 
our  objects  of  a  spatial  kind;  in  the  latter  the  relations 
observed  are  spatial  and  causal.  But  these  objects  and  this 
knowledge  exist  in  a  unity  which  contains  them  and  the 
personal  attitude  which  is  set  over  against  them. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  examine  the  role  played  by 
the  self  in  the  field  of  experience.  When  we  examined  the 
temporal  dimension  of  experience,  we  became  convinced  that 
the  elementary  unity  of  the  field  was  the  result  of  processes 
of  association  intimately  linked  with  purposes.  The  unit 
seems  to  be  the  sensori-motor  arc,  and  this  is  widened  as 
reactions  become  less  immediate  and  interpretation  by  means 
of  ideas  is  required.  The  field  of  experience  broadens  as  time 
goes  on  and  assumes  a  definite  structure  in  which  things 
more  or  less  familiar  are  set  over  against  the  self  and  its 
desires.  The  interesting  fact  to  note  is  that  this  development 
runs  parallel  with  the  growth  of  the  self.  As  the  self  grows, 
it  becomes  increasingly  the  centre  of  the  field  of  experience. 
It  selects  among  the  objects  which  stand  over  against  it  and 
looks  upon  them  in  the  light  of  ideas  and  of  purposes.    The 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUALS  EXPERIENCE  93 

more  voluntary  attention  displaces  involuntary  attention, 
the  more  the  self  feels  itself  the  master.  And  this  feeling 
persists  in  non-voluntary  attention  when  interests  and  habits 
of  a  recognized  standing  control  the  field.  The  consequence 
of  this  active  centrality  of  the  self  is  the  ever-more-conscious 
growth  of  a  unity  of  a  higher  level  within  the  formal  or  ele- 
mentary unity  of  the  field.  This  concrete  unity  is  due  to 
the  crystallization  of  the  field  about  the  self. 

But  we  must  study  the  self  which  comes  to  dominate  the 
field  of  the  individual's  experience.  Only  when  this  is  done, 
can  we  understand  why  the  self  secures  its  prominence. 

We  must  distinguish,  first  of  all,  between  the  self  as  an 
object  of  thought  and  the  self  as  an  immediate  experience 
present  along  with,  and  expressing  itself  in,  the  subjective  proc- 
esses. The  self  as  an  object  of  thought  is  often  very  com- 
plex; it  is  full  of  knowledge  about  the  individual.  I  know 
myself  in  large  part  as  others  know  me.  My  name,  position, 
appearance,  character,  past  history  are  all  interwoven  to 
make  my  self  as  known.  I  contrast  this  self  which  I  and 
others  call  my  self  with  other  selves.  It  is  evident  that  this 
self  is  a  construction  in  the  field  of  my  experience  when  I 
think  about  my  self.  There  are  other  objects  present  in  the 
same  field  which  I  label  other  selves.  As  has  been  pointed 
out  frequently  of  late,  these  selves  develop  together.  The 
child  judges  the  conduct  and  personal  appearance  of  a  play- 
mate, and  this  judgment  reacts  on  its  conception  of  itself. 
There  is  nothing  mysterious  about  the  self  as  object  or  as 
"me,"  and  it  evidently  does  not  involve  the  existence  of  a 
peculiar  substance.  This  object-self^  is  permanent  much  as 
physical  things  are.  We  recognize  our  bodies  and  our  names 
and  our  occupations  just  as  we  recognize  familiar  things. 
Sameness  qualifies  the  self  just  as  it  qualifies  ideas  or  mean- 
ings or  things.  Psychology  finds  that  the  nature  of  recogni- 
tion does  not  vary  from  one  field  to  another.  In  truth,  it 
is  very  probable  that  the  assurance  of  personal  identity 
depends  in  large  measure  upon  the  sameness  of  the  objects 
with  which  we  deal.     Were  our  surroundings  to  be  changed 

1  Knowledge  about  the  self  as  "me"  is  quite  obviously  achieved  in  the  same  logical  way  as 
knowledge  about  physical  things.  We  shall  find  that  the  epistemological  problem  is  essentially 
the  same  for  both. 


94  CRITICAL  REALISM 

from  day  to  day  so  that  we  could  not  fall  into  easy  habits  of 
adaptation,  we  should  lose  much  of  the  sense  of  personal 
identity.  There  are  many  popular  tales  which  illustrate  this 
problem  of  identity,  among  them  the  story  of  the  caliph  who 
plays  a  joke  on  a  poor  porter  by  having  him  transported  to  a 
palace,  dressed  in  fine  clothes  and  treated  as  if  he  were  a 
lord.  At  once  the  poor  man  becomes  bewildered  and  begins 
to  doubt  his  identity.  In  opposition  to  the  position  that  the 
identity  of  the  self  gives  unity  to  the  world,  we  may  say  that 
the  unity  of  the  world  of  things  aids  us  to  achieve  our  own 
unity  and  identity.  It  would  be  false,  however,  to  go  to  the 
other  extreme  and  derive  the  unity  and  identity  of  the  self 
from  the  continuity  and  sameness  of  the  things  around  the 
body.  It  must  be  remembered  that,  when  we  speak  of 
things  and  of  other  selves,  we  refer  to  them  as  objects  within 
the  field  of  the  individual's  experience.  This  fact  does  not 
prevent  the  individual  from  taking,  ordinarily,  an  entirely 
realistic  attitude  toward  them. 

But  the  sense  of  personal  identity  is  a  function  of  the 
sameness  of  the  body  as  well  as  of  familiar  things  in  general. 
And  not  only  of  the  body  as  an  ever-present  thing-experience 
but  also  as  the  seat  of  a  continuous  flow  of  sensations  and 
feelings.  Psychiatry  has  brought  to  the  front  the  importance 
of  a  core  of  persistent  similarity  in  the  organic  sensations  of 
the  individual.  When  these  are  radically  changed,  the  indi- 
vidual may  speak  of  himself  as  dead.  Even  normal  individuals 
may  experience  a  sense  of  alienness  when  these  vital  feelings 
are  temporarily  modified  by  sickness.  We  say  that  we  do 
not  feel  like  ourselves.  This  means  that  there  is  a  comparison 
between  the  present  flow  of  sensations  and  that  to  which  we 
are  accustomed.  The  comparison  may  be  vague  and  not 
consist  in  much  more  than  a  sense  of  discomfort  and  of  strange- 
ness. But,  so  long  as  memory  is  unaffected  and  things  and 
ideas  are  recognized,  this  change  in  the  vital  feelings  is  not 
enough  to  alter  the  personality.  The  importance  of  the  bodily 
feelings  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  qualify  those  subjective 
processes  which  are  in  antithesis  to  objects.  These  processes 
which  are  so  characteristic  of  the  duality  in  the  coexistential 
dimension  are  experienced  as  imbedded  in  an  end-term  which 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE    95 

they  express.  It  is  the  subject-self  which  is  immediately 
experienced  as  that  which  desires  or  thinks  or  wills.  Let  us 
see  whether  it  is  possible  to  analyze  this  subject-self  more 
fully. 

The  danger  which  confronts  reflection  is  to  read  into  the 
subject-self  more  than  is  there  under  ordinary  conditions. 
When  the  individual  is  immersed  in  the  things  around  his 
body,  the  subject-self  is  not  much  more  than  the  felt  presence 
of  the  body  as  present  with  the  things  observed  and  as  some- 
how the  source  of  whatever  activity  is  involved.  It  is  the 
body  as  a  centre  of  control  and  of  motor  dispositions.  At 
such  a  time,  subjective  processes  are  at  a  minimum.  For 
this  level,  to  which  we  all  drop  now  and  then,  the  subject-self 
is  a  bodily  self  tingling  with  motor  potentialities,  i.  e.,  with 
attitudes  and  recurrent  tendencies  to  movement.  Probably, 
breathing,  eye-movements,  kinaesthetic  sensations,  and  a  dim 
sense  of  purpose  merge  together  and  set  themselves  over  against 
the  things  which  attract  our  attention.  All  this  is  experienced 
as  familiar;  and  no  wonder,  seeing  how  long  we  have  been  at 
work  training,  guiding,  and  controlling  our  bodies. 

At  other  times,  the  subject-self  is  enlarged  by  the  presence, 
along  with  the  bodily  self,  of  plans  and  purposes  and  ideas. 
The  individual  is  aware  that  he  can  direct  his  thoughts  this 
way  or  that,  and  that  he  can  adopt  as  his  own  certain  ideals 
of  conduct.  The  mental  processes  of  preparation  which 
occupy  the  mind  before  any  overt  act  is  performed  are  colored 
by  the  sense  of  spontaneity  and  rest  upon  the  familiar  bodily 
feelings  and  the  ever-recurrent  touches  of  memory.  I  feel 
certain  that  it  is  the  recognition  of  meanings,  of  objects, 
of  ideals,  the  sense  of  familiar  bodily  presence,  the  continuity 
of  past  and  present  mediated  by  memory,  and  the  growing 
realization  of  choice  that  give  the  content  of  the  "I. "  It  is  a 
mistake  to  seek  to  find  a  unique  element  which  can  be  isolated 
from  the  complex  process  of  the  inner  sphere  of  the  field. 
The  "I"  is  the  process  itself  as  somehow  having  a  unity  in 
opposition  to  the  rest  of  the  field.  Very  often  the  not-self 
fades  into  a  sort  of  background  dimly  shadowing  the  turbulent 
changes  going  on  in  the  inner  sphere. 

This  subject-self,   whose  content  may  be  so  various,  is 


96  CRITICAL  REALISM 

tinged  by  a  feeling  which  we  all  recognize.  This  feeling 
may  be  called  the  I-feeling.  Undoubtedly,  it  is  a  product, 
but  no  individual  while  he  is  normal  finds  himself  without 
it.  It  is  impossible  to  describe  it,  since  description  implies 
analysis.  It  is  analogous  to  the  reality-feeling  to  which 
psychologists  have  called  attention.  This  I-feeling  is  more 
like  a  sentiment  or  a  mood  than  an  emotion,  although,  when 
the  individual  feels  himself  affronted,  it  swells  like  a  summer 
torrent  and  incorporates  itself  in  the  emotion  of  anger  which 
ensues.  Another  way  in  which  to  approach  the  I-feeling  is 
to  examine  the  objects  which  call  it  forth.  Things  which  we 
possess  and  cherish  have  this  capacity  of  arousing  the  sense 
of  self  to  the  greatest  extent.  They  excite  a  feeling  of  pos- 
session which  varies  with  the  value  of  a  sentimental  sort 
which  we  attach  to  the  object. 

But  we  are  not  interested  in  the  various  grades  of  the 
sentiment  of  the  self.  The  indication  of  the  kinds  of  self- 
feeling  which  are  to  be  found  in  different  types  of  persons  is 
the  task  of  social  psychology  and  of  ethics  rather  than  of 
epistemology.  All  that  we  need  to  note  is  that  this  sense  of 
self  may  be  refined  and  delicate  or  may  be  harsh  and  crude. 

When  we  come  to  examine  the  higher  ranges  of  thinking 
and  acting,  the  subject-self  turns  out  to  be  a  central  and  well- 
organized  part  of  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience 
which  is  haloed  by  the  my-feeling  and  is  the  decisive  standard 
for  plans,  judgments,  and  decisions  of  all  sorts.  The  spon- 
taneity which  we  all  experience  at  such  moments  seems  to  be 
directed  by  this  system  of  ideas  and  values,  much  as  an  army 
is  controlled  by  its  general.  Here  is  the  centre  of  decision, 
the  creative  spring  of  activity,  from  which  subjective  processes 
take  their  rise ;  and,  as  the  tension  increases  when  the  valley 
of  decision  is  reached,  the  "I"  stands  out  ever  more  clearly 
as  that  which  must  decide.  When  the  self  is  stable,  it  con- 
sists of  ideals,  of  norms  of  duty,  a  knowledge  of  what  one  is 
capable  of,  and  a  decent  self-respect.  Thus  the  "me"  is  ab- 
sorbed by  the  subject-self  to  form  part  of  the  "I,"  the 
difference  between  them  being  not  so  much  that  of  content 
as  that  of  function.  It  is  this  immediately  experienced  self 
that  remembers  and  appropriates  that  which  is  remembered, 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE    97 

that  wills  and  contrasts  itself  with  the  not-self  which  it 
desires  to  change,  that  knows  and  distinguishes  itself  from 
that  which  is  known.  The  "I"  is,  however,  not  a  stable 
entity.  It  enlarges  itself  at  times  with  the  full  content  of 
the  "me,"  and  at  other  times  diminishes  to  not  much  more 
than  the  felt  bodily  presence.  Always  it  differs^ from  the 
"me"  as  an  object  of  thought  by  the  fact  that  it  belongs  to 
the  subject  side  of  the  duality  and  is  qualified  by  the  sense  of 
control  which  is  seldom,  if  ever,  absent.  The  "I"  can  absorb 
the  "me,"  but  the  "me"  alone  is  too  passive  to  constitute 
the  "I." 

Probably,  the  best  way  in  which  to  bring  out  the  conse- 
quences of  the  foregoing  analysis  is  to  consider  the  question,  Is 
the  individual  always  self-conscious  ?  The  term  "self-conscious," 
is  ambiguous.  It  seems  to  me  best  to  differentiate  between 
self-consciousness  and  consciousness  of  self.  Consciousness 
of  self  is  awareness  of  self  as  an  object.  This  self  of  which 
I  am  aware  may  be  the  empirical  "me"  which  is  supposedly 
open  to  the  knowledge  of  other  individuals.  It  is  generally 
granted  that  my  friends  may  know  my  character  and  capabili- 
ties and  personal  appearance  as  well  as  I  myself  do.  The  self 
as  object  is  as  common  as  any  other  object,  and  we  naturally 
take  the  same  realistic  attitude  toward  it.  It  is  this  sort  of 
self  which  goes  by  the  name  of  the  individual  in  history.  We 
speak  of  the  character  of  Cicero  or  of  Cato  and  seek  to  set 
it  in  the  context  of  the  ethos  of  the  time.  We  add  to  the 
character  as  thus  judged  the  knowledge  we  possess  of  the 
life  of  the  individual.  All  this  is  objective  and  belongs  to 
the  sphere  of  objects  known  as  common.  But  the  individual 
cherishes  the  conviction  that  the  self  as  common  object  of 
knowledge  should  be  qualified  by  information  which  he  alone 
possesses.  He  is  conscious  of  his  motives  and  the  exact 
circumstances  which  led  him  to  act  in  such  and  such  a  way. 
Such  information  is  felt  to  be  private;  other  persons  must 
depend  on  inference  or  on  his  assertions,  while  he  remembers 
what  his  motives  were.  With  remembrance,  we  come  to  the 
essentially  private  nature  of  part  of  the  self.  It  will  be  best 
to  limit  ourselves  to  the  self  of  introspection  for  the  time 
being  and  to  leave  the  problem  of  the  identity  of  the  self 


98  CRITICAL  REALISM 

through  change  until  we  have  reached  an  agreement  in  regard 
to  self-consciousness  and  consciousness  of  self. 

The  self  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  introspection  is  the 
subject-self  of  the  previous  moment.  We  can  recall  our 
attitude,  the  dominant  ideas  and  purposes  associated  with 
the  sense  of  control,  and  the  background  of  the  bodily  self 
in  which  these  are  incarnated.  These  are  the  objects  of 
which  we  are  conscious  in  a  quick-reviewing  memory.  But 
introspection  implies  a  control-self  dominated  by  the  purpose 
which  guides  memory  and  its  association  processes.  Hence, 
introspective  consciousness  of  self  is  always  private,  although 
the  results  may  be  communicated  by  means  of  language.  The 
self  of  which  the  individual  is  conscious  is  now  an  object, 
while  it  purports  to  be  the  subject-self  of  the  previous  moment. 
It  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  self  of  which  we  are  conscious 
in  introspection  when  this  is  the  case  is  only  part  of  what  is 
potentially  open  to  introspection.  The  whole  field  of  the 
individual's  experience  is  theoretically  open  to  introspective 
memory.  This  much  must  suffice  for  the  self  of  which  we  are 
conscious  in  introspection  and  for  the  self  which  we  know 
in  common  with  others. 

But  self-consciousness  is  different  from  consciousness  of 
self.  There  are  degrees  of  self -consciousness.  I  mean  that 
the  subject-self  of  the  moment  may  be  more  or  less  prominent 
and  more  or  less  highly  developed.  In  ordinary  perception, 
it  may  not  be  much  more  than  the  sense  of  bodily  pres- 
ence and  the  feeling  of  control  and  of  a  vague  purpose.  In 
moments  of  decision,  the  subject-self  may  be  very  com- 
plex and  consist  of  stable  elements  in  changing  relations  to 
merely  suggested  plans,  the  whole  rooted  in  a  felt  process 
of  determination  suffused  with  the  I-feeling.  Such  a  subject- 
self  may  bulk  very  large  in  the  field  of  experience  and  almost 
crowd  out  the  other  elements.  We  often  lose  sight  of  our 
surroundings  at  such  moments.  This  is  self -consciousness 
in  the  best  sense  of  that  term.  The  "me"  flows  into  and 
^Herges  with  the  "I"  and  gives  it  ideational  content. 

A  word  or  two  must  be  said  about  self-consciousness  in 
the  derogatory  sense  of  the  term.  A  nervous  youth  becomes 
self-conscious  when  he  enters  a  drawing-room  where  a  number 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUALS  EXPERIENCE    99 

of  persons  are  assembled.  This  means  that  he  becomes  aware 
of  his  clothing  and  of  the  carriage  of  his  body  and  thinks  of 
what  opinions  those  who  are  present  may  form  of  him.  Such 
a  self -consciousness  is  a  sort  of  social  consciousness  in  which 
the  "me"  is  felt  to  be  under  fire.  The  characteristic  feature 
of  this  condition  is  the  obstruction  of  clear  thinking  and 
acting  which  it  brings  in  its  wake.  The  result  is  a  chaotic 
state  of  ideas  and  feelings  in  which  the  sense  of  self  throbs 
like  a  recurrent  pain. 

We  have  lingered  over  the  self,  partly  because  the  topic 
is  so  fundamental  and  partly  because  the  term  is  used  in  so 
many  different  ways.  Thus  far  the  self  has  turned  out  to 
be  quite  empirical.  We  have  seen  no  reason  to  postulate  a 
spiritual  substance  or  to  call  in  a  Transcendental  Ego.  The 
unity  and  identity  of  the  subject-self  are  based  on  the  I-feeling 
and  on  the  familiarity  of  the  body,  the  organic  sensations,  and 
the  ideas  and  ideals  which  are  associated  with  it.  In  large 
measure,  also,  it  rests  on  the  recognition  of  the  things  to  which 
it  is  opposed,  as  objects  to  be  dealt  with  in  various  ways. 
The  higher  the  level  of  self-consciousness,  the  more  the  same- 
ness of  the  ideational  content  absorbed  into  the  "I "  by  means 
of  the  ' '  me ' '  gives  identity  to  the  self.  The  unity,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  essentially  functional  in  character,  and  reflects  the 
organization  of  habits  and  motor  dispositions  and  the  harmony 
of  tendencies  of  all  sorts  which  is  the  product  of  past  activities 
and  decisions.  Thus  the  unity  of  the  subject-self  is  a  creation 
of  the  individual  based  on  those  instinctive  unities  which 
he  receives  as  an  inheritance.  Like  character,  it  is  a 
growth.  The  "me"  which  enters  into  the  "I"  is  obviously 
empirical.  Its  unity  and  identity  do  not  differ  in  the  least  in 
their  basis  and  nature  from  that  of  our  ideas  of  other  selves. 
These  are  objects  which  are  notoriously  constructs.^  They  are, 
in  large  measure,  social  in  their  genesis  and  implications,  yet 
the  "me"  always  has  a  context  of  elements  in  its  constitution 
which  are  qualified  as  private.  We  may  say,  then,  that  the 
self  grows  up  with  its  objects  in  the  temporal  dimension  of 
the  field  of  the  individual's  experience. 

1  While  we  have  knowledge  about  other  selves,  this  knowledge  involves  no  literal  participation 
in  their  experiences.     On  this  point,  also,  I  am  opposed  to  the  "New  Realism." 


lOO  CRITICAL  REALISM 

The  identity  of  the  self  through  time  has  caused  unneces- 
sary difficulty  to  many  thinkers.  When  I  think  of  myself 
as  an  object,  one  of  the  chief  characteristics  of  that  object  is 
its  persistence.  I  know  that  I  am  some  thirty-odd  years  old 
and  that  I  have  passed  through  a  certain  physical  and  intel- 
lectual development.  But  I  know  that  other  individuals  have 
similarly  lived  and  developed.  Indeed,  this  characteristic  is 
not  confined  to  persons,  for  trees  have  their  history  as  well. 
There  is  not  the  least  doubt  that  we  can  think  of  objects  in  this 
fashion  as  existing  through  time.  Let  us  take  an  inanimate 
object  such  as  a  building  and  ask  ourselves  what  we  mean  by 
identity  through  time  and  how  we  are  able  to  think  it.  The 
question  is  purely  empirical  in  its  nature  and  must  not  be 
thought  to  beg  any  metaphysical  difficulty  as  to  the  thinkable- 
ness  of  change.  It  seems  to  me  that  we  remember  the 
object  which  we  now  recognize  as  having  been  in  some  place 
at  a  time  in  the  past.  The  nature  of  the  object  which  thus 
persists  is  supposed  to  be  given  in  perception.  There 
are  two  motives  at  work  to  determine  our  ability  to 
think  of  persistence  through  time.  The  first  and  more 
obvious  one  is  recognition*  The  object  is  suffused  with  a 
sense  of  sameness.  But  man  has  a  dated  memory  and  a 
conception  of  time  intervals.  Hence,  recognition  is  inter- 
preted by  means  of  the  meaning  of  persistence,  so  that  it 
becomes  merely  the  testimony  for  this  persistence.  We 
pointed  out  in  our  analysis  of  Natural  Realism  that  objects 
are  experienced  as  permanent  from  the  first  and  not  as  tran- 
sient. But  why  are  they  experienced  as  permanent?  For  the 
simple  reason  that,  given  the  conditions  of  perception,  tran- 
siency is  a  harder  meaning  to  develop  than  permanence. 
Perception  is  closely  connected  through  organic  reactions  to 
things,  and  these  things  perceived  are  experienced  as  those 
to  which  we  react.  They  are,  therefore,  as  real  as  we  are. 
What  is  more  natural  than  that  our  sense  of  sameness 
through  change  should  also  qualify  them,  especially  since 
this  attitude  is  supported  by  recognition? 

The  question  now  is.  What  is  this  sense  of  sameness  which 
suffuses  the  individual  based  on?  We  have  already  answered 
it  in  large  measure.     I  wish,  however,  to  call  attention  to  the 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUALS  EXPERIENCE  loi 

fact  that  a  sense  of  difference  would  be  harder  to  account  for 
than  a  sense  of  sameness.  It  is  too  often  assumed  that  dis- 
continuity is  more  natural  than  continuity.  That  may  be 
the  case  for  reality,  but  it  certainly  is  not  so  for  experiencing. 
Difference  is  secondary  to  resemblance,  and  resemblance  only 
slowly  separates  itself  from  felt  sameness.  Hence,  the  felt 
sameness  of  the  self  from  moment  to  moment  is  based  on  con- 
tinuity, and  this  continuity  in  turn  on  the  resemblance  of  the 
elements  on  the  subject  side  as  well  as  the  object  side.  Experi- 
enced sameness  is  one  thing,  changelessness  is  another.  Be- 
cause I  feel  myself  to  be  the  same  as  I  was  a  moment  ago,  it 
does  not  follow  that  a  changeless  something  persists  through 
that  time. 

But  the  identity  of  the  self  is  not  merely  felt  from  moment 
to  moment;  it  is  also  thought  over  wide  lapses  of  time  by 
means  of  memory.  I  remember  certain  experiences  I  had  in 
Milan  a  few  years  ago.  This  means  that  I  now  remember 
experiences  that  I,  the  "I"  of  a  few  years  ago,  had.  In  what 
sense,  are  these  the  same  "I"?  It  must  be  noted  that  I 
remember  the  "I"  as  well  as  the  experiences  which  I  had. 
The  relation  between  this  past  "I"  and  the  experiences  is 
similar  to  that  which  exists  between  the  present  "I"  and  its 
experiences.  The  "  I "  and  the  experiences  are  objects  thought 
of  as  in  this  relation.  The  question  thus  comes  to  be.  Why  do 
we  identify  this  "I"  we  remember  with  the  present  self?  So 
far  as  I  can  see  it  is  because  the  two  selves  have  a  similar 
content  and  can  be  connected  by  the  remembrance  of  a  chain 
of  selves  leading  up  to  the  present,  and  because  the  "I"  is 
related  to  experiences  which  are  themselves  remembered. 
The  process  or  fact  of  remembering  is  qualified  as  holding  only 
for  the  experiences  of  the  individual  who  remembers.  It  is 
in  this  regard  that  memory  differs  from  knowledge  as  such 
and  is  only  a  species  of  knowledge.  Now,  so  far  as  I  can  see, 
there  is  no  need  for  any  bond  between  my  past  experiences 
and  my  past  subject-self  and  the  present  field  of  my  experience. 
Memory  is  a  present  construction  which  claims  to  give  us 
knowledge  of  what  was  but  is  no  longer.  Why  we  are  able 
to  have  memory  is,  however,  a  problem  which  the  field  of 
experience  as  such  does  not  seem  to  me  capable  of  answering. 
8 


I02  CRITICAL  REALISM 

Any  inexplicability  concerns  the  basis  of  experiencing  and  not 
the  empirical  self. 

Once  we  have  freed  ourselves  from  a  false  view  of  the 
identity  of  the  self  through  time,  we  can  indicate  the  demands 
which  the  true  outlook  brings  in  its  wake.  John  Stuart  Mill 
speaks  of  the  "inexplicable  tie  which  connects  the  present 
consciousness  with  the  past  one  of  which  it  reminds  me,"  and 
asserts  that  this  is  "  as  near  as  I  think  we  can  get  to  a  positive 
conception  of  the  Self."  "We  are  forced,"  he  says,  "to  appre- 
hend every  part  of  the  series  as  linked  with  the  other  parts 
by  something  in  common,  which  is  not  the  feelings  themselves, 
any  more  than  the  succession  of  the  feelings  is  the  feelings 
themselves  .  .  .  "  He  is  thus  led  to  speak  of  a  common  and 
permanent  element.  {Examination  oj  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
Philosophy,  p.  263,  fifth  edition.)  Such  a  position  is  perilously 
near  that  held  by  Thomas  Hill  Green.  Let  me  state  my  objec- 
tion to  this  argument  of  Mill  as  briefly  as  possible.  I  see  no 
reason  to  believe  that  my  present  consciousness  is  connected 
with  the  past  one  of  which  it  reminds  me.  Memory  is  not  a 
revival  of  the  past,  but  a  knowledge  about  the  past  by  means 
of  the  present.  Therefore,  there  is  no  series  of  feelings  which 
literally  belong  to  different  periods  to  be  related  by  a  self.  The 
memory -process  is  empirical  and  above-board;  like  thought, 
it  involves  association  and  a  production  which  comes  to  us  as 
recognized.  The  only  difference  is  that  in  memory  the 
content  recognized  is  dated  and  connected  with  the  indi- 
vidual as  he  was  in  the  past.  All  this  is  empirical  fact;  it  is 
complex,  no  doubt,  but  in  no  sense  inexplicable.  However, 
it  does  leave  a  problem  which  empirical  idealism  such  as 
Mill's  cannot  answer.  The  present  does  imply  the  conserva- 
tion, in  some  form,  of  the  past.  Memory  must  have  a  basis. 
But  such  a  basis  cannot  be  found  in  either  the  subject-self  or 
the  object-self.  When  these  are  actual,  they  are  elements 
in  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience  and  are  temporal. 
We  have  here,  in  short,  a  challenge  to  the  sufficiency  of  mental 
pluralism.  The  individual  may  be  more  than  his  changing 
field  of  experience. 

Our  work  thus  far  has  been,  in  the  main,  that  of  description 
and  analysis.     We  have  become  convinced  that  the  field  of 


THE  FIELD  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE  103 

the  individual's  experience  is  a  unity  of  a  concrete  sort  and 
that  the  coexistential  dimension  of  this  unity  must  be  kept  in 
touch  with  the  temporal  dimension.  Psychology  has  devoted 
much  of  its  energy  to  the  temporal,  or  process,  side  of  the  field 
and  has  succeeded  in  proving  that  the  unity  is  much  more 
intimate  than  appears  on  the  surface.  The  analysis  of  the 
coexistential  dimension  was  especially  interesting,  because  it 
led  to  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  distinction  between  the 
sphere  of  objects  known  and  the  subject,  or  knower.  The 
subjective,  or  psychical,  processes  which  are  apt  to  be  thought 
of  as  acts  of  a  relatively  permanent  self  were  seen  to  merge  in 
the  subject-self  as  a  centre  of  control  or  spontaneity.  For 
this  reason,  they  are  naturally  experienced  as  mental  in 
contrast  with  the  objects  upon  which  they  terminate.  We 
pointed  out,  however,  that  the  whole  field  is  mental  and 
that  the  contrast  between  "mental"  processes  and  acts  and 
their  objects  lies  within  the  mental  in  this  broader  sense. 

In  the  next  chapter,  we  shall  apply  the  results  of  this 
better  understanding  of  the  field  of  experience  to  particular 
problems. 


CHAPTER  V 

DISTINCTIONS   WITHIN   THE   FIELD 

TN  ORDER  that  we  may  make  assured  progress  in  theory 
-■-  of  knowledge,  it  is  imperative  that  we  become  well 
acquainted  with  the  distinctions  characteristic  of  the  field 
of  the  individual's  experience.  A  slight  misstep  in  this 
intricate  domain  may  have  disastrous  consequences,  much 
as  a  slight  miscalculation  in  astronomy  may  lead  the  investi- 
gator far  astray.  We  shall  see  that  idealist  and  realist  read 
the  fundamental  terms  and  contrasts  of  experience  differently ; 
yet,  until  there  is  a  fair  consensus  of  opinions  on  these  points, 
more  ultimate  constructions  must  be  shadowed  in  doubt.  It 
will  be  our  endeavor  to  examine  the  different  interpretations 
of  these  basic  distinctions  with  a  view  to  a  non-partisan 
determination  of  the  facts. 

I  shall  select  as  the  problem  which  will  best  introduce  us 
to  our  task  the  following :  Do  we,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  experience 
an  act  of  perceiving  when  we  have  percepts  or  thing-expe- 
riences? Perception  is  typical  of  those  events  which  idealists 
and  immediate  realists  unite  in  calling  knowledge.  Later 
we  shall  see  that  there  is  another  kind  of  knowledge  besides  this 
presentational  sort;  but  for  the  present  we  shall  confine 
ourselves  to  the  problems  which  have  arisen  around  it.  Some 
thinkers  maintain  that  it  is  possible  to  go  to  a  lower  level  than 
perception  and  find  the  same  contrast  between  the  mental 
act  and  the  object  of  the  act.  Mr.  S.  Alexa'nder,  for  instance, 
speaks  in  the  following  assured  manner:  "Or  go  down  lower 
than  perception  to  sensation.  In  sensation  we  distinguish 
the  sensing  which  is  an  act  of  consciousness  from  the  sensum 
which  is  non-mental.  The  act  of  consciousness  has  no  property 
of  green,  or  sweet,  or  musical,  or  any  other  character  which 
can  strictly  be  said  to  be  one  of  quality."  (Aristotelian  Society, 
Proceedings,  1910-11,  p.  8.)  The  point  is  not  important  for 
me;  and,  as  I  wish  to  avoid  dogmatism,  I  shall  simply  give 
the  position  to  which  I  incline.     I  believe  that  the  individual 

104 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  105 

perceives  sensa.  This  means  that  sensa,  or  sense-qualities, 
are  abstracted  elements  within  the  perceptual  field.  If 
anything,  attention  is  more  strained  in  the  experience  of 
sensa  than  in  the  perception  of  familiar  things.  Purpose 
and  analytic  attention  are  apparently  the  preconditions  of 
such  sensa.  Fact  and  theory  have  been  sadly  mingled  on  this 
subject.  Those  who  feel  compelled  to  universalize  the 
distinction  between  the  act  of  awareness  and  the  object  of 
this  act,  naturally  assume  its  presence  from  the  beginning. 
Those  who  believe  that  this  contrast  develops  within  the  field 
of  the  individual's  experience  for  empirical  reasons  but  is  not 
primitive  do  not  extend  it  farther  down  than  introspection 
warrants.  But  introspection  is  easily  warped  by  pre- 
conceptions, as  the  psychologist  is  the  first  to  warn  us.  A 
compromise,  therefore,  seems  best.  Since  those  who  hold 
that  there  is  a  mental  act  in  sensation  to  be  distinguished  from 
its  object,  the  sensum,  maintain  that  this  contrast  exists  also 
at  higher  levels,  it  will  be  advisable  to  begin  analysis  with 
these.  We  can  then  have  common  ground.  What  we  desire 
is,  first,  an  unbiased  account  of  the  coexistential  field  of  the 
individual's  experience  when  he  has  percepts,  and,  second,  an 
explanation  of  this  account.  I  fear  that  both  idealists  and 
realists  have  sought  to  advance  a  theory  before  they  simimed 
up  the  facts. 

Under  ordinary  conditions,  objects  are  continually  arising 
in,  and  leaving,  the  field  of  observation.  Suppose  we  take  the 
instance  of  a  traveler  who  is  looking  out  upon  an  interesting 
landscape  through  the  window  of  a  fast-moving  train.  Rivers, 
forests,  mountains,  and  cottages  succeed  one  another  in  a 
continuous  panorama.  These  things  are  new  to  him  and 
engross  his  attention.  Consequently,  he  is  outward-looking 
and  fairly  lives  among  them.  Probably  he  is  barely  conscious 
that  he  is  sitting  in  the  car  and  looking  out  upon  the  landscape. 
Let  us  now  ask  whether  such  a  traveler  is  aware  of  an  act  of 
perceiving.  If  he  were  a  psychologist,  what  would  be  revealed 
to  his  introspection?  We  must  remember  that  introspection 
is  apt  to  change  the  field  and  to  render  the  individual  more  self- 
conscious.  It  will  be  best,  therefore,  to  trust  to  what  the  psychol- 
ogist really  means  by  introspection,  viz.,  quick  retrospection. 


io6  CRITICAL  REALISM 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  individual  will  discover  that  the 
things  dominated  his  field  and  that  the  remainder  consisted 
of  a  vague  background  of  bodily  attitude  and  feelings — the 
subject-self  at  its  lowest.  This  analysis  would  seem  to  exclude 
the  successive  mental  acts  of  perception  of  which  the  immedi- 
ate realist  speaks. 

As  Hirnie  pointed  out,  percept  and  thing  coincide  for 
common  sense.  This  thing  is  contrasted  with  those  feelings 
and  ideas  which  the  individual  considers  peculiarly  his  own. 
Along  with  the  entrance  of  things  into  the  field  goes  the 
realization  that  the  individual  plays  a  part  in  conditioning 
this  entrance.  We  are  not  always  so  passive  as  in  the  instance 
referred  to  above.  It  is  likely  that  eye-movements  and 
head-movements  and  relative  change  of  position  qualify  the 
sense  of  attention  and  enter  as  constituents  in  what  is  called 
the  "perception  of  things."  The  greater  this  sense  of  personal 
activity  and  the  more  definite  the  feeling  of  the  importance, 
for  the  presence  of  things  in  the  field,  of  the  part  played  by 
the  individual,  the  more  such  terms  as  "apprehension,"  "con- 
sciousness of,"  "awareness,"  and  "perceiving",  as  referring  to 
acts  of  the  individual  bearing  upon  the  presence  of  objects, 
come  into  use.  What  we  have  here  is  a  development  which 
runs  parallel  with  the  growth  of  the  meanings  which  char- 
acterize Natural  Realism.  We  as  individuals  apprehend 
that  which  is  common  and  independent.  We  shall  see  later 
that  other  motives  enter  to  make  the  presence  of  things  stand 
out  as  a  condition  to  be  contrasted  with  their  absence.  This 
condition  of  presence  is  naturally  connected  with  the  individual 
and  quietly  emphasizes  those  activities  already  noted  and 
qualifies  them. 

We  may  say,  then,  that  when  an  individual  is  engrossed  in 
things,  they  are  simply  present  along  with  a  minimal  degree  of 
self -consciousness.  When  an  individual  directs  his  attention 
on  things,  he  usually  senses  a  certain  amount  of  activity  on 
his  own  part,  and  this  lends  itself  to  interpretation  in  the  light 
of  meanings  and  distinctions  which  have  gradually  grown  up 
and  become  second  nature  to  him.  Hence,  when  the  individual, 
becomes  reflective  and  describes  his  experience,  he  does  so  by 
stating   that   he   perceived  or  apprehended   the   objects   in 


'      DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  107 

question.  It  is  natural  for  reflection  to  stress  the  more  con- 
scious experience.  This  conclusion  of  reflection  is  frequently- 
carried  on  into  perception,  and  we  seek  to  take  note  of  our- 
selves as  perceiving  things.  "When  I  see  the  sun,"  writes 
Mr.  Russell,  "I  am  often  aware  of  my  seeing  the  sun;  thus 
'my  seeing  the  sun'  is  an  object  with  which  I  have  immediate 
acquaintance."  In  other  words,  our  attention  tries  to  cover 
a  larger  domain.  But  what  is  this  object  called  "seeing" 
which  is  suffused  with  the  feeling  of  self  ?  It  is  not  a  cognitive 
relation,  but  seems  to  stand  for  a  sense  of  activity  plus  a  belief 
in  the  necessity  for  something  more.  We  must  not  be  satisfied 
with  a  verbal  description  and  the  assurance  that  this  object  of 
acquaintance  is  mental ;  we  must  press  on  to  discover  what, 
exactly,  these  words  symbolize.  I  am  inclined  to  hold  that 
they  stand,  in  large  measure,  for  a  construction  which  is 
added  by  the  plain  man  to  his  actual  experience  and  which 
finds  a  support  in  those  immediately  enjoyed  or  experienced 
processes  which  run  parallel  to  things  in  the  field  of  ex- 
perience. 

It  is  the  mistake  of  the  psychologist,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
of  the  epistemologist,  on  the  other,  to  forget  that  the  adult 
individual  moves  and  thinks  within  a  highly  organized  level  of 
experience.  It  is  impossible  to  penetrate  by  mere  introspection 
into  a  virgin  experience  uninfluenced  by  the  outlook  on  the 
world  and  the  self  which  has  gradually  been  built  up.  Common- 
•  sense  theory  is  intertwined  with  psychical  fact.  With  the 
assistance  of  reflection,  we  must  try  to  remove  these  theories 
one  by  one  and  clear  away  their  additions  to  what  is  undeni- 
ably given.  In  this  connection,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that, 
when  circumstances  lead  the  individual  to  assign  the  initiative 
to  the  object,  he  asserts  that  it  presented  itself  to  him.  And 
the  fact  that  the  presence  of  things  in  the  field  of  the  indi- 
vidual's experience  is  actually  approached  from  these  two 
opposite  directions,  so  that  the  activity  is  now  assigned  to  the 
individual  and  now  to  the  things,  confirms  me  in  the  belief 
that  we  have  in  mental  apprehension,  or  awareness,  a  theory 
more  than  a  fact. 

Common  sense  accepts  the  dualism  into  which  the  field  of 
experience  divides  itself  on  its  coexistential  side  and  does  not 


io8  CRITICAL  REALISM 

ask  too  curiously  its  conditions  and  meaning.  Things  are  im- 
personal, common,  and  permanent;  the  person  is,  in  a  sense, 
one  thing  among  others,  yet  there  is  for  him  an  inner  realm 
of  ideas  and  feelings  and  mental  processes  present  along  with 
these  things  while  distinguishable  from  them.  Such  mental 
processes  as  wishing,  thinking  about,  choosing,  and  remember- 
ing involve  an  object  which  they  terminate  upon  and  revolve 
about.  This  complex  whole  is  suffused  with  feeling  like  an 
atmosphere  in  which  it  lives.  How  natural  it  is  to  carry 
this  contrast  between  the  mental  process  and  its  central  object 
down  to  perception!  We  have  seen  in  part  why  we  tend  to 
do  so.  In  what  we  call  perception  there  is  the  contrast  between 
the  impersonal  and  common  object  and  the  relatively  active 
individual  who  perceives.  But  what  is  this  perceiving?  In 
wishing  or  thinking  about  there  is  a  very  definite  immediate 
experience  of  a  mental  process  which  occupies  time  and  has 
analyzable  elements.  We  do  not  depend  in  large  measure 
upon  a  construction.  This  is  far  less  the  case  in  what  we  call 
perceiving.  The  mental  process  in  contrast  to  the  object  is 
reduced  to  certain  precedent  activities  and  to  a  bodily  atti- 
tude surrounding  the  subject-self.  It  is  for  this  reason  that 
perceiving  is  called  by  the  immediate  realists  a  mental  act 
rather  than  a  process. 

We  have  to  do  with  a  sort  of  snap-shot  of  the  structure  of 
the  coexistential  dimension  which  does  not  do  justice  to  the 
temporal  dimension.  Yet  the  psychologist  will  inform  you 
that  the  percept  is  a  construction  which  involves  an  inter- 
pretation on  the  part  of  the  mind.  He  is  concerned  at  this 
point  with  the  temporal  dimension  and  admits  that  this 
process  of  interpretation  is  simultaneous  with  the  entrance  Of 
the  percept  into  the  field.  It  is  only  after  this  that  the 
duality  of  the  coexistential  field  is  clearest.  Thus  we  have 
two  kinds  of  mental  processes:  the  more  primitive,  which  do 
not  reveal  themselves  to  the  plain  man  very  clearly,  if  at  all; 
and  the  immediately  experienced  processes,  which  appear 
within  the  structure  of  the  coexistential  field  and  are  con- 
sciously contrasted  with  the  world  of  objects  perceived  and 
otherwise  known.  The  confusion  of  these  two  kinds  is 
dangerous    to    epistemology,    especially  when  it  is  blended 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  109 

with  a  mystical  or  non-empirical  view  of  mind.  In  the 
preceding  chapter  we  tried  to  keep  a  grip  on  the  two 
dimensions  in  which  they  chiefly  function  and  thus  to  see  the 
structure  of  the  field  in  the  light  of  the  processes  which 
sustained  it. 

The  realistic  implication  of  the  word  "perception"  can  be 
brought  out  in  another  way.  Objects  are  thought  of  as 
existing  whether  perceived  or  no.  Thus  perception  refers 
to  the  openness  of  the  domain  of  things  to  inspection.  As 
the  ability  of  the  individual  to  attend  to  different  portions 
of  a  supposedly  independent  world  becomes  associated  with 
the  mind  as  a  system  of  processes  and  capacities  more  or  less 
under  the  control  of  the  self,  the  way  is  prepared  for  the 
development  of  a  theory  of  this  openness  of  things  to  observa- 
tion. Common  sense,  we  have  seen,  accepts  the  fact.  But 
reflection  is  not  satisfied  with  mere  acceptance.  The  more 
the  outer  and  the  inner  world  are  separated  by  reflection,  the 
more  does  this  openness  become  a  problem  and  the  more  does 
stress  tend  to  be  laid  upon  the  mind  as  the  active  source  of  a 
peculiar  cognitive  apprehension.  The  mind  is  even  thought 
of  as  reaching  out  and  somehow  coming  in  contact  with  things 
independent  of  itself  or,  at  least,  of  pointing  toward  them. 
Thus  with  the  sharpening  of  the  dualism  characteristic  of 
Natural  Realism  comes  a  theoretical  interpretation  of  percep- 
tion. Very  often  this  interpretation  claims  to  be  no  more 
than  a  description  of  fact.  This  is  the  case  with  Mr.  Alexander. 
"I  assume,"  he  writes,  "and  will  afterwards  justify  the 
assumption,  that  the  table  provokes  in  the  thing  called  my 
mind  the  action  of  perceiving,  stirs  my  consciousness  into 
activity,  and  that  it  does  so  by  acting  causally  on  my  brain. 
All  this  is  theory.  Fact  is  that  mind  is  active  as  an  act  of 
consciousness,  and  the  table  is  present  along  with  it."  (Aris- 
totelian Society,  Proceedings,  1910-11,  p.  7.)  He  further 
states:  "Realize  that  if  of  two  things  which  are  together,  and 
can  affect  one  another,  one  has  the  character  of  being  conscious- 
ness, then  you  will  understand  that  to  be  conscious  of  a 
thing  is  to  be  a  consciousness  and  to  have  that  consciousness 
evoked  by  that  thing."  It  is  evident  that  this  outlook  is 
built  rather  naively  on  what  we  have  called  Natural  Realism. 


no  CRITICAL  REALISM 

The  facts  developed  in  the  earlier  chapters  forced  us  to  give 
up  Natural  Realism;  the  result  was  that  we  were  led  to  hold 
that  we  perceived  a  percept  and  not  a  thing  and  that  the 
contrast  between  consciousness  and  thing,  upon  which  these 
thinkers  lay  so  much  stress,  is  one  within  the  field  of  the 
individual's  experience. 

If  the  foregoing  analyses  be  well-founded,  it  follows  that 
the  mental  act  of  perceiving,  or  act  of  consciousness,  is  partly 
a  construction.  I  mean  that  what  is  present  on  the  subject- 
side  is  read  in  the  light  of  an  interpretation  suggested  to  the 
thinker  by  the  structure  and  "meanings  of  that  level  of  expe- 
rience which  is  called  Natural  Realism.  The  realization  of 
mental  control  combines  with  the  activities  of  the  body  and 
the  sense-organs  to  produce  an  immediate  experience  which 
can  readily  be  interpreted  as  an  act  of  perceiving.  To  this  is 
added  the  power  of  words  to  cast  their  spell  over  the  quickly 
changing  consciousness  of  him  who  tries  to  introspect.  The 
phrase  "  I  perceive"  easily  dominates  the  outlook  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  misleads  even  painstaking  introspection. 

The  status  of  immediate  realism  depends  upon  the  accept- 
ance of  the  distinction  between  the  act  of  perceiving  and  the 
thing  perceived.  A  recent  criticism  of  Berkeley  is  based  upon 
the  assertion  that  Berkeley  confused  the  thing  apprehended 
with  the  act  of  apprehension.  "Either  of  these,"  writes 
Mr.  Russell,  "might  be  called  an  'idea';  probably  either 
would  have  been  called  an  idea  by  Berkeley."  {The  Problems 
oj  Philosophy,  p.  66.)  He  suggests,  in  other  words,  that 
the  mental  character  of  the  act  is  transferred  to  the  things 
apprehended  by  an  "unconscious  equivocation."  But  only 
the  act  is  mental  in  Mr.  Russell's  eyes.  "The  faculty  of 
being  acquainted  with  things  other  than  itself  is  the  main 
characteristic  of  a  mind."  Mind  is  evidently  limited  to  these 
mental  acts  which  are  related  to  something  other  than  the 
mind.  Thus  Mr.  Russell  asserts  that  "Acquaintance  with 
objects  essentially  consists  in  a  relation  between  the  mind  and 
something  other  than  the  mind;  it  is  this  that  constitutes  the 
mind's  power  of  knowing  things."  In  the  chapter  entitled, 
"An  Examination  of  Idealism,"  we  shall  point  out  the  fallacy 
of  this  postulate.     At  present  we  are  concerned  more  with  the 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  m 

attack  upon  Berkeley.  This  attack  displays  such  self- 
assurance  that  it  demands  investigation.  Does  Berkeley 
confuse  these  two  things,  the  mental  act  and  the  thing 
apprehended  ? 

In  the  Principles,  Berkeley  seems  to  have  held  that 
sensible  things  are  in  the  mind  only  as  they  are  perceived  by  it, 
and  to  have  thought  of  perception  as  an  operation.  But  in 
this  book  he  never  came  to  close  quarters  with  perception  as  an 
operation.  When  he  speaks  of  mental  operations  of  which  we 
have  notions,  he  mentions  willing,  loving,  remembering,  which 
are,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  mental  processes  which  are  imme- 
diately experienced.  In  the  Three  Dialogues,  however,  he 
took  up  the  problem  and  faced  it  squarely,  although  he  did 
not  realize  the  consequences  of  the  conclusion  to  which  he  came. 
He  attacks  the  suggestion  that  we  must  distinguish  between 
sensation,  as  an  act  of  the  mind  perceiving,  and  the  object 
perceived.  Now,  this  is  precisely  the  contrast  which  imme- 
diate, or  presentational,  realists  like  Russell  and  Alexander  have 
in  mind  and  by  means  of  which  Russell  seeks  to  show  that 
Berkeley  was  the  victim  of  a  confusion.  But  Berkeley  denies 
that  the  mind  is  active  in  perception.  I  recommend  to  the 
English  realists  a  study  of  this  part  of  the  Dialogues  (pp. 
40-4,  Open  Court  edition).  Berkeley  cherishes  the  necessity 
of  a  substance;  and  since  ideas  cannot  exist  in  an  unperceiv- 
ing  substance,  he  decides  that  they  must  exist  in  a  perceiving 
substance  which  is,  however,  essentially  passive  in  perception. 
What  is  necessary  to  reach  Hume's  position  is  to  deny  the  need 
for  a  substance  at  all.  Thus  Berkeley's  "ideas"  are  Hume's 
"impressions"  and  Russell's  "sense-data."  Hence  the  prob- 
lem comes  to  be :     Who  is  more  nearly  right,  Hume  or  Russell  ? 

The  problem  raised  by  the  criticism  of  the  scholastic 
element  in  Berkeley  is  of  fundamental  importance  for  theory  of 
knowledge.  We  shall  take  G.  E.  Moore  as  the  typical  advocate 
of  the  position  that  there  is  an  element  called  consciousness 
in  perception  distinct  from  that  which  is  perceived.  We  shall 
endeavor  to  see  what  he  means  and  whether  what  he  means  is 
true.  As  a  result,  certain  conclusions  should  stand  out  clearly 
to  guide  us  in  our  interpretations  of  basic  distinctions  in  the 
field  of  the  individual's  experience. 


112  CRITICAL  REALISM 

Mr.  Moore  passes  from  perception  to  sensation.  What, 
he  asks,  is  a  sensation  ?  The  sensation  of  blue  differs  from  the 
sensation  of  green;  yet  they  are  both  aUke  in  being  sensations. 
They  must,  therefore,  have  a  common  element.  This  common 
element  Mr.  Moore  calls  consciousness.  In  every  sensation 
there  are,  accordingly,  two  distinct  terms:  (i)  consciousness 
in  respect  of  which  all  sensations  are  alike;  and  (2)  something 
else,  in  respect  of  which  one  sensation  differs  from  another. 
"  The  true  analysis  of  a  sensation  or  idea  is  as  follows.  The 
element  which  is  common  to  them  all,  and  which  I  have 
called  'consciousness'  really  is  consciousness.  A  sensation  is, 
in  reality,  a  case  of  knowing  or  'being  aware  of  or  'experienc- 
ing' something  .  .  .  To  have  in  your  mind  knowledge  of 
blue  is  not  to  have  in  your  mind  a  'thing'  or  'image'  of 
which  blue  is  the  content."  (**The  Refutation  of  Idealism," 
Mind,  Vol.  XXVIII,  p.  433.) 

Let  us  first  see  what  Mr.  Moore  deduces  from  this  dis- 
tinction before  we  attack  it.  He  maintains  that  idealists  have 
held  that  the  object  of  consciousness  in  a  sensation  is  merely 
a  content  of  the  sensation.  "It  is  held  that  in  each  case  we 
can  distinguish  two  elements  and  two  only:  (i)  the  fact  that 
there  is  a  feeling  or  experience;  and  (2)  what  is  felt  or  expe- 
rienced; the  sensation  or  idea,  it  is  said,  forms  a  whole,  in 
which  we  must  distinguish  two  'inseparable  aspects,'  'content' 
and  'existence.'"  With  Mr.  Moore's  extremely  able  criticism 
of  this  conception  I  am  in  full  agreement.  The  logical  con- 
clusion of  the  position  is  that  the  "sensation  of  blue"  differs 
from  a  blue  bead  or  a  blue  beard  as  the  latter  two  differ  from 
each  other;  the  former  contains  consciousness  rather  than  glass 
or  hair.  {Ibid.,  p.  448.)  Having  reduced  the  content,  or 
quality,  view  to  absurdity,  he  returns  to  his  own  analysis  that 
consciousness  really  is  consciousness  and  a  sensation  a  case  of 
knowing  something.  Thus  the  sensation  of  blue  includes 
blue,  awareness,  and  a  unique  relation  of  this  element  to  blue. 

Before  we  consider  the  assumptions  made  by  Mr.  Moore, 
it  may  be  well  to  call  attention  to  the  answer  which  Berkeley 
gives  to  the  assertion  that  idealism  holds  that  blue  is  a  quality 
of  consciousness.  To  the  fifth  objection,  that  if  extension  and 
figure  exist  only  in  the  mind,  it  follows  that  the  rtiind  is 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  113 

extended  and  figured,  he  replied  that  these  "qualities  are  in 
the  mind  only  as  they  are  perceived  by  it,  that  is,  not  by  way 
of  mode  or  attribute,  but  only  by  way  of  idea."  As  I  under- 
stand this  answer,  it  admits  that  sensations  are  objects  of 
the  mind.  But  sensations  do  not,  for  Berkeley,  contain  any 
inner  duplicity;  they  are  not  analyzable  into  consciousness 
and  its  object.  The  object  is  the  sensation.  This  at  least 
is  the  position  which  he  takes  in  the  Three  Dialogues.  Blue 
and  green  are  sensations  because  they  have  a  certain  status 
as  objects  of  the  mind,  not  because,  as  Mr.  Moore  asserts, 
they  have  a  common  element. 

But  Mr.  Moore  would  reply  that  Berkeley  wishes  to  make 
sensations  objects  of  the  mind  without  admitting  the  aware- 
ness of  which  they  are  objects. ^  We  have  already  pointed 
out  the  difficulty  which  confronts  the  analyst  who  wishes  to 
give  a  cross-section  of  what  is  actually  experienced  in  per- 
ception according  to  Berkeley  {cf.  Chap.  IV).  He  asserts  that 
the  mind  is  passive  and  not  active  in  perception.  Thus 
there  is  too  much  talk  of  substance  or  mind  and  too  little 
of  what  is  meant  by  perceiving.  But  if  we  eliminate  soul- 
substance,  as  Hume  does,  we  are  left  with  sensations  as  impres- 
sions or  mental  existences  which  exist  although  they  are  not 
objects.  The  mind,  according  to  Hume,  consists  of  these  and 
their  reproductions.  While  we  have  criticised  Hume's  denial 
of  the  unity  of  the  field  of  experience,  it  is  quite  possible  that 
he  is  right  in  the  position  that  impressions  and  ideas  are 
independent  of  any  special  act  of  perceiving,  although  not  of 
attention.  This  is,  in  fact,  but  the  logical  consequence  of 
his  amendment  of  Berkeley. 

It  is  necessary  to  study  perception  instead  of  sensing, 
for  the  reasons  given  above.  We  saw  that  the  subject-self 
is  given  with  the  percept,  which  is  ordinarily  regarded  as  a 
thing.  Whatever  activities  occur  qualify  the  subject-self 
and  are  readily  interpreted  as  mental  acts,  since  they  harmon- 
ize with  other  meanings.  Chief  among  these  is,  perhaps, 
the  contrast  between  the  thing  as  given  and  as  merely  con- 
ceived. Because  we  can  think  of  the  thing  when  it  is  not 
actually  present,  we  are  able  to  distinguish  the  givenness  as 

1  Moore's  "A  Refutation  of  Idealism"  seems  to  boil  down  to  this  point  of  diflference. 


114  CRITICAL  REALISM 

a  sort  of  additional  fact.  It  is  this  additional  fact  which, 
when  taken  in  connection  with  the  growing  feeling  that  the 
mind  must  perform  an  act  of  apprehension,  gives  much  of 
the  meaning  of  awareness.  {Cj.  Strong,  "Has  Mr.  Moore 
Refuted  Idealism?"  Mind,  Vol.  XXX,  p.  i8i.)  The  result 
is  that  a  growing  dualism  within  the  field  of  the  individual's 
experience  between  the  person  experiencing  and  the  things 
experienced  is  interpreted.  What  I  wish  to  emphasize  is  that 
this  development  is  the  inevitable  outcome  of  the  meanings 
characteristic  of  Natural  Realism. 

We  may  feay,  then,  that  there  is  a  dualistic  structure  of 
experience  in  perception  but  that  both  sides  are  mental.  The 
dualism  is  a  developed  one  within  the  unity  of  the  field.  The 
nature  and  extent  of  this  unity  was  sufficiently  discussed  in 
the  preceding  chapter,  but  certain  points  should  be  touched 
on  in  this  connection. 

Before  impressions  are  clearly  present  to  the  subject-self,  as 
they  are  in  perception,  they  must  go  through  a  process  of  inter- 
pretation. Past  experience  is  brought  to  bear  upon  the  present 
claimant  and  it  is  clothed  with  definite  meaning.  Psycholo- 
gists frequently  speak  of  this  process  as  the  ascription  of 
meaning  to  the  stimulus  and  explain  it  in  terms  of  association. 
Perception  involves  the  complication  of  the  sensational  nucleus 
with  knowledge-about.  Every  percept,  or  thing-experience, 
is  a  product  in  which  centrally-aroused  factors  are  as  impor- 
tant as  the  sensational  core.  We  stressed  these  activities 
as  characteristic  of  the  temporal  dimension  of  the  field.  Only 
after  this  has  been  accomplished  does  the  percept  stand  out 
clearly  to  the  percipient.  For  this  reason  interpretation  of 
the  stimulus  and  entrance  into  consciousness  are  considered 
simultaneous.  It  is  evident  that  entrance  into  consciousness 
involves  distinct  presence  along  with  the  subject-self  in  the 
field.  This  is  what  Reid  had  in  mind  when  he  condemned 
Hume's  position.  The  first  stage  is  not  simple  apprehension 
of  sensations,  but  "apprehension  accompanied  with  belief  and 
judgment."  {Cj.  Chap.  III.)  Entrance  into  consciousness 
ordinarily  implies  the  level  of  Natural  Realism. 

It  is  a  mistake,  however,  to  think  of  the  subject-self  as 
performing  an  act  of  apprehension  of  a  peculiar  kind  at  the 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  115 

time  of  the  entrance  of  a  stimulus  into  consciousness.  Apper- 
ception involves  processes,  but  these  are  not  centred  in  the 
subject-self  as  Kant  supposed.  Judgment,  assimilation, 
ascription  of  meaning,  and  interpretation  are  temporal 
processes  which  require  the  capacities  of  the  individual  mind 
and  are  so  treated  by  psychology ;  but  the  capacities  of  the 
mind  should  not  be  identified  with  the  subject-self  of  the 
coexistential  dimension  to  which  the  product  appears,  for 
this  is  itself  a  product. 

We  may  say,  then,  that  perceiving  stands  for  two  things 
which  are  quite  different:  (i)  processes  in  the  mind  of  a  syn- 
thetic character;  and  (2)  a  supposed  act  of  apprehension  to 
explain  the  bridging  of  a  chasm  between  the  inner  and  the 
outer  sphere  of  the  field  of  experience  as  these  are  understood 
at  the  level  of  Natural  Realism.  As  I  see  the  situation,  the 
epistemologist  who  supports  immediate  realism  stresses  the 
second  meaning  and  accepts  a  peculiar  mental  act  of  appre- 
hension. I  have  tried  to  point  out  why  I  believe  he  is 
mistaken. 

But  Mr.  Moore  seems  to  have  in  mind  not  so  much  blue 
as  a  quality  of  a  thing  as  blue  as  a  sensation.  Certainly, 
his  terminology  is  ambiguous  at  the  present  day  when  it  is 
the  psychologist  who  uses  the  term  "sensation."  The  psy- 
chologist is  "conscious  of"  the  sensation  of  blue.  The 
sensation  of  blue  is  thus  an  object  for  him.  It  is  an  object 
in  that  realm  which  he  calls  the  stream  of  consciousness.  Why, 
then,  does  he  give  it  this  cumbersome  name  which  suggests 
to  the  unwary  that  it  is  a  double  phenomenon?  The  reason 
is  that  for  common  sense  the  physical  world  is  primary  and 
has  become  the  reductive  and  base  of  reference  for  the 
inner  world.  When  we  remember  that  the  physical  world  of 
which  we  are  aware  is  looked  upon  as  common,  while  the 
psychical  world  is  considered  private,  we  can  understand  why 
language  has  emphasized  the  subordination  of  sensations  to 
qualities  of  things.  Reference  to  the  inner  world  is  secured 
indirectly  by  means  of  the  supposedly  common  world  of 
things.  The  idea  of  "quality  of"  dominates  the  use  of  blue 
as  an  adjective.  We  tell  what  sensation  we  have  by  indicat- 
ing the  quality;  but  if  we  said  "a  blue  sensation,"  this  would 


ii6  CRITICAL  REALISM 

suggest  that  the  sensation  is  a  thing  of  which  blue  is  a 
quaHty.  Mr.  Moore  saw  this,  but  misread  it.  The  distinc- 
tion between  sensation  of  blue  and  blue  as  a  quality  of  a 
thing  is  inseparable  from  the  contrasted  outlooks  repre- 
sented by  the  two  things.^ 

A  sensation  of  blue  is,  then,  a  mental  element  of  which  we 
can  be  conscious  in  introspection.  We  may  think  about  it 
in  various  ways.  As  an  object  of  our  thought,  it  is  independ- 
ent of  these  thoughts  about  it  much  as  a  toothache  is 
independent  of  our  thoughts  concerning  it.  But  this  relative 
exteriority  of  things  to  which  we  take  the  cognitive  attitude 
to  the  various  ideas  we  may  entertain  regarding  them  is  a 
standard  characteristic  of  reflection.  Unless  there  were  this 
stability  on  the  part  of  elements  of  the  field,  reflection  would 
be  impossible;  the  least  thought  would  blur  things. 

The  conclusion  at  which  we  have  arrived  is  that  mental 
elements  are  experiences  so  far  as  they  are  present  in  the 
unity  of  the  field  with  the  subject-self.  It  is  in  this 
sense  that  they  enter  consciousness.  They  are  not,  how- 
ever, apprehended  in  any  unique  way  by  the  subject-self. 
What  makes  it  seem  so  to  us  until  we  take  second  thought  is 
the  dominance  of  the  self  in  introspective  reflection  and  the 
part  played  by  it  in  the  control  of  voluntary  attention.  Hence 
it  is  best  to  relinquish  the  phrase  which  Berkeley  made  famous ; 
it  has  become  meaningless  with  the  denial  of  the  construction 
which  it  was  used  to  interpret.  For  the  same  reason,  it  is 
useless  to  attempt  to  modify  the  phrase  into  percipere  or 
sentire.  Mental  elements  have  their  own  nature  and  are 
present  with  the  subject-self  in  an  intimate  unity,  but  they 
are  no  more  dependent  on  the  subject-self  than  the  subject- 
self  is  dependent  on  them.  This  is  evidently  Hume's  posi- 
tion, modified  by  a  keener  sense  of  the  unity  of  the  field. 
This  field,  which  is  so  complex  for  the  normal  man  while  he 
is  awake,  may  at  other  times  drop  to  a  simplicity  which  is 
hardly  realizable.  In  sleep,  and  when  one  is  just  recovering 
from  an  anaesthetic,  it  may  consist  of  mental  elements  in  a 
field  which  has  no  definite  structure.     At  these  low  levels  the 

1  We  must  remember  that  psychology  is  a  special  science  and  accepts  in  many  ways  that 
outlook  of  common  sense  which  we  have  called  Natural  Realism.    This  fact  tinges  its  terminology. 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN  THE  FIELD  117 

sense  of  self  often  disappears  and  we  say  that  we  lose  con- 
sciousness. It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  there  are  no 
mental  elements  present  in  the  organism.  If  we  may  believe 
the  results  of  abnormal  psychology,  quite  the  contrary  is  the 
case.  There  is  unconscious  consciousness,  or,  to  put  it  in  a 
less  paradoxical  form,  there  are  mental  elements  which  are 
not  present  to  a  subject-self.  Thus  when  I  am  told  that  I 
cannot  have  a  feeling  unless  I  am  conscious  of  it,  the  question 
arises  whether  the  two  "I's"  are  the  same.  The  subject-self 
which  we  immediately  experience  is  merged  by  common  sense 
with  the  body  as  the  individual;  presence  to  it  seems,  there- 
fore, to  be  essential  to  relation  to  the  individual.  The  more 
dominant  the  self  becomes,  the  more  does  this  appear  to 
reflection  to  be  necessary.  This  higher  unity  in  which  refer- 
ence to  the  self  qualifies  all  experiences  is  only  a  development 
within  the  field.  There  is  no  good  reason  to  hold  that  all 
mental  elements  connected  with  the  organism  must  be  in  the 
field.  In  truth,  recent  investigation  tends  to  show  that  this 
is  not  the  case  and  that  the  field  in  which  the  self  dominates 
is  empirical  and  that  its  basis  can  be  disrupted  by  dissociation. 

Let  us  now  glance  at  the  supposed  cognitive  relation  which 
connects  the  mental  with  the  non-mental.  We  saw  how 
important  this  was  considered  by  Russell  and  by  Moore.  This 
relation  between  mind  and  something  other  than  mind  is 
held  to  constitute  the  mind's  power  of  knowing  things.  If 
our  analysis  be  true,  this  element  of  relation  is  simply  a 
metamorphosis  of  the  togetherness  which  we  found  to 
characterize  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience  from  the 
beginning.  "All  knowing,"  writes  Mr.  Alexander,  "is  a 
togetherness  of  the  mind  and  the  object."  The  significance 
of  this  statement  can  be  better  gauged  when  we  remember 
that  the  objects  which  are  actually  present  in  the  field  of  the 
individual's  experience  are  constructs  which  depend  on  the 
past  experience  of  the  individual.  Is  it  not  evident  that  we 
have  in  immediate  realism  the  abiding  influence  of  Natural 
Realism?  (If  I  remember  rightly,  Mr.  Alexander  started 
out  with  the  ideal  of  the  description  of  experience.) 

But  the  contrast  between  the  mind  and  what  is  not  the 
mind  does  exist  as  a  distinction  of  which  we  are  aware  and 


ii8  CRITICAL  REALISM 

which  we  do  not  seen  to  be  able  to  avoid.  The  inner  sphere 
constantly  grows  more  definite  and  complex  and,  like  the 
subject-self  and  the  mental  processes  which  form  its  vivid 
nucleus,  links  itself  to  the  body.  In  this  way  it  secures  a 
justified  contrast  with  the  outer  sphere,  which  consists  of 
things  obviously  independent  of  the  body.  This  inner  sphere 
thus  qualified  is  thought  of  as  the  mind  of  the  individual. 
This  is  the  logic  of  the  development  of  the  stream  of  conscious- 
ness attached  to  the  body  and  yet  somehow  cognizant  of  the 
body  and  other  non-mental  things.  Common  sense  does  not 
go  so  far  as  psychology,  but  stops  with  a  mind,  connected  with 
a  body,  which  knows  non-mental  things.  This  is  where 
Mr.  Alexander  seeks  to  take  it  up.  We  may  say,  then,  that 
the  contrast  between  mind  and  the  non-mental  is  not  primi- 
tive and  intuitive,  as  the  immediate  realists  hold,  but  develops 
within  experience.  What  mind  really  is,  is  a  problem  which 
psychology  and  logic  are  just  beginning  to  solve.  We  have 
advanced  far  enough  to  recognize  that  it  extends  farther  than 
either  common  sense  or  immediate  realism  supposes.  The 
distinction  is,  however,  an  important  one  for  epistemology ; 
we  shall  use  it  as  the  basis  for  a  mediate  realism. 

But  is  there  any  mark  by  means  of  which  the  mental  can 
infallibly  be  known?  Moore  and  Russell  believe  that  we  can 
become  aware  of  consciousness  or  the  mental  and  know  that 
it  is  different  from  the  non-mental.  Thus  these  writers  en- 
tertain no  doubt  as  to  the  distinguishing  features  of  the 
mental  as  such.  We,  on  the  contrary,  have  been  led  to  hold 
that  the  ordinary  contrast  between  the  mental  and  the  non- 
mental  is  one  within  the  mental  as  a  whole.  These  are 
species  of  the  mental,  as  it  were,  whose  difference  of  assign- 
ment is  due  to  a  difference  of  rdle  played  in  the  economy  of 
the  field  of  experience.  Every  element  in  the  field  is  mental, 
although  the  individual  does  not  experience  them  as  mental 
in  the  contrast  sense.  Those  which  belong  to  the  sphere  of 
objects  qualified  as  known  or  perceived  are,  instead,  experi- 
enced as  physical  or  non-physical,  but  not  as  mental.  Only 
in  introspection  do  we  have  all  the  objects  which  are  experi- 
enced qualified  as  mental.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why 
idealism  seems   foolishness   to   the   beginner.     Mental   is  a 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  119 

contrast-meaning,  and  it  appears  that  idealism  wishes  to 
make  it  absolute.  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  field 
of  experience  appears  to  the  individual  as  a  unity;  that 
aspect  is  in  the  background.  Moreover,  consciousness  is  not 
a  birthmark  which  can  be  found  in  the  elements.  The  inti- 
mate unity  and  personal  character  of  the  field  as  a  whole  is 
a  discovery  made  by  reflection  in  the  face  of  such  mean- 
ings as  "commonness,"  "permanence,"  and  "independence," 
which  surround  these  elements  like  an  atmosphere.  Mental, 
in  the  inclusive  sense,  is  a  new  meaning  which  has  to  gain 
mastery  through  a  reflective  struggle. 

There  is,  however,  a  characteristic  of  the  field  which  sup- 
ports the  new  meaning  after  it  has  once  been  achieved.  This 
is  the  variability  of  the  clearness  of  objects  due  to  attention. 
We  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  objects  vary  in  this  manner 
in  their  own  right.  Variation  in  clearness  is  not  the  same  as 
a  variation  in  intensity.  Clearness  does  not  appear  to  be  a 
quality  of  objects,  yet  it  is  very  intimate.  Those  who  have 
followed  the  argument  thus  far  will,  I  am  sure,  agree  with  me 
that  variation  in  clearness  is  the  sign  and  seal  of  the  mental 
character  of  all  experiences.  It  is  the  expression  in  the  co- 
existential  dimension  of  that  vital  unity  which  psychology 
has  brought  to  light. 

Thus  far  we  have  treated  the  more  general  distinctions  of 
the  field  of  experience.  With  a  knowledge  of  these  as  a  basis, 
it  is  possible  to  avoid  the  grosser  errors  to  which  theory  of 
knowledge  is  prone.  There  still  remain  certain  more  reflec- 
tive distinctions  which  require  careful  interpretation.  The 
three  which  are  important  for  epistemology  are  as  follows: 
(i)  the  distinction  between  an  immediate  experience  and  the 
thought  of  it;  (2)  the  contrast  between  an  object  as  an  ex- 
istence and  the  concept  of  it  or  knowledge  about  it;  (3)  the 
difference  between  the  use  of  the  word  "idea"  in  contemporary 
logic  and  its  traditional  use  in  epistemology.  We  shall  take 
these  up  in  their  present  order. 

The  best  way  of  approach  to  the  implications  of  the  con- 
trast between  an  immediate  •  experience  and  the  thought  oj 
it  is  through  Hume.  For  Hume,  an  immediate  experience 
is  an  impression;  an  impression  is  vivid  and  lively  and,  in 


I20  CRITICAL  REALISM 

general,  easily  distinguishable  from  thoughts  or  ideas  which 
are  less  lively.  Moreover,  these  thoughts  are  copies  of  pre- 
ceding impressions.  By  the  term  "copy"  Hume  has  in  mind 
two  things:  (i)  the  resemblance  between  the  thought  and  the 
impression;  (2)  the  fact  that  one  is  supposed  to  precede  the 
other  and  make  it  possible.  In  these  three  assumed  facts  of 
decreased  vividness,  resemblance,  and  temporal  posteriority 
on  the  part  of  thoughts  in  relation  to  impressions,  we  have 
the  ground  of  the  distinction  between  them.  So  long  as  we- 
identify  thoughts  with  images,  psychology  accepts  this  analy- 
sis. It  has,  however,  added  a  physiological  basis  to  the  con- 
trast. Images  are  centrally  aroused,  while  impressions  are 
peripherally  aroused.  But  psychology  has  also  asked  why 
we  are  able  to  distinguish  between  impressions,  or  percepts, 
and  ideas.  Hume  took  too  much  for  granted  at  this  point. 
In  the  first  place,  there  is  not  between  an  idea  and  the  original 
percept  as  regards  vividness  the  degree  of  difference  that  he 
assumes.  Besides,  even  were  there  the  marked  difference 
between  them  which  he  supposed,  we  have  no  right  to  assume 
that  the  individual  possesses  an  intuition  of  the  meaning  of 
this  difference.  He  must  learn  by  bitter  experience.  We 
need  not  enter  very  fully  into  the  psychology  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  this  contrast  between  ideas  and  percepts.  Common 
sense  is  aware  of  the  difference  between  things  and  the 
thoughts  of  things. 

So  long  as  the  reproduction  of  ideas  is  subordinate  to 
anticipations  leagued  with  action,  memory  in  the  strict  sense 
cannot  develop.  Memory  is  a  recognition  of  an  idea-object 
and,  along  with  this,  the  realization  that  the  real  or  perceptual- 
object  is  absent.  Such  recognition  of  the  idea-object  is  due 
to  associations  and  is  not  essentially  different  from  the  recog- 
nition of  perceptual  objects.  The  idea-object  tends  to  be  taken 
for  the  perceptual-object,  yet,  because  it  belongs  to  the  class 
of  ideas,  cannot  be  so  taken.  It  is  this  tension  between  two 
ways  of  taking  the  recognized  idea-object  which  gives  the 
meaning  oj  representation.  The  present  context,  which  is 
different  from  the  old,  especially  on  the  side  of  purpose,  and 
the  fact  that  it  is  an  idea-object,  make  it  a  memory;  the 
ideational  similarities  together  with  the  recognitive  associations 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  121 

make  it  a  memory  of  a  definite  thing.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  memories  of  things  are  constantly  being  tested  by  appeal 
to  a  new  immediate  experience  of  the  thing  remembered.  The 
idea-object  as  remembered  can  in  this  way  be  compared  with 
the  perceptual-object.  The  selection  of  the  perceptual-object 
with  which  it  is  to  be  compared  is  thus  made  by  the  idea.  All 
this  is  required  before  it  is  possible  to  have  the  facts  of  de- 
creased vividness,  resemblance,^  and  temporal  posteriority 
brought   out   by   reflection. 

Let  us  glance  at  the  nature  of  representation,  or  reference, 
as  it  is  indicated  by  this  analysis.  It  seems  to  be  entirely 
empirical  and  to  be  a  function  of  the  meanings  which  surround 
the  idea-object  as  a  result  of  experience.  The  idea-object 
is  first  self-sufficient  and  non-referring.  It  is  recognized  and 
tends  to  be  taken  as  a  thing;  but  it  is  qualified  by  experience 
as  only  an  idea.  In  consequence,  it  is  experienced  as  an  idea 
of  the  thing  which  it  tends  to  be  taken  for.  This  seems  to  me 
to  be  the  logic  of  the  development  of  reference;  but  of  course 
this  way  of  taking  an  idea-object  is  so  familiar  to  us  that  it 
is  almost  immediate. 

Now  in  memory,  as  in  ideational  experience  in  general, 
the  particular  image  which  stands  out  for  introspection  is 
not  as  fundamental  as  it  is  often  taken  to  be.  Memory  is  a 
case  of  knowledge,  and  in  knowledge  the  system,  or  experienced 
organization  of  associations,  is  the  fundamental  fact.  This 
conceptual  object  is  not,  as  in  fancy,  felt  to  be  under  the  free 
control  of  the  self.  That  which  we  remember  is  held  to  be  as 
objective  as  that  which  we  perceive.  Our  attitude  is  that  of 
belief.  A  memory  would  seem,  then,  to  be  ^  complex  imme- 
diate experience  qualified  by  certain  meanings  which  introduce 
a  contrast  with  past  experience  into  its  heart.  Another  point : 
the  component  parts  of  a  memory-system  may  conflict,  and 
this  fact  reveals  the  looseness  of  a  memory  in  contrast  with 
the  stability  of  a  percept.  I  may  know  that  a  building  is  of 
a  certain  color, —  I  think  in  words,  and  for  me  this  knowledge 
is  connected  with  a  word,  "red"  for  instance, — yet  the  visual 
image  may  persist  in  being  grayish.     Thus  the  inadequacies, 

1  Of  course,  the  amount  of  resemblance  depends  upon  the  purpose.  We  may  think  about 
a  clock  and  have  not  much  more  than  a  word  in  mind. 


122  CRITICAL  REALISM 

and  even  errors  of  images,  may  be  realized  without  resort  to 
a  new  immediate  experience. 

At  this  place  it  may  be  well  to  criticise  the  position  often 
taken  by  psychologists  toward  these  problems.  Since  we 
are  now  aware  that  even  physical  things,  as  experienced,  are 
thing-experiences  and  are  mental  even  though  they  are  consid- 
ered by  the  individual  to  be  non-mental  and  independent, 
we  are  not  so  apt  to  feel  the  pressure  to  get  outside  the 
mind  in  thinking  that  the  psychologist  feels  with  his  tend- 
ency to  a  juxtaposition  of  consciousness  as  a  stream  and  that 
which  it  knows.  A  criticism  of  the  outlook  of  Stout  will 
make  my  meaning  clearer.  "Thus  sense  impressions  and 
images  are  means  by  which  we  perceive  or  imagine  mate- 
rial things  and  their  qualities,  states,  and  processes.  We 
cannot  imagine  a  horse  without  having  an  image  of  it;  but 
the  image  in  our  heads  is  evidently  not  what  we  intend  to 
refer  to.  It  cannot  be  simply  identified  with  the  object 
of  the  mental  act  which  we  call  thinking  of  a  horse." 
(Stout,  Some  Fundamental  Points  in  the  Theory  of  Knowl- 
edge, p.  3.)  I  fear  that  the  influence  of  Bradley's  reaction 
against  the  psychology  of  Mill  is  evident  in  this  statement. 
We  do  not  experience  images  primarily  as  in  our  heads; 
that  view  is  the  result  of  the  reflective  assignment  of  the 
image  to  the  stream  of  consciousness  as  opposed  to  the 
world  of  things.  When  we  think  of  a  horse,  the  image  is  a 
part  of  the  object;  or,  to  put  it  more  accurately,  what  is 
afterwards  called  the  image  is  a  part  of  the  object  which  we 
think.  This  object  is  classified  by  the  psychologist  as  a  con- 
cept, and  the  image  is  an  analyzable  part  of  the  concept; 
but  the  whole  concept  is  just  as  much  in  the  head  of  the  indi- 
vidual as  is  the  image.  Neither  are,  however,  experienced 
as  in  the  head.  Professor  Alexander  has  realized  this  fact, 
but,  unfortunately,  has  taken  a  description  of  the  immediate 
experience  for  an  epistemological  finality,  whereas  it  is  only 
the  foundation  for  epistemology  as  against  the  special  view- 
point of  psychology.  When  the  psychologist  analyzes  the 
experience  of  thinking  of  an  object,  he  is  forced  to  recognize 
two  elements  within  the  stream  of  consciousness:  (i)  "A 
thought-reference  to  something  which,  as  the  thinker  means 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  123 

or  intends  it,  is  not  a  present  modification  of  his  individual 
experience";  (2)  "A  more  or  less  specific  modification  of  his 
individual  experience,  which  determines  the  direction  of 
thought  to  this  or  that  special  object."  This  last  is  called 
the  content.  Strictly  speaking,  however,  we  are  not  aware 
of  the  content,  but  of  the  object  which  is  present  to  the  subject- 
self.  This  mysterious  thought-reference  is  introduced  to 
counteract  the  evident  flatness  of  mere  content. 

We  pass  next  to  the  distinction  between  an  existence  and  the 
concept  of  it,  or  knowledge  about  it.  This  structure  is  fundamental 
for  the  capacity  to  think  a  critical  realism.  Immediate  realism 
makes  the  mistake  of  building  on  a  contrast  not  adapted  to  reflec- 
tive knowledge.  The  contrast  between  the  mind  and  its  ideas, 
and  existences  independent  of  these  but  known  by  them,  is 
really  a  reflective  one  which  critical  experience  only  strengthens. 
We  shall  try  to  show  that  knowledge  is  not  a  matter  of  direct 
apprehension  by  the  mind  of  what  is  non-mental.  That  is 
too  simple  a  theory  to  cover  the  facts,  and  even  common  sense 
is  not  entirely  sympathetic  with  it.  I  am  unable  to  under- 
stand how  a  thinker  trained  in  psychology  can  for  a  moment 
entertain  it.  But  in  the  present  chapter  we  are  concerned  with 
empirical  analyses  of  distinctions  which  the  mind  has  built  up 
and  uses,  and  not  with  their  epistemological  implications. 

In  the  first  chapter  we  saw  why  the  distinction  between  a 
percept,  or  thing-experience,  and  the  physical  thing  arose; 
the  percept  is  qualified  as  personal  and  causally  connected 
with  the  physical  thing,  while  the  thing  retains  the  meanings 
of  independence  and  perdurableness.  We  think  the  thing 
and  perceive  the  percept.  Soon,  however,  a  like  fission 
threatens  the  thing  which  is  contrasted  with  the  percept. 
We  think  or  know  or  conceive  the  physical  thing.  But  we 
can  make  mistakes  in  regard  to  it  and  are  convinced  that  we 
do  so.  For  these  reasons,  and  others  which  will  come  out  later, 
man  has  been  forced  to  go  further  and  to  distinguish  objects 
of  his  thoughts  from  objects  as  existing.  And  the  more  he 
studies  the  objects  of  his  thinking,  the  more  he  is  aware  of 
their  history  and  the  more  convinced  is  he  that  they  are  con- 
structions made  upon  the  basis  of  his  experiences.  Our  realistic 
attitude  toward  the  world,  nevertheless,  continues  unshaken. 


124 


CRITICAL  REALISM 


The  consequence  is  an  increased  emphasis  on  the  distinction 
between  objects  existing  outside  the  mind  and  the  objects 
of  our  thinking.  Thus  a  further  fission  of  the  independent 
thing  arises.  It  breaks  up  now  into  the  object  of  our  thinking, 
or  our  concept,  and  the  object-as-existing.  The  stages  in 
development  from  the  level  of  Natural  Realism  correspond 
to  this  retrogression  of  the  independent,  or  non-mental,  thing. 
At  first  the  object-as-existing  is  identified  with  the  thing- 
experience  which  contains  perceptual  and  conceptual  elements ; 
then  comes  the  contrast  between  the  percept  in  the  mind  of 
the  individual  and  the  thing  which  is  the  object  of  thinking; 
and,  finally,  there  arises  the  contrast  between  the  object  of 
thinking  and  the  thing-as-existing.  In  all  these  stages  the 
realistic  outlook  with  its  meanings  remains,  and  I  can  see  in 
the  movement  no  hope  for  the  idealist  unless  the  defeat  of 
the  immediate  realist  along  with  himself  gives  him  sufficient 
comfort.      I  give  a  diagram  to  make  this  movement  clearer: 

The  Field  of  the  Individual's  Experience 
Inner  Sphere  Outer  Sphere 

a  Personal  a  Independent 

Dominant  Meanings  Dominant  Meanings  h  Impersonal 

h  Mental  c  Non-mental 

First  Level 
(Natural  Realism) 
Subject-self  Cognitive  Attitude  Physical  Things 

Second  Level 

(Scientific  Realism) 

Boundaries  between  inner  sphere  and  outer  sphere  no  longer  marked. 

Subject-self        Cognitive  Attitude  Concepts  of 

Third  Level 
(Advance  of  the  Personal) 
Inner  sphere  now  absorbs  the  outer  sphere. 
Thing-experiences 
Subject-self       Cognitive  Attitude    Concepts 

Propositions 
Fotuth  Level 
(Critical  Realism) 

Thing-experiences 
Subject-self    Cognitive  Attitude  Concepts  Physical 

Propositions  giving  Things 

Knowledge  about 


Physical  Things 


Physical? 
Things 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  125 

Now  the  objects  of  thought  are  usually  termed  ideas  or 
concepts  and  are  set  in  opposition  to  the  existences  of  which 
they  are  said  to  be  ideas.  Thus  we  contrast  the  sun  as  an 
existence  with  the  idea  of  it  formed  by  astronomers.  This 
idea  consists  of  a  series  of  propositions  about  the  stm.  We 
know  that  the  sun  is  nearly  ninety-two  million  nine  hundred 
thousand  miles  distant  from  the  earth,  that  it  possesses  a 
corona,  that  its  density  is  little  more  than  a  quarter  of  the 
earth's  density,  and  so  forth.  Our  ideas  are  supposed  to  con- 
tain knowledge  which  is  referred  to  the  existent  thing.  It  is 
this  reference  which  is  symbolized  by  the  preposition  "of." 
When  we  appreciate  the  high  level  of  reflection  at  which  this 
contrast  between  idea  and  existence  can  be  used,  we  realize 
that  we  possess  in  it  the  means  to  harmonize  the  Advance 
of  the  Personal  with  its  enlarged  view  of  mind  and  the  meanings 
of  Natural  Realism.  The  concept,  idea,  or  object  of  thought 
is  personal,  while  the  object-as-existing  is  independent. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  antithesis  between  the 
object  of  thought,  or  the  idea,  and  the  object-as-existing  is  one 
within  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience.  We  have  tried 
to  explain  its  origin  and  apparent  significance.  The  further 
task  of  describing  the  mechanism  of  the  distinction  remains. 
The  point  which  I  wish  to  emphasize  is  that  the  contrast 
between  the  mind  and  that  which  is  independent  of  it  arises 
within  the  mind  and  that  knowledge  is  a  meaning  oj  like 
empirical  character. 

The  first  level  of  the  distinction  between  a  thing  and  the 
individual's  idea  of  it  is  to  be  found  at  the  stage  of  Natural 
Realism.  For  common  sense  there  are  two  ways  of  knowing 
things,  knowing  them  immediately  or  intuitively  and  know- 
ing them  conceptually  or  representatively.  {Cj.  William 
James,  The  Meaning  oj  Truth,  p.  43.)  Let  us  take  the 
example  chosen  by  James.  What  do  we  mean  by  saying 
that  we  here  know  the  tigers  in  India?  The  tigers  are  quali- 
fied as  absent,  yet  they  are  present  to  our  thought.  James 
is  rightly  averse  to  making  a  mystery  of  this  peculiar  presence- 
in-absence.  To  speak  of  the  intentional  inexistence  of  the 
tigers  in  our  thought  does  not  seem  to  him  to  solve  the 
problem.     Certainly  representative  knowledge  must  not  be 


126  CRITICAL  REALISM 

made  into  a  mystery;  but  this  desire  to  escape  mystery 
does  not  justify  the  adoption  of  that  metaphor  of  pointing 
which  has  been  characteristic  of  pragmatism.  But  if  con- 
ceptual knowledge  is  a  case  of  pointing,  what  is  the  pointing 
known  as?  James's  answer  to  this  question  is  as  follows: 
"The  pointing  of  our  thought  to  the  tigers  is  known  simply 
and  solely  as  a  procession  of  mental  associates  and  motor 
consequences  that  follow  on  the  thought,  and  that  would 
lead  harmoniously,  if  followed  out,  into  some  ideal  or  real 
context,  or  even  into  the  immediate  presence  of  the  tigers." 
{CJ.  note  on  pp.  44-45.)  When  we  examine  this  discussion 
closely,  we  find  that  he  is  combating  the  view  that  images 
taken  by  themselves  are  self -transcendent.  This  is  the  mys- 
tery to  which  he  is  opposed.  Only  one  other  possibility 
seems  open  to  him,  viz.,  that  "To  know  an  object  is  here 
to  lead  to  it  through  a  context  which  the  world  supplies." 
To  know  is  "only  an  anticipatory  name  for  a  further  asso- 
ciative and  terminative  process  that  may  occur.  "^  (P.  46, 
and  note.) 

This  analysis  of  knowing  is  a  beautifvd  example  of  the  fact 
that  the  psychologist  is  most  at  home  in  the  temporal  dimension 
of  consciousness.  It  is  the  ambulatory  relation  between  image 
and  renewed  percept  which  he  has  in  mind.  And,  assuredly, 
an  image,  as  the  psychologist  understands  that  term,  cannot 
transcend  itself.  An  image  is  an  object  of  thought  and  not  a 
thought-of.  Let  us  recall  our  examination  of  memory.  We 
saw  that  the  image  is  only  a  part  of  the  object  of  memory. 
The  object  involves  a  system  qualified  by  meanings.  When 
we  desire  we  can  make  the  system  explicit  in  a  series  of 
propositions  of  which  the  object  known  or  remembered  is  the 
subject.  This  expansion  is  felt  to  be  a  development  of 
the  object  known.  The  attitude  taken  by  the  individual  all 
through  is  that  of  cognition  or  acceptance.  Now,  in  contrast 
to  memory,  when  one  thinks  of  an  object  one  does  not  have  in 
mind  the  fact  that  the  object  has  been  experienced  before. 
We  conceive  or  think  objects  and  remember  our  experiences 
of   them.     ("For   when   memory   actually   takes   place,    one 

•  This  is  the  so-called  instrumentalist  view  of  knowledge,  which  is  really  an  expression  of 
idealism. 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  127 

must  say  that  the  process  in  the  soul  is  such  that  one  formerly 
heard,  perceived,  or  thought  the  thing."  Aristotle  On 
Memory  and  Recollection.)  When  I  think  an  object,  there  is 
for  the  time  being  no  dual  role  played  by  the  object ;  the  object 
seems  to  be  present  to  my  contemplation.  But  common 
sense  introduces  a  new  motive,  since  it  regards  perception  as 
the  basic  form  of  knowledge  because  the  independent  thing  is 
supposed  to  be  present  to  the  observer  in  perception.  We  see 
here  the  influence  of  Natural  Realism.  Hence,  an  object  which 
is  thought  of  is  contrasted  with  the  same  object  as  it  is 
perceived.  We  are,  accordingly,  said  to  have  an  idea  of  the 
object.  This  interpretation  is  the  more  natural,  inasmuch  as 
we  make  mistakes  in  our  thinking  of  objects  that  we  do  not 
make  in  perceiving.  The  result  is,  we  have  the  object  present 
to  our  minds  so  that  it  is  recognized;  but  it  is  qualified  as  an 
idea  by  means  of  the  motives  referred  to  above.  This  is  the 
genetic  logic  of  intentional  inexistence,  or  presence  in  absence. 
So  engrained  is  the  conviction  that  only  in  perception  are 
physical  things  actually  present  to  the  mind,  that  the  object 
of  thought,  although  it  evidently  presents  itself  as  present  in 
another  way,  is  called  an  idea  or  concept  or  thought  of  the 
thing.  Thus  we  speak  of  thinking  of  a  thing  or  conceiving  a 
thing  as  practically  synonymous  with  having  a  thought  of  a 
thing  or  a  concept  of  a  thing. 

Those  immediate  realists  who  are  opposed  to  Pragmatism 
tend  to  stress  the  fact  that  thinking  is  a  type  of  cognition. 
So  far  as  this  brings  out  the  fact  that  the  individual's  attitude 
in  thinking  of  an  object  is  as  cognitive  as  it  is  in  perceiving, 
they  are  correct.  "The  ambulation  from  idea  to  percept," 
writes  Mr.  Alexander,  "is  not  cognition  in  general,  but  the 
special  case  of  passing  from  an  imperfect  cognition  of  the 
object  to  a  completer  one. "  As  a  matter  of  fact,  interests  other 
than  knowing  make  us  desire  perception.  Conception  is 
not  a  less  perfect  cognition  than  perception;  it  is,  instead,  a 
more  adequate  mode  where  the  purpose  is  not  merely  to 
secure  an  idea  of  the  sensible  appearance  of  the  thing.  When 
this  more  penetrative  character  of  conception  is  realized,  the 
way  is  prepared  for  a  new  view  of  knowledge.  The  individual 
is  not  satisfied  with  perception,  but  considers  it  a  means  to 


128  '         CRITICAL  REALISM 

knowledge.  Indeed,  he  begins  to  ask  himself  whether  there  are 
really  two  kinds  of  knowledge  about  the  physical  world,  one 
in  which  the  object  is  present  in  his  field  of  experience  and 
one  in  which  it  is  present  representatively. 

So  far  as  common  sense  is  reflective,  the  thing  perceived  is 
the  existence,  and  the  object  of  thought  is  the  concept  of  it. 
Now,  when  Natural  Realism  breaks  down  and  the  thinker 
comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the  percept,  or  thing-experience, 
is  not  the  physical  thing,  he  carries  the  same  manner  of 
speaking  over  to  the  realm  of  what  was  supposed  to  be  intuitive 
knowledge.  He  speaks  of  a  percept  of  the  thing  just  as, 
before,  he  spoke  of  an  idea  of  the  thing.  Thus  the  contrast 
continues  after  its  first  historical  basis  has  been  removed. 
The  preposition  "of"  symbolizes  the  reference  or  pointing  which 
is  just  as  necessary  in  one  case  as  in  the  other.  The  contrast 
in  mind  in  both  instances  is  that  between  what  is  mental 
and  what  is  independent  of  mind.  But  what  are  ideas  ideas 
of  now?  Not  of  percepts,  for  it  is  recognized  that  concepts 
involve  knowledge  gained  from  many  percepts  by  means  of 
those  mental  processes  which  we  call  thought.  We  continue 
to  mean  by  them  concepts  of  existences  which  are  independ- 
ent of  the  mind.  They  leap  to  the  front  in  science  as  the 
more  adequate  mode  of  knowledge.  Once  pass  beyond  the 
level  of  Natural  Realism,  and  it  is  more  than  doubtful 
whether  the  old  contrast  between  immediate  knowledge  of 
the  physical  world  and  representative  knowledge  has  not 
lapsed.  All  it  now  seems  to  stand  for  is  the  fact  that  con- 
cepts are  based  on  a  more  primary  experience. 

So  long  as  we  remain  at  the  level  of  Natural  Realism,  the 
nature  of  reference  is  clear.  The  world  appears  open  to  obser- 
vation ;  things  are  where  they  are  seen  and  are  seen  where 
they  are.  Thinking  involves  a  dimmer  presence  of  this  world; 
at  least,  concepts  which  we  know  are  of  the  things  we  have 
seen  or  of  things  like  them.  But  when  Natural  Realism  breaks 
down,  how  shall  we  word  this  contrast?  If  the  existence  to 
which  the  object  of  thought  referred,  turns  out  to  be  a  thing 
experience,  what  shall  we  do?  What  we  must  do  is  to  throw 
away  the  view  that  knowledge  is  ever  the  immediate  presence 
of  the  physical  thing  in  the  field  of  experience.     We  at  last 


DISTINCTIONS   WITHIN   THE  FIELD  129 

distinguish  between  presence  to  the  psycho-physical  individual 
and  presence  in  experience.  For  Natural  Realism  these  are 
identical.  Reflection,  however,  brings  out  the  fact  that  the 
presence  of  the  physical  thing  to  the  individual  is  the  condition 
for  the  presence  of  the  thing-experience  in  the  field  of  the  indi- 
vidual's experience.  In  this  way,  the  Advance  of  the  Personal 
and  the  causal  theory  of  perception  which  is  worked  out  in 
detail  by  science  and  admitted  by  common  sense  are  harmon- 
ized with  the  realistic  meanings  which  will  not  down.  Thus 
physical  things  are  causally  connected  with  percepts  and  help 
to  control  their  development,  but  are  not  perceived.  What  is 
perceived  does  not  cause  its  own  perception.  But  we  are  able 
to  conceive  this  absence-in-presence  of  the  physical  thing  by 
means  of  the  distinction  between  the  thing  and  the  thought 
of  it  which  we  already  possess.  The  presence-in-absence  of 
thought  makes  thinkable  the  absence-in-presence  of  perception. 
We  realize  at  last  that  knowledge  cannot  be  the  presence  of 
the  object  known  in  the  field  of  experience.  The  logical 
consequence  is  that  perception  loses  its  primacy  as  a  mode  of 
knowledge  and  becomes,  in  the  main,  a  means  to  knowledge. 
When  it  is  once  realized  that  all  knowledge  of  the  external 
world  is  mediate,  the  question  shifts  to  the  problem  of  the 
adequacy  of  knowledge.  Need  we  emphasize  the  fact  that, 
at  this  level,  conception  gains  the  day?  All  scientific  knowl- 
edge is  of  this  sort.  But  it  is  false  to  make  the  contrast  too 
harsh.  Both  psychology  and  logic  are  informing  us  that 
conceptual  material  is  absorbed  by  perception  and  that  the 
two  are  more  continuous  than  we  had  supposed.  The  main 
difference  lies  in  the  fact  that  a  perspective  is  indissolubly 
linked  with  perception  which  reflection  can  remove  from  con- 
ception (c/.  Chap.  11).^ 

That  we  do  and  can  think  a  realism  in  which  we  distinguish 
between  the  objects  present  in  thought  and  the  objects  as 
existing  which  are  no  longer  identified  with  our  thing- 
experiences  seems  to  me  indubitable.  It  is  obvious  that  we 
do  this  by  means  of  the  development  of  a  distinction  char- 
acteristic of   Natural  Realism.     The  higher  levels  build,  as 

1  It  is  evident  that  I  differ  from  M.  Bergson  both  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  perception  and 
the  adequacy  of  conception  as  a  mode  of  knowledge  of  nature. 


I30  CRITICAL  REALISM 

we  should  expect,  on  the  lower  level,  and  the  idealistic 
motives  incite  to  this  growth  from  immediate  to  mediate 
realism.  That,  as  we  shall  try  to  show  later,  is  their  func- 
tion; and  it  is  unfortunate  that  they  have  not  been  seen  in 
this  light.  Only  after  we  have  met  idealism  fairly,  shall 
we  be  able  to  state  what  a  critical  realism  must  mean  by 
"knowledge."  It  is  evident  even  now  that  pointing,  or 
reference,   is  within  experience. 

Now  the  objects  of  thought  in  contrast  to  objects  as 
existing,  or  existences,  are  usually  spoken  of  as  ideas  in  the 
traditional  epistemology.  These  ideas  are  supposed  to  mediate 
knowledge  of  an  independent  world.  It  is  evident  that  we 
agree  with  this  outlook,  although  our  view  of  knowledge  is  not 
the  traditional  one. 

We  come  now  to  the  final  distinction  of  the  three  to  which 
we  called  attention,  the  difference  between  the  use  of  the  word 
"idea"  in  contemporary  logic  and  its  traditional  use  in  epis- 
temology. The  point  is  important,  because  were  the  reader 
to  confuse  these  two  uses  he  would  be  bewildered  by  recent 
controversial  writings  in  which  one  school,  intoxicated  by  its 
supposed  discovery  of  the  logic  implicit  in  scientific  method, 
proclaims  in  season  and  out  that  "ideas"  are  but  suggestions, 
hypotheses,  theories,  or  conjectures  entertained  during  reflection 
in  response  to  a  specific  problem  which  arises  within  experience. 

In  spite  of  the  strictures  I  have  felt  compelled  to  pass,  I 
have  a  deal  of  sympathy  with  the  logical  analysis  of  reflec- 
tive thought  made  by  these  thinkers.  (See  especially  the 
first  five  chapters  of  Dewey's  Studies  in  Logical  Theory.  The 
quotations  will  be  made  from  these.)  Let  us  glance  at  this 
analysis  in  order  to  gain  a  clear  notion  of  what  is  meant 
by  an  "idea";  we  shall  then  be  able  to  determine  whether 
the  presence  of  these  ideas  and  their  function  conflict  with 
ideas  in  the  epistemological  sense  of  the  term. 

It  is  the  situation  as  a  whole  which  calls  forth  and  directs 
thinking.  "Positively,  it  is  the  whole  dynamic  experience 
with  its  qualitative  and  pervasive  identity  of  value,  and  its 
inner  distraction,  its  elements  at  odds  with  each  other,  in 
tension  against  each  other,  contending  each  for  its  proper 
placing  and  relationship,  that  generates  the  thought-situation" 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN   THE  FIELD  131 

(p.  38).  This  whole  situation  is  objective.  To  use  our  ter- 
minology, it  is  "  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience." 
Naturally  enough,  however,  it  is  not  reflectively  qualified 
as  mental.  The  outlook  of  the  individual  who  reflects  on 
specific  problems  is  more  apt  to  be  that  of  the  context  within 
which  he  is  working.  If  he  is  a  plain  man,  his  world  will  have 
the  structure  and  characteristic  meanings  of  Natural  Realism. 
If  he  is  a  scientist,  the  point  of  view  will  be  that  of  scientific 
realism.  The  total  situation  within  which  reflection  works 
simply  is,  much  in  the  same  way  that  the  environment  is  to 
an  organism.  The  total  situation  is,  as  it  were,  the  universe 
for  the  specific  problem  which  breaks  out  within  it.  It  is  in 
this  sense  that  it  is  objective.  Now  the  conflicting  situation 
inevitably  polarizes  itself.  There  is  something  which  remains 
secure,  unquestioned,  and  there  are  elements  which  are  ren- 
dered doubtful  and  precarious.  The  field  is  thus  distributed 
between  "facts — "the  given,  the  presented,  the  Datum — and 
"ideas,"  the  ideal,  the  conceived,  the  Thought.  The  Datum 
is,  so  far  as  it  is  uninterpreted,  crude,  raw,  unorganized,  brute ; 
the  Ideatum  is  only  a  suggestion.  Thus  datum  and  ideatum 
are  cooperative  instrumentalities  for  economical  dealing  with 
the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  experience.  Such  a 
specific  process  leads  to  the  rejection  of  certain  ideata  as 
fancies,  misconceptions,  errors.  They  are  then  adjudged 
subjective  and  given  merely  a  psychical  existence.  We  must 
remember,  however,  that  the  term,  psychical,  is  larger  than 
the  subjective  in  this  sense.  When,  after  due  reflection,  an 
idea  is  accepted  as  solving  the  problem  in  hand  and  restoring 
unity  to  experience,  it  merges  with  the  datiun  to  become  an 
objective,  cosmic  fact.  This  is,  in  brief,  the  character  of 
reflective  thought  and  the  function  of  "ideas"  therein. 

With  all  this,  if  it  be  considered  an  analysis  of  concrete 
thinking,  I  would  agree.  It  is  only  when  epistemological 
significance  is  read  into  it  that  I  would  call  a  halt.  Reflective 
thinking  does  arise  under  the  spur  of  doubt  and  does  seek  to 
restore  unity  to  experience.  There  are  no  absolute  facts 
or  data  which  are  independent  of  this  active  process  of  reor- 
ganization. "The  datum  is  given  in  the  thought-situation, 
and  to  further  qualification  of  ideas  and  meanings. ' '     As  against 


132  CRITICAL  REALISM 

Lotze,  Professor  Dewey  certainly  makes  his  point — as  is 
practically  admitted,  for  instance,  by  Bosanquet.  Lotze  is 
involved  in  a  tangle  of  contradictions.  Given  a  thought-in- 
itself  which  acts  externally  on  material,  and  the  following 
dilemma  results:  "either  thought  is  separate  from  the  matter 
of  experience,  and  then  its  validity  is  wholly  its  own  private 
business;  or  else  the  objective  results  of  thought  are  already 
in  the  antecedent  material,  and  then  thought  is  either 
unnecessary,  or  else  has  no  way  of  checking  its  own  perform- 
ances" (p.  72).  We  shall  see  that  Kant's  system  is  open 
to  similar  objections.  Certainly  we  cannot  test  scientific 
systems  by  the  fragmentary  observations  whose  very  inade- 
quacy spurred  us  on  to  the  discovery  of  explanations.  If 
they  remain  as  facts,  they  are  facts  which  have  been  inter- 
preted. Of  course,  if  new  observations  make  this  interpreta- 
tion questionable,  they  can  drop  back  to  their  former  status 
as  within  a  tensional  situation.  Thinking  is,  therefore,  an 
activity  through  which  experience  goes  in  its  attempt  to 
secure  coherence.  "The  outcome  of  thought  is  the  thinking 
activity  carried  on  to  its  own  completion;  the  activity,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  the  outcome  taken  anywhere  short  of  its 
own  realization,  and  thereby  still  going  on"  (p.  79).  The 
worth  of  the  thinking  is  to  be  found  in  the  result  or  conclu- 
sion ;  but  this  can  be  tested  and  understood  only  in  the  light 
of  its  achievement. 

It  is  interesting  that  the  older  English  logicians,  so  far  as 
they  understand  Professor  Dewey's  argument,  agree  with  it. 
For  them,  also,  coherence,  the  overcoming  of  conflicts,  is  the 
goal  of  thought ;  in  a  similar  way,  they  repudiate  absolute  facts 
or  data.  "In  logic  as  I  understand  it,"  writes  Bosanquet 
{Truth  and  Coherence,  p.  10),  "attempting  to  follow  out 
at  a  long  interval  the  practice  of  the  masters,  there  is  no 
epistemology  in  the  sense  supposed  [by  Dewey],  no  treatment 
of  thought  in  itself  as  opposed  to  reality  in  general  .  .  ." 
Evidently,  these  thinkers  agree  that  knowledge  cannot  be 
directly  tested  by  a  reality  taken  as  an  external  standard. 
The  difference  which  enters  into  their  logic  is  due  to  a  difference 
in  metaphysical  outlook.  Of  the  two,  Dewey  is  the  more 
empirical,  keeps  closer  to  the  standpoint  of  common  sense 


DISTINCTIONS   WITHIN   THE  FIELD  133 

and  science ;  but  he  is  inclined  to  mistake  an  empirical  descrip- 
tion of  experience  for  an  explanation.  In  other  words,  he  is 
too  prone  to  affirm,  as  does  Avenarius,  that  epistemological 
problems  are  unreal. 

We  shall  now  consider  certain  problems  the  discussion 
of  which  has  been  made  possible  by  the  exposition  above. 
"Ideas,"  as  defined  by  Dewey,  are  not  objects  of  thought  in 
contrast  to  objects  as  existing.  Objects  of  thought  in  this 
contrast  sense  are  the  products  of  reflective  thought  as  it  per- 
forms its  function  of  solving  problems  of  a  scientific  character. 
Thus  they  are  made  possible  by  "ideas"  in  the  logical  sense 
in  which  they  are  antithetic  to  data.  Objects  of  thought 
are  tested  and  accepted  meanings,  systems  of  facts  and  theo- 
ries, or  propositions  which  reflective  analysis  and  synthesis 
have  achieved.  They  represent  solutions.  Once  get  clearly  in 
mind  the  difference  in  temporal  and  logical  status  between 
"ideas"  and  objects  of  thought  in  the  epistemological  sense, 
and  the  conflict  vanishes.  It  is  unfortunate  that  the  English 
language  is  so  poor  in  technical  philosophical  distinctions. 
The  word  "idea"  has  been  used  for  almost  everything  under  the 
sun  by  English  and  American  thinkers.  Objects  of  thought 
are  objects  of  thinking  as  a  cognitive  attitude  succeeding 
thought  as  a  reflective  activity.  We  call  them  objects  of 
thought  because  we  have  "perception"  in  mind  as  a  contrast 
term.  It  is  only  after  specific  problems  have  been  solved  and 
conclusions  have  been  achieved  that  we  pass  on  to  this  further 
distinction.  Of  this  distinction  which  arises  in  the  field  of 
experience  and  which  specific  reflection  plays  into,  we  have 
surely  said  enough  in  the  preceding  pages.  In  the  third  chap- 
ter, I  tried  to  point  out  that  the  pragmatists  of  the  so-called 
"Chicago  school"  use  the  term  "experience"  in  a  socially 
objective  sense.  It  is  because  of  this  naive  objectivity  that 
they  manage  to  escape  the  urgency  of  epistemology.  They 
escape  it  much  as  the  ordinary  scientist  does. 

A  purely  external  reality  cannot  furnish  a  single  criterion 
of  truth.  Tests  of  truth  must  be  immanent.  But  to  argue 
from  this  fact  to  the  conclusion  that  we  have  no  right  to 
consider  tested  results  as  giving  us  knowledge  of  existences 
which  cannot  enter  the  field  of  experience  is  unjustified.  We 
10 


134  CRITICAL  REALISM 

do  have  such  an  outlook,  and  there  is  nothing  self-contradictorj' 
about  it.  If  thinkers  would  only  be  more  empirical  and  more 
patient,  they  would  escape  many  enforced  self-deceptions. 
In  the  later  chapters  we  shall  see  that  the  conception  of 
control,  by  existences  outside  the  field  of  experience,  of  the 
constructs  within  the  field  of  experience  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  of  the  psycho-physical  organism — as  seen  in  physiology, 
psychology,  and  logic — is  not  only  thinkable  but  unescapa- 
ble.  Therefore,  knowledge  secures  an  objective  basis  in  reality 
as  a  whole,  just  as  it  has  an  objective  position  in  experience. 

All  the  distinctions  with  which  we  have  dealt  in  the  last 
two  chapters  are  to  be  found  in  the  field  of  the  individual's 
experience.  We  have  felt  that  an  appreciation  of  this  field 
in  its  very  real  complexity  is  the  precondition  of  any  adequate 
epistemology.  While  we  have  at  various  times  made  sug- 
gestions as  to  what  epistemological  conclusions  the  description 
of  the  field  would  warrant,  we  have  endeavored  to  hold  these 
suggestions  separate  from  the  empirical  description.  In  the 
same  way,  we  have  shown  ourselves  favorable  to  a  logic  which 
is  not  avowedly  epistemological.  The  relation  between  fact 
and  theory  in  experience  and  the  nature  of  judgment  are 
empirical  problems,  and  logic  is  only  another  science.  The 
fault  with  Lotze's  logic,  which  leads  it  into  the  dilemma  that 
Professor  Dewey  has  so  well  criticised,  is  that  its  standpoint 
is  not  homogeneous.  Mix  logic  and  epistemology  together 
before  you  have  an  adequate  epistemology  or  a  satisfactory 
logic,  and  the  inevitable  product  is  poor  logic  and  a  bastard 
epistemology.  But  the  holding  up  of  such  a  product  to  ridicule 
is  not  a  proof  that  epistemology  is  a  pseudo-discipline. 

The  empirical  foundation  which  we  have  desired  is  now 
practically  complete.  We  shall  pass  to  a  criticism  of  the 
dominant  epistemological  theories,  using  this  criticism  as  a 
means  to  develop  the  position  which  we  ourselves  hold. 


CHAPTER  VI 

AN   EXAMINATION    OF    IDEALISM 

'T^HE  mental  pluralism  at  which  we  have  arrived  is  in 
-^  unstable  equilibrium.  It  is  not  an  epistemology  nor, 
a  fortiori,  a  metaphysics ;  but  it  is,  if  our  analyses  have  been 
valid,  the  indispensable  basis  of  both.  Instead  of  making 
haste  to  a  system  under  the  guidance  of  emotion  or  prejudice, 
we  have  endeavored  to  achieve  a  survey  of  the  individual's 
field  of  experience  and  the  distinctions  characteristic  of  it. 
The  Advance  of  the  Personal  has  been  so  successful  that  it 
would  be  easy  to  forget  the  protest  that  cognition  constantly 
made  against  the  reduction  of  its  objects  to  percepts  and 
concepts.  Were  this  done,  it  would  be  possible  to  declare  the 
sphere  of  objects  known  to  be  merely  constructs  having  no 
cognitive  import.  In  like  manner,  it  would  be  easy  to 
forget  the  fact  that  the  individual's  thing-experiences  always 
seem  conditioned  by  factors  of  a  causal  nature.  All  this 
has  been  done  again  and  again  on  less  apparent  evidence  for 
idealism  than  has  been  offered  in  the  preceding  parts  of  our 
argument.  But  we  have  undertaken  an  analysis  of  experience 
of  the  broadest  and  least  biased  character.  It  is  our  duty, 
therefore,  to  discover  and  to  marshal  together  the  motives  for 
realism  as  well  as  those  for  idealism  and,  when  this  empirical 
task  is  accomplished,  to  determine  whether  or  not  some  out- 
look more  comprehensive  than  the  customary  idealisms  and 
realisms  may  satisfy  all  these  empirical  motives. 

In  order  that  this  completer  examination  may  be  seen  to  be 
necessary,  let  us  consider  the  principles  upon  which  idealisms 
base  themselves,  for,  if  there  be  quasi-apriori  principles  at 
the  foundation  of  idealism,  the  exhaustive  study  of  the  various 
motives  which  reveal  themselves  in  experience  would  be  a 
work  of  supererogation.  Before  we  go  further,  it  will  be  well 
to  bear  in  mind  that  idealism  is  seldom  offered  in  a  pure  form. 
Other  tendencies  are  mingled  with  it  to  make  it  conform  more 
to  the  demands  of  common  sense  and  of  science.     And  the 

135 


136  CRITICAL  REALISM 

whole  thus  achieved  is  put  under  the  egis  of  religious  and 
ethical  values.  In  brief,  idealistic  philosophies  are  substituted 
for  idealism.  The  quasi-apriori  principles,  to  which  reference 
has  been  made,  are  treated  as  means  to  the  development  of  a 
romantic  or  religious  outlook  on  the  world,  and,  unfortunately 
for  the  scientific  character  of  these  systems,  the  epistemological 
support  is  not  always  separated  out  and  tested  disinterestedly. 
For  this  reason,  the  criticism  passed  upon  idealism  by  those  who 
are  advocates  of  clear-cut,  logical  analysis  must  face  the  danger 
of  appearing  carping  and  little-minded.  Their  arguments 
cannot  be  in  the  grand  manner.  But  stricter  methodological 
demands  in  every  field  have  had  to  pass  through  the  fire  of 
adverse  criticism.  History,  for  example,  has  only  recently 
become  exigent  and  made  its  postulates  and  methods  a  subject 
for  impartial  investigation.  With  this  warning  given,  I  hope 
that  the  framework  of  idealism  discussed  below  may  not  seem 
too  bare  and  unfamiliar. 

Let  us  examine  the  idealistic  principles  which  stand  in  the 
way  of  a  realistic  view  of  knowledge.  The  first  principle  is  of  a 
formal  character  and  is  somewhat  as  follows.  The  terms  *  'sub- 
ject" and  "object"  are  relative  and  imply  each  other;  hence  a 
thing  cannot  be  an  object  unless  there  is  a  subject  for  which 
it  is  an  object.  Other  examples  of  relative  terms  which 
involve  each  other  are  usually  advanced  to  support  the 
contention  that  subject  and  object  are  meaningless  expressions 
when  separated  from  their  unity  of  implication.  A  ruler 
implies  subjects  whom  he  rules;  a  doctor,  patients  whom  he 
doctors;  a  shepherd,  sheep  which  he  herds.  But  we  can  think 
of  a  sheep  without  implying  that  there  must  be  a  shepherd. 
These  terms  are  only  semi-correlatives.  Let  us  recall  the 
attitude  taken  by  common  sense  as  described  in  the  chapter  on 
Natural  Realism.  Things  are  supposed  to  exist  in  the  physical 
world  whether  we  perceive  them  or  not.  Our  perception  is 
an  event  or  act  which  reveals  them  to  us  as  they  are,  and  has 
no  influence  upon  them.  These  are  thought  of  as  semi- 
correlatives  and  not  as  relatives.  Again,  when  we  say  that  we 
have  an  idea  of  a  person,  we  do  not  think  that  our  idea  is 
literally  connected  with  the  person.  The  phrase  "of  a  person" 
tells  what  sort  of  an  idea  it  is  and  is  thus  the  result  of  an 


AN  EXAMINATION  OF  IDEALISM  137 

analysis  of  the  idea,  The  idea  means  to  give  knowledge  of  the 
person,  but  does  not  assert  that,  as  an  idea,  it  is  existentially 
related  to  the  person.  In  order  to  possess  the  idea,  the  knower 
must  have  had  direct  or  indirect  causal  relation  with  the 
person  known  but  this  causal  relation  may  have  been  in  the 
distant  past.  Our  conclusion  is,  that  neither  in  the  subject- 
object  antithesis  nor  in  the  more  complicated  trinity  of 
subject,  idea-object,  and  existent  do  we  have  anything 
stronger  than  semi-correlatives. 

.  Another  point  should  be  noted  in  this  connection.  The 
relatives  which  are  usually  selected  as  throwing  light  upon 
the  relativity  of  subject  and  object  involve  two  things  which 
act  upon  each  other  or  are  in  spatial  relation.  The  ruler 
acts  upon  the  ruled,  the  doctor  upon  the  patient,  the  shepherd 
upon  the  sheep.  We  have  to  do  with  objective  relations 
between  things.  But  is  it  not  begging  the  question  to  assume 
that  in  knowing  we  have  to  do  with  a  relation  between  things 
of  either  a  passive  or  an  active  character?  Knowledge  may 
be  something  unique  in  nature  for  which  we  can  find  no  good 
analogy  in  the  relations  of  objects  known. 

There  are  now  two  possibilities  before  us.  Either  there 
is  no  relation,  be  it  active  or  passive,  between  subject  (or 
knower)  and  object  (or  known),  or  the  relation  which  exists 
must  be  discovered  by  reflection.  We  have  no  right  to  work 
by  analogy  in  the  uncritical  way  that  is  so  often  done. 

Now,  the  immediate  realist  and  the  idealist  both  accept 
a  cognitive  relation  between  the  knower  and  the  object  known. 
They  differ,  however,  in  their  view  of  the  nature  of  this  rela- 
tion. The  immediate  realist  asserts  that  it  is  external  and 
does  not  affect  the  object  known,  while  the  idealist  claims 
that  it  is  internal  and  inseparable  from  the  object.  Let  us 
examine  these  two  positions  to  show  the  a  priori  character  of 
the  controversy  between  them. 

As  the  reader  has  no  doubt  already  realized,  the  current 
forms  of  idealism  are  directed  mainly  against  presentative 
or  immediate  realisms.  These  realisms  hold  that  an  inde- 
pendent object  is  literally  present  to  the  individual's  mind 
in  knowledge.  To  the  idealist,  this  literal  presence  seems  to 
involve  a  mystic  power  of  transcendence,  a  sort  of  cognitive 


138  CRITICAL  REALISM 

telepathy,  which  is  unthinkable.  Unfortunately,  in  order  to 
combat  this  error,  he  sees  no  point  of  attack  other  than  a 
belief  in  a  cognitive  relation  which  binds  subject  and  object 
together.  The  object  is  not  independent  of  the  subject,  he 
replies.  The  relation  between  them  is  not  external,  as  you 
would  have  us  believe,  but  intimate  and  internal.  Thus  the 
controversy  ttuns  about  the  nattue  of  a  supposed  cognitive 
relation. 

The  idealist  attacks  the  presentative  realist  in  the  follow- 
ing way.  The  cognitive  relation  must  to  some  extent  modify 
the  reality  known.  Hence  it  is  impossible  to  know  the  reality 
as  it  is  apart  from  this  relation.  The  situation  is  similar  to 
the  familiar  instance  of  the  palpably  absurd,  the  turning  on 
of  a  light  to  see  the  darkness.  Consequently,  reality  becomes 
a  thing-in-itself  which  we  cannot  get  at.  Against  this  position 
the  idealist  holds  that  thought  assists  in  the  construction  of 
reality;  it  does  not  seek  a  reality  as  something  given  inde- 
pendently of  mind.  That  this  controversy  is  not  merely  a 
scholastic  survival  appears  evident  from  a  study  of  recent 
philosophical  literature.  The  argument  of  the  idealist  is 
used  by  a  keen  thinker  against  the  American  type  of  the 
"New  Realism."  "Stated  broadly,  the  epistemological  prob- 
lem may  be  said  to  centre  in  the  question  how  the  same  fact 
can  be  at  the  same  time  a  member  in  the  'objective'  and  in 
the  'subjective'  order;  how  it  can  be  both  a  physical  reality 
and  an  experiential  fact.  ...  It  seems,  however,  that  the 
fact  which  thus  figures  in  two  different  orders  at  once  is  not 
quite  the  same  fact  in  both  cases.  .  .  Hence  the  question 
how  the  fact  can  be  known  as  it  was  before  the  change  took 
place."  (B.  H.  Bode,  "Consciousness  and  Its  Object," 
Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods, 
Vol.    IX,    No.    19.) 

The  task  which  presentative  realisms  thus  assume  so  light- 
heartedly  becomes  the  more  insoluble  the  more  consciousness 
is  admitted  to  possess  a  imique  centrality  or  unity.  Now, 
the  American  type  of  the  "New  Realism"  differentiates 
itself  from  the  English  type  by  its  elimination  of  an  episte- 
mological or  entitative  consciousness.  It  looks  upon 
consciousness   as   a   relation   into   which   things   may   enter 


AN  EXAMINATION  OF  IDEALISM  139 

temporarily.  Yet,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is  unable  to  escape  the 
age-old  shaft  of  idealism.  What,  then,  is  realism  to  do?  To 
maintain  dogmatically  that  the  cognitive  relation  does  not 
affect  the  reality  known  is  a  tour  de  force  even  more  unstable 
as  a  foundation  for  a  system  of  philosophy  than  the  idealistic 
principle. 

Let  us  examine  some  of  the  motives  which  have  led  to  the 
assumption  of  a  cognitive  relation.  If  we  can  satisfy  these 
in  another  way,  we  may  be  able  to  rise  above  the  interminable 
controversy  as  to  whether  the  cognitive  relation  is  internal 
or  external. 

If  there  is  no  relation  between  the  knower  and  the  known, 
it  is  asked,  how  is  knowledge  possible  ?  It  becomes  inexplicable 
because  there  is  nothing  to  compare  with  it.  Knowledge  as 
a  function  seems  to  bid  defiance  to  time  and  space;  the  most 
distant  past  and  the  farthest  reaches  of  the  material  cosmos 
are  laid  bare  to  its  gaze.  So  different  is  it  from  all  other 
acts  and  processes  that  it  must  be  adjudged  non-natural  and 
without  a  basis  in  the  immediate  physiological  and  psycho- 
logical processes  which  apparently  underlie  experience.  We 
saw  that  Natural  Realism  is  open  to  these  charges.  For  it, 
knowledge  seemed  to  be  master  of  space  within  limits  not 
easily  discoverable.  But  I  do  not  see  that  the  addition  of  a 
cognitive  relation  aids  matters  to  any  extent.  Yet  this  is 
what  is  done.  The  idealist  bridges  the  apparent  gulf  which 
separates  the  knower  from  the  things  known  by  the  tenuous 
rope  of  a  cognitive  relation.  Is  it  strange  that  the  presenta- 
tive  realist  replies  by  adopting  this  unique  and  non-dynamic 
relation  and  making  it  external  instead  of  internal?  When 
epistemology  limits  itself  to  such  formal  and  abstract  motives, 
the  argument  can  go  on  indefinitely.  The  reply  to  this  will 
be  that  these  formal  arguments  must  be  met  if  the  problem 
of  knowledge  is  to  be  solved.  How  can  a  mind  know  a  thing 
if  it  has  no  commerce  with  it?  The  mind  that  knows  is  one 
entity  and  the  object  known  is  another  entity,  and  knowledge 
surely  involves  a  relation  between  them.  My  answer  is  that 
knowledge  involves  a  commerce  between  the  mind  knowing 
and  the  thing  known,  but  that  this  commerce  precedes  the 
event  of  knowing  and  is  not  identical  with  it.     The  mistake 


I40  CRITICAL  REALISM 

made  is  to  take  the  mind  as  a  simple  entity  whose  sole  function 
is  knowing.  Presentative  realisms  have  been  especially  prone 
to  look  at  the  mind  in  this  way. 

But  the  cognitive  relation,  if  it  exists,  should  be  empirically 
discoverable.  Let  us  see  whether  a  relation  between  the 
knower  and  the  object  known  is  a  matter  of  immediate  experi- 
ence given  as  directly  as  the  object  itself.  So  far  as  I  can 
make  out,  cognition  is  an  event  characterized  by  an  experience 
called  apprehension  on  the  part  of  the  self  and  an  object 
which  is  apprehended.  The  individual  takes  a  peculiar 
attitude  toward  the  object  which  is  present  in  the  field  of 
experience.  But  if  this  is  an  adequate  description  of  the 
total  experience,  where  is  the  cognitive  relation  which  is  always 
taken  for  granted?  Is  it  introduced  to  obviate  an  episte- 
mological  action  at  a  distance?  If  so,  the  assumption  is  at 
work  that  a  cognitive  attitude  is  an  act  like  a  physical  act 
and  demands  something  on  which  and  through  which  to  act. 
This  assimilation  of  the  mental  field  to  the  physical  is 
unjustified  unless  there  are  strong  analogies  to  urge  it.  Where, 
however,  are  the  analogies?  James  Ward,  for  instance, 
maintains  that  the  subject-object  relation  is  not  causal  in  its 
nature.  "But  one  thing,  I  think,  we  must  not  do:  we  must 
not  attempt  to  bring  this  relation  of  subject  and  object  under 
the  category  of  cause  and  effect.  .  .  I  only  demur  to  the 
assumption  that  the  subject-object  relation  itself  is  causal." 
{Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  Vol.  II,  p.  117.)  Now,  it  is 
generally  agreed  that  the  causal  category  is  fundamental  for 
the  physical  world.  Hence  to  exclude  it  from  epistemology 
is  to  admit  that  the  two  fields  differ  markedly.  Yet  I  feel 
certain  that  many  arguments  for  the  cognitive  relation  are 
based  on  an  assimilation  of  knowledge  to  a  physical  act.  As 
has  sometimes  been  pointed  out,  there  is  likewise  a  tendency 
to  read  the  presence  of  the  body  in  perception  into  the  cogni- 
tive attitude  and  to  confuse  spatial  relations  with  a  supposed 
cognitive  relation.  In  like  manner,  there  is  danger  of  con- 
ceiving cognition  as  an  act  of  the  mind  directed  upon  an 
object  outside  the  mind. 

There  is,  however,  another  motive  for  the  assumption  of 
a  cognitive  relation.     It  may  be  asserted  that  in  cognition  we 


AN  EXAMINATION  OF  IDEALISM  141 

experience  a  unique  relation  of  ' '  presence  to, ' '  or  togetherness. 
The  object  is  together  with  the  self  in  cognition.  This  motive 
is  probably  the  strongest  one  for  the  assumption  of  a  cognitive 
relation. 

In  the  chapter  on  "Distinctions  within  the  Field,"  we 
tried  to  distinguish  between  the  elemental  unity  of  the  field, 
which  I  designated  by  the  term  "togetherness,"  and  the  more 
special  contrasts  which  were  developed  within  it.  Such  con- 
trasts arise  on  the  surface  of  what  is  a  unity  of  a  peculiarly 
intimate  sort.  The  antitheses  between  the  self  and  the  not- 
self,  the  subject  and  the  object,  the  past  and  the  present,  the 
idea  and  its  object,  are  examples  of  contrasts  within  a  basic 
unity.  Now,  it  is  a  mistake  easily  made  to  read  into  these 
oppositions  a  relation  of  a  peculiar  sort  to  reconcile  them  with 
the  unity  which  they  seem  to  outrage. 

If  the  distinction  between  the  field  in  which  there  is  no 
sheer  separation  and  the  special  contrasts  which  arise  within 
it  is  kept  in  mind,  the  nature  of  the  so-called  act  of  cognition 
becomes  clearer.  The  subject-self  takes  the  cognitive  attitude 
toward  some  object  in  the  field.  But  the  subject-self  as  the 
centre  of  control  is  thought  of  as  the  "mind,  "  while  the  object 
is  regarded  as  non-mental.  We  have,  in  other  words,  the 
presence  in  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience  of  an  object 
which  is  not  considered  a  part  of  the  mind,  and  the  attitude 
taken  toward  it  on  the  part  of  the  subject-self.  We  saw 
how  this  contrast  led  common  sense  to  Natural  Realism. 
Idealism  rebukes  Natural  Realism  and  asserts  that  the  object 
is  connected  \vith  the  mind  by  a  relation.  We  are  beginning 
to  see  that  both  are  right  and  both  are  wrong.  The  object 
directly  present  to  the  "mind"  in  the  narrower  sense  is  a 
part  of  the  field  and  is  mental  in  the  larger  sense.  Here 
idealism  is  right.  However,  we  do  not  experience  a  relation  of 
a  peculiar  sort,  but  a  contrast  in  which  the  object  is  ex- 
perienced as  independent.  Here  Natural  Realism  is  right. 
Enough  has  been  said,  I  think,  to  show  that  the  cognitive 
relation  is  not  experienced,  but  is  a  creation  of  reflection. 
When  we  take  the  cognitive  attitude,  there  is  a  contrast  of 
parts  of  the  field  which  are  yet  together. 

Many  idealists  have  recognized   the  fact  that  idealism 


142  CRITICAL  REALISM 

really  founds  itself  on  the  unity  of  the  individual's  experience 
rather  than  on  an  internal  cognitive  relation.  Since  we  have 
already  persuaded  ourselves  that  this  unity  is  a  fact,  the 
conclusion  which  ideaUsm  draws  from  it  should  be  of  especial 
interest.  Let  us  glance  at  Mr.  Bradley's  use  of  this  empirical 
principle.  "For  if,  seeking  for  reality,  we  go  to  experience, 
what  we  certainly  do  not  find  is  a  subject  or  an  object,  or 
indeed  any  other  thing  whatever,  standing  separate  and  on 
its  own  bottom.  What  we  discover  rather  is  a  whole  in 
which  distinctions  can  be  made,  but  in  which  divisions  do 
not  exist."  {Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  146.)  In  contrast 
to  the  unity  of  the  level  of  mere  sentience,  the  later  level 
contains  the  contrasts  characteristic  of  the  practical  and 
theoretic  attitudes  (p.  '463).  The  interesting  feature  of  his 
treatment  is  his  essential  recognition  of  the  dualism  of  the 
cognitive  attitude.  "One  or  more  elements  are  separated 
from  the  confused  mass  of  feeling,  and  stand  apparently  by 
themselves  and  over  against  this.  And  the  distinctive 
character  of  such  an  object  is  that  it  seems  simply  to  be.  If 
it  appeared  to  influence  the  mass  which  it  confronts,  so  as  to 
lead  that  to  act  on  it  and  alter  it,  and  if  such  a  relation  quali- 
fied its  nature,  the  attitude  would  be  practical.  But  the 
perceptional  relation  is  supposed  to  fall  wholly  outside  of  the 
essence  of  the  object.  It  is  in  short  disregarded,  or  else  is 
dismissed  as  a  something  accidental  and  irrelevant. ' '  (Pp.  460—1 . ) 
(The  italics  are  mine.)  Now,  this  analysis  is  a  classic,  and 
the  empirical  idealists  should  give  it  due  acknowledgment. 
The  subject-object  relation  is  not  looked  upon  as  a  trans- 
cendental mystery,  but  as  a  distinction  developed  in  time 
{cf.  note  on  p.  460).  Still  he  retains  it,  though  phrase 
after  phrase  discounts  its  conscious  presence.  With  Mr.  Brad- 
ley's position  I  am  essentially  satisfied,  although  I  am  con- 
vinced that  the  opposition  between  subject-self  and  object 
usually  dominates  the  togetherness  of  the  field. 

From  the  process  side,  experience  does  present  a  unity  of 
a  progressive  sort.  Objects  do  not  permanently  retain  that 
fixity  and  aloofness  with  which  the  cognitive  attitude  endows 
them.  Currents  of  influence  pass  from  the  subjective  side 
to  the.  objective  and  from  the  objective  to  the  subjective. 


AN  EXAMINATION  OF  IDEALISM  143 

Reflection  remodels  and  reinterprets  idea-objects  according 
to  some  dominant  problem  or  purpose,  while  feeling  floats 
like  a  veil  over  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience.  No 
fact  stands  on  its  own  bottom  and  successfully  denies  the 
suzerainty  of  the  whole.  Such  vital  interdependence  of  the 
parts  in  the  temporal  achievements  of  experience  with  its 
recognition  of  the  penetrating  authority  of  thought,  reflective 
and  unreflective,  is  the  teaching  of  logic  and  of  psychology. 
It  is  upon  this  rock  that  idealism  should  take  its  stand  rather 
than  upon  the  quicksand  of  some  formal  principle.  Thought 
is  the  movement  of  readjustment  and  of  creative  construction 
in  the  continuous  field  of  the  individual's  experience.  It 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  view  does  not  make  thought 
subjective,  but  lifts  it  from  its  traditional  psychological 
subjectivity  to  a  logical  objectivity  and  places  it  among  the 
objects  and  ideas  whose  mediation  and  testing  it  is.  I  wish, 
however,  to  stress  emphatically  the  fact  that  such  thinking 
works  within  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience. 

But  what  does  this  frank  admission  that  the  objective 
spheres  are  open  to.  thought  imply?  Primarily,  that  knowl- 
edge is  an  achievement  and  not  a  gift.  This,  it  has  always 
seemed  to  me,  is  the  contribution  which  idealism  makes  to 
philosophy.  This  fact  has  had  few  doubters  among  those 
who  have  made  a  name  for  themselves  in  the  field  of  science. 
The  immediate  datum  apprehended  simply  and  without 
mental  toil  and  method  vanishes  upon  closer  inspection.  A 
fact  for  science  and  a  fact  for  common  sense  differ  in  texture 
and  in  validity,  and  they  resist  in  unequal  degrees  the 
acid- test  of  new  facts  and  a  larger  context.  We  shall  agree, 
then,  with  idealism  that  knowledge  is  an  achievement,  and  we 
shall  emphasize  with  subjective  idealism  that  it  arises  in  the 
minds  of  individuals.  We  shall,  however,  deny  that  the 
cognitive  attitude  within  the  individual's  field  of  experience 
is  supplemented  by  a  relation  which  connects  the  subject- 
self  with  the  object. 

But  an  unwarranted  deduction  is  drawn  by  idealism  from 
the  unity  of  the  individual's  experience.  The  objective 
spheres  which  grow  up  in  men's  minds  through  the  interplay 
of  immediate  experience  and  ideational  activities  until  they 


144  CRITICAL  REALISM 

bloom  forth  as  worlds  open  to  cognition  are  adjudged  the 
outer  limits  of  reality,  beyond  which  lies  emptiness.  In  other 
words,  it  is  assumed  that  the  individual  is  unable  to  refer  his 
knowledge  to  that  which  is  other  than  experience.  To  use 
a  cosmic  parallel,  experience  is  a  universe  bounded  by  void 
reaches  of  space  in  which  the  weary  imagination  can  find  no 
resting-place,  the  thing-in-itself  being  a  virtual  image  whose 
source  is  discovered  by  reflection  to  be  within  experience. 

The  decision  of  the  idealist  that  extra-experiential  reality 
is  meaningless  rests  on  two  main  principles:  The  principle 
that  the  causal  category  has  validity  only  within  experience, 
where  it  links  phenomena  together  and,  therefore,  cannot 
be  employed  to  join  extra-experiential  realities  with  the 
individual's  experience;  and  the  principle  that  "to  be  real 
or  even  barely  to  exist  must  be  to  fall  within  sentience."  The 
first  principle  is  typical  of  the  idealism  founded  on  the  theory 
of  knowledge  of  Kant;  the  second  is  more  characteristic  of 
Berkeley.  This  second  principle  is  to-day  championed  by 
Bradley.  Let  us  examine,  first,  the  view  that  the  causal 
category  cannot  be  used  to  connect  extra-experiential  realities 
among  one  another  and  with  the  individual's  experience.  To 
understand  the  meaning  of  this  principle,  we  must  consider 
it  in  connection  with  a  criticism  of  the  Kantian  philosophy. 

A  typical  statement  of  the  idealist  criticism  of  the  realistic 
element  in  Kant's  philosophy  is  to  be  found  in  Miss  Calkins 's 
book  entitled  The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy.  "Things- 
in-themselves  are,  by  hypothesis,  independent  of  consciousness, 
yet  they  must  be  talked  about  and  thought  about  if  they  are 
to  be  inferred  as  existing.  They  are  drawn,  thus,  into  the 
domain  of  the  self,  they  become  objects  of  consciousness,  no 
longer  independent  realities"  (p.  240).  It  is  evident  that 
the  assumption  is  that  to  know  is  to  bring  into  consciousness. 
Let  us  see  how  this  assumption  grows  out  of  the  Kantian 
point  of  view.  The  problem  raised  is  fundamental  for  the  cog- 
nitive import  of  the  categories,  and  must  be  faced  squarely. 

We  have  seen  that  the  cognitive  attitude  encourages  the 
development  of  realistic  meanings  within  the  field  of  the 
individual's  experience.  Kant  realized  this  fact  and  called 
his  position  empirical  realism.     We  may  indicate  this  by  a 


AN  EXAMINATION  OF  IDEALISM  145 

description  of  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience.  Each 
person  thinks  of  himself  as  real  and  at  the  same  time  thinks  of 
himself  as  in  relations  to  other  persons  and  to  things.  These 
are  realities  on  the  same  level  as  himself.  The  individual 
takes  the  same  cognitive  attitude  toward  himself  as  toward 
others.  The  content  of  his  mind  at  any  moment  is,  implicitly 
at  least  and  at  certain  moments  explicitly,  a  sort  of  map  of 
persons  and  physical  things  in  complex  relations  to  one  another. 
All  these  are  thought  of  as  having  that  independence  and 
realness  of  which  Mr.  Bradley  speaks.  When  we  finally  come 
to  state  our  own  position,  we  shall  lay  great  stress  upon  this 
empirical  realism  as  the  natural  basis  for  a  more  critical  realism. 
But,  if  knowledge  involves  the  categories,  and  these  are  entirely 
and  uncontroUedly  mental,  what  guarantee  have  we  that  knowl- 
edge is  not  a  subjective  creation?  Once  grant  that  forms 
and  relations  are  contributed  by  a  mind  uncontrolled  by 
independent  realities,  and  agnosticism  undeniably  follows. 
But  both  psychology  and  logic  have  long  moved  from  the 
Kantian  standpoint.  The  field  of  the  individual's  experience 
is  a  continuum,  and  in  it  continuities  and  relations  are  as 
much  and  as  primitively  present  as  the  sensory  qualities. 
This  conclusion,  which,  in  the  English-speaking  world,  owes 
its  recognition  mainly  to  the  work  of  James  Ward  and  William 
James,  is  now  becoming  generally  conceded.  It  measures  up 
to  the  facts  of  an  unbiased  inspection.  But  the  significance 
of  this  conclusion  for  theory  of  knowledge  has  not  been  realized. 
Along  with  the  rejection  of  the  Kantian  distinction  between 
form,  contributed  by  mental  faculties,  and  the  inchoate 
manifold  of  sense  has  gone  a  renewed  interest  in  percepts  as 
contrasted  with  sensations.  Percepts  are  now  regarded  as 
empirical  growths  whose  genesis  and  characteristics  can  be 
explained  only  by  the  synthetic  capacity  of  consciousness 
working  under  the  control  of  the  environment.  The  motor 
aspect  of  consciousness  is  emphasized  in  a  way  that  brings 
out  this  control.  Percepts  are  thus  controlled  constructs 
developed  in  the  objective  sphere  of  consciousness  as  thing- 
experiences.  The  same  empirical  view  of  the  development 
of  the  objects  in  consciousness  is  being  carried  to  conceptual 
objects.     In    this    domain,    the    process    of    construction    is 


146  CRITICAL  REALISM 

often  a  conscious  one.  Let  me  repeat  my  definition  of  thought, 
which  fits  in  with  this  view.  Thought  is  the  movement  of 
readjustment  and  of  creative  construction  in  the  continuous 
field  of  the  individual's  experience.  The  specific  processes 
involved  in  it,  as  analysis,  synthesis,  hypothesis,  checking  by 
new  percepts,  etc.,  are  treated  in  any  good  logic,  so  they  need 
not  be  examined  here.  The  main  point  to  be  stressed  in  the 
contrast  with  the  Kantian  logic  which  I  have  in  mind  is  the 
control  of  constructive  thought  by  percepts  and  thus,  indi- 
rectly, by  the  environment.  This  view  of  thought  may  be 
accepted,  but  the  query  may  at  the  same  time  be  made, 
How  can  you  be  sure  that  an  environment  external  to  con- 
sciousness controls  the  formation  of  percepts  and,  hence,  of 
concepts?  Psychology  assumes  it  and  seemingly  for  very 
good  reasons,  but,  then,  psychology  is  a  special  science  and 
accepts  the  realism  of  the  physical  sciences  as  a  contrast-basis 
for  its  own  material  and  methods.  This  objection  is  the 
classic  caveat  to  the  hasty  assumption  that  the  standpoint 
of  psychology  is  sufficient  to  found  a  realism  on;  but,  if  the 
theory  that  percepts  are  controlled  by  the  environment  can 
be  shown  not  to  conflict  with  theory  of  knowledge,  it  and  the 
facts  which  support  it  point  toward  a  control  of  the  categories 
by  the  environment  and,  therefore,  to  the  possibility  of  a 
mediate  realism. 

Before  we  pass  to  a  criticism  of  the  idealist  reductio  ad  ab- 
surdum  of  the  doctrine  of  things-in-themselves,  i.e.,  in  present- 
day  terms,  of  an  environment  known  to  be  independent  of 
consciousness,  yet  conditioning  it,  let  us  contrast  the  Kantian 
theory  of  the  categories  with  the  implications  of  the  foregoing 
sketch.  For  Kant,  the  categories  are  the  pure  forms  of  the 
understanding,  a  faculty  separate  from  sense  and  uncontrolled 
by  it.  There  is,  consequently,  in  his  theory  of  knowledge  a 
fundamental  dualism  to  begin  with.  The  formal  aspect 
of  percepts  as  well  as  the  synthetic  principles  which  furnish 
the  supporting  structure  of  scientific  knowledge  derive  from 
the  understanding.  In  other  words,  all  combination,  all 
relation  of  however  specific  a  character,  all  organization  to  be 
found  in  experience  comes  from  the  understanding.  This 
startling  position  is  partly  obscured  from  the  ordinary  reader 


AN  EXAMINATION  OF  IDEALISM  147 

of  Kant  by  the  interminable  twistings  and  turnings  by  means 
of  which  he  covers  up  what  is  the  only  logical  doctrine  to  be 
sifted  out.  The  imagination  to  which  he  makes  appeal  to 
account  for  the  specific  combinations  which  precede  the  more 
general  syntheses  of  a  higher  order  effected  by  the  understand- 
ing proper  is,  and  can  be,  nothing  but  the  understanding  work- 
ing unconsciously.  Moreover,  no  cue  can  be  found  in  the 
sensory  manifold  for  the  infinite  variety  of  forms  and  rela- 
tions which  make  the  phenomenal  world  so  complex,  for  a  cue 
would  imply  the  suggestion  of  the  structure  and  relations  of 
phenomena  to  the  understanding,  which  would  have  only  the 
function  of  interpreting  these  indications  and  bringing  them 
out  into  relief.  And  this  relationship  between  sense  and  the 
understanding  would  make  sense  the  artist  and  understand- 
ing the  artisan.  Or,  to  employ  a  simile  from  the  field  of  pho- 
tography, sense  would  correspond  to  the  condition  of  the  sen- 
sitized plate  after  the  exposure,  while  the  activity  of  the 
understanding  would  correspond  to  the  function  of  the 
developing  fluid.  Hence,  given  his  crass  distinction  between 
form  and  matter,  sense  and  understanding,  passivity  and 
activity,  Kant  is  forced  to  make  all  but  the  purely  qualitative 
side  of  nature  dependent  on  the  arbitrary  modeling  of  the 
mind.  And  even  this  counsel  of  despair  is  unsatisfactory, 
because  qualities,  in  so  far  as  they  are  terms,  cannot  be 
related  arbitrarily.  To  put  sounds  side  by  side  in  space  and 
to  arrange  colors  in  octaves  would  hardly  be  a  successful 
method  of  procedure;  yet,  upon  the  Kantian  basis,  one  should 
be  as  easy  as  the  other.  It  has  been  necessary  to  state  Kant's 
primary  position  thus  barely  and  unsympathetically  and  to 
separate  it  from  his  attempts  to  overcome  the  dualism  in  his 
theory  of  the  constituents  of  knowledge — attempts  which  are 
painfully  futile — in  order  to  realize  the  essential  nature  of  the 
categories  as  he  conceives  them.  The  categories  are  for  him 
forms  of  unity  resident  in  the  understanding  and  applied  by  it 
to  the  material  of  sense  already  more  or  less  rationalized  by 
the  previous  work  of  the  imagination,  a  lower  stage  of  the 
understanding.  Hence,  that  part  of  experience  which  is  most 
emphasized  in  science,  and  in  terms  of  which  the  structure  and 
functions  of  physical  things  are  stated,  is  assigned  a  subjective 


148  CRITICAL  REALISM 

origin.  To  put  the  consequences  of  this  position  on  the 
biological  side  where  its  implications  become  more  specific  and, 
a  fortiori,  more  absurd,  the  structure  and  connections  of  the 
things  in  the  environment  to  which  the  body  must  react  in 
order  to  survive,  are  subjective  assignments  legislated  by  the 
understanding.  Knowledge  is,  then,  an  amalgam  in  which 
the  most  important  constituent,  that  furnished  by  the  under- 
standing, is  uncontrolled  by  things-in-themselves.  It  is  not 
to  be  wondered  at  that  Kant  adjudged  things-in-themselves  to 
be  unknowable.  Even  if  knowledge,  as  we  shall  hold,  does 
not  require  the  presence  of  the  existent  known  in  consciousness, 
it  at  least  presupposes,  as  a  condition,  the  control  of  experience 
by  that  which  is  known.  This  control  need  not  be — as  we 
study  psychology  and  logic  we  realize  that  it  cannot  be — of 
a  mechanical  nature.  Kant's  mistake,  then,  was  to  assume 
a  dualistic  theory  of  the  constituents  of  knowledge  which 
precluded  this  control  from  those  reaches  of  experience  in 
which  knowledge  is  ripened.  Instead  of  the  control  by 
things-in-themselves  being  continuous,  as  the  methodology 
of  science  certainly  seems  to  indicate,  it  is  temporary  and 
limited  to  a  fictive  sense-manifold. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  develop  the  implications  of  our 
own  sketch  of  the  locus  and  control  of  the  categories.  In  doing 
so,  three  motives  are  discovered  to  point  in  the  same  direction, 
and  this  convergence  of  distinct  investigations  to  one  result 
will  give  us  increased  assurance  of  the  correctness  of  our 
approach.  The  first  motive  is  the  generally  acknowledged 
failure  of  the  Kantian  theory  of  the  constituents  of  knowledge. 
The  fundamental  dualism  within  experience  which  it  postulates 
leads  to  an  endless  number  of  artificial  problems  which  require 
additional  hypotheses.  Even  were  these  relatively  successful, 
the  complexity  of  the  whole  would  condemn  the  primary 
assumptions,  if  a  simpler  analysis  were  forthcoming.  Hence, 
a  theory  of  the  growth  of  knowledge  which  accepts  a  funda- 
mental continuity  between  perception  and  thought,  in  so 
far  as  it  excises  the  morbid  basis  on  which  these  artificial 
problems  flourish,  must  be  regarded  as  a  step  in  the  right 
direction.  The  second  reenforcing  motive  is  the  empirical 
analysis  of  experience,  which,  as  we  have  indicated  above,  is 


AN  EXAMINATION  OF  IDEALISM  149 

wholly  against  the  Kantian  separation  of  form  from  matter. 
Instead,  relations  and  categories  appear  immersed  in  the  ob- 
jective continuum  spread  out  before  us  and  are  analyzed  out 
and  used  by  thought  in  the  solution-  of  problems  which  concern 
the  interpretation  of  that  continuum.  Concepts  and  univer- 
sals,  in  short,  arise  from,  and  play  back  into,  the  perceptual  field 
under  the  spur  of  either  practical  or  theoretical  interests. 
We  must  not,  however,  for  the  sake  of  simplicity,  limit  the 
source  of  the  categories  to  the  domain  of  external  perception; 
the  inner  sphere,  also,  contributes  elements  which  enrich  and 
deepen  the  construction  of  such  fundamental  meanings  as 
"identity,"  "causality,"  "time,"  "substantiality,"  etc.  The 
point  to  grasp  is  the  growth  of  the  categories  from  immediate 
experience  and  the  fact  that  this  growth  is  immanently 
controlled  by  experiences  which  lie  deeper  than  our  caprice. 
Evidently,  the  categories  do  not  perform  the  tremendous 
function  assigned  to  them  by  Kant,  that  of  accounting  for 
all  the  syntheses  to  be  found  in  knowledge,  when  they  are 
taken  in  this  empirical  way;  rather  do  they  interpret  and 
carry  further  the  syntheses  from  which  they  arise.  They  are 
incapable  of  explaining  the  continuities  and  unities  which 
characterize  experience  as  such  or  those  powers  of  analysis 
and  of  organization  which  render  knowledge  possible.  Certain 
capacities  being  given  as  preconditions  of  the  rise  of  knowledge, 
the  employment  of  these  and  their  consequent  increase  in 
power  and  delicacy  is  due  to  the  material  which  elicits  them 
and  which  suggests  the  principles  and  concepts  to  be  used. 
In  short,  organization  is  never  absent  from  experience,  no 
matter  how  far  down  into  primitive  sentience  we  go,  and  the 
lower  levels  control  the  higher  so  far  as  they  set  the  problems 
and  give  the  material  upon  which  mental  ability  is  to  work. 
It  is  a  mistake  to  regard  intelligence  as  creative  apart  from 
that  which  calls  it  forth.  It  is  a  servant,  not  a  despot. 
This  status  of  intelligence  is  brought  into  relief  in  science 
by  the  constant  appeal  to  new  facts  to  test  suggestions  and  the 
fruitfulness  of  facts  in  suggestions.  In  this  second  motive 
which  supports  an  objective  basis  for  the  categories,  we  have 
drawn  mainly  on  the  testimony  of  logic,  psychology,  and  the 
methodology  of  the  sciences.  To  make  the  categories  grow 
11 


ISO  CRITICAL  REALISM 

from  the  perceptual  field  and  to  continue  responsible  to  it  is  to 
transfer  to  them  the  possibility  of  control  by  things-in-them- 
selves.  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  that  such  a  control  exercised 
by  things-in-themselves,  when  it  is  strengthened  by  experiment 
and  by  the  necessity  for  motor  adaptations,  is  a  sufficient 
foimdation  for  the  degree  of  knowledge  we  claim  to  possess  of 
the  physical  world.  What  is  needed,  besides  this  indication 
of  the  basis  of  a  realistic  knowledge,  is  the  demonstration,  as 
against  agnostic  realism  and  idealism,  that  such  a  knowledge 
of  reality  external  to  mind  is  both  thinkable  and  meaningful. 
We  have  tried  to  show  that  the  categories  are  not  contributed 
by  the  self  in  the  Kantian  way,  and  that  they  and  the  knowledge 
which  they  help  to  build  up  are  objective  to  the  individual 
and  probably  responsible  to  nature. 

If  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  categories  are 
responsive  to  realities  independent  of  the  field  of  the  individ- 
ual's experience,  why  cannot  they  assist  in  giving  us  knowledge 
about  these  realities  ?  Let  us  examine  the  idealistic  argument 
against  things-in-themselves  in  the  light  of  the  foregoing 
criticism  of  the  Kantian  theory  of  the  categories.  We  are 
evidently  desirous  of  showing  that  things-in-themselves  are 
knowable  and  that  they  are  really  what  the  scientist  calls 
physical  things. 

The  assumption  which  the  idealist  makes  is  that  to  know 
is  to  bring  within  experience  in  a  literal  way.  The  reason  for 
this  assumption  is  twofold:  first  comes  the  Kantian  tradition 
with  its  subjective  note;  then  comes  the  limitation  of  knowl- 
edge to  the  dualism  of  the  subject-object  contrast.  Because 
of  these  assumptions,  the  thing  known  is  assumed  to  be 
literally  present  to  the  subject-self  and  to  be  formed  largely  by 
the  imcontroUed  activity  of  the  ego.  We  have  indicated  rea- 
sons for  the  denial  of  the  Kantian  outlook ;  let  us  now  give  our 
reasons  for  the  denial  of  the  view  that  knowledge  necessarily  in- 
volves the  literal  presence  in  consciousness  of  the  thing  known. 

In  the  fifth  chapter,  we  stressed  the  distinction  between 
the  idea  and  the  thing  of  which  it  is  an  idea.  The  idea,  or 
concept,  claims  to  give  knowledge  of  the  thing  it  means.  The 
thing  is  absent,  while  the  idea  is  present.  This  idea  may 
consist  of  propositions  which  are  referred  to  the  thing.     Here 


AN  EXAMINATION  OF  IDEALISM  151 

we  have  the  cognitive  trinity  to  which  I  made  reference  a 
while  ago,  subject-self,  idea-object  (or  series  of  propositions), 
and  thing.  Let  us  note  at  once  that  the  idea-object  is  present 
in  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience,  while  the  thing  may- 
be absent.  Yet  the  idea  gives  knowledge  of  the  thing.  We 
have  here  a  structure  which  can  be  employed  by  critical 
realism  under  the  stress  of  facts  to  undermine  the  idealistic 
assumption  made  by  Miss  Calkins  that  to  know  is  to  bring 
into  consciousness.  When  we  analyze  the  knowledge  of  the 
physical  world  given  by  science  we  find  that  it  is  reducible  to  a 
knowledge  of  the  relative  sizes,  the  structure,  the  active 
properties,  and  the  relations  of  things.  Nowhere  do  we  have 
the  actual  presence  of  a  physical  thing  in  the  field  of  experience. 
We  have,  then,  good  reason  to  deny  the  proposition  that  objects 
to  be  known  must  be  drawn  into  the  domain  of  consciousness. 
But,  if  we  can  possess  knowledge  of  physical  things  which 
remain  outside  the  field  of  experience,  what  right  has  a  critic 
to  assert  that  we  are  unable  to  think  of  these  objects  as  inter- 
acting and  as  affecting  ourselves?  The  fact  is,  we  do  so  think. 
In  the  empirical  realism  which  Kant  emphasized,  and  which  is 
little  other  than  a  critical  statement  of  Natural  Realism,  we 
think  of  ourselves  as  persons  with  minds  in  active  relations 
with  persons  and  things.  Psychology,  in  its  assumption  that 
percepts  are  induced  by  stimuli  coming  from  the  physical 
environment,  is  only  accepting  the  realistic  outlook  common 
to  everyone.  The  further  step  which  reflection  forces  us  to 
make  is  to  assert  that  we  have  knowledge  of  these  interacting 
things,  but  that  the  things  themselves  do  not  enter  the  field 
of  consciousness,  even  though  they  control  it.  Since  I  look 
upon  my  experiencing  as  existentially  connected  with  my  body 
and  my  mind,  it  is  evident  that  I  relate  things  to  my  experience 
at  the  same  time  that  I  relate  them  to  the  psycho-physical 
organism.  The  truth  is  that  the  principle  to  which  the  idealists 
appeal  must  be  restated ;  it  is  then  robbed  of  its  terrors.  The 
causal  category  grows  up  in  the  outer  sphere  of  experience  to 
enable  us  to  express  our  knowledge  of  the  changing  relations 
of  physical  things  to  one  another  and  to  ourselves.  The 
causal  category  does  not  join  realities,  for  the  very  good  reason 
that  they  join  themselves. 


152  CRITICAL  REALISM 

When  we  think  of  a  reality  in  terms  of  our  knowledge  of  it 
and  connect  it  with  our  field  of  experience  by  means  of  the 
causal  category,  we  are  really  building  up  a  construction  within 
our  experience  as  a  whole.  That  we  possess  such  a  construction 
cannot  be  denied.  That  we  are  practically  forced  to  make  it 
by  the  characteristics  of  our  experience  I  hope  to  demonstrate 
in  the  next  chapter.  Kant  used  it  when  he  asserted  that  the 
world  of  phenomena  is  logically  prior  to  the  subjective  realm. 
The  Kantian  phenomenon  is  the  physical  thing  as  known 
by  the  science  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Because  of  his 
logical  impersonalism,  Kant  doubled  up  on  the  thing-in-itself. 
I  have  given  many  reasons  why  the  Kantian  theory  of  the 
origin  of  the  categories  is  indefensible.  I  have  also  tried  to 
show  that  the  Kantian  theory  of  cognition  upon  which  the 
idealist  bases  his  rejection  of  things-in-themselves  as  involving 
a  contradiction  is  a  presentationalism.  With  the  rejection  of 
these  two  supports,  the  attack  upon  the  use  of  the  category 
of  causality  to  account  for  the  individual's  thing-experiences 
falls  to  the  ground. 

We  are  at  length  in  a  position  to  discuss  intelligibly  the 
principle,  employed  rather  dogmatically  by  Mr.  Bradley, 
that  "to  be  real  or  even  barely  to  exist  must  be  to  fall  within 
sentience." 

When  we  examine  Mr.  Bradley's  argument,  we  find  that 
it  turns  out  to  be  a  very  cogent  statement  of  the  idealistic 
motive  we  have  amply  satisfied  in  the  Advance  of  the  Personal. 
"Find  any  piece  of  existence,  take  up  anything  that  anyone 
could  possibly  call  a  fact,  or  could  in  any  sense  assert  to  have 
being,  and  then  judge  if  it  does  not  consist  in  sentient  expe- 
rience." {Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  145.)  We  shall  call 
this  the  argument  from  content.  Our  position  that  the  total 
field  of  the  individual's  experience  is  mental  would  seem  to 
grant  what  is  demanded.  In  our  conclusion  that  knowledge 
about  persons  and  things  is  not  the  presence  of  the  object 
known,  as  Natural  Realism  supposes,  we  have  admitted  all 
that  this  argument  from  content  can  require.  Knowledge  con- 
sists of  tested  judgments,  and  these  judgments  are  within  the 
individual's  experience  while  they  are  asserted  to  hold  true 
of  that  which  is  outside  the  individual's  experience.     When 


AN  EXAMINATION  OF  IDEALISM  153 

knowledge  is  taken  in  this  more  critical  way,  it  is  evident 
that  Mr.  Bradley's  axiom  loses  its  force  as  a  basic  and  final 
proof  of  idealism.  If  cognition  by  means  of  concepts  is 
treated  as  valid  of  that  which  does  not  exist  in  consciousness, 
it  is  scarcely  a  convincing  argument  against  such  a  reference 
to  say  that  knowledge — that  which  is  known  of  reality — is 
within  the  mental  field. 

If  knowledge  involves  no  cognitive  relation  between  the 
mind  which  knows  in  terms  of  propositions  and  the  things 
known,  does  it  imply  a  unique  sort  of  transcendence?  This 
is  the  objection  which  is  usually  advanced  against  a  non- 
presentative  realism,  but  it  is  based  on  a  complete  misunder- 
standing. The  implicit  assumption  which  lies  back  of  it  is 
this:  the  object  known  must  be  present  to  the.  knowledge. 
The  transcendence  view  is  the  ghost  of  a  presentational  theory 
of  knowledge.  The  mind  which  knows  things  and  persons 
must  have  had  a  direct  or  an  indirect  commerce  with  them  in 
order  to  build  up  the  knowledge  which  it  has,  but  this  comr 
merce  must  not  be  confused  with  a  relation  within  knowledge 
itself.  Reference  is  achieved  by  the  structure  of  the  field  of 
experience  so  that  it  is  entirely  internal  and  empirical. 
Empirical  realism  gives  the  foundation  for  critical  realism. 
But  we  shall  discuss  the  problem  of  reference  or  denotation 
in  another  chapter. 

In  the  present  chapter,  we  have  tried  to  show  the  weakness 
of  both  the  formal  and  the  empirical  principles  upon  which 
idealism  is  founded.  We  saw  that  the  formal  principles  were 
quite  invalid,  while  the  empirical  principles  worked  against 
immediate  or  presentational  realisms  and  not  against  a  critical 
or  non-presentational  realism.  The  error  involved  in  idealism 
turned  out  to  be  the  assumption  that  knowledge  demands  the 
presence  of  that  which  is  known.  In  the  past,  both  idealism 
and  realism  have  had  this  assumption  in  common,  and  the 
result  has  been  an  endless  and  rather  sterile  wrangling  in 
regard  to  the  nature  of  a  supposed  cognitive  relation.  Critical 
realism  denies  this  assumption  and  thus  is  able  to  gain  a  more 
adequate  point  of  view  which  does  justice  to  the  truth  of  both 
realism  and  idealism. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM 

IN  THE  preceding  chapter  we  confined  ourselves  very 
largely  to  a  consideration  of  the  formal  principles  upon 
which  idealism  is  usually  based.  Were  there  such  quasi- 
apriori  principles,  the  exhaustive  study  of  experience  to  find 
motives  which  pointed  beyond  a  pluralism  of  minds  seemed 
a  work  of  supererogation.  The  Advance  of  the  Personal, 
instead  of  being  a  stepping-stone  to  a  more  adequate  view  of 
knowledge  of  a  realistic  type,  would  reveal  itself  as  a  tidal 
movement  engulfing  all  realisms,  Natural  Realism  included. 
But  our  examination  of  idealism,  far  from  supporting  the 
claims  of  those  epistemological  principles  upon  which  idealism 
relies,  led  to  the  suggestion  of  a  view  of  knowledge  which 
would  include  and  satisfy  the  idealistic  motives,  yet  grant  all 
that  realism  could  rightly  demand.  The  result  was  that 
realism  presented  itself  as  formally  thinkable.  The  question 
before  us  now  is,  accordingly,  whether  or  not  realism  is  forced 
upon  us  by  the  empirical  characteristics  of  our  experience. 
Idealism  and  realism  may  be  considered  as  two  hypotheses 
which  seek  to  cover  and  to  explain  the  facts.  Of  these  two, 
idealism  is  in  a  sense  the  simpler,  since  it  limits  reality  to  the 
contents  of  a  pluralism  of  minds.  Hence,  it  is  best,  as  a  matter 
of  method,  to  examine  idealism  to  see  whether  it  is  sufficient 
to  account  for  the  empirical  facts. 

To  this  program  the  reader  may  reply  that  idealism  is 
limited  to  subjective  idealism  and  that  this  limitation  gives 
an  unfair  advantage  to  realism.  "The  objective  idealist,"  he 
may  say,  "acknowledges  the  insufficiency  of  subjective  ideal- 
ism to  explain  the  nature  of  our  experience.  Hence,  your 
method  involves  a  begging  of  the  question."  This  objec- 
tion is  in  a  sense  valid.  Very  few  idealists  are  avowedly  sub- 
jective idealists.  Actually,  however,  the  majority  of  them 
are  fundamentally  influenced  by  arguments  against  real- 
ism which  are  strictly  those  of  subjective  idealism.     I  refer 

154 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        155 

especially  to  the  content  argument  of  Mr.  Bradley  and  to 
the  corresponding  endeavor  of  Berkeley  to  show  that  the 
external  world  is  reducible  to  what  is  undeniably  mental. 
Besides,  objective  idealism  is  virtually  an  attempt  to  satisfy 
realistic  motives  and  instincts  while  admitting  the  validity  of 
the  arguments  of  subjective  idealism.  Remove  these  prin- 
ciples, and  you  draw  out  the  support  from  under  objective 
idealism.  The  main  battle  which  realism  has  to  wage  is 
against  subjective  idealism.  After  that  is  through,  it  can  turn 
its  attention  to  the  weaknesses  of  objective  idealism  with 
confidence. 

As  the  result  of  the  Advance  of  the  Personal,  the  external 
world  seemed  to  lose  the  independence  which  it  possesses  for 
common  sense  and  to  shrink  into  a  temporal  continuum  of  my 
percepts  and  concepts.  For  other  people  the  same  meta- 
morphosis had  to  be  postulated.  The  one  common  world  in 
which  we  live  and  act  retreated  into  the  distance  and  became 
dimmer,  while  in  its  former  place  was  found  a  plurality  of 
corresponding  perceptual  and  conceptual  experiences.  In 
brief,  a  pluralism  of  minds  with  partially  similar  but  unshar- 
able  contents  dispossessed  for  reflection  the  common  physical 
world  open  to  the  inspection  of  all.  We  need  not  recapitu- 
late the  motives  which  led  to  this  important  reinterpretation 
of  what  appears  to  every  man  his  immediate  and  almost  trans- 
parently certain  experience.  Suffice  it  to  recall  that  the 
physical  world  lost  upon  examination  the  immediacy  which 
it  possesses  for  the  plain  man  and  appeared  dissolved  into 
a  multitude  of  objective,  yet  personal,  percepts  and  concepts. 
We  were  not,  however,  induced  because  of  this  hastily  to 
assume  the  dogmatic,  idealistic  principle  that,  to  be  for  the 
physical  world  is  to  be  perceived  or,  better  still,  to  be  expe- 
rienced. Such  over-hasty  conclusions  are  examples  of  that 
petitio  principii  which  is  too  frequent  in  metaphysics  and 
which  is  rightly  considered  a  scandal.  The  philosopher 
should  be  content  to  advance  step  by  step  in  his  analysis  of 
experience.  The  mental  pluralism  at  which  we  have  arrived 
by  means  of  an  examination  of  experience  is,  consequently, 
to  be  identified  neither  with  idealism  nor  with  realism.  These 
terms  have  as  yet,  strictly  speaking,  no  applicability. 


IS6  CRITICAL  REALISM 

The  facts  which  demand  interpretation  are  essentially  as 
follows:  Individuals  are  unable  to  possess  identical  percepts 
and  meanings,  yet  they  communicate  and  have  every  reason 
to  believe  that  they  understand  one  another.  Of  course  we 
must  not  exaggerate  this  insight  into  another's  mind;  it  has 
its  degrees  and  probably  never  is  perfect.  Because  we  were 
interested  in  the  facts,  we  were  able,  in  the  Advance  of 
the  Personal,  to  face  solipsism  without  a  tremor.  The 
minds  of  individuals  do  not  overlap  so  that  they  have  expe- 
riences literally  in  common,  as  circles  which  intersect  have 
points  in  common;  yet  these  minds  do  somehow  communi- 
cate and  influence  one  another  both  to  knowledge  and 
to  action.  Thus  the  facts  corroborate  mental  pluralism 
when  by  this  term  is  meant  the  assertion  that  individuals 
cannot  share  numerically  the  same  percepts  and  meanings, 
but  the  facts  are  outraged  if  isolation  and  non-communication 
add  themselves  under  the  guise  of  deductions.  So  long  as  we 
are  empirical,  these  additional  assertions  have  no  tendency  to 
intervene,  since  they  contradict  the  social  nature  of  our  con- 
sciousness and  of  our  activities.  They  are  the  result  of  a 
too  hasty  assumption  that,  with  the  breakdown  of  the  common 
world  of  Natural  Realism,  the  medium  of  communication  is 
removed.  A  gulf  seems  to  yawn  between  minds  where  once 
was  the  friendly  and  subservient  physical  world.  We  must 
not  forget,  however,  to  state  among  our  facts  a  continued 
belief  in  a  physical  world  now  known  to  be  distinct  from  the 
individual's  percepts  and  concepts.  Such  a  physical  world  is 
a  hypothesis,  almost  a  demand,  requiring  a  new  view  of 
knowledge  to  make  it  thinkable,  yet  it  looms  in  the  back- 
ground of  empirical  mental  pluralism. 

While  we  have  denied  that  solipsism  is  a  logical  deduction 
from  the  empirical  facts  which  have  destroyed  Natural 
Realism,  it  will  be  well  to  consider  at  this  point  in  a  little  more 
detail  why  this  is  so.  Solipsism  is  a  metaphysical  position, 
and  not  an  empirical  fact.  Furthermore,  it  is  based  on  a 
limitation  of  an  idealistic  principle  which  makes  the  principle 
more  dogmatic  than  it  is  in  its  broader  form.  To  be  is  to  be 
experienced,  is  the  formal  idealistic  postulate  directed  against 
the  independent  existence  of  the  external  world.     In  order 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        157 

to  arrive  at  solipsism,  it  is  necessary  to  extend  the  reference 
to  include  other  selves  as  well  as  nature,  and  then  to  limit 
the  experiencer  to  himself.  Being  is  inseparable  from  my 
experience.  Now,  no  one  has  ever  claimed  that  such  a  principle 
has  a  basis  in  intuition.  It  is  certainly  not  suggested  by  the 
experience  of  the  individual  which,  instead,  is  lavish  in  its 
recognition  of  being;  nor  can  such  a  limitation  be  deduced 
from  the  concept  itself.  Consequently,  solipsism  as  a  point  of 
view  thinkable  although  seldom  if  ever  held,  is  the  outgrowth 
of  a  certain  reflective  perspective.  The  reduction  of  physical 
things  to  a  manifold  of  thing-experiences  in  the  minds  of 
distinct  individuals  is  the  opening  wedge  to  the  conquest  of 
all  presentable  objects  by  the  mind  to  which  they  appear. 
Whatever  else  they  may  be  or  stand  for,  objects  are  seen 
to  be  contents.  As  contents  they  are  inseparable  from  the 
mind  whose  experiences  they  are.  Hence,  the  personal,  or 
(as  it  is  frequently,  though  wrongly,  called)  the  subjective, 
secures  a  certainty  and  immediacy  strongly  contrasted  with 
that  which  claims  to  be  other  than  a  content.  The  breakdown 
of  Natural  Realism  carries  in  its  train  as  an  inevitable  result 
the  tendency  to  link  all  objects  to  the  self.  They  become 
dependencies  of  the  self,  satellites  or  planets  which  revolve 
round  it  as  the  dominant  body.  But  the  self  can  only  be 
my  self,  since  selves  do  not  experience  in  common.  The 
reduction  of  objects  to  contents  leads  inevitably  to  a  contrast 
between  the  immediacy  of  my  own  field  of  experience  and 
the  aloofness  of  the  experiences  of  others.  These  fields,  each 
with  its  own  centrality,  are,  by  their  very  nature,  systems 
which  cannot  intersect.  Even  a  symbiosis  seems  unthinkable. 
Each  system  is  a  universe  of  finite  dimensions  beyond  which 
there  is  nothingness.  Such  is  the  construction  we  seemed 
forced  to  erect.  But  this  absolute  pluralism  of  self-centred 
fields  of  experience  is  logically  unstable  and  tends  to  break 
down  as  a  result  of  an  internal  conflict  between  two  points  of 
view.  Looked  at  from  the  point  of  view  of  objects  known,  I 
am  only  one  self  among  others,  each  with  its  unique  field  of 
experience;  seen  from  the  personal  or  content  point  of  view, 
these  other  selves  forsake  their  independence  and  enter  my 
field  of  experience  as  constituent  parts.     Thus  the  universe,  so 


iS8  CRITICAL  REALISM 

far  as  it  can  be  thought  by  me,  must  enter  into  my  conscious- 
ness. The  form  it  takes  there  is,  beyond  question,  tinged 
with  the  unity  of  which  it  becomes  a  part.  Or,  to  put  it  in  less 
easily  misunderstood  terms,  the  universe  is  for  me  at  least 
my  idea;  whether  it  is  more,  as  cognition  claims,  is  a  question 
which  must  be  frankly  faced  no  matter  how  absurd  such  a 
question  may  appear.  To  ask  it  does  not  express  doubt  that 
there  is  a  imiverse  independent  of  the  field  of  my  experience, 
but  indicates  a  desire  to  realize  how  I  know  there  is  such  a 
universe  and  what  knowledge  of  it  may  mean  and  imply. 
The  Advance  of  the  Personal  when  imflinchingly  followed  to 
its  conquest  of  other  selves  as  well  as  the  external  world  does 
not,  however,  necessitate  solipsism.  Our  knowledge  of  other 
selves  is  seen  to  be  content  just  as  our  knowledge  of  physical 
things  is.  The  immediacy  of  Natural  Realism  is  recognized 
to  be  valid  in  this  case  no  more  than  in  the  other.  All  things 
which  I  can  know  must  have  their  representative  in  the  field 
of  my  experience ;  but  I  do  not  see  that  from  this  the  deduction 
can  be  made  that  nothing  outside  of  the  field  of  my  experience 
can  exist.  Such  a  deduction,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  would 
require  as  premise  the  principle  that  being  is  limited  to  my 
experience.  We  have  the  right  to  say,  then,  that  solipsism 
is  not  a  valid  inference  from  the  Advance  of  the  Personal 
and  the  breakdown  of  Natural  Realism. 

Instead  of  taking  an  evidently  absurd  position  on  the 
strength  of  a  principle  which  is  not  suggested  by  experience 
and  which  cannot  be  regarded  as  analytic,  it  is  more  whole- 
some to  accept  mental  pluralism  in  the  broad  and  qualified 
sense  in  which  a  critical  experience  presents  it  and  to  seek 
to  discover  what  it  involves  and  suggests.  Such  an  empirical 
via  media  nms  safely  between  two  untenable  extremes,  solip- 
sism on  the  one  hand  and  the  absorption  of  the  individual 
consciousness  in  a  supposedly  inclusive  social  consciousness 
on  the  other.  It  is  noteworthy  how  many  thinkers  pass  to 
one  or  the  other  of  these  extremes,  unable,  it  seems,  to  maintain 
their  equilibrium  under  the  stress  of  opposing  motives  and, 
hence,  swinging  to  either  side  instead  of  seeking  an  explana- 
tion which  would  satisfy  both  motives.  It  is  unfortunate  that 
few  can  distinguish  clearly  between  a  complete  description  of 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        159 

experience  and  an  assertion  of  ultimate  theory.  Consciousness 
is  social,  yet  consciousness  is  individual.  How  shall  we  do 
justice  to  both  these  facts  at  the  same  time?  Only  by  a  sane 
interpretation  of  both  motives  and  a  theory  which  assigns 
to  each  its  proper  place. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  state  the  data  from  which  we 
can  rightly  start.  We  shall  assume,  as  a  minimum  which 
idealism  grants,  the  existence  of  other  minds  of  like  nature 
with  our  own.  Our  belief  in  the  existence  of  other  selves  has 
such  a  definite  basis  in  the  growth  and  the  contrast  implica- 
tions of  our  own  objective  or  empirical  self  that  it  would  require 
a  tremendously  strong  motive  to  cast  doubt  upon  it.  Such 
a  motive  has,  to  my  knowledge,  never  been  advanced.  Into 
this  problem  we  shall,  however,  enter  in  extenso  in  a  later 
chapter.  What  I  wish  to  point  out  is,  that  idealism  need  not 
rely,  as  with  Berkeley,  on  the  argument  from  analogy  for  the 
existence  of  other  selves.  The  characteristics  and  contents 
of  each  mind  are  matters  of  first-hand  acquaintance  to  each. 
Each  individual  must  reason  from  his  own  field  of  experience. 
While  a  knowledge  of  logic  and  of  psychology  enables  him  to 
describe  this  field  more  minutely  and  to  understand  better 
the  processes  which  occur  in  it,  the  broad  outlines  are  recog- 
nizable by  all.  There  is,  first,  that  domain  of  experience 
which  is  called  the  external  world  of  physical  things.  These 
appear,  disappear,  appear  again  and  are  recognized;  they  are 
relatively  the  same  from  time  to  time,  yet  classes  of  them 
change  at  different  rates  and  in  different  ways.  We  have 
already  described  this  realm,  and,  even  had  we  not,  it  is  so 
familiar  that  further  description  is,  at  least  for  our  present 
purpose,  unnecessary.  In  contrast  to  this  realm  of  bodies  is 
the  sphere  of  ideas,  plans,  memories,  and  imaginations, 
which  are  brought  into  touch  with  the  physical  world  in  judg- 
ment and  in  action  or  are  held  separate  as  merely  personal  and 
as  having  no  direct  bearing  upon  it.  Such,  in  outline  and 
viewed  from  within,  is  the  experiencer's  world,  and  this  when 
taken,  not  passively  like  a  lifeless  picture,  but  as  caught  up 
into  the  activities  which  sustain  and  produce  it,  is  for  me  the 
individual's  mind.  Concrete,  you  see,  and  quite  independent 
of  particular  logical  and  psychological  theories.     The  self, 


i6o  CRITICAL  REALISM 

physical  things,  and  other  selves  as  idea-objects,  processes — 
such  as  thinking,  willing,  attending  to — all  these  are  parts  of 
and  processes  in  each  individual  mind.  Such  a  mind  has  an 
internal  structure  in  which  processes  are  related  to  contents 
as  activities  to  their  objects.  Each  mind  is,  indeed,  a  micro- 
cosm and  may  rightly  be  supposed  to  mirror  a  world.  More- 
over, we  must  never  forget  that  each  mind  claims  knowledge 
of  other  minds,  and  there  is  no  adequate  reason  to  deny  that 
such  knowledge  is  possible.  Minds  in  this  concrete  sense,  then, 
furnish  the  justified  basis  on  which  philosophy  must  explain 
experience. 

While  the  foregoing  data  give  the  brightly  illuminated  centre 
from  which  we  must  work  gradually  outwards,  certain  demands 
and  constructions  characteristic  of  these  minds  point  out 
beyond  the  definite  to  what  is  problematic  and,  as  it  were, 
marginal.  My  mind  claims  a  knowledge  of  an  external, 
impersonal  world  in  which  I  live  and  move  and  have  my 
being  and  by  means  of  which  I  communicate  with  my  fellows. 
It  asserts  that  it  is  somehow  most  intimately  connected  with 
a  part  of  this  world  which  it  calls  its  body,  and  that,  by  means 
of  this  body,  it  exerts  influence  upon  this  environing  world 
and  makes  it  relatively  subservient  to  its  purposes.  Further- 
more, it  acknowledges  that  its  experiences  come  and  go 
while  this  environing  world,  which  it  calls  nature,  is  far  more 
enduring.  These  constructions  and  beliefs  present  reflection 
with  problems  whose  historic  insistence  should  warn  against 
a  too  facile  treatment.  The  sufficiency  or  insufficiency  of  ideal- 
ism must  be  adjudged  with  reference  to  the  satisfaction  which 
it  is  able  to  accord  these  beliefs  and  constructions.  It  may 
be  that,  if  we  examine  more  reflectively  the  tested  basis 
upon  which  philosophy  counts,  viz.,  mental  pluralism,  we  may 
discover  a  clue  to  guide  us  in  dealing  with  these  elusive  and 
tantalizing  problems. 

Our  basis  secured,  we  wish  to  show  now  that  mental 
pluralism  as  a  theory  is  unable  to  answer  certain  fundamental 
questions  which  it  itself  evokes.  In  other  words,  the 
characteristics  of  experience  force  us  beyond  idealism  as 
insufficient  and  suggest  a  realism  of  a  more  critical  character 
than  Natural  Realism  as  alone  satisfactory.     It  is  true  that 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        i6i 

objective  idealism  seeks  to  enter  the  breach  and  hold  the 
day  for  idealism.  However,  the  weakness  which  it  has  ex- 
hibited on  the  formal  side  robs  it  of  strength  and  attractive- 
ness. It  is  too  evidently  imempirical  and  a  pis  aller  to  awaken 
the  allegiance  of  the  modem  thinker  trained  in  science.  More-- 
over,  it  fails  miserably  whenever  it  is  asked  to  solve  a  con- 
crete problem  like  that  of  the  mind-body  relation.  It  moves 
too  much  in  the  region  of  abstractions,  such  as  "experience- 
in-general,"  to  be  able  to  appreciate  and  to  state  in  rugged 
and  meaningful  terms  a  problem  which  always  threatens  a 
dualism.  By  this  statement  I  do  not  mean  that  thinkers 
trained  in  objective  idealism  may  not  assist  in  the  solution 
of  the  problem,  but  that  their  allegiance  to  the  standpoint 
of  the  whole,  when  this  whole  is  stated  in  terms  of  mind,  un- 
avoidably leads  to  the  suggestion  that  the  body  is  more  or 
less  appearance.  If  the  finite  mind  be  also  considered  appear- 
ance from  the  view-point  of  the  whole,  matters  are  not  much 
improved.  The  w'ay  in  which  we  relate  two  appearances 
cannot  be  regarded  as  seriously  as  the  problems  of  how  two 
realities  are  related.  The  keen  edge  is  taken  from  the 
problem;  it  is  now  considered  methodological  in  character. 
But  more  of  this  later,  when  this  particular  problem  comes 
up  for  analysis  and  solution. 

The  thinker  who  accepts  the  qualified  form  of  mental 
pluralism  which  the  Advance  of  the  Personal  has  forced  upon 
us  must  cope  with  several  difficult  but  extremely  suggestive 
problems.  These  arise  so  naturally  that  only  mental  con- 
fusion or  a  will  not  to  see  them  can  keep  them  down.  The 
reason  why  they  have  been  kept  in  the  background  and  their 
significance  for  metaphysics  unrealized  is  — I  am  convinced  of 
it  — that  the  analysis  which  gives  the  setting  for  metaphysics 
has  been  vague  and  inadequate.  Metaphysicians  have  struck 
out  blindly  under  the  urgency  of  general  motives,  as  a  swimmer 
thrown  overboard  on  a  dark  night  strikes  out  gaspingly 
in  any  direction  in  his  blind  search  for  land.  Idealism  has 
only  too  often  been  satisfied  with  the  promotion  of  experience 
to  the  position  of  an  ultimate  term  without  demanding  whose 
experience  is  in  question.  Now,  such  a  vagueness  in  the 
statement  of  the  terms  involved   inevitably  brought   as   a 


i62  CRITICAL  REALISM 

consequence  vagueness  and  lack  of  localization  in  the  questions 
asked.  Take  Kant,  for  instance.  Recent  investigation  seems 
to  prove  that,  in  his  refutation  of  idealism,  he  really  affirms 
that  bodies  in  space  are  things-in-themselves.  (Cf.  Prichard, 
Kanfs  Theory  of  Knowledge,  p.  321.)  This  affirmation, 
however,  contradicts  his  own  characteristic  position.  Again, 
his  dualistic  theory  of  knowledge  springs  from  the  absence 
of  an  empirical  analysis  of  actual  experience.  Yet  Kant 
sinned  less  than  the  traditional  Continental  philosophy;  his 
orientation  is  more  assured,  more  a  matter  for  reflection. 
Once  more,  Hegel's  neglect  of  the  individual  as  the  unit  of 
experience  was  undoubtedly  the  cause  of  his  panlogism  and 
of  that  "unearthly  ballet  of  bloodless  categories"  of  which  a 
certain  writer  speaks.  The  movements  in  philosophy  of 
recent  years  consist  largely  in  an  attempt  at  an  empirical 
orientation  which  will  avoid  the  pitfalls  of  psychologism. 
What  characterizes  them  in  the  main  is  a  reaction  against 
experience-in-general  and  against  an  absolute  consciousness 
as  the  beginning  from  which  philosophy  must  work.  The 
position  that  holds  consciousness  or  experience  to  be  social, 
which  we  have  already  criticised,  is  an  advance  from  this 
standpoint  over  the  experience-in-general  of  many  writers. 
Yet  the  type  of  pragmatism  which  advocates  social  experience 
as  the  ultimate  basis  fails,  as  we  shall  see,  for  that  very  reason 
to  ask  and  answer  sharply  the  problems  which  are  persistent 
and  permanent.  In  brief,  incomplete  analysis  carries  with  it 
blindness  to  the  very  facts  which  have  the  power  to  suggest 
pregnant  inquiries  and  explanatory  hypotheses.  The  proper 
orientation  is  over  half  the  battle.  Idealism  has  never  been 
desirous  enough  of  problems.  Confident  of  formal  principles 
like  esse  est  percipi  and  non-contradiction,  it  has  tended  to  slur 
over  problems  rather  than  eagerly  to  welcome  them.  Having 
removed  the  support  of  these  principles  in  a  preceding  chapter, 
it  will  give  us  peculiar  pleasure  to  bring  forward  the  difficulties 
which  confront  mental  pluralism. 

There  are  seven  main  questions  with  which  mental  pluralism 
must  reckon.  Under  their  stimulus,  mental  pluralism  will 
lose  its  ultimacy  and  will  suggest  supplementations  in  accord- 
ance with  principles  already  implicitly  contained  in  itself;  it 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        163 

will  reveal  itself  in  its  true  light  as  a  point  of  departure. 
The  first  problem  which  challenges  the  finality  of  mental 
pluralism  may  be  stated  as  follows:  Within  the  field  of  each 
individual's  experience  there  arises  the  distinction  between 
the  physical  and  the  psychical.  Why  is  this?  Is  it  simply 
a  fact  which  we  must  admit,  but  which  we  cannot  explain;  or 
does  it  rest  upon  and  reproduce  a  difference  in  reality  which 
idealism  as  such  cannot  grant?  Let  us  look  a  little  more 
closely  at  this  contrast.  The  outer  sphere  of  the  individual's 
field  of  experience  consists  of  bodies  in  relation  to  one  another. 
These  are  adjudged  common  and  more  or  less  permanent 
and  in  direct  or  indirect  relation  to  the  individual's  body.  In 
contrast  to  this  domain  is  the  psychical  sphere  which  is 
personal  and  transitory.  It  seems  to  flow  alongside  of  the 
permanent  sphere  and  live  largely  as  a  changing  atmosphere 
of  it.  Thus  we  have  ideas  of  things,  memories  of  things, 
imaginations  based  on  things,  etc.  These  are  transient,  while 
the  outer  domain  of  which  they  are  satellites  is  considered 
independent  and  stable.  There  are  several  species  of  the 
genus  psychical,  and  these  are  united  by  their  common  contrast 
to  the  physical  realm.  There  are  processes  like  reasoning, 
acts  like  attention,  "true"  ideas,  "false"  ideas,  dreams, 
sensations,  feelings,  plans,  etc.  Some  of  these  are  "objective" ; 
some  are  "subjective,"  as  mental  acts  or  attitudes  are  in 
contrast  to  their  objects;  some  are  subjective,  as  deposed 
meanings  are  in  contradistinction  to  accepted  theories; 
others  are  subjective,  as  things  admittedly  mental  are  in 
contrast  to  that  which  is  physical.  But  all  are  felt  to  belong 
to  the  inner  world,  and  all  are  transitory.  When  we  come 
to  examine  these  two  spheres,  the  physical  and  the  psychical, 
we  find  that  one  is  as  immediate  as  the  other,  yet  they  are 
thought  of  as  existentially  distinct.  The  preposition  "of"  in 
the  phrase,  "idea  of,"  is  not  symbolic  of  any  actual  relation, 
but,  instead,  of  a  distinction  between  two  spheres  with  different 
characteristics.  Whatever  relatedness  seems  to  overarch  this 
separateness  is  due  to  the  fact  that,  in  spite  of  the  accepted 
existential  distinctness  of  the  two  spheres,  they  nevertheless 
coexist  in  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience.  Is  not  the 
presence  of  this  existential  contrast  within  the  individual's 


1 64  CRITICAL  REALISM 

experience  curious?  More  curious  still  would  it  be  had  it  no 
symbolic  significance.  Again,  why  does  the  psychical  tend  to 
engulf  the  whole  of  the  individual's  experience  at  the  same 
time  that  it  recognizes  its  relativity  to  the  physical? 

There  have  of  late  been  attempts  to  explain  the  distinction 
between  the  physical  and  the  psychical  as  one  of  context. 
Probably  William  James  deserves  more  credit  than  any  other 
one  individual  for  the  opening  up  of  this  point  of  view.  His 
conclusion  is  that  "thoughts  in  the  concrete  are  made  of  the 
same  stuff  as  things  are."  The  primal  reality  is  "pure" 
experience,  and  each  bit  of  pure  experience  may  be,  and  usually 
is,  taken  in  two  contexts ;  in  one  context  it  is  the  physical  object, 
in  the  other  it  is  the  mental.  "The  one  self -identical  thing 
has  so  many  relations  to  the  rest  of  experience  that  you  can 
take  it  in  disparate  systems  of  association  and  treat  it  as 
belonging  with  opposite  contexts.  In  one  of  these  contexts 
it  is  your  "field  of  consciousness,"  in  another  it  is  "the  room 
in  which  you  sit" ;  and  it  enters  both  contexts  in  its  wholeness, 
giving  no  pretext  for  being  said  to  attach  itself  to  conscious- 
ness by  one  of  its  parts  or  aspects  and  to  outer  reality  by 
another."  (James,  "Does  'Consciousness'  Exist?"  Journal  oj 
Philosophy,  etc..  Vol.  I,  p.  477.)  It  is  evident  that  our  own 
position  agrees  with  that  of  James  on  many  points,  but  it 
differs  from  it  on  other  —  and  fundamental  —  points.  In  the 
first  place,  we  agree  that,  when  an  object  is  considered  physical, 
it  has  a  context  in  the  outer  sphere  quite  different  from  that 
which  it  would  have  were  it  considered  psychical.  But  the 
vital  question  is  this :  Does  it  have  these  associates  because  it 
is  assigned  to  the  outer  sphere,  or  is  it  assigned  to  the  outer 
sphere  because  it  has  these  associates?  In  other  words,  is  not 
the  matter  of  associates  a  consequence  of  something  more 
fundamental?  We  have  seen  reason  to  believe  that  the 
dualism  of  Natural  Realism  is  as  primitive  a  distinction  as  we 
possess.  Even  here,  however,  the  physical  world  stands  as  a 
stable  domain  shot  through  with  characteristic  meanings, 
many  of  which  seem  to  have  a  basis  in  organic  reactions.  To 
exist  in  it  involves  independence,  commonness,  and  describable 
causal  and  spatial  relations.  The  genesis  of  these  meanings 
can  be  traced  with  more  or  less  certainty  to  motives  within 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        165 

experience.  To  do  this  appreciatively,  yet  critically,  so  that 
these  meanings  might  not  be  misunderstood,  has  been  an 
essential  part  of  our  task.  As  a  consequence,  we  feel  impelled 
to  deny  what  James  seems  to  imply — that  the  field  of  the 
individual's  experience  presents  itself  at  first  as  "pure" 
experience,  as  "plain,  unqualified  actuality  or  existence,  a 
simple  that."  What  we  do  seem  obliged  to  admit  is,  that  an 
object  of  reflection  may  be  held  between  the  outer  and  the 
inner  sphere  and  temporarily  assigned  to  neither.  Both,  as  it 
were,  claim  it,  but  neither  has  as  yet  had  its  claim  acknowledged 
as  valid.  Unless  it  remain  in  this  neutral  state  —  like  Buri- 
dan's  ass  —  indefinitely,  it  falls,  as  the  result  of  reflection,  into 
one  or  other  of  the  domains  into  which  it  naturally  fits.  It  is 
in  this  way  that  judgment  sustains  and  increases  our  world. 
But  we  must  never  forget  that  for  us  judgment  works  within 
a  world  already  relatively  organized.  By  means  of  an  analytic 
study  of  the  characteristics  of  the  field  of  experience  we  can 
penetrate  to  the  forces  and  motives  which  have  produced  this 
organization,  but  it  is  impossible  to  possess  a  "pure" experience 
uninfluenced  by  at  least  implicit  relations  to  the  established 
order.  It  is  required  of  all  objects  that  they  give  allegiance 
as  soon  as  possible.  There  is  seldom,  if  ever,  any  hesitancy 
on  the  part  of  perceptual  objects. 

Let  us  examine  the  physical  realm  a  little  more  closely. 
Berkeley  tried  to  differentiate  "ideas"  from  images  by  refer- 
ence to  the  fact  that  they  do  not  seem  to  be  under  our  control 
as  images  are.  Hume  emphasized  a  difference  in  vividness 
between  impressions  and  thoughts.  Perhaps  spatial  relation 
to  our  body  and  a  disposition,  more  or  less  felt,  to  react  may  be 
added  to  the  above-mentioned  diferentiae  of  the  physical. 
While  Berkeley  was  inclined  to  consider  "ideas"  passive  in 
themselves,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  we  usually  connect  them 
with  that  which  follows  and  judge  them  to  be  "causally" 
active.  Real  fire  bums;  mental  fire  does  not.  There  can  be 
no  doubt,  then,  that  there  is  ample  empirical  foundation  for 
the  distinction  between  the  physical  and  the  psychical.  The 
question  is :  What  does  it  signify  ?  To  make  it  merely  a  matter 
of  context  seems  absurd.  What  we  do  is  to  connect  the  vivid- 
ness of  the  physical  with  the  stimulation  of  our  sense-organs, 

12 


i66  CRITICAL  REALISM 

our  lack  of  control  of  things  with  their  independence,  our 
tendency  to  react  towards  them  with  their  equal  reality  and 
their  influence  upon  us  for  weal  or  woe,  their  activity  with 
processes  in  the  world  of  which  we  are  a  part.  In  short,  this 
distinction  between  the  physical  and  the  psychical  is  inter- 
preted naturally  in  realistic  terms.  What  concrete  explanation 
has  idealism  to  offer? 

To  conclude  this  problem.  The  physical  realm  claims 
to  be  independent  of  the  mind,  and  there  are  valid  motives 
which  differentiate  it  from  the  psychical.  These  motives 
must  secure  satisfaction  in  any  adequate  philosophy,  and 
idealism  is  imable  to  offer  it. 

The  second  problem  which  challenges  the  finality  of  mental 
pluralism  is  this:  How  is  ipt.prpprsnnal  intercourse  possible? 
That  it  exists  is  admitted;  but  how  shall  we  account  for  it? 
The  pressure  of  this  question  was  not  realized  by  Berkeley. 
His  main  effort  was  directed  to  the  disproof  of  matter,  and 
after  this  was  done  to  his  own  satisfaction — and,  we  may 
add,  to  the  satisfaction  of  all  those  who  realize  what  he  meant 
by  matter — his  intellectual  interest  waned.  Consequently, 
we  find  an  almost  total  neglect  of  the  problem  of  social  knowl- 
edge. Our  belief  in  other  selves  is  accounted  for  by  the 
argument  from  analogy.  "The  knowledge  I  have  of  other 
spirits  is  not  immediate,  as  is  the  knowledge  of  my  ideas; 
but  depending  on  the  intervention  of  ideas,  by  me  referred  to 
agents  or  spirits  distinct  from  myself,  as  effects  or  concomi- 
tant signs."  (Cy.  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  sec.  145; 
cj.  also  sees.  147-8.)  Berkeley  seems,  however,  to  assume 
that  the  individual  has  control  over  the  rnotion  of  the 
limbs  of  his  body,  but  asserts  that  such  a  motion  cannot 
affect  another  unless  God  so  will  it.  {Ibid.  sees.  146-7.)  He 
is  forced  to  admit,  in  other  words,  that  human  beings  are  con- 
cerned with  the  producing  of  some  changes  in  nature.  We  are 
face  to  face  here  with  the  mind-body  problem,  which  he  solves 
so  facilely  in  the  second  dialogue  between  Hylas  and  Philonous. 
Surely  if  the  brain  is  in  the  mind,  the  body  must  be,  and  what 
can  the  production  of  motions  in  the  body  by  the  will  mean? 
Intercourse  of  any  moment  depends  upon  language,  and  this 
upon  the  production  of  motions  in  the  throat.     The  conclusion 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        167 

we  must  draw  is  evident.  Either  God  mediates  all  communica- 
tion from  mind  to  mind  directly,  or  he  does  so  upon  the  produc- 
tion of  motions  in  bodies  which  are  as  real  as  the  individual 
minds,  but  under  their  control.  In  either  case,  mental  pluralism 
goes  by  the  board;  God  does  what  we  ordinarily  suppose  the 
physical  world  to  do.  The  question  comes  to  be,  accordingly, 
whether  the  hypothesis  of  an  active  spirit  upon  whom  we 
depend  for  our  percepts  and  for  our  intercourse  with  others 
is  preferable  to  our  natural  assumption  that  activities  occur 
in  nature  and  are  communicated  by  the  body  to  the  mind. 
I  think  every  one  will  agree  that  the  burden  of  proof  rests  on 
the  idealistic  realist.  And  it  is  not  sufficient  to  show  the  absurd- 
ity of  a  crudely  representative  view  of  knowledge  about  the 
physical  world  or  to  point  out  the  meaninglessness  of  mere 
being  or  to  convince  us  of  the  inadequacy  of  inert  matter.  He 
who  regards  it  as  sufficient  is  guilty  of  the  fallacy  of  ignoratio 
elenchi  in  that  he  assumes  as  disproved  what  has  simply  not 
been  brought  into  the  argument.  Also,  he  is  himself  open 
to  the  tu  quoque  of  his  opponent.  We  are  all  aware  that 
Berkeley  had  his  nemesis  in  Hume,  who  speaks  with  the 
voice  of  experience.  (Of.  An  Enquiry  Concerning  Human 
Understanding,  p.  75,  Open  Court  edition.)  We  must  first 
prove  that  God  exists  before  we  have  the  possible  further  right 
to  account  for  human  intercourse  by  means  of  his  mediating 
activity.  Now,  Berkeley  is  honest  enough  on  the  whole 
not  to  resort  to  intuition.  We  do  not  perceive  God,  but  argue 
to  his  existence  by  analogy.  Just  as  we  are  led  to  believe  in 
the  existence  of  our  fellow  men  by  the  nature  and  conduct  of  a 
certain  collection  of  ideas,  so  we  are  forced  to  assert  the  being 
of  God  from  our  perception  of  nature  as  a  whole.  But  it  is, 
I  think,  generally  agreed  that  idealism  cannot  resort  to  the 
argument  from  analogy.  Hence,  Berkeley  is  in  sad  plight. 
His  is  not  a  living  hypothesis  which  has  grown  out  of  concrete 
experience,  but  a  theory  motived  by  theological  tradition. 
"We  are  ignorant,  it  is  true,  of  the  manner  in  which  bodies 
operate  on  each  other.  Their  force  or  energy  is  entirely  incom- 
prehensible. But  are  we  not  equally  ignorant  of  the  manner  or 
force  by  which  a  mind,  even  the  supreme  mind,  operates  either 
on  itself  or  on  body?"     These  words  of  Hume,  when  taken 


1 68  CRITICAL  REALISM 

with  a  criticism  of  the  argument  from  analogy,  constitute 
the  best  rejoinder  to  the  constructive  side  of  Berkeley's 
teaching. 

We  have  entered  into  such  detail  in  our  criticism  of  Berkeley 
in  order  to  show  two  things:  First,  that  such  a  keen  thinker 
as  he  is  admitted  to  be  starts  from  mental  pluralism  and  feels 
the  need  to  supplement  it  with  that  which  can  serve  as  a 
realistic  connective  tissue;  second,  that  his  supplementation 
cannot  be  considered  satisfactory.  If  nothing  better  than 
this  can  be  done,  and  if,  furthermore,  metaphysics  wishes  to  be 
considered  a  science,  it  is  far  preferable  to  rest  with  Hume 
in  an  unexplained  mental  pluralism. 

But  idealism  has  still  another  arrow  in  its  quiver,  namely, 
monadism.  Probably  the  best  contemporary  discussion  of 
pluralism  from  this  standpoint  is  to  be  found  in  the  last 
series  of  Gifford  lectures  delivered  by  James  Ward.  Let  us 
briefly  examine  his  position. 

"For  modem  pluralism  the  universe  is  the  totality  of 
monads  really  interacting;  and  this  is  one  fact.  The  plurality 
implies  this  unity  and  this  unity  implies  the  plurality."  In 
other  words,  Ward  recognizes,  as  we  have  recognized,  that  the 
empirical  facts  force  upon  us  a  belief  in  communication. 
What  we  have  called  mental  pluralism  is  qualified  from  the 
first  by  this  admission.  The  question,  consequently,  is  not 
whether  there  be  a  unity,  but  what  sort  of  a  unity  is  suggested 
by  the  facts.  Now  it  is  evident  that  the  monads  themselves 
cannot  be  unified  if  this  unification  contradicts  their  monadic 
characteristics.  To  assert  that  they  must  be  a  unity  either 
involves  this  inner  contradiction  or  else  it  is  a  reassertion  of 
the  problem.  The  concrete  unity  which  must  be  explained  is 
not  given  by  logic,  but  by  experience.  Sentient  and  conative 
beings  can  cooperate  ^nd  do  have  the  capacity  to  communicate 
with  one  another,  which  this  cooperation  involves.  Upon  this 
sort  of  concrete  unity  society  and  civilization  have  been  erected. 
Now  this  sort  of  unity  does  not  involve  either  literal  contact  or 
transeunt  activity  between  the  monads,  nor  can  it  necessitate, 
as  so  many  have  carelessly  thought,  a  literal  participation  in 
the  same  experiences.  If  such  were  the  case,  pluralism  would 
be  outraged.     So  far,  then,  Lotze  would  seem  to  have  been 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        169 

warranted  in  his  belief  that  the  "sympathetic  rapport"  which 
exists  between  individuals  is  an  "inexhaustible  wonder." 
But,  as  Ward  rightly  indicates,  this  rapport  covers  no  contra- 
diction; it  is  only  a  fact  to  be  explained.  The  problem,  then, 
comes  to  be  somewhat  as  follows:  Shall  we  take  refuge  with 
Berkeley  in  a  theism  which  is  essentially  unthinkable?  or 
shall  we  insist  on  a  rapport  between  individuals,  on  what 
might  be  called  an  intermonadic  telepathy?  or  shall  we  seek 
to  connect  individuals,  as  common  sense  and  science  do  in 
the  main,  by  means  of  their  bodies  and  the  fundamental 
continuity  of  the  physical  world?  We  have  already  given 
our  reasons  for  not  regarding  theism  as  a  satisfactory  hypothesis 
with  which  to  supplement  mental  pluralism.  Like  preestab- 
lished  harmony,  it  is  a  counsel  of  despair  whose  supposed 
thinkableness  rests  more  in  feeling  than  in  thought.  As  for 
the  second  possibility,  it  amounts  to  little  more  than  an 
assertion  that  mental  pluralism  may  be  cosmologically  ultimate 
but  that  it  is  not  cognitively  ultimate;  human  monads  have 
windows.  But  the  real  problem  to-day  is  not  whether  or  not 
monads  have  windows,  but  What  kind  of  windows  have  they  ? 
And  here  the  only  basis  for  serious  suggestions  is  the  empirical 
facts.  Now,  leaving  aside  the  question  whether  telepathy  is 
thinkable,  there  still  remains  the  more  matter-of-fact  inquiry 
as  to  whether  cases  of  it  have  been  proved,  and  the  still  more 
matter-of-fact  investigation  which  seeks  to  ascertain  whether 
our  experience  suggests  telepathy  or  some  more  indirect  and 
mediate  basis  as  an  explanation  of  the  fact  of  communication 
between  minds.  There  can  be,  I  think,  only  one  answer  to 
this  inquiry.  Communication  is  by  means  of  the  body  and  is 
therefore  indirect.  Cognition  at  a  distance,  without  a  medium, 
is  even  less  indicated  by  our  experience  than  action  at  a 
distance.  We  shall  see  that  other  problems  support  this 
contention.  In  this  contention  we  have  the  support  of  those 
"stuff"  idealists,  the  panpsychists.  Ward,  in  his  present 
work,  Strong,  Paulsen,  Stout,  and  others  accept  the  reality  of 
the  body  as  consisting  of  more  than  the  individual's  con- 
sciousness. Now  panpsychism  is  a  half-way  house  between 
subjective  idealism  and  some  more  critical  form  of  realism 
than  Natural  Realism.     For  it  the  external  world  is  real,  but 


I70  CRITICAL  REALISM 

we  can  only  know  it  by  analogy;  the  world  of  nature  as  we 
construct  it  is  entirely  phenomenal  and  does  not  contain  real 
knowledge.  Be  this  as  it  may,  for  the  present,  our  examination 
of  the  second  problem — How  is  interpersonal  intercourse 
possible? — has  led  us  to  realize  with  increasing  clearness  the 
insufficiency  of  mental  pluralism.  There  must  be  a  connective 
tissue  in  which  these  fields  of  experience  act  and  have  their 
being. 

The  third  problem  which  confronts  mental  pluralism  may 
be  stated  as  follows:  There  exists  an  evident  correspondence 
between  my  field  of  experience  and  those  of  other  persons  when 
we  are  in  what  we  call  the  same  situation.  This  corre- 
spondence is  so  great  that  it  leads  us  ordinarily  to  believe  that 
the  same  things  are  somehow  presented  to  us.  Even  though 
we  allow  for  the  conventionalizing  influence  of  social  motives, 
there  remains  an  original  presentational  correspondence  that 
demands  explanation.  Why,  for  instance,  do  the  students  in 
a  "quiz  section"  in  philosophy  have  comparable  desk-expe- 
riences so  that  you  can  analyze  your  desk-experiences  and  find 
that  they  agree  with  your  analysis  in  the  main  ?  Point  to  the 
desk  and  they  also  see  it;  rap  sharply  upon  it  and  they  also 
hear  a  sound;  move  it  and  it  moves  simultaneously  for  them. 
Or,  take  the  case  of  two  travelers  visiting  a  picture-gallery. 
They  will  enter  at  the  same  door,  go  up  two  flights  of  stairs, 
turn  to  the  left  and  walk  into  a  room  on  the  description  of 
which  they  will  agree,  and  they  will  note  paintings  by  old 
masters  hung  on  corresponding  parts  of  the  wall,  and  so  on. 
Why  is  this?  The  human  mind  is  not  satisfied  to  accept  this 
constant  perceptual  correspondence  as  simply  a  remarkable 
fact.  There  must  be  a  reason  for  it.  Now,  mental  pluralism 
does  not  contain  in  itself  that  which  can  account  for  this 
agreement.  Thing-experiences  are  given  to  the  individual, 
not  in  the  sense  that  he  is  absolutely  passive  in  respect  to  them, 
but  in  the  sense  that  they  are  not  under  his  control  as  are  his 
ideas,  and  that  their  content  and  relations  are  not  deducible 
from  any  empirical,  personal  source.  The  recognition  of  this 
fact  led  Berkeley  to  his  postulation  of  an  active  Spirit  who 
produces  these  thing-experiences  in  finite  souls ;  it  moved  Kant 
to  his  postulation  of  things-in-themselves — for  Kant,  however, 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        171 

the  finite  soul  contributes  much  that  certainly  does  not  seem 
under  our  control;  it  led  Fichte  to  his  postulation  of  the 
Absolute  Ego;  it  motivates  the  emphasis  which  Bosanquet 
and  thinkers  of  similar  tendencies  put  on  the  contact  with 
Reality  in  immediate  experience.  There  must  be  a  unity  or 
connectedness  as  basic  as  the  pluralism  which  reflection  forces 
upon  us.  The  insufficiency  of  mental  pluralism  stares  us  in  the 
face.  Practically  all  thinkers  have  agreed  upon  this  con- 
clusion; the  question  has  been  partly  one  of  procedure,  partly 
one  of  epistemological  basis.  With  regard  to  the  first,  there  is 
undoubtedly  an  increasingly  strong  current  towards  empiri- 
cism and  induction.  If  a  unity  there  be,  we  must  work  up 
towards  it  and  not  down  from  it.  The  epistemological  aspect 
is,  again,  fundamental.  A  convinced  idealist  inevitably  ends 
in  theism  or  in  absolutism.  No  better  illustrations  of  this 
principle  could  be  desired  than  Ward,  Bradley,  and  Bosanquet. 
A  convinced  realist  is  more  apt  to  seek  the  desired  ground  for 
the  correspondence  between  the  worlds  of  individuals  in  the 
reinterpretation  of  our  knowledge  about  nature.  However 
this  may  be,  the  search  for  a  ground  to  account  for  the 
correspondence  between  the  fields  of  experience  bears  witness 
to  the  acknowledged  insufficiency  of  mental  pluralism. 

The  fourth  problem  which  mental  pluralism  must  face  is 
closely  allied  to  the  preceding  one.  It  points  in  the  same 
direction  to  an  independent  ground  which  controls  the  individ- 
ual's experience;  yet  it  concerns  noteworthy  characteristics  of 
the  individual's  field  of  experience  which  seem  to  demand 
explanation.  The  problem  may  be  stated  as  follows:  Why 
do  physical  things  appear  in  the  perceptual  field  in  the  orde^:. 
spatial  and  temporal,  in  which  they  do  appear?  Both  science 
and  common  sense  are  convinced  that  this  order  is  not  hap- 
hazard, that  it  has  a  basis  in  an  environment  independent 
of  the  individual.  So  far  as  these  standpoints  are  realistic, 
they  naturally  assign  this  control-basis  to  nature  as  a  system 
of  physical  things  which  stimulate  the  organism  and  thus 
occasion  the  orderly  succession  of  experiences.  But  natural 
realism  has  broken  down,  and  this  explanation  itself  requires 
critical  examination.  What  it  witnesses  to  is,  however,  clear. 
There  is  a  spatial  and  temporal  uniformity  in  the  perceptual 


172  CRITICAL  REALISM 

field  which  the  human  mind  is  not  satisfied  to  accept  simply 
as  given  fact  which  demands  no  explanation.  Unable  to 
account  for  it  in  terms  of  its  own  creativeness,  and  unwilling 
to  leave  it  vmexplained  when  Natural  Realism  breaks  down 
under  the  stress  of  unavoidable  conflicts,  the  mind  resorts 
first  to  the  distinction  between  appearance  and  reality  and 
then  to  the  contrast  between  the  physical  world  as  it  is  in 
itself  and  the  percepts  which  it  occasions  in  percipient  agents. 
In  both  stages  it  holds  to  a  ground,  and  to  one  not  entirely 
alien  to  the  objects  present  in  consciousness.  It  should  be 
noted  that  the  previous  problems  and  the  present  problem  all 
work  in  the  same  direction.  They  thus  reenforce  each  other 
and  make  the  demand  for  a  realistic  ground  to  explain  our 
physical- world  experience  almost  irresistible.  It  is  note- 
worthy that  Berkeley  accepts  without  question  this  demand 
for  a  ground,  while  he  refuses  to  acknowledge  that  we  can 
gain  valid  information  about  it  by  means  of  reflection  on  our 
immediate  experience;  yet  only  after  he  has  disposed  of  this 
possibility  to  his  own  satisfaction,  does  he  feel  assured  of  his 
own  spiritualistic  construction. 

I  wish  now  to  take  up  for  consideration  the  relative  inde- 
pendence of  the  last  two  realistic  motives.  Many  thinkers 
of  the  present  day  are  so  obsessed  by  the  social  atmosphere 
in  which  our  experience  is  formed  that  they  are  inclined  to  do 
scant  justice  to  motives  within  the  individual's  experience. 
I  have  heard  philosophers  gravely  assert  that  a  child's  expe- 
rience of  the  physical  world  is  secondary  to,  and  somehow 
mediated  by,  his  relations  to  other  selves.  Such  an  assertion 
seems  to  me  absurd  and  not  likely  to  be  made  by  one  who  has 
observed  children  closely.  A  very  young  child,  only  two  or 
three  months  old,  gazes  with  interest  upon  the  passing  show 
of  nature  when  he  is  taken  for  a  walk.  To  him  persons  are 
but  other  things;  but  because  of  his  inherited  instincts  and 
the  part  persons  play  in  the  satisfaction  of  his  wants,  he  finds 
persons  more  interesting.  Let  us  admit,  then,  to  the  full,  the 
assistance  rendered  by  interpersonal  intercourse  in  the  devel- 
opment of  consciousness  of  the  self  and  in  the  solidifying  and 
extending  of  the  physical  world;  it  still  does  not  follow  that 
things,  so  far  as  they  are  objective,  are  simply  transsubjective. 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        173 

The  truer  analysis  regards  transsubjectivity  as  merely  a 
deepening  and  intensifying  of  that  objectivity  which  motives 
in  the  individual's  experience  are  themselves  able  to  bring  to 
birth.  Communication  and  cooperation  contain,  as  it  were, 
harmoniously  superposable  motives  which  continue  this 
objectivity  and  orientate  it  in  relation  to  all.  This  further 
development  consists  more  in  a  change  of  perspective  than 
in  a  change  in  content,  and  might  be  likened  to  the  effect 
produced  by  a  stereoscope.  We  are  able  to  stand  back  from 
nature  and  view  it  impersonally.  The  transsubjective  object 
is,  however,  only  the  perceptual  object  which  has  reached  the 
adult  stage  under  the  ever  more  effective  tutelage  of  inter- 
personal relations;  there  is  and  can  be  no  temporal  and  no 
existential  separation.  If  this  analysis  be  true,  it  is  erroneous 
to  account  for  the  independence  of  the  transsubjective  object 
on  the  ground  that  it  is  based  on  a  fallacy.  Ordinary  thought, 
says  Ward,  does  not  raise  Kant's  question :  For  what  conscious- 
ness is  the  transsubjective  object  an  object?  "It  proceeds, 
rather,  in  this  wise.  Regarding  the  sun  as  independent  of  L 
and  M  and  N,  severally,  it  concludes  that  it  is  and  remains  an 
object  independently  of  them  all  collectively.  Such  reasoning 
is  about  on  a  par  with  maintaining  that  the  British  House  of 
Commons  is  an  estate  of  the  realm  independent  of  each 
individual  member,  and  that,  therefore,  it  might  be  addressed, 
from  the  throne,  for  instance,  even  if  there  were  no  members." 
We  have  seen  reason  to  believe  that  Ward  is  wrong  in  his 
analysis.  The  independence  of  the  transsubjective  object 
but  develops  and  continues  that  which  the  more  distinctly 
perceptual  object  or  thing  already  possesses.  What  the 
individual  sees  from  the  first  is,  implicitly  at  least,  the  sun. 
Moreover,  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  the  conditions  for  a 
fallacy  of  composition  are  to  be  found  in  this  problem.  Is  the 
transsubjective  object  thought  of  as  related  to  individuals  in 
their  collective  aspect?  The  dualism  of  common  sense  is  not 
produced  by  social  reference,  but  merely  strengthened  thereby. 
It  is  so  easy  to  adopt  an  extreme  position  and  so  difficult 
to  do  impartial  justice  to  contemporaneous  yet  logically  sepa- 
rable factors  that  the  attitude  taken  by  those  thinkers  who 
have  rediscovered  the  social  moment  in  our  physical-world 


174  CRITICAL  REALISM 

experience  is  natural  and  excusable.  Psychology  and  logic 
were,  until  lately,  far  too  individualistic.  The  political, 
ethical,  and  economic  individualisms  of  the  eighteenth  centun* 
made  their  influence  felt  in  these  disciplines  to  a  degree  little 
suspected  at  the  time.  While  it  is  true  that  the  individual 
alone  judges  and  the  individual  alone  has  experiences, — a 
statement  that  our  study  of  the  Advance  of  the  Personal  has 
justified, — it  is  the  reverse  of  the  truth  to  assert  that  the 
individual  is  not  fundamentally  influenced  in  these  judgments 
and  experiences  by  interpersonal  intercourse.  What .  the 
thinker  must  do  is  to  strike  a  balance  between  the  social  and 
individual  factors  in  the  experience  of  the  individual.  To  do 
this  by  comparing  a  child's  field  of  experience  with  an  adult's, 
as  if  the  difference  could  be  assigned  to  the  social  factor,  is, 
on  the  face  of  it,  unjust ;  yet  the  advocates  of  the  social  factor 
have  suggested  such  a  comparison.  Thus  Royce,  one  of  the 
pioneers  in  the  rehabilitation  of  the  social,  does  not  deny  that 
the  child  "while  its  perceptive  consciousness  is  slowly  clearing 
gets  a  notion  of  something  that  has  many  important  elements 
in  common  with  what  you  and  I  call  our  external  world." 
But  he  tends  to  minimize  these  elements  and  the  development 
which  might  be  attained  apart  from  the  presence  of  the  social 
moment.  Mingled  almost  inextricably  with  this  tendency, 
and  partly  the  cause  of  it,  is  the  belief  that  "consciousness  of 
others  antedates  consciousness  of  self — or,  at  least,  this  is 
nearer  the  truth  than  the  reverse  order."  {The  World  and 
the  Individual,  p.  170,  second  series.) 

Consciousness  of  self  and  consciousness  of  others  are, 
however,  really  correlatives;  and  certainly  consciousness  of 
the  external  world  in  some  form  is  as  primitive  as — probably 
more  primitive  than  —  either.  Professor  Royce's  thesis  finally 
simmers  down  to  this:  "while  the  factor  furnished  by  personal 
verification  by  private  experience  of  the  facts  of  perception, 
plays  an  unquestionable  and  very  important  part  in  the 
formation  of  our  general  conception  of  external  reality,  it  is, 
at  least,  very  probable  that  the  social  factor  plays  a  still 
larger  part,  not  only,  as  just  pointed  out,  in  supplying  us  with 
a  notion  of  what  individual  facts  the  external  world  contains, 
but  also  in  determining  our  very  fundamental  notion  itself 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        175 

of  what  we  now  mean  by  externality."  {Philosophical  Review, 
Vol.  Ill,  p.  515.)  This  element  which  the  social  factor  adds  is 
what  we  have  called  commonness.  Along  with  this  goes  an 
increased  determinateness  due  to  description  and  measurement. 
Granted  the  validity  of  this  analysis  in  the  main,  there  still 
rises  in  our  mind  the  question :  Does  the  social  factor  produce 
a  very  fundamental  change  in  man's  attitude  to  the  physical 
world?  I  am  strongly  inclined  to  say  that  it  does  not,  that 
commonness  and  determinateness  are  additional  qualifications 
surrounding  the  central  core  of  independence,  and  that  this 
central  core  of  independence  is  explicable  only  in  terms  of 
motives  characteristic  of  the  individual's  field  of  experience. 
Commonness  and  determinateness  are,  as  it  were,  embroidery 
on  the  basic  distinction  within  the  individual's  experience 
between  the  physical  and  the  psychical.  They  furnish  tests 
of  that  which  claims  to  be  a  physical  object  but  are  incapable  of 
offering  an  explanation  of  the  distinction  itself.  This  is, 
of  course,  the  point  at  issue,  since  everyone  to-day  would  admit 
that  the  individual's  knowledge  of  the  particular  objects  to 
be  found  in  the  physical  world  is  socially  mediated.  Our 
conclusion  is,  accordingly,  that  the  social  factors  reenforce 
and  clarify  distinctions  which  must  have  their  origin  in 
characteristics  of  the  individual's  experience.  To  believe 
otherwise  is  to  forget  that  society  is  created  by  individuals 
and  that  these,  therefore,  must  have  capacities  of  an  order 
equal  to  their  task.  The  motives  developed  by  interpersonal 
intercourse  do  not  compete  with,  but,  instead,  support  and 
harmonize  with  the  native  structure  of  experience. 

An  example  of  this  support  will  do  to  close  this  discussion 
of  the  relative  independence  of  the  last  two  motives,  critical 
of  mental  pluralism.  We  have  maintained  that  the  distinction 
between  the  physical  and  the  psychical  and  the  independence 
of  the  individual  which  is  assigned  to  the  former  are  explic- 
able in  terms  of  the  individual's  experience.  But  reflection, 
working  critically  within  the  individual's  natural  outlook,  is 
forced  to  develop  the  additional  contrast  between  the  physical 
object  and  its  appearance  to  a  percipient.  Even  this  does  not 
furnish  a  resting-place,  however;  and  analysis  leads  on  to  the 
conception  that  the  physical  object  is  possibly  only  a  synthesis 


176  CRITICAL  REALISM 

of  sensations,  ideas,  and  meanings.  But  these  elements  are 
avowedly  personal  and  cannot  be  shared,  whereas  the  object  is 
somehow  common.  In  this  manner,  the  social  factor  comes  to 
the  rescue  of  the  physical  object  and  defends  it  with  varying 
success  against  the  assaults  of  idealistic  motives.  The  strength 
of  this  defense  consists  largely  in  the  fact  that  it  sets  subjective 
idealism  a  problem  which  it,  in  its  turn,  is  unable  to  answer. 
Idealism  on  the  defensive  is  never  as  confident  and  dogmatic 
as  idealism  on  the  offensive.  The  social  factor  first  confirms 
the  natural  realism  of  the  individual  and  then  tenaciously 
supports  it  when  under  attack.  But  this  role  is  altogether 
different  from  that  assigned  to  it  by  Ward,  who  makes  it  the 
creator  of  dualism. 

A  fifth  problem  is  closely  connected  with  those  which  have 
preceded,  yet  it  has  sufficient  distinctness  to  deserve  a  separate 
treatment.  Natural  Realism  ronrHe^  n  prnmnn^nrr  to  physi- 
cal things  which  thing-experiences,  to  which  idealism  is  forced 
to  reduce  them,  cannot  possess.  Now  such  a  view,  how- 
ever it  may  have  arisen,  certainly  enables  us  to  organize  our 
experience  in  a  way  that  would  otherwise  be  impossible. 
Moreover,  it  empowers  us  to  escape  the  belief  that  things  are 
created  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  us  the  impression  that  they 
are  permanent,  or,  to  express  it  more  accurately,  that  things 
arise  apparently  ex  nihilo  in  such  an  order  and  relation  as  to 
give  us  that  impression.  It  is  interesting  in  this  connection 
to  notice  that  Berkeley  felt  the  force  of  this  demand  that  things 
be  somehow  permanent,  and  endeavored  to  satisfy  it.  "  Ideas ' ' 
have  an  existence  distinct  from  being  perceived  by  me. 
{Three  Dialogues,  p.  64,  Open  Court  edition.)  Again  and 
again,  he  emphasizes  the  fact  that  ideas  are  independent  of 
the  individual's  mind.  Yet  they  must  exist  in  some  mind. 
This  finally  adequate  mind  can  be  no  other  than  God's. 
("Sensible  things  do  really  exist;  and  if  they  really  exist,  they 
are  necessarily  perceived  by  an  infinite  mind :  therefore  there  is 
an  infinite  mind,  or  God."  Ibid.,  p.  65.)  So  far  as  the  individ- 
ual knower  is  concerned,  the  outlook  is  decidedly  realistic. 
But  this  attempt  to  throw  a  sop  to  the  Cerberus  of  realism 
is  little  more  than  a  confession  of  weakness;  for  ideas  are  not 
and  cannot  be  the  same  for  distinct  individuals.     Our  study 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        177 

of  the  Advance  of  the  Personal  has  surely  demonstrated  this 
beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt.  Whose  idea  shall  we  consider 
really  existent?  The  suggestion  of  the  difficulty  is  enough. 
Ideas  are  not  independent  of  the  selective  purposes  and  past 
experiences  of  the  individual;  and  to  regard  the  individual  as 
a  passive  reflector  of  the  divine  ideas  is  most  assuredly  to  sin 
against  what  both  logic  and  psychology  have  taught  us. 
Hence,  there  are  as  many  ideas  as  individuals  (be  they  divine 
or  human)  to  perceive  them.  And  I  see  no  way  of  escape  from 
this  difficulty  that  is  at  all  satisfactory  for  the  idealist.  To 
say  that  our  ideas  are  selections  from  the  single  idea  in  God's 
mind  involves  the  difficulty  which,  in  a  less  theological  context, 
we  saw  confronted  M.  Bergson.  Communication  reveals  the 
fact  that  the  differences  between  the  corresponding  ideas  of 
percipients  are  more  fundamental  than  the  word  "selection" 
indicates.  Ideas  can  be  best  understood  as  functions  of  many 
factors  working  causally  together.  What,  then,  becomes  of  the 
identity  of  the  idea  upon  which  its  permanence  and  inde- 
pendence of  finite  minds  depend?  It  is  the  idea  in  the  divine 
mind,  which  alone  can  be  identical  and  permanent.  But  we 
are  limited  to  the  sensible  existences  which  present  themselves 
to  our  senses.  It  is  from  their  independence  of  the  individual 
that  Berkeley  argues  to  the  infinite  mind.  Thus  the  ground 
is  taken  from  under  his  feet  by  the  Advance  of  the  Personal. 
Berkeley  raised  the  question  of  identity,  although  he  did  not 
see  its  full  significance.  Hylas  asks  (p.  114)  whether  it  does 
not  follow,  from  the  principles  advocated  by  Philonous,  "that 
no  two  can  see  the  same  thing."  There  is  then  given  a  disser- 
tation on  identity  which  cannot  be  freed  from  the  criticism 
that  it  is  question-begging.  He  appeals  to  the  prejudice  of 
common  sense.  This  is  playing  fast  and  loose  with  a  ven- 
geance. Again,  he  assumes  that  individuals  may  be  *  'affected  in 
like  sort  by  their  senses"  and  have  uniform  experiences.  In 
spite  of  all;  he  is  forced  to  appeal  to  an  archetype  in  the 
infinite  mind.  Thus  the  gain  of  Berkeley  over  Locke  turns  out 
to  be  minimal.  In  the  place  of  Locke's  acceptance  of  the 
scientific  view  of  perception  as  involving  the  stimulation  of 
the  sense-organs,  we  have  the  postulation  of  the  creative 
activity  of  an  infinite  spirit  and  the  further  problem  of  the 


178  CRITICAL  REALISM 

relation  of  the  permanent  ideas  to  the  Divine  Mind  and  to 
the  sensible  objects  which  we  perceive.  At  the  best,  the  only- 
thing  permanent  for  us  is  the  will  of  this  infinite  spirit.  Hence, 
Berkeley  does  not  succeed  in  giving  permanence  to  things,  but 
only  to  the  cause  of  things.  It  is  undeniable,  therefore,  that 
Berkeley's  construction  is  entirely  hypothetical  and  be^Hr^ 
witness  to  the  need  for  a  realistic  ground.  Its  strength  is 
negative  rather  than  positive. 

The  fifth  problem  which  confronts  mental  pluralism  may 
be  stated  as  follows :  How  can  the  appearance  and  disappear- 
ance of  these  minds  be  explained  ?  And  let  us  not  forget  that, 
for  us,  minds  do  not  mean  souls  or  metaphysical  entities 
somehow  lying  back  of  consciousness,  like  hidden  springs 
whose  source  and  nature  we  cannot  know.  The  word  denotes 
the  ever-changing  fields  of  experience  whose  unity  we  signify 
by  a  "my."  These  minds  recognize  their  temporal  char- 
acter; they  know  as  certainly  as  they  know  anything  that 
they  had  beginning  in  time.  Memory  carries  each  back  to  a 
period  when  the  field  of  experience  was  far  simpler;  and  social 
relations,  testimony,  and  analogy  convince  the  individual 
that  he  was  bom  a  few  years  back  of  this  ultimate  reach  of  his 
memory.  Again,  we  have  adequate  reason  to  believe  that 
this  stream  of  consciousness  which  we  call  the  mind  is  in 
"danger  of  ceasing.  Shall  we  admit,  then,  that  these  minds 
have  an  absolute  origin,  or  shall  we  agree  to  accept  a  pre- 
existence  for  them?  The  empirical  facts  point  toward  an 
absolute  beginning  of  each  mind,  but  accept  in  mental  heredity 
a  realistic  basis  or  ground  which  underarches  each  mind  and 
gives  it  a  continuity  with  minds  which  have  existed  in  the 
past.  Mental  heredity  is,  however,  merely  a  name  for  this 
continuity  and  does  not  explain  it.  Still  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  there  is  such  a  basic  continuity.  Without  it, 
history  would  be  meaningless  and  parentage  would  lose  its 
deeper  implications.  On  the  other  hand,  such  a  continuity  is 
not  a  fact  within  any  one  of  these  minds.  Accordingly,  mental 
pluralism  has  to  choose  between  preexistence  and  inexplicable 
absolute  beginnings.  But  this  is  to  offer  it  the  horns  of  a 
dilemma.  I'o  choose  preexistence  is  to  deny  heredity  and 
the  logical  relations  it  involves;  to  choose  absolute  beginnings 


.       INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM        179 

is  to  incur  the  enmity  01  our  reason,  which  demands  a  ground 
for  all  things.  A  will-o'-the-wisp  world  has  no  uniformity, 
and  in  it  we  might  well  expect  our  ancestors  to  appear  and 
become  our  pupils.  I  do  not  see  how  mental  pluralism  as 
such  can  escape  this  dilemma.  Thus  the  fifth  problem,  also, 
pi:^ints  to  a  realistic  ground  for  experience. 
..^^"  Reflection  upon  the  preceding  problem  caimot  fail  to 
carry  the  attention  to  one  peculiarity  of  the  appearance  and 
disappearance  of  minds.  Always,  what  we  call  the  individual's 
body  is  associated  with  these  events.  Biology  informs  us  that 
the  continuity  which  we  posit  in  the  conception  of  mental 
heredity  can  be  at  least  partly  assured  by  referring  it  to  the 
actual  continuity  of  the  child's  organism  with  the  organisms 
of  his  ancestors.  It  may  be  replied  that  biology  can  deal 
only  with  physical  continuities  and  resemblances.  In  a 
certain  sense,  such  an  objection  has  truth  on  its  side.  Mental 
resemblances  can  be  investigated  and  be  found  to  accompany 
physical  resemblances,  but  a  real  connection  between  the  two 
cannot  be  proved  by  biology.  All  that  such  an  empirical 
investigation  conducted  by  biology  and  by  psychology  can  do, 
is  to  suggest  a  real  connection.  As  we  shall  see,  such  a  sug- 
gestion in  this  genetic  field  reenforces  a  similar  one  in  regard 
to  the  unity  of  mind  and  body  in  the  individual  himself. 
But  we  have  dealt  so  far  only  with  the  appearance  of  minds 
upon  the  world's  stage;  their  exit,  likewise,  seems  inseparably 
bound  up  with  the  fortunes  of  the  body.  Ever^^one  has  the 
general  information  which  leads  to  this  conclusion,  and 
further  details  can  readily  be  found  in  the  study  of  insanity  and 
of  the  pathology  of  the  brain.  We  may  say,  then,  without 
risk  of  contradiction  that  a  deeper  study  of  the  last  question 
that  we  posed  to  mental  pluralism  leads  to  another  problem, 
namely.  What  is  the  significance  of  the '  distinction  between 
the  mind  and  the  bodv.  which  grows  up  inevitably  in  the 
individual's  experience?  What  meaning  can  this  distinction 
possibly  have  for  mental  pluralism? 

We  have  already  noted  the  solution  which  Berkeley 
offers  for  this  problem.  If  the  brain  be  considered  a  substance 
independent  of  perception,  it  is  inconceivable,  and  falls  under 
the  condemnation  meted  out  to  matter.     Hence,  the  brain 


i8o  CRITICAL  REALISM 

is,  for  me,  only  a  cluster  of  sensations  or,  better  yet,  of  images. 
But  these  exist  only  in  my  mind;  therefore,  my  brain  exists 
only  in  my  mind  and  cannot  support  it  or  mediate  my  knowl- 
edge of  an  external  world.  ("Besides  spirits,  all  that  we 
know  or  conceive  are  our  own  ideas.  When,  therefore,  you 
say  all  ideas  are  occasioned  by  impressions  in  the  brain,  do 
you  conceive  this  brain  or  no?  If  you  do,  then  you  talk  of 
ideas  imprinted  in  an  idea  causing  that  same  idea,  which  is 
absurd.  If  you  do  not  conceive  it,  you  talk  unintelligibly, 
instead  of  forming  a  reasonable  hypothesis."  Second  Dia- 
logue, p.  6i,  Open  Court  edition.)  In  short,  for  idealism, 
the  body,  like  any  other  physical  thing,  becomes  my  idea. 
Berkeley  is  eminently  logical.  But  we  have  also  noticed 
the  difficulty  into  which  this  reduction  of  the  body  to  the 
individual's  idea  drives  him.  To  explain  interpersonal  inter- 
course the  body  seems  essential,  and  Berkeley  practically 
admits  it.  In  spite  of  himself,  he  is  obliged  to  talk  of  the 
control  which  the  individual  has  over  the  body.  But  this 
is  obviously  absurd  if  the  body  is  merely  an  idea,  for  ideas 
are  not  imder  our  control.  The  consequence  is,  God  must 
mediate  all  communication  between  individuals.  Surely  a 
busy  God.  A  new  question  arises,  however.  How  does  God 
know  our  thoughts?  That  we  have  ideas  he  presumably 
knows,  since  he  causes  them  in  us.  But  our  thoughts  are, 
according  to  Berkeley,  under  our  control.  As  active,  although 
subordinate,  spirits  we  make  plans  and  build  up  purposes  and 
peculiar  image-complexes.  How  can  God  have  cognizance  of 
these  and  communicate  them  to  others  ?  They  are,  by  hypoth- 
esis, as  independent  of  his  knowledge  as  the  most  pronounced 
realist  could  desire.  It  is  only  their  mental  character  that 
salves  the  idealist's  conscience.  Again,  if  things  exist  as  ideas 
in  the  Divine  Mind,  must  not  the  body,  too,  so  exist?  But 
this  gives  it  an  independence  of  my  spirit;  either,  then,  I  am 
related  to  God  so  far  as  I  am  related  to  this  archetypal  body, 
or  I  am  not  related  to  it  and  it  is  not  in  any  sense  my  body. 
All  this  shows  how  inadequately  idealism  can  deal  with  the 
mind-body  problem;  yet  all  our  empirical  knowledge  cries 
out  the  reality  of  this  problem  which  asseverates  that  minds 
have  their  roots  in  a  matrix  common  to  all,  in  a  ground  which 


INSUFFICIENCY  OF  MENTAL  PLURALISM 


ISI 


mental  pluralism  cannot  explain.  It  will  be  our  task  in 
another  chapter  to  show  that  the  mind-body  problem  is  a 
real  or  ontological  one;  that  the  individual's  body  cannot  be 
taken  up  into  his  mind. 

When  these  seven  problems  are  held  in  mind  and  brought 
into  relation  with  one  another,  it  is  interesting  to  notice  how 
they  focus  on  the  mind-body  problem.  This  fact  acquires 
peculiar  point  when  we  bear  in  mind  the  ambiguity  of  the  body. 
The  body  is  intimately  connected  with  the  mind  in  the  individ- 
ual's thought  of  himself,  he  seems  to  dwell  in  it  and  permeate  it, 
yet  it  also  assumes  a  marked  independence  and  is  undeniably 
a  part  of  the  physical  world.  Both  science  and  common  sense 
take  for  granted  that  the  body  plays  #  a  dominant  role  in 
intercommunication  and  is  intimately  concerned  v/ith  the 
rise  and  disappearance  of  minds.  Furthermore,  things  seem 
to  have  the  right  to  possess  the  same  permanence  as  the  body 
which  is  nourished  by  them.  Again,  how  natural  seems 
the  explanation  that  individuals  have  corresponding  thing- 
experiences  because  their  bodies  are  actually  under  the  control 
of  a  common  environment.?  We  are  surprised  when  we 
consider  these  hypotheses  by  their  apparent  simplicity  and 
their  harmony  with  the  facts  and  with  one  another.  The 
functions  of  the  sense-organs,  the  part  played  by  the  tongue 
and  the  vocal  cords,  the  facts  of  birth  and  death,  the  order  in 
which  experiences  come,  the  correspondence  of  the  experiences 
of  individuals — all  are  accounted  for  coherently  and  simply. 
But  the  realization  that  this  connected  chain  of  constructions 
conflicts  in  its  present  form  with  the  apparent  reduction  of 
the  external  world  to  elements  in  the  field  of  experience  pre- 
vents its  adoption  until  it  has  been  reinterpreted.  Evidently, 
all  that  is  needed  to  make  the  push  of  this  view  of  the  world 
irresistible  is  a  satisfactory  realistic  epistemology  and  a 
solution  of  the  mind-body  problem  in  harmony  with  this 
epistemology  and  with  empirical  facts.  Granted  these, 
mental  pluralism  would  rest  in  the  environment  which  its 
own  insufficiency  requires. 


13 


CHAPTER  VIII 

MEDIATE   REALISMS 

IN  THE  preceding  chapter  we  reached  the  decision  that 
mental  pluralism  suggests  problems  which  it  is  unable  to 
answer.  These  problems  point  unmistakably  to  a  con- 
tinuous reality  in  which  minds  grow  and  function.  Can  we 
gain  any  insight  into  the  nature  of  this  environing  reality? 
That  still  remains  to  be  seen.  A  realism  of  some  sort  has  still 
to  clarify  and  found  itself.  But  at  this  point  we  again  find 
competing  principles  at  work.  Those  realisms  which  are  most 
strongly  influenced  by  the  epistemological  theories  of  idealism, 
while  refusing  to  accept  the  compromise  offered  by  absolute 
idealism,  take  the  form  of  "stuff  idealisms. "  As  a  rule,  these 
stuff  idealisms  establish  themselves  by  means  of  the  principle 
of  analogy.  They  grant  an  environing  reality  and,  rather  than 
admit  that  it  is  unknowable,  they  read  it  in  the  light  of  con- 
sciousness. It  is  most  interesting  that  these  realistic  idealists 
are,  in  the  main,  psychologists.  Realistic  idealisms  vary  all 
the  way  from  the  crudest  mind-stuff  theories,  through  the 
panpsychism  of  Paulsen,  Prince,  Strong,  and  others,  to 
monadism.  We  might  even  place  in  this  group  that  interesting 
attempt  at  compromise  between  immediate  realism  and  ideal- 
ism to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  M.  Bergson.  But  there  is 
another  possibility  open  to  realism.  May  we  not  hold  that  our 
tested  data  and  theories  give  us  knowledge  about  what  deserves 
to  be  called  a  physical  world  ?  We  have  hinted  at  this  mediate 
epistemological  realism  more  than  once  in  the  foregoing  pages. 
Let  us  see  whether  we  can  carry  it  through  and  prove  it  far 
preferable  to  the  realistic  idealisms  mentioned  above. 

When  we  have  once  clearly  realized  that  mental  pluralism  is 
unable  to  explain  its  own  existence  and  characteristics,  we  are 
naturally  led  to  ask  ourselves  whether  idealism  has  not  over- 
shot the  mark  in  its  interpretation  of  the  Advance  of  the 
Personal.  Instead  of  pointing  forward  to  the  principle  that 
nothing  can  exist  which  is  not  content  of  some  mind,  did  it  not 

182 


MEDIATE  REALISMS  183 

rather  undermine  a  false  view  of  knowledge — that  found 
in  immediate  realisms?  It  will  be  remembered  that  we 
examined  and  denied  the  idealistic  principle  that  the  object 
known  is  necessarily  inseparable  from  the  knower.  We  would 
not  even  qualify  this  statement  were  there  not  a  characteristic 
ambiguity  in  the  word  "knower."  Sometimes  we  look  upon 
the  knower  as  the  subject-self  and  sometimes  as  the  conscious 
individual.  The  question  before  us  is,  accordingly,  to  attain 
a  view  of  knowledge  which  satisfies  the  teaching  contained  in 
the  Advance  of  the  Personal  while  looking  upon  the  object 
known  as  independent  of  the  knower,  i.e.,  independent  of  the 
field  of  the  individual's  experience  when  the  object  is  other  than 
an  element  in  the  field.  Let  us  see  whether  or  not  mental 
pluralism  affirms  the  existence  of  such  knowledge  and  is  thus 
a  secret  traitor  to  idealism. 

Closer  scrutiny  of  mental  pluralism  reveals  the  fact  that  it 
does  not  carry  the  idealistic  interpretation  of  the  Advance  of 
the  Personal  into  complete  application.  In  other  words,  it 
stops  short  of  solipsism.  It  does  so  because  the  facts  of  life 
forbid  its  doing  otherwise.  Solipsism  corresponds,  in  philos- 
ophy, to  a  test  experiment  in  science.  Any  principles  which 
involve  it  are  by  that  very  fact  disproved.  Now,  the  self 
which  knows  can  only  be  my  self.  It  follows  that  other 
selves  are  my  constructs;  but  I  refuse  to  draw  an  idealistic 
conclusion  from  this  fact  and  hold  that  they  are  nothing 
else.  This  refusal  means  that,  in  this  instance  at  least, 
I  do  not  interpret  the  Advance  of  the  Personal  as  signifying 
that  because  the  world  is  somehow  my  idea  it  can  be  nothing 
more.  Knowledge  apparently  uses  contentual  fact  as  the 
object  of  knowledge  without  always  being  aware  that  it  is 
contentual  fact  in  the  mind  of  the  knower.  Even  when  this 
situation  is  pointed  out,  knowledge  refuses  to  draw  the  con- 
clusion which  subjective  idealism  indicates.  And,  strange  to 
say,  while  idealism  is  insistent  when  the  physical  world  is 
concerned,  it  acquiesces  in  this  violation  of  its  foundation 
when  other  selves  are  concerned. 

Idealism  bases  itself  on  two  principles  which  are  frequently 
confused.  The  one  is  formal  and  rests  on  a  supposed  relation 
between  the  object  known  and  the  knower.     We  have  already 


i84  CRITICAL  REALISM 

criticised  this  supposition  sufficiently  in  a  preceding  chapter. 
The  other  principle  is  empirical  and  asserts  that  all  objects 
of  thought  are  mental.  We  called  this  the  argument  from 
content.  It  is  more  widespread  than  is  usually  supposed. 
This  principle  is  supported  by  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge, 
in  so  far  as  he  emphasizes  the  fact  that  phenomena  are  creations 
of  the  human  understanding;  it  is  appealed  to  by  Berkeley 
when  he  reduces  "ideas"  to  sensations;  it  is  acknowledged  by 
the  pragmatist  when  he  points  out  the  reconstructions  which 
things  undergo  in  experience.  Opponents  of  the  argument 
usually  misunderstand  it  and  call  it  psychologism.  We,  on 
the  contrary,  welcomed  it  and  demonstrated  that  it  is  valid 
against  all  forms  of  immediate  realism. 

It  is  obvious  upon  reflection  that  two  assumptions,  closely 
connected,  are  taken  for  granted  in  this  argument.  These 
are  (i)  that  objects  must  be  actually  present  in  the  field  of 
experience  to  be  known;  and  (2)  that  knowledge  of  that 
which  is  non-mental  cannot  be  mediated  by  what  is  mental. 

The  assumption  that  knowledge  always  involves  the 
actual  presence  to  the  mind  of  the  object  known  is  a  survival 
of  Natural  Realism.  The  Advance  of  the  Personal  either 
destroys  it  or  leads  to  solipsism.  When  we  come  to  examine 
the  assumption  more  closely,  we  discover  that  it  is  founded 
upon  the  view  that  knowledge  consists- of  the  presence  of  an 
object  to  the  self,  whereas  it  may  be  the  presence  of  an  idea 
of  an  object  instead  of  the  object  itself.  Since  the  idea  is  an 
object  of  thought,  this  confusion  easily  arises.  But  we  have 
discussed  this  more  critical  view  of  knowledge  in  Chapter  V. 

Now  this  first  principle  of  idealism  is  used  as  a  foundation 
for  the  second.  The  argument  is  as  follows:  Since  objects  to 
be  known  must  be  present  in  the  field  of  experience,  they  must 
be  mental.  All  known  objects  are,  therefore,  mental  and  we 
can  possess  no  knowledge  of  what  is  non-mental.  If  we  grant 
the  first  principle,  the  second  certainly  follows.  But  we  have 
seen  that  the  first  principle  involves  the  obviously  false 
assertion  that  nothing  outside  of  the  individual's  mind  can  be 
known  by  him,  because  only  objects  which  are  present  in  the 
field  of  his  experience  can  be  present  literally  to  his  mind. 

Now,  because  things  which  common  sense  assumes  are 


MEDIATE  REALISMS  185 

present  to  the  mind  and  at  the  same  time  non-mental  turn  out 
to  be  mental,  it  in  no  wise  follows  that  objects  known  which 
are  not  present  to  the  mind  in  a  literal  sense  are  mental  and 
necessarily  so.  Such  a  conclusion  cannot  be  deduced  from 
the  facts  upon  which  the  idealist  relies.  To  prove  the  proposi- 
tion that  only  existences  which  are  mental  can  be  known 
requires  the  premise  that  objects  not  present  in  a  literal  sense 
cannot  be  kno\vn;  and  this  premise  is  a  deduction  from  the 
principle  of  subjective  idealism.  But  mental  pluralism  degen- 
erates into  solipsism  if  the  principle  of  subjective  idealism 
be  held.  Must  not  our  conclusion  be,  that  the  facts  do  not 
furnish  a  basis  for  the  empirical  principle  of  idealism  (that  all 
objects  of  knowledge  are  mental)  any  more  than  an  examina- 
tion of  knowledge  furnishes  a  foundation  for  the  formal 
principle  of  idealism?  Knowledge  as  such  makes  no  dis- 
crimination between  the  mental  and  the  non-mental;  this 
distinction  is  one  between  the  objects  of  knowledge. 

Having  come  unscathed  through  the  fire  of  the  idealistic 
principles,  knowledge  of  the  non-mental  must  m_eet  another 
enemy.  It  is  an  assumption  of  many  thinkers  that  knowledge 
of  the  non-mental  cannot  be  mediated  by  what  is  mental. 
Berkeley's  attack  upon  the  copy,  or  resemblance,  view  of  our 
knowledge  of  physical  objects  will  occur  to  the  reader.  "I 
answer,  an  idea  can  be  like  nothing  but  an  idea;  a  colour  or 
figure  can  be  like  nothing  but  another  colour  or  figure.  If 
we  look  but  never  so  little  into  our  thoughts,  we  shall  find  it 
impossible  for  us  to  conceive  a  likeness  except  only  between 
our  ideas."  {Principles,  sec.  8.  See  also  Dialogues y  pp.  55  ff.) 
This  copy  view  of  knowledge  which  Berkeley  attacks  has 
often  been  misunderstood.  There  is  no  assertion  that  images 
intervene  in  perception  between  thing-experiences  and  the 
percipient;  instead,  it  is  held  that  "ideas"  which  are  per- 
ceived directly  are  judged  by  thought  to  be  copies  of 
reals  which  cannot  be  apprehended.  It  is  often  held  that 
a  still  more  convincing  argument  against  the  copy  view 
of  knowledge  exists  in  the  query:  How  could  we  ever  get 
to  the  real  to  find  out  whether  it  resembled  our  con- 
struct? We  can't  reach  behind  our  "ideas"  and  drag  out  the 
reality  in  order  to  make  a  comparison.     If  we  could  apprehend 


i86  CRITICAL  REALISM 

the    reality,    what    would    be  the  use  of  the  comparison? 

Knowledge  would  seem  to  require  tests  within  experience, 
and  similarity  between  our  construct  and  the  object  cannot 
furnish  the  basis  of  such  an  immanent  test.  Granted  that 
similarity  can  never  be  the  test  for  scientific  knowledge  of 
reality,  the  question  naturally  arises  whether  it  should  be 
considered  the  ideal  of  knowledge.  Berkeley,  confirmed 
sensationalist  that  he  is,  can  think  of  no  other  ideal,  although 
the  ideal  appears  to  him  self -contradictory.  That  which  is 
mental  can  resemble  only  that  which  is  mental.  We  shall 
try  to  show  that  the  knowledge  of  the  physical  woild  which 
science  achieves  does  not  imply  resemblance  as  an  ideal. 

In  order  to  get  the  idealistic  point  of  view  clearly  in  mind, 
let  us  examine  another  instance  of  this  theory  that  the  non- 
mental  cannot  be  known  by  the  mental.  I  take  this  argument 
from  a  characteristic  exposition  of  panpsychism.  "But,  if 
mental  states  are  real,  in  experiencing  them  we  enjoy  a  sample 
of  what  reality  is  like,  and  it  is  at  least  possible  that  things-in- 
themselves  resemble  this  sample,  and  are  accordingly  mental 
in  nature.  ...  If  the  only  reality  of  which  we  have  any 
experience  is  consciousness,  we  have  no  material  out  of  which 
to  form  the  conception  of  a  reality  of  different  nature,  and 
that  conception  is  consequently  perfectly  groundless  and 
arbitrary."  (Strong,  Why  the  Mind  Has  a  Body,  pp.  287-8; 
italics  mine.*)  The  apparent  assumption  here  is  that  con- 
sciousness is  a  stuff,  or  material,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive  of  another  material  different  from  it,  because  we  are 
limited  to  consciousness.  To  this  I  would  reply  that,  in  the 
first  place,  I  do  not  think  that  consciousness  is  a  stuff,  and,  in 
the  second  place,  knowledge  is  not  limited  to,  if  indeed  it 
concerns  itself  at  all  with  stuffs.  If  the  knowledge  of  the 
physical  world  that  science  has  gleaned  by  painstaking  investi- 
gation is  veritably  knowledge,  it  is  indeed  satisfactory  even  if 
it  does  not  inform  us  about  matter  as  a  stuff. 

Now  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  our  knowledge  of  exist- 
ences external  to  our  consciousness  must  be  built  up  on  the 

1  Some  years  ago  I  pointed  out  that  the  essential  fallacy  in  the  principle,  that  the  mental 
cannot  know  the  non-mental,  was  the  assumption  that  to  know  a  thmg  v/as  somehow  to  be  it. 
I  am  sti!l  convinced  that  the  argument  advanced  by  Professor  Strong  is  implicitly  based  on 
some  such  idea. 


MEDIATE  realism::^  187 

basis  of  experience.  Hence,  our  idea  of  an  existence  and  the 
existence  as  we  think  it  are  both  mental.  These  two  objects 
of  attention,  the  idea  qua  idea  and  the  idea  qua  thing  are 
actually  the  same  construct  assigned  to  different  domains 
and  qualified  differently  as  a  consequence.  The  idea  as  thing 
is  thought  of  as  independent  of  the  mind  and  as  containing 
possibilities  as  yet  unglimpsed.  If  we  disregard  this  difference 
of  position,  they  are  identical.  So  long  as  we  remain  at  the 
level  of  Natural  Realism,  idea  and  thing  are  both  supposed 
to  be  given,  and  the  category  of  resemblance  can  be  applied 
to  them.  I  can  compare  my  idea  of  a  thing  with  the  thing  as 
it  is  subsequently  experienced.  Thus  the  copy  view  develops 
and  has  its  value  within  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience. 
It  concerns  the  correspondence  between  thing-experiences  and 
our  ideas  of  them.  But  we  must  rid  ourselves  of  the  copy 
ideal  of  knowledge  when  we  pass  to  science.  Images  give 
way  to  propositions,  and  we  must  raise  ourselves  beyond  the 
level  of  mere  picture-thinking.  We  know  that  a  physical 
thing  has  such  a  ratio  to  our  standard  unit,  that  it  has  such  a 
structure  and  is  capable  of  functioning  in  certain  definite 
ways ;  but  we  do  not  attempt  to  gain  a  mental  copy  of  the  thing 
{cf.  Chap.  II).  When  we  do  so,  we  are  lapsing  back  into  a 
more  subtle  form  of  Natural  Realism.  It  is  unfortunate  that 
most  forms  of  mediate  realism,  so  far  as  they  interpret  the 
primary  qualities  naively,  fall  into  this  copy  view  of  knowledge. 
We  may  say,  then,  that  resemblance  is  the  common-sense 
ideal  of  knowledge,  because  it  concerns  itself  with  relations 
between  objects,  the  thing,  and  the  idea  of  it,  within  the  field 
of  experience.  This  primitive  ideal  is  easily  carried  over  to 
the  more  critical  realm  of  science  and  survives  there  for  a 
long  time,  as  can  be  seen  in  Locke's  theory  of  the  primary 
qualities  as  archetypes  of  the  primary  ideas.  Nevertheless, 
it  must  be  relinquished  and  a  new  view  of  knowledge  developed. 
Scientific  knovdedge  deals  with  the  structure,  functions, 
relative  sizes,  and  relations  of  things,  and  this  information  is 
expressible  in  judgments,  and  not  in  images.  The  category  of 
resemblance  is  no  longer  applicable*.  To  conclude  this  antici- 
patory discussion  of  the  nature  of  knowledge  of  that  which 
is  external  to  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience:  there 


i88  CRITICAL  REALISM 

seems  to  be  no  adequate  reason  that  idealism  can  advance 
against  the  assumption  that  the  mental  can  mediate  knowledge 
of  the  non-mental.  Only  he  who  has  a  primitive  idea  of 
scientific  knowledge  can  maintain  that  Berkeley's  argument 
against  it  is  valid.  It  is  valid  against  Locke,  but  that  is  all. 
Science  makes  the  claim  to  have  knowledge  of  the  physical 
worid,  and,  certainly,  this  garnered  knowledge  enables  us  to 
adjust  ourselves  to  nature;  a  better  test  scarcely  could 
be   desired. 

This  long  and  rather  technical  examination  of  the  empirical 
basis  of  idealism  was  necessary  to  prepare  the  way  for  an 
answer  to  the  question :  Why  is  it  that  idealists  are  insistent 
on  their  supposed  principle  when  a  knowledge  of  nature  is 
concerned  and  not  when  other  selves  are  involved?  We  have 
already  learned  that  idealism  has  so  taken  its  principle  as  to 
allow  knowledge  of  the  mental  when  that  which  is  known  does 
not  exist  in  the  mind  of  the  knower.  We  have  also  discovered 
that  this  extension  of  knowledge  cannot  be  justified  on  the 
empirical  ground  on  which  it  is  supposedly  based.  Knowledge 
of  other  minds  is  not  consistent  with  subjective  idealism. 
There  are  at  least  two  reasons  for  this  disingenuous  attitude 
on  the  part  of  the  idealist.  The  first  is,  that  the  knowledge  of 
other  selves  in  some  sense  and  to  some  degree  is  so  apparent 
and  so  susceptible  of  test  by  communication  that  it  is  folly 
to  deny  it ;  the  second,  that  the  idealist  has  no  fault  to  find  with 
mental  existence.  And  here  peeps  out  the  cloven  hoof  of 
idealism — the  lack  of  disinterested  interest.  Idealism  as  a 
system  has  always  been  in  alliance  with  religion  and  with  a 
spiritualistic  ethics  and  has  been  controlled  by  the  purpose 
to  show  that  the  non -mental  is  unknowable.  Consequently, 
it  confuses  what  it  would  prove,  were  its  principles  correct, 
with  what  it  desires  to  prove.  Onlj'-  in  this  way  can  I  account 
for  the  confusion  which  is  so  prevalent  in  idealism  between 
the  logical  implications  of  the  empirical  principle  and  those 
which  are  actually  drawn. 

Let  me  also  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  it  is  more  than 
doubtful  that  the  self  is  mental  in  the  modem  sense  of  that 
term.  The  self  is  not  to  be  identified  with  the  stream  of 
consciousness  of  any  one  moment.     Yet  this  is  what  the 


MEDIATE  REALISMS  189 

panpsychist  seems  forced  to  hold;  and  I  do  not  see  how  any- 
one— Strong,  for  instance — can  avoid  this  difficulty.  The 
monadist  has  a  far  more  adequate  idea  of  the  self  than  the 
panpsychist ;  but  he  is  confronted,  as  we  shall  see,  with  special 
difficulties.  If  the  self  is  non-mental,  can  the  idealist  main- 
tain that  he  knows  his  self  and  the  selves  of  others  unless  he  is 
prepared  to  admit  that  the  non-mental  can  be  known  by  means 
of  the  mental? 

To  confirm  us  in  the  conclusion  we  have  drawn  in  regard 
to  the  inconsistency  of  idealism,  all  that  is  necessary  is  an 
examination  of  the  method  usually  employed  by  idealists  to 
prove  the  existence  of  other  minds.  The  principle  upon  which 
they  lay  stress  is  that  of  analogy.  We  have  already  noted 
its  use  by  Berkeley.  The  argument  is  as  follows:  When  I 
know  your  mind,  it  is  because  I  judge  that  you  have  thoughts 
like  those  which  I  have.  I  make  certain  gestures  and  speak 
certain  words.  An  organism  similar  to  mine  does  the  same. 
Therefore  I  infer  by  analogy  that  there  are  other  minds. 

But  how  can  I  know  that  you,  another  being,  use  these  ges- 
tures and  words  to  convey  to  me  the  meanings  which  I  attach 
to  them?  How  can  I  know  that  they  are  causally  connected 
with  another  mind  for  which  they  possess  a  corresponding 
significance?  To  this  it  may  be  replied  that  these  sounds 
and  gestures  are  connected  with  a  body  other  than  the  one  to 
which  I  connect  my  words  and  gestures.  True;  but  what  does 
this  fact  prove?  If  my  body  is  only  my  experience,  so  are  the 
other  bodies  only  my  experiences.  I  admit  that  my  field  of 
experience  has  peculiarities  which  suggest  other  minds,  but 
these  other  minds  are  likewise  only  ideas  of  mine  to  which  I 
tend  to  give  a  reality  equal  to  that  which  I  give  to  that  idea 
which  I  call  my  mind.  But  all  this  takes  place  in  the  field  of 
my  experience  which,  by  hypothesis,  I  cannot  transcend  either 
literally  or  cognitively.  If,  then,  knowledge  involves  the 
actual  presence  of  that  which  is  known,  it  is  impossible  to  have 
knowledge  of  other  minds.  We  may  feel  sure  that  there  are 
other  minds,  but  we  cannot  come  into  a  literal  contact  with 
them.  It  is  sometimes  said  that  we  infer  the  existence  of  other 
minds  by  analogy.  If  by  "  inference ' '  is  meant  the  mental  proc- 
ess by  means  of  which  the  individual  comes  to  the  conclusion 


igo  CRITICAL  REALISM 

that  he  believes  there  are  other  minds,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  inference  is  at  work  in  this  case,  although  genetic  analy- 
sis leads  us  to  believe  that  the  thought  of  other  selves  is  as 
early  as  the  thought  of  oneself.  If  by  "inference"  is  meant 
a  mysterious  function  which  enables  the  individual  to  reach 
out  beyond  his  field  of  experience  and  apprehend  another  mind, 
then  we  assuredly  cannot  infer  the  existence  of  other  minds 
by  analogy.  The  argument  from  analogy  gives  the  basis  for  a 
hypothesis  which  everything  hastens  to  confirm,  but  it  does 
not  furnish  the  ground  for  a  deduction.  But  I  am  not  at 
present  concerned  so  much  with  the  grounds  for  our  admitted 
belief  in  other  minds  as  with  the  implications  of  the  belief.  I 
believe  not  only  that  there  are  other  minds,  but  also  that  I  can 
know  them.  In  this  way  the  "that"  goes  hand  in  hand  with  a 
"what."  Indeed,  I  do  not  see  how  they  can  be  separated.  But 
if  they  are,  subjective  idealism  is  flouted.  The  very  attempt 
to  prove  the  existence  of  other  minds  is  a  surrender  of  the 
limitation  of  knowledge  to  the  field  of  the  individual's  expe- 
rience. Here  again,  however,  idealism  retains  its  element  of 
validity  in  so  far  as  its  adoption  of  the  argument  from  analogy 
bears  witness  to  the  mediateness  of  one's  knowledge  of  other 
selves.  We  must  never  confuse  certainty  of  knowledge  with 
immediacy,  i.e.,  with  intuition.^ 

This  refusal  of  idealism  to  draw  its  logical  consequences 
when  it  comes  to  the  problem  of  a  knowledge  of  other  selves  is 
significant.  I  am  forced  to  conclude  that  solipsism  is  so 
contrary  to  our  beliefs,  habits,  and  mental  organization,  which 
are  thoroughly  social,  that  it  cannot  gain  a  foothold.  On  the 
other  hand,  many  individuals  seem  to  consent  readily  to  the 
identification  of  things  with  mental  constructs  which  have  no 
cognitive  import.  It  is  true  that  idealisms  are  usually  vague 
when  it  comes  to  the  question  of  the  existence  of  the  physical 
world  (note  the  discussion  of  Berkeley  in  the  preceding 
chapter),  and  can  generally  be  so  interpreted  as  to  leave  a 
relative  independence  to  things.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a 
difference  in  attitude  toward  the  reality  of  other  selves,  as 
compared  with  things,  marked  enough  to  demand  explanation. 

1  Obviously,  my  poini  is  that  Rerkeiey  never  realized  the  implication  for  knowledge  of  our 
admitted  knowledge  about  other  selves.     It  is  this  implication  which  v:e  are  trying  to  work  out. 


MEDIATE  REALISMS  19 1 

If  idealism  involves  solipsism,  mental  pluralism  of  the 
empirical  sort  which  admits  communication  and  mutual 
knowledge  must  involve  realism.  Let  us  see  whether  it  will 
give  us  a  clue  to  the  nature  of  cognition.  Minds,  we  have 
seen,  do  not  intersect;  active  interpretation,  subject  to  error, 
of  the  activities  of  other  minds,  so  far  as  these  affect  us,  is  the 
sole  source  of  knowledge.  We  have  no  right  to  call  this 
knowledge  inadequate  or  to  deny  it  the  name  of  knowledge 
simply  because  it  is  a  construction  on  our  part.  That,  as  we 
have  surely  realized  by  now,  results  from  the  prejudices  which 
Natural  Realism  has  made  almost  second  nature  to  man. 
The  parallelism  with  the  problem  of  our  knowledge  of  the 
physical  world  is  not  far  to  seek.  In  both  cases,  examination 
of  the  real  extent  of  the  indi^'idual  mind  leads  to  a  readjust- 
ment of  the  idea  of  knowledge.  If  knowledge  does  not  involve 
the  actual  presence  of  the  object  known,  may  we  not  have 
knowledge  of  the  physical?  The  only  principle  which  might 
interpose  itself — that  knowledge  of  the  physical  cannot  be 
mediated  by  the  mental — we  have  already  discussed. 

An  existence  which  I  know,  in  this  case  another  mind,  is 
numerically  distinct  from  the  mind  knowing.  My  knowledge 
qua  knowledge  has  no  relation  to  the  mind  of  which  it  holds 
good.  My  knowledge  is  contained  in  my  ideas,  and  these 
are  personal  and  cannot  be  shared.  There  is,  moreover, 
nothing  to  warrant  the  assumption  that  my  ideas,  when 
they  are  adjudged  by  me  to  contain  knowledge,  must  be 
connected  directly  and  in  a  unique  way  with  that  which 
they  know.  What  good,  indeed,  could  such  a  connection 
do?  Granted  our  analysis  of  the  field  of  the  individual's 
experience,  such  a  relation  must  needs  be  external  and 
irrelevant.  Hence,  it  could  not  make  my  idea  true.  There 
must  be  in  the  mind  of  him  who  holds  this  view  some 
vague  spatial  reminiscence,  some  transmuted  remnant  of 
Natural  Realism,  a  prejudice  that  the  idea  which  contains 
knowledge  must  be  guided  to  that  which  it  knows.  But 
I  do  not  think  much  of  an  idea  which  does  not  contain 
in  itself  the  indication  of  the  object  known  as  part  of  its 
meaning.  Localization  and  identification  of  an  object  is 
the  core  aroimd  which  the  rest  of  my  information  is  built. 


192  CRITICAL  REALISM 

What  thing  I  mean  can  surely  not  be  separated  from  what 
I  mean  oj  it.  Yet  there  are  levels  in  knowledge  which  make 
us  tend  to  separate  these  factors.  Knowledge  ordinarily 
works  within  a  classification  which  it  takes  for  granted.  As 
we  shall  see  later,  immediate  realism  seems  to  find  a  foothold 
in  this  functional  distinction.  Once  warned  that  the  distinc- 
tion between  a  thing  meant  and  the  idea  of  the  thing  is  a 
functional  distinction  within  the  field  of  experience,  we  realize 
that  the  total  idea  of  the  existent  contains  both.  Therefore, 
to  tie  one  end  of  a  string  to  the  idea  and  attach  the  other 
end  to  the  existent  would  do  no  good ;  it  would  be  like  leading 
a  man  who  is  not  blind.  Besides,  who  could  have  the  "inside 
information"  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  hitch  together  the 
right  idea  with  the  right  existent  ?  A  little  reflection  is  surely 
enough  to  convince  one  that  a  unique,  external,  cognitive 
relation  between  an  idea  in  an  individual's  mind  and  an 
existent  is  both  unnecessary  and  absurd. 

Let  us  return  to  the  explanation  of  the  fact  that  a  cognitive 
relation  between  our  idea  and  the  existent  known  is  not 
needed.  The  localization  or  identification  of  the  object  is,  we 
have  said,  a  fundamental  part  of  the  construct  which  contains 
our  knowledge  and  which  we  ordinarily  treat  as  the  existent. 
If  I  told  you  that  I  knew  an  object  but  did  not  know  where  it 
was  or  what  some  of  its  relations  were  or  how  it  could  be 
classed,  you  would  certainly  have  the  right  to  feel  skeptical 
about  my  knowledge.  Even  to  state  that  an  object  is  physical 
is  to  assert  some  knowledge  of  its  relations.  An  object  which 
is  physical  is  so  far  classified  and  localized.  And  I  do  not  know 
of  any  object  a  knowledge  of  which  does  not  involve,  implicitly 
or  explicitly,  this  elementary  core  of  knowledge.  Without  it, 
we  could  not  mean  an  object.  From  such  general  identifica- 
tion as  a  limit,  we  pass  insensibly  to  more  specific  localization 
wherein  the  position  and  relations  of  an  existent  are  given  to  the 
degree  required  or  to  the  degree  possible.  The  layman  can 
tell  you  where  a  star  like  Sirius  is  to  be  found,  but  his  location 
of  it  is  naturally  vague  compared  with  an  astronomer's.  It 
is  this  identification  of  an  object  by  means  of  its  relations, 
spatial  and  temporal,  and  its  classification  as  in  a  certain 
domain  that  constitutes  what  is  usually  called  the  reference 


MEDIATE  REALISMS  193 

of  the  idea  or  the  intent  of  our  knowledge.  So  far  as  the 
purpose  is  identification,  these  relations  are  thought  of  as 
external;  they  give  the  context  of  the  object  in  such  a  way 
that  we  can  handle  it  cognitively.  We  have  already  noted 
(Chap,  III)  how  this  common  reference  begins  with  actual 
pointing  and  develops  to  standardized  positions  in  a  con- 
ceptual space  and  time.  It  is  so  related  to  the  object  of 
which  it  is  the  context,  or  means  of  identification,  that 
it  can  be  used  to  tie  down  any  additional  idea  to  the 
object  intended.  Thus  intention,  or  reference,  has  a  socially 
developed  instrument;  it  involves  the  correspondence  of  my 
means  of  organizing  objects  with  yours.  In  this  way  we 
make  corresponding  and  controlled  selections  of  objects  about 
which  we  are  thinking.  When  asked  what  house  I  mean  when 
I  am  describing  the  interior  of  a  dwelling,  I  reply,  "The 
house  on  the  corner  of  Division  Street  so  many  blocks  west  of 
the  Campus,"  a  means  of  identification  supposedly  known  to 
the  inquirer.  If  asked  what  person  I  am  referring  to,  I  reply 
by  giving  his  name,  the  place  where  he  lives,  and  his  profes- 
sion. Some  such  context  must  exist  before  the  idea  possesses 
a  reference  and  deserves  the  name  of  knowledge. 

There  is,  then,  no  need  for  a, guide  quite  external  to  the 
individual's  experience  in  order  that  an  idea  may  be  referred 
to  the  proper  existent.  Such  reference  as  knowledge  demands 
is  worked  out  within  experience  by  means  of  the  structure  I 
have  just  described.  In  order  that  another  individual  may 
understand  the  reference  which  I  give  to  an  idea,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  he  share  my  space-experience,  perceptual  or 
conceptual.  That  we  have  already  seen  is  impossible.  All 
that  is  needed  is  that  there  be  a  tested  correspondence  between 
the  contexts  which  we  assign  to  the  idea.  Now  the  context 
is,  from  its  very  nature,  more  general  and  abstract  than  the 
construct  which  it  surrounds  and  enmeshes  or  the  idea  which 
is  assigned  to  it.  Hence,  relatively  to  them,  it  takes  on  the 
character  of  an  a  priori  background  more  primitive  and  general 
than  they.  To  illustrate,  spatial  relations  are  so  recurrent 
and  so  similar  that  they  are  early  abstracted  and  generalized. 
The  consequence  is  the  creation  of  mathematical  space  as  a 
menstruum  in  which  the  concrete  and  varied  things  of  this 


194  CRITICAL  REALISM 

complex  world  of  ours  rest.  The  use  made  of  this  contrast 
by  the  scientist  in  his  description  and  analysis  of  space-and- 
time-filling  bodies  is  too  familiar  to  require  explanation.  It 
is  for  this  reason  that  a  spatial  context  functions  best  as  a 
means  of  reference  between  individuals.  It  acts  like  an 
accepted  background  or  like  a  recognized  and  recurrent  theme 
in  music.  But  the  same  motives  hold  good  for  the  individual 
and  his  thought.  Spatial  relations  increasingly  furnish  the 
background  in  front  of  which  objects  move  and  change  in 
various  ways.  It  is  to  the  credit  of  Kant  that  he  saw  the 
importance  of  this  distinction;  it  is  really  the  foundation 
of  his  contrast  between  the  a  priori  and  the  a  posteriori.  It  is 
in  time  and  space  that  the  objective  world  of  phenomena  is 
organized.  Unfortunately,  he  did  not  approach  the  question 
from  the  genetic  side,  did  not  clearly  enough  distinguish 
between  perceptual  and  conceptual  space  and  time,  and  did 
not  connect  it,  as  we  have  attempted  to  connect  it,  with  the 
problem  of  reference. 

When  we  come  back  from  this  apparent  excursus  to  the 
question  of  other  minds,  we  find  that  our  knowledge  of  other 
minds  involves  the  problem  of  reference.  In  history,  for 
instance,  we  are  forced  to  use  space  and  time  as  means  to  the 
selection  of  one  individual  from  others.  The  same  is  true 
for  our  references  to  contemporaries,  although  here  again 
the  additional  aid  of  proper  names  comes  to  our  assistance. 
But  an  examination  of  the  knowledge  possessed  by  one  mind  of 
another  bears  out  the  conclusion  that  no  cognitive  relation  be- 
tween them  is  required.  So  far  as  such  knowledge  is  concerned 
a  pluralism  is  quite  thinkable.  But  epistemological  idealism 
can  never  admit  a  pluralism;  it  seems  condemned  to  move 
between  a  monism  based  on  the  impossibility  of  separating  the 
known  from  the  knower,  and  a  solipsism  which  asserts  that 
knowledge  is  confined  to  the  contents  of  the  individual's  mind. 
It  follows,  then,  that  mental  pluralism  involves  an  episte- 
mological realism.  We  do  know  other  minds,  although  we 
are  not  able  to  possess  their  contents.  This  fact  has  been 
frequently  recognized  in  a  vague  way  of  late,  although  its 
exact  significance  has  not  been  appreciated.  Other  minds,  it  is 
said,  are  ejects.     And  a  discussion  of  ejects  and  of  introjection 


MEDIATE  REALISMS  195 

may  make  the  cognitive  side  of  mental  pluralism  clearer. 
Probably  two  thinkers,  Clifford  and  Avenarius,  have  done 
more  to  bring  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  knowledge  of 
other  minds  to  the  front  than  has  the  traditional  philosophy  of 
either  Great  Britain  or  Germany.  Philosophy  was  too  easily 
satisfied  with  impersonal  logical  motives  or  with  the  argument 
from  analogy.  Clifford's  statement  of  what  he  means  by 
the  term  "eject"  is  interesting.  "When  I  come  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  you  are  conscious  and  that  there  are  objects  in  your 
consciousness  similar  to  those  in  mine,  I  am  not  inferring  any 
actual  or  possible  feelings  of  my  own,  but  your  feelings,  which 
cannot  by  any  possibility  become  objects  in  my  consciousness . 
.  .  .  I  .  ,  .  call  these  inferred  existences  ejects  to  distinguish 
them  from  objects."  We  have  already  noted  the  logical 
difficulties  which  confront  any  such  inference  if  based  on 
analogy.  Inference  works  within  the  distinctions  of  knowledge 
and  is  not  a  function  which  lifts  the  mind  beyond  its  natural 
limitations.  That  I  do  contrast  my  mind  with  your  mind 
and  connect  these  minds  with  numerically  distinct  organisms 
within  the  field  of  my  experience  is  undoubted.  The  "you" 
whom  I  conclude  to  be  conscious  is  evidently  the  individual 
composed  of  mind  and  body  towards  which  I  react  and  with 
whom  I  communicate.  But  this  body  is  my  experience;  to 
assign  it  a  consciousness  like  my  own  while  it  is  so  considered 
is  absurd.  Hence,  to  make  such  an  assignment,  I  must  take  a 
realistic  attitude  toward  this  body  which  I  call  yours.  Now 
this  is  what  is  done  from  the  start.  Ejection  goes  hand  in 
hand  with  Natural  Realism  and  can  be  understood  only  when 
considered  from  the  genetic  standpoint.  Thus  it  is  within 
the  world  as  common  sense  sees  it  that  all  these  realistic 
meanings  develop.  Ejection  is  no  more  mysterious  than 
Natural  Realism.  Why  is  it,  then,  that  ejects  appear  to 
challenge  our  ordinary  outlook  more  than  physical  things  do? 
The  reason  is  that  the  unsatisfactoriness  of  Natural  Realism 
reveals  itself  sooner  and  clearer  in  the  case  of  other  minds 
than  in  the  case  of  physical  things;  yet  idealism  does  not 
offer  itself  as  a  palliative.  To  reduce  things  to  our  ideas 
seems  within  the  limits  of  possibility,  but  to  reduce  other  selves 
to  my  ideas  is  frowned  upon  as  inadmissible.     Other  minds  are 


196  CRITICAL  REALISM 

so  bound  up  with  our  knowledge  of  our  own  that  the  denial 
of  them  is  felt  to  be  a  flight  from  the  problem  rather  than  its 
solution.  Yet  the  fact  that  I  cannot  have  another's  experiences 
in  a  literal  sense  is  also  forced  upon  me  as  the  only  possible 
interpretation  of  undeniable  facts.  Other  minds  are  not 
perceived  and,  therefore,  their  existence  and  entire  separate- 
ness  is  not  blurred  by  a  misunderstanding  of  perception  as  is 
the  case  with  physical  existents.  Natural  Realism  takes  it 
for  granted  that  things  are  present  in  perception.  It  is  almost 
impossible  to  take  this  naive  position  in  reference  to  other 
minds.  Clifford  arrived  at  the  stage  where  he  realized  this, 
but  he  still  assumed  that  physical  things  are  actually  "objects 
in  consciousness." 

We  have  hinted  again  and  again  that  perception  is  not 
knowledge,  although  it  gives  the  basis  of  knowledge.  I  mean 
that  objects  are  not  literally  present  to  the  knower  as  they 
appear  to  be  in  perception.  Better  yet,  objects  are  present, 
but  they  are  not  the  objects  we  take  them  to  be.  They  are 
thing-experiences  and  not  physical  existents.  When  this 
blurring  is  overcome  and  perception  is  properly  adjusted  to 
knowledge,  there  still  remain  differences  in  our  way  of  regard- 
ing physical  things  and  other  minds.  The  content  and 
qualifications  of  other  minds  are  constructed  in  terms  of  our 
contents  as  such.  When  I  assert  that  another  has  experiences 
like  those  which  I  have,  I  transfer  to  him  a  tang  of  imme- 
diacy and  sense  of  control  as  well  as  meanings  and  percepts. 
In  this  way,  knowledge  approaches  nearest  to  that  original 
ideal,  an  intuition.  I  read  other  minds  in  terms  of  my  own 
mind,  but  I  refuse  more  and  more  to  read  physical  things  in 
terms  of  my  mind.  Sympathy  and  Einjuhlung  are  strength- 
ened as  social  ideals,  while  animism  is  rejected  by  science. 
We  may  call  this  sympathy  which  depends  upon  penetrative 
and  subtle  interpretation  and  broad  interests  a  "mediate" 
intuition.  I  call  it  a  mediate  intuition  to  distinguish  it  from 
the  mystical  views  of  intuition  again  coming  into  vogue  owing 
to  a  misunderstanding  of  Natural  Realism. 

But  it  is  a  mistake,  encouraged  by  psychology  of  the 
introspective  type,  to  suppose  that  knowledge  of  other  selves  is 
characteristically  the  construction  of  their  mental  contents 


MEDIATE  REALISM  197 

in  terms  of  our  own.  Ordinarily,  we  treat  people  as  complex 
objects  which  are  able  to  perform  certain  acts  of  which  animals 
and  inorganic  things  are  incapable.  When  I  think  of  Plato, 
for  instance,  I  think  of  him  as  a  genius  in  the  field  of  philosophy, 
as  the  author  of  the  Republic,  as  a  sympathizer  with  the 
Spartan  ideals,  and  so  on.  I  have  his  work  and  type  of  mind 
before  me  as  objects.  These  give  me  knowledge  about  Plato. 
Now  the  interesting  thing  is  that  I  can  add  to  this  objective 
construct,  which  is  my  knowledge  of  Plato,  an  attempt  to 
envisage  the  inner  control  of  ideas,  the  surge  of  feelings  and 
passions  which  I  believe  accompanied  and  found  expression 
in  the  behavior  which  history  describes.  The  result  passes 
insensibly  beyond  knowledge  as  such  and  seeks  to  achieve  a 
veritable  intuition  of  another's  field  of  experience.  I  strive 
to  penetrate  into  the  ideals  and  prejudices  and  values  of  the 
Athenian  of  long  ago  and  at  times  hope  to  realize  the  attach- 
ment of  these  stable  elements  to  the  swirling  current  of  the 
man's  inner  life.  But  I  fall  back  disillusioned  from  such  moods 
of  constructive  Einfuhlung;  the  chasm  to  bridge  is  too  great.  It 
makes  me  realize,  however,  that  all  insight  is  based  on  the 
experience  of  the  individual  knowing,  which  flows  into  the  mold 
set  by  the  behavior  of  the  person  known.  Thus  Natural  Real- 
ism, once  scotched  for  the  perceptual  realm,  is  soon  killed  for  the 
ejective  realm.  Eject  and  object  form  an  indissoluble  unity 
when  our  construction  of  another  person  reaches  its  highest 
level  and  both  are  seen  to  be  knowledge-of ,  and  not  intuition. 

It  is  the  inability  to  keep  these  two  sides  together  that 
leads  to  panpsychism  and  to  materialism,  respectively.  The 
panpsychist  makes  a  thing-in-itself  out  of  the  ejective  feature 
and  rejects  the  objective  side  as  not  being  knowledge.  The 
materialist  accepts  the  objective  side  and  rejects  the  control 
side,  linked  as  it  is  with  a  mental  field  not  shareable  by  others. 
A  sane,  realistic  outlook  admits  both  and  sees  how  they  go 
together  in  our  knowledge  of  reality. 

In  order  to  clear  up  the  nature  of  ejection,  we  must  briefly 
consider  introjection,  a  term  we  owe  to  Avenarius.  Such  an 
examination  is  peculiarly  necessary,  because  a  refutation  of 
dualism  has  been  based  upon  it.  I  may  remark  that  certain 
thinkers  confuse  any  mediate,  epistemological  realism  with 

14 


igS  CRITICAL  REALISM 

dualism  in  the  derogatory  metaphysical  sense  of  that  term, 
although  they  have  not  shown  that  the  connection  is  inevitable. 
"The  essence  of  introjection,"  writes  Ward,  "consists  in 
applying  to  the  immediate  experience  of  my  fellow  creatures 
conceptions  which  have  no  counterpart  in  my  own."  (I  see 
the  Sim,  but  I  assume  that  another  has  in  him  a  percept  of  the 
sun.)  "Thus  while  my  environment  is  an  external  world  for 
me,  his  experience  is  for  me  an  internal  world  in  him.  This  is 
introjection.  And  since  I  am  led  to  apply  this  conception 
to  all  my  fellow-men  and  it  is  applied  by  all  my  fellow-men 
to  me,  I  naturally  apply  it  also  to  myself."  (Ward,  Natural- 
ism and  Agnosticism,  Vol.  II,  p.  172.)  This  interpretation  of 
introjection  seems  to  me  founded  on  a  misunderstanding  of  our 
natural  outlook  on  the  world  and  the  motives  which  gradually 
modify  that  outlook.  At  first,  I  assume  that  another  person 
perceives  the  external  world  much  as  I  do.  For  him,  also, 
perception  is  an  event  in  which  the  common,  independent 
physical  world  reveals  itself.  It  is  not  until  certain  motives 
in  my  own  experience  suggest  to  me  that  I  perceive  the  appear- 
ances of  things  and  not  the  things  themselves  that  I  carry  the 
same  distinction  over  to  another's  experience.  In  our  criticism 
of  Natural  Realism,  we  had  no  need  to  appeal  to  introjection; 
the  contrast  between  percepts  and  physical  things  was  forced 
upon  us  by  the  facts.  If  this  be  the  case,  introjection  is  only  a 
social  motive  which  strengthens  and  clarifies  tendencies  which 
are  already  existent  in  the  experience  of  the  individual  as  such. 
The  Advance  of  the  Personal  leads  to  the  realization  that  the 
field  of  the  individual's  experience  is  mental  and  that  the  terms 
"private"  and  "common"  are  meanings  which  have  developed 
within  it  to  qualify  functionally  separable  spheres.  The 
result  is  the  empirical  mental  pluralism  upon  which  we  have 
laid  so  much  stress.  In  order  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  this 
standpoint  is  not  that  of  psychology,  we  called  the  objective 
elements  of  the  field  thing-experiences  instead  of  percepts. 

I  am  fully  persuaded  that  Avenarius  has  led  thinkers 
astray.  It  is  impossible  to  remain  at  the  naively  realistic 
outlook,  and  it  is  possible  to  go  beyond  it  without  falling  into 
errors  and  contradictions.  I  am  confident  that  the  method 
I  have  adopted  accomplishes  this  result.     But  the  point  is 


MEDIATE  REALISMS  199 

so  important  for  a  mediate,  epistemological  realism  that  I  wish 
to  consider  it  at  more  length. 

In  his  admirable  study  of  the  logical  character  of  psychol- 
ogy, Mr.  Taylor  falls  back  on  the  world  as  common  sense 
experiences  it.  Unfortunately,  he  over-simplifies  the  direct 
experience  of  actual  life.  It  is  true  that  we,  as  sentient  and 
purposive  beings,  react  directly  to  our  environment;  but  we 
also  nourish  a  private,  inner  world  which  fronts  this  external, 
common  world.  Thus  it  is  not  true  that  "So  long  as  I  am 
concerned  only  with  the  analysis  of  my  own  experience, 
there  is  nothing  to  suggest  the  distinction  between  a  physical 
and  a  psychical  aspect  of  existence."  {Elements  of  Meta- 
physics, p.  298.)  To  support  this  denial  I  must  again 
call  attention  to  the  analysis  in  the  first  few  chapters.  But 
this  assumption  made  by  Avenarius,  Ward,  and  Taylor  is  the 
primary  fallacy  of  their  whole  argument.  They  hold  that  all 
tendencies  to  dualism  come  through  a  misinterpretation  of 
the  social  element;  I  hold  that  the  social  element  merely 
emphasizes  distinctions  already  present.  The  interesting 
thing  is  that  Taylor  so  lucidly  states  the  motives  which  lead  us 
to  mental  pluralism  and  does  not  enter  a  caveat  except  where 
psychology  substitutes  images  and  ideas  for  thing-experiences 
qualified  as  common.  With  his  criticism  of  the  standpoint  of 
psychology  I  would  in  large  measure  agree.  It  is  a  special 
science  and  as  such  has  its  point  of  view  which  cannot  be 
regarded  as  valid  for  epistemology.  When  we  come  to  treat 
the  mind-body  problem,  this  fact  will  be  seen  to  be  of  tremen- 
dous significance.  But  introjection,  when  properly  carried 
on  under  the  control  of  philosophy,  results  in  the  empirical 
mental  pluralism  which  we  have  stressed.  The  field  of  the 
individual's  experience,  with  its  distinctions  and  meanings,  is 
the  foundation  of  epistemology. 

If  the  foregoing  interpretation  of  ejection  and  of  introjection 
be  valid,  the  nature  of  knowledge  of  other  minds  is  clear. 
At  no  point  did  we  feel  the  necessity  to  assume  either  an 
actual  penetration  of  other  minds  or  a  unique  cognitive  relation 
which  would  guarantee  the  reference.  It  follows  that  mental 
pluralism  involves  a  mediate,  epistemological  realism  and 
thus  contains  a  clue  to  the  nature  of  knowledge  of  that 


200  CRITICAL  REALISM 

which  is  not  in  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience.  To  be, 
in  the  case  of  other  minds,  is  not  to  be  known  Knowledge 
does  not  require  the  actual  presence  of  the  object  known. 
Thus  there  seems  to  be  no  good  reason  to  suppose  that  being 
can  be  defined  by  its  relation  to  knowing.  Being,  it  would 
seem,  is  independent  of  knowing,  which  is  a  transient  event 
earnestly  disclaiming  any  grip  on  being.  In  truth,  I  have  no 
patience  with  the  dogmatic  purblindness  of  idealism  on  its 
epistemological  side.  Its  only  excuse  is  the  recalcitrant  naivete 
of  immediate  realisms. 

When  we  once  admit  the  distinction  between  being  and 
knowledge,  we  recognize  that  these  are  meanings  which  have 
developed  within  experience.  Up  to  the  present  we  have 
concerned  ourselves  mainly  with  knowledge.  We  shall  now 
investigate  the  significance  of  being.  We  shall  see  that,  in  a 
very  true  sense,  everything  can  be  said  to  exist.  But  not 
everything  exists  in  the  realm  in  which  it  first  lays  claim  to 
existence;  if  it  did,  there  could  be  no  negative  judgments. 
The  best  way  to  approach  the  question  of  being  is  to  study  it 
at  the  different  levels  which  we  have  already  examined.  At 
the  level  of  Natural  Realism,  that  thing  exists  or  has  being 
with  which  we  must  reckon.  The  physical  world  has  being 
because  we  must  react  towards  it.  Thus  being  involved 
primarily  qualification  by  our  responses  as  active  creatures 
seeking  self-preservation.  It  is  evident  that  we,  as  individuals, 
are  involved  in  this  semi-biological  derivation  of  the  resonant 
reality-feeling  which  surrounds  that  which  we  admit  to  be 
existent.  Existences  are  as  real  as  ourselves.  It  is  we  who 
respond;  it  is  they  to  which  we  respond.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered that,  at  this  level,  man  assumes  that  he  can  perceive 
these  objects  to  which  he  assigns  existence  and  that  such 
assignment  is  essentially  immediate  and  not  reflective.  The 
individual  is  felt  to  be  one  among  many  which  are  as  real  as 
he  feels  himself  to  be.  It  is  upon  this  as  a  background  that 
philosophy  must  build  in  its  study  of  being.  Philosophy  does 
not  so  much  create  meanings  as  determine  how  they  should 
be  applied  in  order  to  escape  contradictions. 

With  this  analysis  of  being  in  mind,  let  us  study  other 
attempts  to  define  being.     Passing  over  Berkeley's  view  as 


MEDIATE  REALISMS  201 

now  discredited,  we  find  another  idealistic  phrase  which  is 
becoming  popular.  If  being  cannot  be  limited  to  being 
perceived,  then,  it  is  suggested,  it  must  be  identified  with 
perceiving.  To  use  the  scholastic  Latin,  esse  est  percipere. 
Such  a  definition  was  already  implicit  in  Berkeley's  conception 
of  the  self.  The  self  is  that  which  perceives,  thinks,  wills, 
and  performs  divers  operations.  In  the  first  place,  we  saw  good 
reason  to  doubt  the  existence  of  such  a  substantive  self  as 
that  which  Berkeley  had  in  mind.  His  psychology  had  in 
it  too  strong  an  infusion  of  Rational  Psychology  with  its 
substantive  entities  and  acts.  And,  in  the  next  place,  to  per- 
ceive involves  something  which  is  perceived.  If  the  ''esse''  of 
the  latter  is  separable  from  the  act  of  which  it  is  an  object, 
there  are  two  kinds  of  being,  and  realism  remains  possible. 
But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this  attempt  to  define  being  by 
reference  to  an  operation  of  the  self  does  not  have  its  roots  in 
the  structure  of  experience.  The  individual  recognizes  that 
he  is  only  one  thing  among  others;  to  these,  as  to  himself,  he 
can  take  either  a  theoretical  or  a  practical  attitude. 

What,  then,  can  the  phrase  "to  be  is  to  perceive"  mean? 
It  is  evidently  worded  as  an  antithesis  to  the  principle  enun- 
ciated by  Berkeley.  Its  contrast-significance  consists  in  the 
relinquishment  of  the  belief  that  existence  can  be  stated 
adequately  in  terms  of  perception;  it  implies  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  attempt  to  define  being  on  the  basis  of  episte- 
mological  dependence.  It  is  a  withdrawal  into  the  supposed 
citadel  of  the  self  as  something  assured.  It  is  a  metaphysical 
definition  of  being,  and  not  an  epistemological  one.  But 
what  right  have  we  to  say  that  only  that  which  perceives  is? 
How  does  the  idealist  come  to  know  that  being  is  inseparably 
bound  up  with  perceiving?  As  soon  as  we  give  up  episte- 
mological idealism,  w^e  must  admit  that  we  know  many  things. 
What  principle  enables  us  to  assert  that  these  things  must  be 
experiencers  ?  or,  to  put  it  as  fairly  as  possible  for  idealism, 
How  do  we  know  that  reality  must  be  "psychical  matter  of 
fact"? 

I  have  already  paid  my  respects  to  this  view  (Chap.  V). 
It  is  founded  on  the  argument  from  content,  advanced  by 
Mr.  Bradley  and  seconded  by  Mr.  Taylor.     (C/.  Elements  oj 


202  CRITICAL  REALISM 

Metaphysics,  p.  23.)  These  thinkers  challenge  an  opponent 
to  perform  the  experiment  of  thinking  of  anything  whatever 
as  real  and  then  explaining  what  he  means  by  its  reality.  Let 
us  glance  at  Mr.  Taylor's  argument.  What  is  the  difference 
between  the  real  and  the  imagined  hundred  dollars  in  Kant's 
famous  case?  They  have  the  same  qualities  as  contents. 
The  difference  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  real  dollars  may  be 
the  objects  of  direct  perception,  while  the  imaginary  dollars 
cannot  be.  "It  is  in  this  connection  with  immediate  psychical 
fact  that  the  reality  of  the  real  coins  lies."  Really  I  do  not 
understand  this.  Are  not  the  imaginary  dollars  objects  as 
directly  connected  with  immediate  psychical  fact  as  are  the 
real  dollars.  Are  they  not  more  indissolubly  connected  than 
the  real  dollars?  Perception  is  here  thought  of  as  merely  a 
test  of  the  real  dollars.  If  they  are  real  and  not  merely 
imaginary,  they  can  be  perceived.  Berkeley  pointed  out 
that  the  distinction  between  images  and  things,  or  — to  use 
James's  contrast — thoughts  and  things,  is  one  within  expe- 
rience. This  signifies  that  existence  is  a  meaning  which  has 
grown  up  in  our  minds.  But  the  realist  would  admit  this 
conclusion.  He  claims,  however,  that  existence  does  not 
mean  connection  with  immediate  psychical  fact.  Imaginary 
dollars  do  not  exist  except  as  ideas,  i.e.,  objects  of  thought 
qualified  as  merely  mental;  real  dollars  are  thought  of  as 
existing  outside  of  the  mind.  We  have  pointed  out  the  fact 
that  this  meaning  is  not  contradicted  by  the  argument  from 
content,  because  both  percept  and  knowledge  are  within  the 
field  of  the  individual's  experience. 

In  conclusion,  let  us  gather  together  the  more  important 
principles  of  which  our  investigations  in  this  chapter  have 
assured  us.  These  may  be  enumerated  as  follows :  Subjective 
idealism  plays  fast  and  loose  with  its  principles  and  avoids 
solipsism  only  by  its  one-sided  application  of  its  theory  of 
knowledge.  The  idealist  is  more  concerned  to  prove  that 
the  non-mental  cannot  be  known  by  the  mental  than  that 
other  minds  cannot  be  known,  whereas  he  really  proves  that 
objects  outside  of  the  mind  of  the  individual  cannot  be  literally 
apprehended.  The  truth  to  which  subjective  idealism  has 
blindly  borne  witness  against  immediate  realism  is  that  the 


MEDIATE  REALISMS  203 

world  must  somehow  control  the  development  of  a  substitute 
in  the  individual's  mind.  To  panpsychism  we  must  say  that 
consciousness  is  real  and  not  phenomenal  but  that  it  is  not  the 
whole  of  reality.  In  other  words,  the  mind-body  problem 
still  remains  to  be  solved.  So  far  as  panpsychism  is  built  up 
on  the  principles  of  idealism,  we  must  refuse  to  accept  its 
epistemological  foundation.  Both  Ward  and  Strong  obviously 
erect  their  metaphysical  construction  upon  this  false  founda- 
tion. Remove  it,  and  the  whole  edifice  comes  tumbling  to 
the  ground.  Furthermore,  consciousness  does  not  seem  to  be 
a  stuff  from  which  a  persistent  world  can  be  made. 

But  our  work  has  been  destructive  only  in  appearance. 
The  criticism  we  have  been  engaged  in  has  welcomed  the 
essential  element  of  truth  in  each  of  these  positions  which  we 
have  been  compelled  to  reject.  The  possibility  of  explaining 
these  truths  by  means  of  a  mediate  or  non-presentative 
epistemological  realism  has  stood  out  ever  more  clearly.  It 
is  to  the  completion  of  this  task  that  the  remainder  of  the 
book  will  be  devoted. 


CHAPTER  IX 
IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL? 

IT  IS  beyond  question  the  common  belief  to-day  that  the 
physical  world  is  alien  to  consciousness.  Scientists  take 
this  alienness  for  granted  as  a  position  essentially  self-evident 
and  not  likely  to  be  disputed  by  anyone  who  has  clear  ideas 
on  the  subject;  philosophers  in  the  main  agree  with  the  scien- 
tists, although  they  are  apt  to  qualify  their  agreement  with  the 
assertion  that  the  physical  world  is  merely  phenomenal.  By 
this  qualification,  they  leave  open  a  way  of  escape  from  the 
dualism  which  the  admission  of  the  alienness  of  consciousness 
to  the  physical  implies.  Thus  it  is  assumed  that  nature,  so  long 
as  it  is  regarded  as  physical,  is  void  of  sentiency  and  can,  under 
no  conditions,  develop  it.  In  this  belief  is  founded  the  mind- 
body  dualism  which  has  been  such  a  thorn  in  the  side  of 
naturalism  and  which  has  caused  so  much  discomfort  to 
psychology  and  to  physiology.  Mind  and  matter  are  looked 
upon  as  incompatibles,  severely  distinct  from  each  other  and 
unable  to  flow  together  and  form  one  plastic  reality.  Con- 
sciousness is,  as  it  were,  homeless  in  a  universe  from  which 
it  is  inseparable.  Such  is  the  view  that  has  slowly  formulated 
itself  under  the  pressure  of  various  motives,  chief  among  which 
is  the  conception  of  nature  urged  by  mechanical  rationalism. 
But  this  dualism,  which  seems  so  natural  to  the  thinker 
of  the  present,  did  not  always  exist.  Nature  did  not  seem 
from  the  first  so  thin,  transparent,  and  alien.  It  took 
the  Greeks  some  time  and  effort  to  realize  the  difference 
between  causal  activity  and  sense-perception.  This  fact 
means  that  for  them  sense-perception  was  immersed  in  the 
general  activities  of  nature.  Empedocles,  in  his  doctrine  of 
like  perceived  by  like,  made  perception  a  property  of  the 
elements  dependent  on  a  relation  between  them.  A  similar 
hylo-psychism  is  characteristic  of  the  outlook  of  Heracleitus. 
"  Heracleitus,  also,  says  the  soul  is  the  first  principle,  since 
it  is   fiery  vapor   from  which  everything  else  is  derived." 

204 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   205 

(Aristotle,  De  Anima,  405a.)  Even  the  view  of  Democritus, 
the  first  systematic  materialist  of  whom  we  have  detailed 
information,  is  qualified  by  the  acceptance  of  conscious- 
ness as  a  natural  feature  of  the  cosmos.  We  must  bear  in 
mind  the  fact  that  the  materialism  of  ancient  philosophy  had 
a  context  and  toning  that  distinguishes  it  from  the  materialism 
of  modem  times.  The  supposed  gulf  that  separates  sentiency 
and  matter  was  not  realized;  consciousness  had  not,  as  it  were, 
crystalized  out  from  the  physical.  Even  Aristotle's  doctrine 
of  sensation  and  of  the  passive  reason  may  be  considered  to 
have  a  materialistic  aspect ;  all  depends  upon  the  interpretation 
which  one  gives  to  the  relation  of  form  to  the  potential  matter. 
The  soul  is  so  knit  with  the  body  that  it  perishes  with  it. 
Strato  realized  this  materialistic  moment  in  Aristotelianism 
and  sought  to  release  it  by  means  of  a  criticism  of  the  doctrine 
of  pure  form,  a  survival  of  the  Platonic  reification  of  universals. 
Plotinus,  the  most  spiritualistic  of  ancient  thinkers,  did  not 
assume  the  existence  of  a  hard-and-fast  line  between  the 
Intelligible  World  and  matter.  Matter  does  not  exist  inde- 
pendently of  the  One;  it  is  the  lower  limit  of  emanation,  the 
field  of  exhaustion,^  where  being  passes  into  non-being.  We 
may  conclude  that  the  mind-body  dualism  did  not  present 
itself  in  the  same  terms  to  the  ancients  as  it  does  to  the  modems. 
Why,  then,  has  modem  thought  so  definitely  read  consciousness 
out  of  nature?  This  problem  has  far-reaching  possibilities  in 
the  way  of  a  clarification  of  the  presuppositions  of  our  modem 
outlook. 

It  is  customary  to  begin  the  examination  of  the  question 
with  a  statement  of  the  position  of  Descartes,  not  because 
he  originated  the  main  features  of  the  outlook,  but  because  he 
formulated  them  so  clearly.  Descartes,  as  is  well  known, 
assumed  the  existence  of  two  spheres,  or  types,  of  reality  in  our 
world,  viz.,  extension  and  thought.  This  dualism  was  the 
expression  of  the  science  of  his  epoch,  with  its  emphasis  upon 
extension  and  motion.  These  concepts  had  gradually  become 
clear  through  their  ability  to  organize  the  facts  of  science. 
For  this  reason  they  seemed  to  illuminate  nature  and  render 
it  transparent.     The  process  of  despiritualizing  nature  had 

1  It  is  interesting  to  compare  Bergson  and  Plotinus  on  this  point 


2o6  CRITICAL  REALISM 

been  begun  by  Kepler  in  his  later  years  and  had  been  carried 
on  with  increasing  success  by  the  physicists.  Mathematics, 
allied  with  the  mechanical  theory,  justified  itself  to  such  an 
extent  that  thinkers  became  blind  to  the  complexity  of  nature. 
That  this  blindness  was  inevitable,  we  realize  when  we  con- 
sider the  helplessness  of  the  preceding  period.  Moreover,  it 
was  probably  helpful  so  far  as  it  gave  courage;  but  it  led  to 
an  assurance  in  regard  to  the  structtwe  and  essence  of  the 
physical  which  we  should  not  emulate.  We  may  say,  then, 
that  Descartes  excluded  consciousness  from  the  physical  by 
his  very  conception  of  the  essence  of  the  physical. 

Mathematical  rationalism  harmonized  so  beautifully  with 
the  kinetic  theory  of  the  physical  processes  that  they  united, 
as  it  were,  defensively  and  offensively  in  the  scientific  move- 
ments of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries.  They 
carried  along,  as  a  matter  of  implication,  the  Cartesian  theory 
of  two  substances  alien  to  one  another.  The  more  dynamic 
outlook  of  the  Newtonian  physics  demanded  no  essential 
modification  of  this  presupposition.  It  also,  as  is  evident  in 
Locke,  was  dualistic.  Let  us  indicate  by  an  example  the 
import  of  such  a  dualism. 

Physiologists  frequently  remark  that,  were  the  brain 
magnified  many  thousands  of  times  so  that  even  the  molecular 
movements  were  visible,  it  would  be  impossible  to  perceive 
consciousness  there.  To  this  the  obvious  reply  is  that  we 
can  perceive  only  our  percepts.  We  have  here  a  typical 
argument  in  a  circle.  The  magnifying  of  the  brain  could  not 
change  its  constitution.  Once  exclude  consciousness  from 
your  conception  of  physical  bodies,  and  such  a  process  as 
magnification  cannot  restore  it.  It  produces  merely  a  quanti- 
tative change,  not  a  new  source  of  insight.  We  have  pointed 
out  that  the  primary  question  is:  What  sort  of  knowledge 
can  we  obtain  of  the  physical  world  by  means  of  the  senses? 

So  long  as  mechanical  rationalism  dominated  thought, 
dualism  was  inevitable.  How,  indeed,  could  consciousness 
have  any  meaning  in  a  nature  consisting  of  extended  sub- 
stances in  motion?  It  could  be  put  in  externally  by  the 
imagination,  but  it  could  not  be  thought  into  it.  This  concep- 
tual exclusion  is  the  logic  of  what  is  called  epiphenomenalism. 


75  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?  207 

a  position  which  makes  consciousness  a  shadow  of  the 
physical.  We  deal  with  a  metaphor,  the  work  of  the  imagina- 
tion, and  not  with  a  harmonious  conceptual  system. 

But  there  has  been  a  distinct  reaction  against  mechanical 
rationalism  on  the  part  of  science.  For  Kant  there  was  only 
one  science  of  nature;  to-day  many  sciences  are  becoming 
relatively  autonomous  and  trusting  in  experience  to  justify 
them.  While  mathematics  functions  in  all  of  them  so  far  as 
measurements  are  involved,  this  does  not  mean  that  its 
method  of  forming  concepts  is  accepted  as  the  only  valid 
method.  Nature  is  seen  to  be  far  more  complex  and  plastic 
than  was  supposed.  Hence,  tendencies  to  break  away  from 
a  dead-level  view  of  nature  and  of  causality  are  manifesting 
themselves.  The  old  frames  are  being  adjudged  inadequate. 
Evolution  is  at  last  being  taken  seriously.  In  short,  the 
concepts  of  extension  and  motion  no  longer  light  up  the  whole 
of  nature  as  they  were  once  thought  to  do. 

On  the  general  philosophical  side,  the  Cartesian  rationalism 
has  likewise  fared  badly.  The  epistemological  difficulties  it 
must  face  have  always  militated  against  it  in  the  eyes  of 
philosophers.  Seldom,  however,  have  the  criticisms  been 
supported  by  satisfactory  constructive  suggestions.  We  shall 
attempt  to  offer  such  suggestions  on  the  basis  of  the  critical 
realism  we  have  tried  to  establish.  If  critical  realism  enables 
us  to  construct  a  view  of  the  physical  world  which  agrees  with 
the  results  of  science  and  yet  solves  the  mind-body  problem  in 
a  naturalistic  way,  this  achievement  should  be  of  the  nature  of 
a  supplementary  proof  of  its  correctness. 

Science  gives  us  knowledge  about  the  physical  world,  but  this 
knowledge  is  not  an  intuition  of  the  stuff  or  substance  of  the 
world.  The  conceptual  rationalism  of  Descartes,  upon  which 
the  two-substance  theory  was  founded,  assumed  that  the  mind 
had  an  intuition  of  the  veritable  essence  of  the  physical  world. 
Those  who  have  followed  my  argument  thus  far  will  realize 
that  this  position  is  a  rationalistic  refinement  upon  Natural 
Realism,  for  which  the  thing  itself  is  present  to  the  mind  to 
inspect.  Instead  of  trying  to  refine  upon  this  outlook  in  order  to 
obtain  a  more  adequate  vision  of  matter,  we  advocated  a  right- 
about-face and  a  relinquishment  of  the  ideal.     Knowledge, 


2o8  CRITICAL  REALISM 

as  we  obtain  it  in  science,  is  not  an  intuition  of  the 
substance  or  stuff  of  nature,  but  a  knowledge  of  the  rela- 
tive proportions,  structure,  relations,  and  functions  of  things. 
Space,  either  as  perceived  or  conceived,  is  not  the  substance 
of  the  physical.  In  brief,  we  must  know  what  sort  of  knowl- 
edge we  obtain  about  nature  before  we  come  to  the  hasty  con- 
clusion that  its  essence  excludes  consciousness.  When  we 
refuse  to  believe  that  nature  is  reproduced  in  knowledge  so 
that  we  have  a  penetrative  insight  into  its  very  stuff,  must 
we  not  likewise  hesitate  to  accept  the  dualism  based  on  a 
false  theory  of  the  knowledge  science  obtains? 

We  know  that  things  are  extended,  that  they  have  a 
structure,  that  they  are  in  active  relations  with  one  another, 
that  they  can  ftmction  in  certain  ways.  Such  knowledge  is 
by  no  means  to  be  despised.  It  must  not,  however,  be  mis- 
interpreted. It  does  not  mean  that  we  know  the  qualities  of  a 
hidden  substance.  This  Lockian  interpretation,  which  goes 
back  to  Greek  philosophy,  reflects  a  false  point  of  view. 
When  we  say  that  things  are  actually  extended,  we  do  not 
mean  that  space  as  conceived  by  the  mathematician  is  a  quality 
of  things.  The  distinction  between  a  thing  and  its  qualities 
grows  up  on  the  epistemological  level  of  Natural  Realism,  with 
its  intuitional  view  of  knowledge,  and  has  no  place  for  critical 
realism.  Hence,  I  do  not  hold  that  in  science  we  gain  knowl- 
edge of  primary  qualities  of  the  physical  world.  Things 
move  and  we  can  measure  the  relative  rate  of  motion,  but 
motion  is  not  a  quality  of  a  substance.  Things  exclude  one 
another  dynamically,  but  impenetrability  is  not  a  quality  in 
the  sense  of  a  passive  possession  of  an  underlying  substance. 
As  Berkeley  rightly  pointed  out,  the  word  "possession"  in 
such  a  connection  is  a  mere  metaphor.  Thus  I  can  accept 
the  criticism  which  Berkeley  passed  upon  the  Lockian  con- 
ception of  the  physical  world,  and  still  be  a  realist. 

We  have  laid  this  much  stress  upon  the  implications  of  our 
own  theory  of  knowledge  because  its  import  is  fundamental. 
Even  such  a  critic  of  the  purely  mathematical  view  of  the 
world  as  M.  Bergson  still  looks  upon  knowledge  as  primarily 
an  intuition.  Both  his  theory  of  perception  and  his  theory  of 
knowledge  are  different  from  those  which  we  have  advanced. 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?  209 

When  we  come  to  a  detailed  examination  of  the  mind-body 
problem  this  difference  will  be  seen  to  have  its  effect.  Let  us 
now  look  at  some  of  the  other  motives  which  have  led  to  the 
belief  that  consciousness  is  not  native  to  the  physical  world. 

The  behavior  of  things,  it  is  asserted,  does  not  demand  for 
its  explanation  the  existence  of  consciousness  in  them  as  an 
effective  agent.  Hence,  we  do  not  need  to  assume  its  presence, 
since  the  principle  of  economy  rules  that  we  should  not  multiply 
entities  beyond  necessity. 

We  can  reply  that  the  behavior  of  men  and  of  certain 
animals  seems  to  require  the  efficacy  of  consciousness  for  their 
explanation;  that  this  fact  relieves  us  of  the  burden  of  proof 
and  throws  it  on  the  shoulders  of  the  advocates  of  the  purely 
mechanical  view.  If  a  non-contradictory  conception  of 
nature  with  consciousness  in  it  can  be  achieved,  the  naturalness 
is  with  such  a  conception.  Again,  the  strictly  mechanical 
theory  has  not  succeeded  in  explaining  the  development  and 
activities  of  organisms  and,  therefore,  has  not  earned  the 
right  to  sole  possession.  The  human  organism  is  obviously 
controlled  by  plans  and  memories,  and  there  is  no  good  reason 
to  deny  that  something  similar  may  hold  of  organisms  less 
highly  developed.  Recent  experiments  in  comparative  psy- 
chology point  most  strongly  to  such  a  conclusion. 

A  clear-sighted  consideration  of  the  argument  from  behavior 
is  advantageous  because  it  forces  us  to  remark  the  various 
grades  of  organization  and  of  conduct  in  things.  Seeing  this, 
it  would  be  unscientific  to  assume  that  the  same  grade  of 
consciousness  and  of  mental  control  is  everywhere  present  in 
nature,  or  that  any  consciousness  is  necessarily  existent  in 
the  lower  levels  of  nature.  We  shall  be  compelled  to  face  the 
question  of  newness  in  evolution  in  this  connection.  It  is 
one  of  the  many  weaknesses  of  panpsychism  that  it  cannot 
admit  that  consciousness  may  be  something  relatively  new  in 
nature  which  dates  from  a  comparatively  high  level  of  evolu- 
tionary development.  But  a  true  empiricism  is  not  forced 
to  advance  beyond  its  data  in  a  deductive  fashion.  The  fault 
with  much  of  past  science  and  with  much  of  past  philosophy 
has  been  their  dialectic  character.  They  have  been  ruled  by 
sharp  antitheses,  such  as,  mechanical  and  teleological,  life  and 


2IO  CRITICAL  REALISM 

lifeless,  consciousness  and  unconsciousness.  As  evolution  is 
taken  seriously,  it  will  modify  the  logic  of  both  philosophy  and 
science.  Knowledge  of  nature  is  no  longer  to  be  gleaned  by 
reflection  on  those  aspects  of  nature  which  the  abstracter 
sciences  are  occupied  with  to  the  exclusion  of  the  more  con- 
crete sciences. 

But  we  must  obtain  clear  ideas  of  the  nature  of  the  usual 
contrasts  between  the  physical  and  the  psychical  in  order  that 
they  may  not  lead  us  astray. 

We  shall  take  it  for  granted  that  we  know  what  objects  are 
physical.  The  denotation  of  the  term,  at  least,  should  be 
clear.  Those  objects  of  whose  existence,  structure,  and 
relations  we  learn  through  the  sense-organs  are  called  physical. 
Our  own  bodies  are  of  course  included.  Much  of  our  effort 
has  concerned  itself  with  the  problem  of  what  we  should  mean 
by  knowledge  about  these  objects  and  what  the  nature  and 
extent  of  such  knowledge  is. 

Psychical  objects,  on  the  other  hand,  are  more  various. 
They  do  not  possess  that  fundamental  continuity  which  science 
has  shown  to  be  such  a  marked  characteristic  of  the  physical 
world.  We  may  say  that  psychical  objects  are  of  two  main 
classes:  First  come  those  which  have  claimed  to  be  physical 
and  whose  claim  has  been  denied ;  second,  those  which  are  not 
physical  and  make  no  claim  to  be.  Members  of  this  second 
class  do  not  demand  place  in  the  one  real  space  in  which 
physical  things  are.  They  do  not  seek  inclusion  in  nature. 
A  mathematical  object,  for  instance,  can  be  clearly  conceived 
and  analyzed,  but  we  do  not  assign  it  a  place  among  the  things 
to  which  we  react  bodily.  What,  then,  is  the  nature  of  this 
systematic  exclusion  of  psychical  objects  from  the  sphere  of 
physical  existence?  Since  it  occurs  in  the  mind,  it  is  evidently 
not  a  dynamic  expulsion  from  the  space  which  physical  things 
occupy;  rather  is  it  the  logical  separation  of  classes  of  objects 
with  different  attributes  and  relations  and  assigned  to  different 
spheres  of  existence.  In  other  words,  psychical  objects  are 
not  excluded  from  the  physical  world  as  one  physical  thing 
excludes  another.  We  have  to  do  here  with  a  logical  division, 
not  with  an  overt,  causal  expulsion.  The  laws  of  behavior  of 
the  two  realms  are  different,   and  they  cannot  be  woven 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   211 

together  into  any  larger,  objective  whole.  Who  can  think  of 
a  perfect  triangle  jostling  an  electron?  We  are  no  longer 
Platonists  or  Pythagoreans,  even  though  we  believe  in  the 
applicability  of  mathematics  to  scientific  data.  To  take 
another  — and,  for  our  present  purpose,  important  — instance 
of  this  disparity,  physical  objects  as  existences  control  our 
percepts  in  large  measure,  whereas  psychical  objects  have  no 
such  connection. 

There  are  certain  objects,  chief  among  which  are  the 
objects  of  religion,  which  claim  to  have  dynamic  connection 
with  the  physical  world.  These  we  cannot  regard  offhand  as 
psychical  in  the  sense  here  given  to  that  term.  It  is  certainly 
one  of  the  problems  of  metaphysics  to  state  what  reasons  there 
may  be  for  judging  that  these  objects  are  other  than  psychical. 
Interesting  as  the  question  is,  this  is  not  the  place  to  consider  it. 

The  logic  of  psychical  objects  of  the  first  class,  that  is, 
those  which  are  excluded  from  the  physical  world,  although 
they  have  made  a  claim  to  presence  in  it,  is  somewhat  different. 
However,  even  they  are  not  mechanically  expelled.  The 
cotmtry  which  Jack  the  Giant-KHler  reached  when  he  climbed 
the  bean-stalk  is  such  a  pseudo-physical  object.  It  strives 
towards  the  physical  and  seeks  vaguely  a  place  somewhere  in 
it,  but  cannot  for  obvious  reasons  make  good  its  claim.  It  is 
not  excluded  because  it  is  psychical;  it  is  psychical  because  it 
is  excluded.  Another  example  of  this  class  is  phlogiston, 
the  substance  by  means  of  which  the  older  chemists  explained 
combustion.  At  one  time  its  claim  to  be  physical  was  allowed; 
but,  as  a  result  of  the  investigations  of  Lavoisier,  it  was 
finally  adjudged  to  be  merely  psychical  or  a  false  hypothesis. 
Now,  as  soon  as  these  objects  are  judged  to  be  non-physical, 
we  no  longer  trouble  ourselves  with  their  location.  Their 
space  is  considered  illusory,  just  as  they  are;  they  are  not  in 
the  one  real  space  because  they  are  unreal.  Real  space  and  the 
physical  go  together.  What  this  correlation  signifies  we  shall 
indicate  later,  although  we  shall  not  be  able  to  substantiate 
our  conclusion  to  the  degree  we  could  desire.  To  do  so  would 
require  an  analysis  of  the  different  meanings  of  space.  (The 
Categories  will  be  treated  in  full  in  another  volume.)  Dream- 
objects  and  their  space  furnish  other  typical  instances  of  this 


212  CRITICAL  REALISM 

exclusion  from  what  we  consider  the  one  real  space  preempted 
by  physical  things  and  processes. 

But  how  is  this  classification  of  objects  into  spheres  of 
existence  of  importance  for  the  problem  we  have  in  hand? 
Suppose  it  to  be  granted  that  psychical  objects  qua  objects  do 
not  exist  in  the  one  real  space  in  which  physical  things  exist, 
does  this  fact  affect  the  question  which  we  are  considering, 
that  of  the  presence  of  consciousness  in  physical  things? 
It  does  so,  negatively  at  least.  The  recognition  of  the  logical 
classification  of  objects  prevents  the  confusion  of  consciousness 
with  psychical  objects  and  the  consequences  for  theory  which 
would  follow  such  a  confusion.  Consciousness  is  not  an 
object  in  the  usual  sense  of  that  term  and,  therefore,  is  not 
psychical  when  the  psychical  is  defined  as  a  class  of  objects 
distinguished  from  the  class  of  physical  objects.  Con- 
sequently, there  is  no  logical  exclusion  of  it  from  nature.  It 
does  not  claim  a  position  in  space  as  a  thing  in  causal  relation 
with  other  things;  nor  is  it  an  object  with  characteristics  and 
relations  which  make  its  presence  in  nature  meaningless.  We 
have  seen  that  the  assertion  that  a  geometrical  figure  exists  in 
the  physical  world  is  absurd.  Such  an  assertion  would  be 
comparable  to  saying  that  love  weighs  so  many  pounds 
avoirdupois.  But  there  is  surely  no  need  to  dwell  longer  upon 
the  nature  and  significance  of  this  logical  division  of  objects 
into  classes,  although  the  contrast  has  not  infrequently  been 
taken  as  a  substantiation  of  the  mind-body  dualism.  Indeed, 
it  has  even  been  taken  as  a  proof  that  the  distinction  between 
the  physical  and  the  psychical,  in  the  sense  of  consciousness, 
is  purely  a  functional  one  within  experience.  It  cannot  be  too 
often  insisted  upon  that  consciousness  is  not  an  object  in  this 
sense.  In  the  most  comprehensive  sense  of  the  term,  it  is  an 
object  — that  is,  it  can  be  thought  about ;  but  it  is  an  object 
sui  generis,  which  the  capacity  to  make  logical  distinctions 
presupposes. 

There  is  another  usage  of  the  term  "psychical,"  which  must 
be  briefly  examined.  The  psychical,  is  the  subjective;  it 
consists  of  those  feelings,  ideas,  and  attitudes  which  are  distin- 
guishable from  the  object  in  the  act  of  cognition.  Its  correlate 
is  the  objective,  and  the  contrast  stressed  is  that  between  the 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   213 

objective,  be  it  physical  or  psychical,  and  the  other  pole  of  the 
field  of  the  individual's  experience.  The  objective  sphere  is 
the  realm  of  objects  known;  the  subjective,  or  psychical,  sphere 
is  that  of  the  subject-self  and  its  attitudes.  Thus  the  contrast 
between  the  two  is  quite  different  from  that  between  physical 
and  psychical  objects.  The  subjective  qua  subjective  makes 
no  claim  to  exist  in  any  realm  of  objects;  the  duality  is  not 
existential,  but  functional,  in  character.  The  independence 
of  the  object  does  not  involve  the  exclusion  of  one  class  of 
objects  by  another  class  nor  the  existential  separateness  of 
kinds  of  being,  but  the  freedom,  so  to  speak,  of  the  object 
known  from  the  event  of  its  being  known.  The  antithesis 
is  evidently  unique  and  must  not  be  confused  with  those  which, 
presuppose  it.  The  psychical  as  subjective  is,  accordingly, 
not  excluded  by  the  physical  qua  physical,  but  by  the  physical 
qua  objective.  The  same  relation  holds  for  the  psychical  as 
objective.  Here,  again,  we  meet  with  no  proof  that  con- 
sciousness is  alien  to  the  physical. 

Yet  another  application  of  the  term  is  to  be  found  in  recent 
logic.  The  psychical  represents  a  phase  in  consciousness,  or 
the  field  of  the  individual's  experience,  during  which  the  object- 
stimulus  is  undergoing  interpretation  and  reconstruction.  A 
conflict  with  its  uncertainty  produces  the  same  effect  upon 
consciousness  as  the  addition  of  a  reagent  to  a  test-tube  of 
chemicals  in  solution.  A  ferment  of  activities  immediately  re- 
places the  previous  definite  structure.  The  psychical  thus  cor- 
responds to  a  stage  in  a  process  and  consists  of  those  elements 
which  are  held  suspended  in  the  process  of  readjustment  and 
which  are  not  objectified  because  they  have  as  yet  no  settled 
status.  Such  elements  in  this  stage  are,  strictly  speaking, 
neither  objective  nor  subjective  though  they  may  become 
either.  That  which  is  stressed  is  the  temporal  situation  of 
consciousness  as  a  whole ;  the  attitude  is  pre-cognitive,  that  is, 
precedes  and  conditions  that  structure  of  the  coexistential 
dimension  of  the  individual's  field  of  experience  in  which  the 
subject-self  takes  an  attitude  toward  the  sphere  of  objects 
known.  Out  of  such  a  condition  of  the  field  of  experience, 
judgments  and  decisions  grow  like  crystals  from  the  mother- 
liquor.     Epistemology  has  much  to  do  with  the  psychical  in 

15 


214  CRITICAL  REALISM 

this  sense.  The  recognition  that  it  is  a  stage  in  knowledge 
involves  the  relinquishment  of  all  forms  of  immediate  realism. 
What  is  important  for  us  to  note  further  in  the  present  con- 
nection is  that  the  psychical  in  this  temporal,  logical  sense  has 
no  contrast  with  the  physical.  While  the  psychical  exists 
in  consciousness  as  a  phase  of  its  process,  its  contrasts  are 
specific,  and  not  general.  It  can  be  understood  only  as  a  stage. 
The  lines  of  force  which  run  through  it  bind  it  with  that  which 
is  to  come.  The  relation  of  such  a  psychical  to  the  sphere  of 
objects  known  cannot  be  one  of  logical  inclusion  or  exclusion. 
Even  to  ask  such  a  question  is  to  ignore  the  universe  of  dis- 
course within  which  this  kind  of  psychical  exists.  Evidently, 
the  stream  of  consciousness  swallows  up  this  species  of  the 
psychical ;  not  tmtil  we  know  the  relation  of  consciousness  to 
the  physical  will  we  know  its  relation. 

Finally,  there  is  the  meaning  of  the  psychical  in  which  it 
is  identified  with  the  personal.  The  individual  has  plans 
and  purposes  and  values  which  are  distinctly  his  own.  He 
knows  the  common  objective  world,  but  uses  it  as  a  means  for 
the  furtherance  of  his  own  desires  and  ideals.  The  psychical 
is  now  the  personal  reference  and  control;  it  is  the  self  as 
opposed  to,  yet  in  a  working  harmony  with,  the  not-self. 
The  not-self  is  not  necessarily  the  physical;  indeed,  it  is  even 
more  frequently,  under  the  conditions  of  modem  civilization, 
the  social,  another  person  or  group  of  persons,  a  law,,  an 
obnoxious  convention,  I  may  seek  to  adapt  my  plans  to  the 
prejudices  of  the  community  or  to  the  wishes  of  a  friend.  For 
our  present  problem  the  essential  to  realize  is  the  coequal 
reality  of  these  objects,  be  they  physical  things,  wishes,  the 
moral  tone  of  the  community,  or  my  own  plans.  It  is  apparent 
that  it  is  meaningless  to  speak  of  the  exclusion  of  the  personal 
by  the  physical.  Here  our  practical  knowledge  is  a  challenge  to 
theory.  Feelings  pulsate,  and  the  face  of  the  world  is  changed ; 
ideas  have  hands  and  feet  and  force  nature  to  do  their  will. 
The  self  and  the  not-self,  the  personal  and  the  not-mine 
appear  no  more  separated  than  one  physical  thing  is  separated 
from  another.  But  how  can  this  be ?  "In  the  widest  possible 
sense,"  writes  James,  "a  man's  Self  is  the  sum  total  of  all  that 
he  can  call  his;  not  only  his  body  and  his  psychic  powers,  but 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?  215 

his  clothes  and  his  house,  his  wife  and  children,  his  ancestors 
and  friends,  his  reputation  and  works,  his  lands  and  horses, 
his  yacht  and  bank-account."  To  be  sure,  some  selves  are 
more  modest,  but  the  essential  point  is  brought  out  by  this 
quotation.  It  is  this :  The  self  is  omnivorous  and  devours  the 
physical  equally  with  the  undeniably  psychical.  The  thinker 
who  is  seeking  an  existential  line  of  demarkation  between  the 
self  and  the  not-self  is  baffled  by  the  seemingly  capricious 
allotment  of  things  to  the  two  sides  and  by  the  shifting  char- 
acter of  the  boundary  between  them.  A  little  reflection  will, 
however,  assure  us  that  we  have  here  a  distinction  which 
exists  only  within  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience. 
There  is  no  reason  why  the  self  should  not  identify  itself 
with  various  objects  which  have  their  representatives  in  the 
field.  This  means  that  we  take  possessive  attitudes  toward 
things  which  we  experience.  Such  an  attitude  does  not  change 
the  nature  of  things,  but  does  alter  our  relations  to  them  and 
may  thus  lead  to  the  occurrence  of  overt  actions.  What  I 
mean  to  assert  is  that  the  contrast  between  the  self  and  the 
not-self  is  primarily  within  the  individual's  experience  and  has 
existential  import  only  so  far  as  it  is  the  basis  for  conduct, 
personal  or  social.  We  may  conclude,  then,  that  the  distinc- 
tion does  not  coincide  with  that  between  the  physical  and 
consciousness  and  throws  only  a  negative  light  upon  it. 

If  consciousness  does  not  consist  of  psychical  objects,  nor 
of  the  subjective  in  contrast  to  the  objective,  nor  of  the  pre- 
judgmental  flux  of  experiencing,  nor  of  the  personal,  what  is  it  ? 
Is  there  an  antithesis,  still  more  primary,  which  has  sometimes 
been  confused  with  these  and  therefore  misunderstood? 

In  a  preceding  chapter  we  worked  out  a  fairly  definite 
conception  of  consciousness  as  identifiable  with  the  whole  field 
of  the  individual's  experience.  We  saw  that  the  realization  of 
the  unity  and  personal  character  of  the  total  field  is  an  achieve- 
ment made  by  reflection  in  the  face  of  the  protests  of  mean- 
ings such  as  "common,"  "independent,"  and  "permanent." 
Mental  in  this  inclusive  sense  is  a  new  meaning  which  has  to 
gain  clearness  and  mastery  through  a  reflective  struggle. 
As  soon  as  this  more  critical  standpoint  is  taken,  the  meanings 
and  relations  in  which  the  different  classes  of  objects  are 


2i6  CRITICAL  REALISM 

set  are,  like  the  objects  which  they  quaUfy,  seen  to  be  mental. 
When  this  is  done,  another  group  of  reflective  meanings  qualify 
the  whole  field  of  experience  as  such.  It  is  judged  to  be  a 
'  process  whose  parts  are  considered  private  and  transient.  It 
is  this  mental  process  which  contains  knowledge  of  existences 
independent  of  it.  This  way  of  approach  to  the  total  field  of 
experiencing  guards  against  the  presuppositions  of  the  sciences 
with  which  psychology  is  connected;  and,  when  philosophy 
uses  the  term  "consciousness"  in  relation  to  the  mind-body 
problem,  it  should  mean  the  mental  in  this  inclusive  sense  in 
which  it  is  identifiable  with  experiencing  as  a  process.  Let  us 
keep  this  definition  of  consciousness  in  mind  while  we  examine 
the  contrast  between  consciousness  and  the  physical  which 
psychology  has  partly  built  up  and  partly  accepted.  We  shall 
see  that  the  psychologist  has  never  freed  himself  completely 
from  the  assumptions  of  the  other  special  sciences.  The 
reason  for  this  lies  in  the  genesis  of  the  concept  of  conscious- 
ness as  held  by  the  psychologist.  Consciousness  for  him  is 
virtually  the  inner  sphere  in  contrast  to  the  outer  sphere.  In 
the  second  chapter  we  studied  the  development  of  this 
contrast-compromise  between  psychology  and  the  physical 
sciences.  Consciousness,  as  it  should  be  conceived  by  the 
philosopher  with  an  adequate  epistemology,  escapes  many 
of  these  implications,  although  it  also  has  much  in  common 
with  the  consciousness  of  which  the  psychologist  writes.  In 
other  words,  the  psychologist  does  not  usually  have  an  adequate 
epistemology,  and  this  lack  is  reflected  into  his  view  of  con- 
sciousness. We  shall  try  to  make  this  point  clear  in  the 
next  few  pages. 

Wundt  states  that  psychology  "investigates  the  whole 
content  of  experience  in  its  relation  to  the  subject  and  in  its 
attributes  derived  directly  from  the  subject."  Psychology, 
according  to  Judd,  has  as  its  subject-matter  "the  total  content 
of  experience  in  its  immediate  character."  The  difficulty 
which  faces  these  definitions  is  to  determine  what  is  meant  by 
the  immediate  character  of  the  total  content  of  experience  and 
what  the  aforesaid  peculiar  relation  to  the  subject  is.  If  we 
analyze  Wundt's  theory,  we  find  that  he  has  in  mind  the 
distinction    between    knowledge,    which    has    an    evidently 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   217 

objective  reference,  and  the  flow  of  the  individual's  experience, 
which  keeps  a  personal  connection  and  does  not,  as  it  were, 
crystallize  out  into  objects.  "Subjective  and  mediate  knowl- 
edge are  in  this  wise  correlative  ideas,  in  that,  exactly  in 
proportion  as  certain  elements  of  perception  are  withdrawn 
into  the  subject,  the  remaining  elements  are  regarded  as  parts 
of  a  mediate  knowledge,  i.  e.,  a  knowledge  brought  about 
by  a  previous  logical  correction."  (System  der  Philosophie, 
p.  143;  quoted  from  Mead,  The  Definition  of  the  Psy- 
chical.) The  logic  of  the  distinction  between  a  thing  and  its 
perception  is  illustrative  of  what  Wundt  has  in  mind.  {Cf. 
Chap. H,  "Natural  Realism  and  Science.")  The  same  material 
is  thrown  into  two  contexts  with  different  principles  and 
presuppositions.  The  one  sphere  is  temporal  and  personal 
and  somehow  connected  with  a  brain;  the  other  is  impersonal, 
spatial,  and  common.  Feelings  and  volitions  retain  their 
personal  character  and  are  now  supplemented  by  percepts. 
This  rather  composite  realm  is  then  contrasted  with  the 
objects  of  common  knowledge  as  the  sphere  of  consciousness. 
Psychology  only  carries  on  the  distinctions  of  common  sense. 
But  a  contrast  higher  up  than  perception  breaks  out  to  chal- 
lenge the  adequacy  of  the  above  disjunction.  Does  not  the 
individual  think  these  mediate  objects  by  means  of  concepts? 
These  concepts  and  the  processes  by  which  they  are  elaborated 
likewise  pass  to  the  side  of  consciousness.  Must  we  not  say 
that  psychology,  so  long  as  it  remains  a  special  science,  does 
not  question  the  existence  of  objects  which  are  known  and  with 
which  consciousness  as  a  personal  domain  is  contrasted,  and 
that  it  does  not  doubt  that  consciousness  contains  knowledge  of 
these  objects?  We  have  seen  reason  to  believe  that  the 
psychologist  is  right  in  this  attitude;  the  field  of  the  individual's 
experience  ia  personal,  and  the  individual  does  have  knowledge 
about  existences  which  are  not  literally  present  in  the  field. 

Every  special  science  has  a  view-point  by  means  of  which 
it  can  be  defined.  The  subject-matter  of  psychology  seems 
in  large  measure  to  be  the  total  field  of  the  individual's  expe- 
rience as  this  is  controlled  by  mental  operations.  How  does 
the  psychologist  approach  this  material? 

There  are  at  least  three  points  of  view  from  which  the 


2i8  CRITICAL  REALISM 

psychologist  regards  the  field  of  experience  which  he  terms 
consciousness.  He  may  endeavor  to  analyze  the  more  complex 
experiences  into  simpler  ones  which  he  treats  as  structural 
elements  and  to  find  the  laws  in  accordance  with  which  these 
elements  are  organized  (so  long  as  the  ideal  is  not  the 
construction  of  a  mental  chemistry,  this  work  throws  light 
upon  the  foundations  of  actual  experience) ;  or,  he  may 
be  interested  chiefly  in  the  connection  of  consciousness  with 
the  organism;  or,  he  may  endeavor  to  study  the  forms  of 
consciousness,  their  conditions,  genesis,  and  functions.  In 
the  first  case,  we  have  what  is  usually  called  structural  psy- 
chology. Here  the  psychologist  concerns  himself  almost 
entirely  with  consciousness  as  a  content  open  to  inspection 
and  analysis.  In  the  second  case,  we  have  psycho-physics 
which  treats  of  the  correlations  between  consciousness,  the 
body,  and  physical  stimuli.  (We  shall  see  that  much  of  the 
difficulty  which  meets  psycho-physics  is  due  to  the  acceptance 
of  the  alienness  of  the  psychical  to  the  physical.)  Finally, 
we  have  what  is  usually  called  functional  psychology.  The 
functionalist  is  dissatisfied  with  the  limitation  of  psychology 
to  consciousness;  he  wishes  to  see  consciousness  in  its  context. 
He  is  haunted  with  a  feeling  that  consciousness  is  not  ob- 
jective enough  to  furnish  the  basis  for  a  science.  Mind,  he 
asserts,  is  known  from  man's  activities.  If  we  include 
language  we  may  grant  that  the  mind  of  another  is  inferred 
from  his  activities;  but  it  is  wrong  to  say  that  mind  is  known 
only  in  that  way.  There  must  be  the  individual's  own 
immediate  experiences  from  which  to  start.  I  do  not  mean, 
of  course,  that  the  basis  of  the  knowledge  of  other  minds  is 
consciously  that  of  our  own  minds  recognized  as  such. 
Knowledge  about  other  minds,  like  knowledge  about  physical 
things,  does  not  involve  the  reflective  standpoint  we  have 
reached  only  in  epistemology — that  each  mind  is  a  sort  of 
microcosm.  But  into  this  question  we  need  not  enter,  since 
it  has  already  been  sufficiently  discussed.  The  functionalist 
is,  then,  inclined  to  define  psychology  as  the  science  of  human 
behavior.  It  may  be  stated  that  this  definition  is  too  broad, 
since  ethics,  for  example,  also  concerns  itself  with  human 
behavior.     We  will  leave  the  question  of  the  mutual  relations 


75  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   219 

of  sciences  dealing  with  behavior  to  the  sciences.  What 
interests  us  at  present  is  the  evident  desire  of  the  psycholo- 
gist to  connect  consciousness  with  conduct;  he  wishes  to 
understand  human  action.  {Cf.  Pillsbury,  Essentials  of  Psy- 
chology, Introduction.)  He  is  also  certain  that  he  cannot 
understand  it  without  a  knowledge  of  consciousness,  or  con- 
sciousness without  a  knowledge  of  human  action.  With  this 
we  shall  find  reason  to  agree  most  heartily.  The  problem 
which  we  are  investigating  concerns  itself  with  the  "why"  of 
this.  If  consciousness  is  alien  to  the  physical,  it  is  hard  to 
comprehend  why  consciousness  and  conduct  apparently  imply 
each  other. 

When  we  once  realize  that  the  psychologist  is  a  scientist, 
we  are  not  surprised  that  he  is  influenced  in  his  view  of  the 
relation  of  consciousness  and  the  physical  by  the  current 
theories  of  science.  He  is  also,  undoubtedly,  influenced  by 
the  traditional  dualism  between  mind  and  matter  considered 
as  two  substances.  The  philosopher  must  take  up  the  problem 
as  it  is  left  by  science  and  seek  to  understand  the  nature  of  the 
reality  studied  by  the  physical  sciences  and  of  that  studied  by 
psychology  with  a  view  to  discovering  whether  they  are 
existentially  separate.  We  have  already  done  this  in  large 
measure  and  wish  to  justify  our  epistemology  by  the  capacity  it 
possesses  to  solve  this  age-old  problem.  Hard  as  the  task  is, 
it  is  one  from  which  no  system  should  shrink.  Indeed,  the 
mind-body  problem  ought  to  be  used  as  a  touchstone  by  means 
of  which  to  judge  of  the  truth  of  an  epistemology. 

The  states  of  mind  which  the  psychologist  studies  are 
objects  in  consciousness  which  do  not  claim  to  have  existence 
elsewhere  or  to  give  information  about  anything  but  the 
structure  of  the  elements  of  consciousness,  the  processes  which 
occur  there,  and  the  temporal  and  coexistential  dimensions  of 
consciousness.  Fact  and  theory  work  together  here  as  in  all 
the  sciences;  mistakes  are  made  and  mistakes  are  rectified. 
States  of  mind  are  thus  psychical  data  which  are  studied  in 
order  that  information  may  be  obtained  of  the  field  of  the 
individual's  experiencing.  That  is  the  reality  of  which  there 
can  be  no  doubt.  Shall  we,  then,  say  that  the  states  of 
mind  are  phenomena  or  appearances?    Such  a  question  is 


2  20  CRITICAL  REALISM 

evidently  nonsense,  since  the  states  of  mind  are  objects  in 
experience  when  the  self  takes  a  certain  attitude  called  intro- 
spection. We  must  say  that  states  of  mind  are  objects  in 
experience,  as  real  as  any  other  objects  in  experience,  which 
are  used  to  give  us  information  about  the  total  field  of  the 
individual's  experience  or  consciousness.  The  psychologist 
in  pursuit  of  this  purpose  analyzes  characteristic  group  after 
characteristic  group,  the  sensational,  the  affective,  the  conative, 
the  ideational,  the  subjective  attitudes,  and  so  on,  and  seeks  to 
realize  how  all  these  exist  together  in  the  actual  flow  of  expe- 
riencing. He  does  not  deal  with  appearances,  but  with 
realities.  What  we  must  distinguish,  however,  is  the  knowl- 
edge he  thus  achieves,  from  the  field  of  an  individual's  expe- 
riencing as  this  exists  while  the  individual  is  extrospective. 
To  conclude,  the  distinction  between  appearance  and  reality 
is  false  if  applied  to  psychology. 

But  we  have  already  come  to  the  same  conclusion  for  the 
other  sciences.  Nowhere  in  science  does  the  contrast  between 
appearance  and  reality  have  meaning.  The  sciences  seek  to 
know  about  things  and  processes.  This  knowledge  cannot  be 
said,  however,  to  be  an  appearance  of  that  which  is  known. 
Thus  the  distinction  between  appearance  and  reality  has  no 
meaning  for  knowledge  and  should  not  be  transferred  to  it 
from  the  domain  of  perception. 

What  are  the  characteristics  of  consciousness  as  brought 
out  by  psychology?  There  are  at  least  four  which  are  impor- 
tant for  our  problem.  Consciousness  is  personally  toned ; 
it  is  synthetic;  it  is  not  directly  conserved;  it  is  not  a  substance. 
Let  us  examine  these  points  briefly. 

This  first  characteristic  has  been  discussed  in  detail  in  the 
chapter  on  the  Advance  of  the  Personal.  We  saw  there  that 
a  concept,  no  matter  how  impersonal  it  may  seemingly  be, 
is  the  thought  of  an  individual  and  is  bathed  in  a  tide  of 
feelings,  purposes,  and  desires.  Consciousness  clings  to  a 
personal  mooring.  It  has  none  of  the  supposed  cosmopolitan 
traits  of  energy.  Mental  pluralism  is  the  law  in  this  domain, 
and  each  stream  of  consciousness  has  an  inner  continuity,  or 
unity.  It  is  true  that  individual  minds  may  break  down  and 
dissociation   result   in   the   formation   of   relatively   distinct 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   221 

streams  which  coexist;  but  the  fields  of  consciousness  which 
are  thus  formed  in  connection  with  one  brain  have  their  own 
inner  imity.  The  question  of  multiple  personality  leads  us 
to  the  second  trait  of  consciousness. 

Consciousness  is  essentially  synthetic.  I  mean  by  this 
that  any  experience  links  itself  or  tends  to  link  itself  with  all 
that  is  kindred  to  it.  Stimuli  within  the  field  come  together, 
and  the  response  which  interprets  and  organizes  them  must 
take  them  all  into  account.  In  this  way  the  material  from 
the  various  senses  is  organized  into  thing-experiences,  and 
these  again  are  associated  with  ideas  by  means  of  which  they 
are  recognized  and  interpreted.  Consciousness  is  alive  with 
convection  currents  which  bring  every  part  to  bear  upon  every 
other  part.  Certain  of  these  currents  are  activities  of  which 
we  can  become  conscious  and  in  which  we  can  perceive  the 
work  of  synthesis.  And  where  ordinary  introspection  fails, 
experimental  conditions  enable  us  to  penetrate  beneath  what  is 
usually  given  and  see  the  same  synthetic  tendencies  weaving 
the  elements  of  the  individual's  field  of  consciousness.  The 
study  of  abnormal  minds  has,  moreover,  confirmed  the  impor- 
tance of  this  trait  by  showing  what  results  when  the  brain's 
energy  is  lessened  and  all  the  consciousness  in  one  brain  is 
not  drawn  into  one  unified  and  controlled  whole. 

'Again,  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience  is  continually 
changing.  The  very  terms,  states,  pulses,  events,  experiences, 
which  are  applied  to  parts  of  the  field  show  a  recognition  of  the 
transient  nature  of  consciousness.  Here,  if  anywhere,  is  the 
flux  so  celebrated  by  Heracleitus.  Consciousness  is  a  stream 
whose  waters  sink  into  its  bed,  yet  the  stream  flows  on- 
ward; it  is  a  continual  birth  and  also  a  continual  death.  In 
other  words,  consciousness  is  not  directly  conserved  in  the 
sense '  that  the  same  experience  presents  itself  over  again  in 
the  field.  The  constructions  of  the  present  which  we  call  mem- 
ories tend  to  make  us  forget  this  fragility  and  essential  mor- 
tality of  consciousness.  We  do  not  always  realize  that  what 
we  assign  to  the  past  is  a  creature  of  the  present.  When 
we  say  that  consciousness  is  only  indirectly  conserved,  we 
mean  that  our  present  experience  would  be  different  were  it 
not  for  what  we  experienced  in  the  past;  yet  the  past  is  not 


22  2  CRITICAL  REALISM 

revived  in  a  literal  sense.  The  psychologist  can  explain  the 
perceptions  and  judgments  of  an  individual  only  in  the  light  of 
his  previous  perceptions  and  judgments ;  continuity  and  growth 
are  the  main  characteristics  of  mind.  But  consciousness  can- 
not be  identified  with  mind  for  this  reason.  For  it  there  is 
an  ever-changing  now.  The  mind  is  like  the  score  of  some 
piece  of  music  which  the  artist  is  seeking  to  perfect ;  conscious- 
ness, like  the  instrumentation  of  parts  of  it  from  time  to  time. 
The  last  general  characteristic  of  consciousness  is,  at  first 
glance,  negative  rather  than  positive.  It  is,  as  we  have  said, 
not  a  substance.  The  categories  which  we  apply  to  states  of 
consciousness — and  hence  to  consciousness  as  a  stream — 
are  negative  in  form  because  mankind  has  been  chiefly  inter- 
ested in  the  physical  things  which  form  the  environment  to 
which  the  individual  must  react  rightly  in  order  to  live.  Man 
acts  before  he  introspects.  This  is  the  reason  why  Natural 
Realism  is  the  outlook  of  common  sense.  Man  is  interested 
primarily  in  things  and  does  not  stop  to  consider  whether  they 
are  distinct  from  his  thing-experiences.  Presence  is  tested 
by  organic  reaction;  presence  to  the  organism  is  not  differ- 
entiated from  presence  to  the  subject-self.  The  self  is,  as  it 
were,  immersed  in  the  body  and  sees  with  it  as  it  reacts. 
"All  roots,  i.e.,  all  the  material  elements  of  language,  are 
expressive  of  sensuous  impressions,  and  of  sensuous  impressions 
only;  and  as  all  words,  even  the  most  abstract  and  sublime, 
are  derived  from  roots,  comparative  philology  fully  endorses 
the  conclusions  arrived  at  by  Locke."  (Max  MuUer,  Lectures  on 
the  Science  of  Language,  Bk.  II,  pp.,  372,  373;  quoted  from 
Hoffding,  Outlines,  p.  2.)  Thus  man  worked  gradually  from 
the  outside  inward.  This  dominance  of  the  concepts  formed 
on  things  is  especially  apparent  in  the  philosophy  of  Kant. 
Because  the  categories  of  the  understanding  are  not  applicable 
to  the  data  of  the  "inner  sense,"  psychology  cannot  be  a 
science.  It  is  gradually  dawning  upon  thinkers  that  the 
categories  which  are  applicable  to  the  physical  world,  as  that 
world  is  known  through  the  natural  sciences,  are  not  applicable  to 
consciousness,  but  that  this  divergence  is  not  a  proof  that 
consciousness  cannot  be  known. ^    The  material  is  different  and 

iDocs  not  Beigson  tend  to  exalt  the  psychological  categories,  thus  committing  the  reverse 
fallacy? 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?    223 

expresses  itself  in  different  terms.  It  is  wrong,  therefore,  to 
hold  that  the  one  set  of  categories  is  truer  or  more  fundamental 
than  the  other.  Each  is  relative  to  its  subject-matter.  Har- 
mony between  them  will  come  only  as  a  result  of  the  recognition 
of  this  fact.  Our  main  purpose  is  to  show  how  such  harmony 
can  be  attained. 

Since  man  came  to  understand  consciousness  after  he  had 
analyzed  the  world  of  physical  things  as  known  by  means  of 
perception,  the  concepts  he  employed  to  think  it  were  natur- 
ally negative  in  form.  Consciousness  is  the  incorporeal,  the 
unextended,  the  imsubstantial,  the  transient,  the  knower  as 
distinguished  from  that  which  is  known.  Such  at  least  are  the 
vague  contrasts  which  most  readily  presented  themselves. 
As  more  became  known  about  it — especially  its  correspondence 
with  the  brain — the  more  the  wonder  grew  how  it  could  be 
related  to  that '  which  was  substantial.  The  most  tenuous 
and  intangible  of  natural  phenomena,  as  these  appeared  to 
common  sense,  were  employed  as  quarries  from  which  to  obtain 
similes  for  this  connection.  Consciousness  is  a  lambent  flame, 
a  magnetic  field,  an  aura,  potential  energy.  It  plays  about  the 
brain  as  St.  Elmo's  fire  about  the  masts  of  ships.  It  is  an 
epiphenomenon  like  the  shadows  which  accompany  an  engine 
in  motion.  Such  attempts  at  description  remind  us  of  the 
identification  by  the  ancients  of  mind  with  the  fire-atoms,  the 
subtlest,  smoothest,  and  most  penetrating  of  all  atoms.  But 
the  employment  of  images  is  not  enough;  it  represents  the  stage 
of  wonder  at  a  necessary  differentiation.  We  must  think  the 
contrast  and  know  what  it  involves. 

The  other  characteristics  of  consciousness  which  we  have 
examined  should  help  us  to  give  content  to  this  contrast  which 
appears  to  the  scientist  and,  therefore,  to  the  thinker  at  first, 
as  a  negation  which  he  cannot  comprehend.  I  shall  be 
compelled  to  use  technical  terms  in  order  to  pass  from  imagina- 
tion to  thought.  Consciousness  is  clearly  a  variant,  and  not  a 
substance.  It  does  not  persist  through  change.  Hence,  it 
cannot  be  identified  with  the  physical  as  such.  It  may  pos- 
sibly act  in  things,  but  not  on  things  as  one  physical  existent  acts 
on  another.     In  other  words,  its  action  cannot  be  mechanical. 


2  24  CRITICAL  REALISM 

If  it  is  connected  with  the  brain  as  a  physical  existent,  it 
must  be  thought  of  as  of  the  brain,  not  as  one  physical 
thing  is  encapsulated  in  another,  but,  rather,  as  a  light  is  in  a 
diamond  or  a  pain  in  the  hand.  Here,  again,  we  have  only 
similes ;  however,  these  are  useful  to  free  the  imagination  from 
the  tyranny  of  space-perception  so  that  it  will  not  oppose 
thought  too  zealously.  Perhaps  there  is  not  so  much  diffi- 
culty in  thinking  consciousness  rightly  when  we  make  an 
effort;  the  danger  lies  rather  in  a  lapse  from  the  correct  view 
at  the  critical  moment.  Many  excellent  thinkers  have  shown 
how  easy  it  is,  when  the  motives  are  strong,  to  regard  con- 
sciousness as  a  most  subtle  and  intangible  material  or  sub- 
stance, yet  a  material  notwithstanding  its  delicacy  and 
tenuousness.  Panpsychism  is  obviously  guilty  of  this  applica- 
tion to  consciousness  of  inapplicable  categories.  It  is  forced 
to  employ  practically  the  same  categories  in  thinking  this 
mind-stuff  as  in  thinking  matter  of  a  supposedly  physical 
nature.  The  panpsychist  does  not  like  the  matter  which  the 
crude  materialist  or  the  more  naive  type  of  scientist  presents 
him  with ;  moreover,  he  has  a  theory  of  knowledge  which  assures 
him  that  he  cannot  know  any  existent  that  is  different  from 
consciousness.  How  easy  it  is  under  these  circumstances  to 
make  a  matter  out  of  consciousness.  Certain  panpsychists 
are,  however,  frank  enough  to  acknowledge  the  difficulties 
which  ensue.  "The  trouble  is,  that  consciousness  appears  so 
very  much  simpler  a  thing  than  the  brain-process.  When 
we  reflect,  the  disparity  between  the  two  seems  immense:  the 
brain-process  a  concourse  of  moving  molecules  inconceivable 
in  its  complexity;  consciousness  a  tangle  of  half-a-dozen 
feelings,  or  at  most  a  mosaic  of  a  few  hundred."  (Strong, 
Why  the  Mind  Has  a  Body,  p.  353.)  In  short,  consciousness 
and  the  physical  world  simply  cannot  be  flatly  identified. 
Such  an  identification  would  be  the  turning  of  our  back  upon 
the  distinction  which  makes  a  solution  possible.  It  would 
imply  the  invalidity  of  the  knowledge  which  science  achieves 
of  the  physical  world. 

A  still  subtler  form  of  this  mistake  is  to  be  foimd  in 
the  transmission  view  of  the  mind-body  relation  advocated 
by  James.     ("Human  Immortality,"  Ingersoll  Lecture;  and 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   225 

A  Pluralistic  Universe. ")  Consciousness  is  thought  of  as  a  stuff 
existent  in  a  vast  reservoir  independent  of  the  physical  world. 
For  some  reason  it  flows  thence  into  certain  accredited  parts 
of  nature.  In  these  it  is  integrated  and  disintegrated  and 
appears  finally  in  the  form  in  which  we  experience  it.  In  the 
first  place,  we  must  not  be  led  by  the  term  "transmission"  into 
the  supposition  that  we  have  in  this  theory  a  scientific  explana- 
tion. The  word  is  merely  a  metaphor.  Nor  can  we  imder- 
stand  how  the  brain  gives  individuality  to  this  impersonal 
stuff  which  sifts  through  it.  Does  the  brain  constitute  a  mold 
into  which  consciousness  is  poured  like  bronze  into  a  pattern? 
Such  a  mechanical  view  would  of  course  be  rejected  with  scorn, 
but  it  suffices  to  indicate  the  difficulties  which  are  implicit  in 
the  position.  How,  again,  does  a  consciousness  coming  from 
outside  enable  us  to  know  the  physical  world  or  to  assist  the 
organism  to  adapt  itself  to  its  environment?  This  theory 
treats  consciousness  as  a  substance  which  can  be  divided  and 
compounded  and  thus  assigns  it  a  semi-atomic  constitution. 
The  interesting  feature  is,  that  James  wrote  an  excellent 
criticism  of  the  mind-stuff  hypothesis  in  The  Principles  of 
Psychology,  yet,  in  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  a  later  book,  he 
declared  for  a  view  essentially  open  to  all  the  objections  he 
had  previously  formulated  so  clearly.  The  reason  for  this 
change  of  front  was  his  belief  that  he  had  to  choose  between 
the  acceptance  of  a  soul  and  some  form  of  the  mind-stuff 
theory.  Certainly,  this  would  be  an  ungrateful  dilemma; 
but,  like  most  dilemmas,  the  disjunction  is  incomplete.  There 
are  other  possibilities.  Until  these  are  known  to  be  exhausted, 
we  need  not  resign  ourselves  to  a  Hobson's  choice.  The  space 
which  we  have  at  our  command  will  not  permit  an  adequate 
study  of  the  various  forms  of  the  transmission  theory.  At 
best,  we  shall  be  able  to  point  out  some  of  the  difficulties  which 
confront  the  spiritualism  of  M.  Bergson,  who  has  worked 
out  in  more  detail  the  dualistic  conception  of  the  relation  of 
mind  and  body.  Our  purpose  is,  however,  positive  rather 
than  critical;  we  wish  to  show  the  epistemological  and  logical 
satisfactoriness  of  a  more  flexible  naturalism. 

We  are  now  in  a  better  position  to  seek  an  answer  to  the 
question  which  led  to  these  analyses.     Does  the  physical  world 


226  CRITICAL  REALISM 

exclude  consciousness?  We  have  given  the  reason  why  this 
alienness  has  been  acknowledged  by  men  of  science.  It  was 
the  result  of  the  belief  that  the  essence  of  the  physical  is  given 
in  the  attributes,  extension  and  motion.  A  quotation  from 
the  famous  Belfast  Address  of  Tyndall  will,  I  think,  make 
clear  what  the  scientist  has  in  mind  when  he  asserts  that 
consciousness  and  the  brain  are  incompatible.  "We  can 
trace  the  development  of  a  nervous  system  and  correlate  with 
it  the  parallel  phenomena  of  sensation  and  thought.  We  see 
with  undoubting  certainty  that  they  go  hand  in  hand.  But 
we  try  to  soar  in  a  vacuum  the  moment  we  seek  to  comprehend 
the  connection  between  them  .  .  .  There  is  no  fusion 
possible  between  the  two  classes  of  facts — no  motor  energy 
in  the  intellect  of  man  to  carry  it  without  logical  rupture 
from  the  one  to  the  other."  What  is  it  that  Tyndall  has  in 
mind?  Evidently  a  deduction  of  one  class  of  facts  from  the 
other.  He  desired  that  the  two  classes  of  facts  should  fuse. 
But  that  is  obviously  nonsense.  In  both  we  have  knowledge  of 
the  real  world ;  it  does  not  follow,  however,  that  one  is  deducible 
from  the  other.  All  that  we  have  a  right  to  demand  is  that 
they  be  referable  to  the  same  reality  without  logical  conflict. 
In  the  book  entitled  Fragments  of  Science,  Tyndall  makes  the 
same  demand  that  we  be  able  to  pass  by  reasoning  from  the 
knowledge  of  the  brain  acquired  by  physicists  and  physiologists 
to  consciousness.  '  *  The  passage  from  the  physics  of  the  brain 
to  the  corresponding  facts  of  consciousness  is  unthinkable." 
Has  not  the  problem  of  the  mind-body  relation  been  wrongly 
put?  When  we  assert  that  consciousness  is  not  alien  to  the 
physical  world,  we  do  not  mean  that  feeling  can  be  deduced  by 
thought  from  a  motion  or  that  a  motion  can  become  a  feeling. 
Yet  the  dualism  which  science  thinks  it  proves  is  founded  on 
the  negation  of  such  absurdities.  The  demand  itself  seems 
strange  when  we  find  a  chemist  asserting  that  the  qualities 
of  chemical  substances  are  not  deducible  from  the  quantitative 
aspects  which  the  chemist  measures.  (Ostwald,  UEvolution 
d'une  Science — La  Chimie.)  It  is  extremely  interesting  to 
discover  that,  in  spite  of  his  false  assumption  that  conscious- 
ness should  be  deducible  from  the  knowledge  of  the  physical 
which  the  sciences  founded  on  external  perception  acquire, 


75  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   227 

Tyndall  confesses  to  a  belief  in  the  potency  of  matter  to 
produce  every  form  and  quality  of  life.  This  confession  is 
evidence  that  the  physicist  is  not  so  certain  as  he  at  first  seemed 
to  be  of  the  inner  nature  of  matter. 

Philosophy  has  been,  as  a  rule,  harsh  and  dictatorial  in  its 
treatment  of  materialism.  Modem  philosophers  have  usually 
felt  themselves  to  be  defenders  pf  the  ideal  against  the  cold 
naturalism  of  science.  This  is  the  case  with  even  such  a 
veracious  thinker  as  Lange.  {History  of  Materialism.) 
The  primacy  of  consciousness  for  theory  of  knowledge  is  used 
as  a  dialectical  instrument  to  bewilder  where  it  does  not 
convince.  The  result  is  that  the  impartial  observer  is  im- 
pressed with  the  belief  that  the  victory  of  philosophy  over 
materialism  is  more  a  semblance  than  a  reality.  Should  not 
philosophy  have  examined  the  concept  of  matter  more  closely 
and  taken  into  consideration  the  motives  and  reasons  which 
have  led  so  many  earnest  minds  to  materialism  or  semi- 
materialism?  The  common  error  of  materialists  and  anti- 
materialists  alike  is  to  commence  their  thinking  with  a  stereo- 
typed idea  of  the  physical  world.  The  result  has  been 
a  series  of  barren,  wrangling  controversies  in  which  the 
idealist  has  demonstrated  amid  plaudits  "that  Materialism, 
in  attempting  to  deduce  the  mental  from  the  physical,  puts 
into  the  conclusion  what  the  very  terms  have  excluded  from 
the  premises."  (Lewes,  The  Physical  Basis  of  Mind,  Preface.) 
But  must  these  terms  be  so  conceived  that  the  conclusion  is 
excluded  from  the  premises?  This  is  the  real  point  at  issue. 
Philosophers  should  not  consider  it  their  sufficient  duty  to 
point  out  dialectical  errors,  but  should  assist  in  the  construc- 
tion of  as  adequate  ideas  of  nature  as  possible.  Perhaps  the 
physicist  has  had  a  wrong  conception  of  the  extent  and 
nature,  of  the  knowledge  he  achieves.  It  may  be  true 
knowledge  of  nature  yet  not  complete  knowledge  of  nature. 

True  knowledge  may  exclude  that  which  claims  to  be 
further  knowledge  if  an  incongruity  or  contradiction  would 
ensue  from  its  acceptance.  Does,  perchance,  the  alienness  of 
consciousness  to  the  physical  mean  that  the  two  are  incon- 
gruous? I  think  that  it  is  often  supposed  that  this  is  the 
situation.     It  is  asserted  to  be  the  height  of  absurdity  to 


228  CRITICAL   REALISM 

seek  to  harmonize  things  so  different  from  each  other  as  con- 
sciousness and  the  physical.  Can  you  measure  love  by  a 
yardstick  or  weigh  intelligence  ?  it  is  asked.  I  remember  that 
a  prominent  theologian,  the  president  of  a  theological  semi- 
nary, is  said  to  have  silenced  some  dogmatic  materialists 
by  such  an  interrogation.  And  at  first  glance,  the  objection 
seems  final.  But  is  not  the  old  fallacy  at  work  here  which  we 
exposed  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs?  Love  is  not  a  physical 
thing,  nor  is  intelligence  physical.  Love  is  an  emotion  and, 
therefore,  of  the  nature  of  consciousness.  We  have  seen, 
however,  that  consciousness  is  not  a  substance  and  does  not  lay 
claim  to  be  a  thing  among  other  things  in  a  spatial  and  causal 
connection.  It  is,  therefore,  nonsense  to  apply  the  same 
categories  to  consciousness  as  to  the  physical  world.  The 
physical  world  may  be  extended  and  its  parts  have  weight 
and  yet  be  conscious,  that  is,  have  consciousness  within  it 
as  a  part  of  its  nature.  The  judgment  of  incongruity  rests 
on  a  misunderstanding.  When  we  assert  that  consciousness 
is  not  alien  to  the  physical  as  an  existent,  we  do  not  mean 
that  the  same  categories  are  applicable  to  the  physical  as  known 
by  the  physical  sciences  and  to  consciousness,  or  that  the  physical 
as  it  is  conceived  by  common  sense  or  the  naive  scientist  is 
logically  classifiable  with  the  psychical  as  this  is  conceived  by 
common  sense.  The  logic  of  classes  of  objects  as  conceived 
by  common  sense  leads  to  incongruity.  Thus  incongruity  is  a 
result  of  a  point  of  view  and  is  no  more  final  than  the  point  of 
view  itself.  What  we  wish  to  do  is  to  get  back  of  this  super- 
ficial view  of  the  physical  which  identifies  the  physical  with  the 
knowledge  we  have  gained  of  it  through  the  external  sciences. 
Does,  then,  the  alienness  of  consciousness  refer  to  a  contra- 
diction? If  so,  there  must  be  some  property  of  the  physical 
which  contradicts  consciousness  so  that  it  is  impossible  to 
assert  them  both  of  the  same  thing.  The  argument  is  some- 
what as  follows:  Just  as  you  cannot  think  a  geometrical 
figure  as  roimd  and  square  at  the  same  time  and  have  a  self- 
consistent  thought,  so  you  cannot  assert  consciousness  of  a 
subject  which  possesses  this  other  property.  This  is  the 
character  of  the  objection  advanced  by  Busse  against  material- 
ism.    "Psychical   and   physical   characteristics  exclude  one 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   229 

another;  spaceless  thoughts  and  feelings  which  are  neither 
thick  nor  thin,  neither  long  nor  short,  neither  round  nor 
angular,  neither  moved  nor  unmoved,  can  in  no  way  be  the 
characteristics  of  a  spatial-material  thing."  {Zeitschrift  fir 
Philosophie  und  Philosophische  Kritik,  Band  114-115.)  It  will 
be  well  to  point  out,  first  of  all,  that  the  problem  is  not  whether 
the  properties  of  the  physical  as  known  conflict  with  the 
properties  of  consciousness.  We  are  not  trying  to  identify 
two  subjects  with  each  other,  but  are  trying  to  enlarge  our 
conception  of  the  one  so  that  it  will  include  the  other  without 
a  logical  conflict.  When  Busse  asserts  that  feelings,  which 
are  spaceless,  cannot  be  the  characteristics  of  a  spatial 
thing,  he  evidently  thinks  that  the  assignment  of  feelings 
implies  the  proposition  that  things  •  must  be  spatial  and 
spaceless  at  the  same  time.  This  is  a  mistake.  As  classes 
thought  about  by  scientists,  the  physical  and  the  psychical 
have  contradictory  attributes.  This  fact  must  not  be 
confused  with  the  question  whether  the  physical  as  an 
existent  can  absorb  consciousness.  When  we  come  to 
treat  of  the  relation  of  consciousness  to  the  brain  in  a  more 
detailed  way,  the  difference  which  I  have  in  mind  will  stand 
out  more  clearly.  Consciousness  will  be  seen  to  be  not  an 
external  attribute,  but  a  part  of  reality.  Of  course  this 
position  is  not  exactly  like  materialism,  but  it  is  nearer  to  it 
than  to  idealism.  Were  I  inclined  to  lay  much  stress  upon 
the  argument  advanced  by  Busse,  I  would  point  out  the  fact 
that  qualities  such  as  color  are  assigned  by  common  sense  to 
physical  things,  although  they  are  spaceless.  Does  not  Hume 
somewhere  raise  the  question  of  how  savors  and  perfumes  are 
in  things  as  their  qualities?  All  that  logic  enables  us  to  say  is, 
that  contradictory  attributes  shall  not  be  predicated  of  the 
same  thing  and  that  classes  with  contradictory  attributes 
cannot  be  identified;  it  does  not  give  us  the  right  to  say  that 
the  attribute  of  an  attribute  must  be  uncontradictory  of  an 
associated  attribute.  The  assertion  that  matter  is  conscious 
under  certain  circumstances  does  not,  because  consciousness 
is  imextended,  conflict  with  the  assertion  that  matter  is  ex- 
tended. This  is  an  affair  of  logic.  Later  we  shall  see  that, 
in    a    very    real    sense,    consciousness    is    extended.     This 

16 


230  CRITICAL  REALISM 

statement  will  seem  absurd  to  those  who  think  that  only- 
things  can  be  extended.  I  can  only  ask  them  to  have  patience 
until  I  can  take  up  the  topic.  It  is  interesting  that  Locke  saw 
no  contradiction  in  the  association  of  consciousness  with 
matter,  although  he  believed  that  matter  is  evidently  in  its  own 
nature  void  of  sense  and  thought.  (Essay,  Bk.  IV,  Chap.  III.) 
I  think  that  we  must  agree  with  Locke  as  to  the  absence  of 
contradiction. 

If  there  be  no  incongruity  or  contradiction  in  the  assign- 
ment of  consciousness  to  the  physical,  the  only  possible  reason 
which  could  prevent  such  a  reference  would  be  a  knowledge 
that  nature  is  void  of  consciousness.  We  have  seen  that  this 
is  the  usual  view,  and  it  is  certainly  that  held  by  Locke.  But 
how  can  anyone  prove  that  the  physical  is  necessarily  void  of 
consciousness  unless  its  presence  involves  a  contradiction? 
And  Locke  himself  has  pointed  out  the  empirical  character  of 
our  knowledge  of  coexistence  and  repugnancy  to  coexistence. 
All  any  advocate  of  the  alienness  to  consciousness  of  the 
physical  can  do  is  to  state  that  his  concept  of  the  physical  does 
not  include  either  consciousness  or  the  potentiality  of  con- 
sciousness, which  statement  would  be  interesting  as  a  fact,  but 
would  scarcely  prove  anything. 

But  there  is  another  aspect  of  this  problem  which  is  of 
special  importance  because  it  brings  to  the  front  the  implica- 
tions of  change.  The  full  treatment  of  change  will  come 
under  the  category  of  time  (a  category  to  be  analyzed  in  a 
succeeding  volume);  however,  certain  points  can  be  touched 
upon  now.  What  we  wish  to  call  attention  to  is  the  tendency 
to  disregard  the  penetrative  workings  of  change  in  nature. 
Locke  rests  his  case  against  materialism  seemingly  upon  a 
denial  of  any  real  change  in  the  physical.  (Ibid,  Bk.  IV., 
Chap.  X.)  What  is  wholly  void  of  knowledge  cannot  produce 
a  knowing  being.  This  is  as  impossible  as  "that  a  triangle 
should  make  itself  three  angles  bigger  than  two  right  ones." 
A  similar  protest  against  the  appearance  of  consciousness 
in  a  world  evolved  from  nebulous  matter  is  often  voiced  by 
believers  in  continuity.  Does  the  principle  of  continuity  ex- 
clude newness  in  nature?  Let  us  examine  Locke's  argument 
first,  and  afterwards  analyze  the  principle  of  continuity. 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   231 

Locke's  argiiment  is  of  a  logical  character  and  is,  in  essen- 
tials, the  traditional  one  employed  against  naturalism.  There 
lurks  in  it  a  subtle  fallacy  founded  on  a  misinterpretation  of 
the  negative  and  on  a  mathematical  conception  of  the  nature 
of  the  physical.  Is  the  physical  known  to  be  senseless  ?  That 
is,  can  senselessness  be  regarded  as  a  positive  characteristic 
which  excludes  sentiency  as  roundness  precludes  squareness? 
We  can  undoubtedly  state  that  a  mass  of  matter  in  a  nebulous 
condition  is  not  conscious,  but  this  assertion  must  not  be 
interpreted  to  mean  that  it  possesses  unconsciousness;  that  is, 
that  it  has  an  essence  alien  to  consciousness.  But  such  is  the 
conception  implied  in  Locke's  comparison.  A  triangle  is  an 
object  with  determinate  characteristics ;  its  essence  is  laid  bare 
in  the  definition.  When  it  loses  this  it  ceases  to  be  a  triangle ; 
it  has  outraged  its  nature.  We  will  acknowledge  with  Locke 
that  this  feat  is  impossible,  for  the  simple  reason  that  mathe- 
matical objects  do  not  change.  Time  does  not  enter  into  their 
nature.  They  are  conceptual  constructions  determined  by  the 
character  of  conceptual  space.  Is  matter  something  logically 
fixed  with  its  nature  determined  once  and  for  all  as  a  triangle 
is?  Such  a  logical  rationalism  has  more  than  once  dominated 
man's  view  of  reality.  In  such  a  world,  reason  can  disregard 
Time  as  a  blustering  intruder  who  arrogates  to  himself  more 
than  is  his  due.  Change  is  not  penetrative  for  this  outlook. 
But  is  nature  logically  determined  as  a  mathematical  ob- 
ject or  a  mathematical  system  is?  Philosophy  has  no  right 
to  assert  it  unless  it  can  be  proved  or  unless  its  assumption 
enables  the  thinker  to  organize  experience  in  a  way  not  other- 
wise possible.  Let  us  come  back  to  the  question  of  the 
interpretation  of  the  negative.  Is  not  a  negative  which  cannot 
be  transformed  into  a  positive  term  merely  expressive  of  the 
absence  of  a  certain  positive  term?  It  does  not  involve 
the  assertion  of  a  contradictory  positive  term.  Perhaps  I  can 
make  my  argument  clearer  by  means  of  an  example.  If  I 
assert  that  a  certain  liquid  is  colorless,  do  I  mean  more  than 
that  it  does  not  have  any  color?  I  do  not  assert  the  presence 
of  an  attribute  which  is  contradictory  of  color.  Suppose  I 
take  it  for  granted  that  an  object  must  have  some  color;  then, 
if  I  say  that  an  "object  is  not  red,  I  know  that  it  must  be  brown 


232  CRITICAL  REALISM 

or  yellow  or  purple,  or  what  not.  A  negative  in  this  case 
implies  some  positive  of  the  same  class.  Thus  a  negative 
varies  with  the  context.  If  the  context  is  disjunctive,  the 
negative  is,  implicitly  at  least,  a  positive ;  if  the  context  is  not 
disjunctive,  this  is  not  the  case.  Thus  Locke  argues  that, 
because  matter  is  at  one  time  void  of  knowledge,  it  must 
always  remain  so.  Voidness  of  knowledge  is  taken  as  a 
positive  characteristic  defining  matter  which  excludes  knowl- 
edge, even  as  the  equality  of  the  angles  of  a  triangle  to  two 
right  angles  excludes  equality  to  three  right  angles.  In  the 
case  of  the  triangle,  the  system  is  such  that  there  is  no  negative 
which  is  not  implicitly  a  positive.  However,  when  we  turn 
to  the  physical  world  as  an  evolving  process  we  realize  that 
absences  are  not  positive  characteristics  which  hinder  the 
production  of  new  positive  ones.  Nature  is  not  a  geometrical 
system,  and  negatives  are  empirical  interrogations  founded 
on  the  absence  o%  some  attributes  and  the  presence  of  others. 
Nature  moves,  not  from  negative  to  positive  or  from  posi- 
tive to  negative,  but  from  one  positive  condition  to  another; 
and  it  is  probable  that  these  changes  are  more  gradual  than 
our  concepts  are  capable  of  expressing.  Thought  cannot 
dictate  to  nature,  yet  nature  dictates  to  thought.  It  does 
not  pass  from  privation  to  possession,  but  from  possession  to 
possession. 

While  we  are  touching  upon  the  logic  of  the  negative,  it 
may  be  worth  our  while  to  note  another  attempt  to  apply  it 
against  consciousness.  Rehmke  argues  that  consciousness 
cannot  be  an  intermittent  characteristic  of  the  physical,  because 
reality  shows  us  no  instance  where  a  special  characteristic  of  a 
body  vanishes  without  another  of  the  same  kind  taking  its 
place.  A  color  always  replaces  another  color.  But,  as  Busse 
points  out,  when  a  body  loses  a  straight  motion,  it  does  not 
have  to  move  in  some  other  way;  it  can  become  motionless. 
Thus  motion  would  be  intermittent.  But,  so  far  as  we  know, 
consciousness  is  sui  generis,  and  this  type  of  argument  does  not 
touch  our  problem  very  deeply.  It  is  evident,  I  think,  that 
formal  logic  cannot  prove  that  nature  is  alien  to  consciousness. 
Experience  alone  can  decide  the  question. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  discuss  the  principle  of  continuity 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?  233 

in  its  relation  to  the  presence  of  consciousness  in  the  world. 
The  majority  of  thinkers  appeal  to  this  principle  as  though  it 
were,  susceptible  of  only  one  interpretation.  Thus  James 
asserts  that ' '  If  evolution  is  to  work  smoothly,  consciousness  in 
some  shape  must  have  been  present  at  the  very  origin  of 
things."  {Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  p.  149.)  This  state- 
ment arises  out  of  his  belief  that  the  brain  is  nothing  but  the 
self  same  atoms  which  make  the  nebula,  jambed  and  temporarily 
caught  in  peculiar  positions.  For  this  view  the  relations  between 
the  atoms  are  external,  and  organizations  which  are  more  than 
arrangements  do  not  exist  for  nature.  I,  on  the  contrary, 
take  evolution  to  mean  the  development  of  wholes  which  are 
not  merely  collections  of  units.  For  the  mechanical  rationalist, 
there  is  nothing  new  in  the  brain  except  the  rapidity  with  which 
the  atoms  strike  one  another  and  the  paths  traversed  by  the 
moving  particles.  But  these  could  supposedly  be  deduced 
from  the  past  and  are  not,  therefore,  considered  new.  We 
have  in  this  outlook  the  application  of  the  mechanical  form 
of  the  principle  of  ground  and  consequent.  By  the  very  nature 
of  the  system,  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  is  changed  into 
that  of  sameness.  Mechanical  rationalism  has  a  transpar- 
ent nature,  and  this  transparency  precludes  newness.  Thus 
Strong,  who  follows  James,  states  that  "The  worst  difficulty  of 
materialism  was  to  explain  how  in  the  midst  of  a  purely 
material  world  such  things  as  minds  could  ever  arise."  (Why 
the  Mind  Has  a  Body,  p.  292;  italics  mine.)  The  argument 
is  evidently  of  this  character:  Granted  the  alienness  of  the 
physical  and  consciousness,  reason  cannot  connect  them;  and 
so  the  appearance  of  consciousness  is  inexplicable  and  against 
the  principle  of  sufficient  reason.  But  we  have  tried  to 
show  that  there  is  no  warrant  for  the  assumption  that 
consciousness  is  alien  to  the  physical;  and  we  must  not 
confuse  rationality  and  sameness.  I  see  no  justification 
for  the  rather  current  position  that  intelligence  is  limited 
to  the  connection  of  the  same  with  the  same  in  series.  All 
depends  on  the  nature  of  the  system  within  which  intelligence 
is  at  work.  A  true  empiricism,  on  the  other  hand,  recognizes 
that  newness  occurs  in  nature  as  it  does  in  our  experience. 
The  conditions  of  the  rise  of  the  new  should  be  investigated. 


234  CRITICAL  REALISM 

but  this  does  not  mean  that  the  new  can  be  reduced  to  the  old 
in  any  absolute  sense.  Thus  the  biologist  sees  the  rise  of  new 
organs  in  the  animal  kingdom  but  his  explanation  of  them 
consists  in  showing  what  function  they  perform  and  how  this 
function  is  demanded  by  the  relation  of  the  organism  to  the 
environment.  If  evolution  is  to  be  taken  seriously  by  science, 
the  principle  of  continuity  must  not  be  taken  to  exclude 
newness.  I  must  confess,  then,  that  the  assertion  of  James 
that  * '  If  evolution  is  to  work  smoothly,  consciousness  in  some 
shape  must  have  been  present  at  the  very  origin  of  things" 
seems  to  me  a  bit  of  dogmatism. 

It  is  interesting  that  Bradley  does  not  feel  the  same  objec- 
tion to  the  origin  of  consciousness  from  what  we  usually  speak 
of  as  physical  conditions.  "We  might  have  at  one  moment 
a  material  arrangement  and  at  the  next  moment  we  might 
find  that  this  arrangement  was  modified,  and  was  accom- 
panied by  a  certain  degree  of  soul.  Even  if  this  as  a  fact 
does  not  happen,  I  can  find  absolutely  no  reason  to  doubt 
that  it  is  possible,  nor  does  it  seem  to  me  to  clash  with  our 
preceding  view."  {Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  337,  second 
edition.)  Of  course,  Bradley  must  not  be  considered  a  material- 
ist because  of  his  denial  of  the  dogmatic  use  made  by  some 
writers  of  the  principle  of  continuity.  For  him  the  relation 
of  mind  and  body  is,  in  its  essence,  inexplicable  because  the 
two  are  not  realities;  they  are  phenomenal  series  artificially 
abstracted  from  the  whole,  and  each  is  self-contradictory 
{ibid,  p.  336).  I,  on  the  other  hand,  regard  our  knowl- 
edge to  hold,  not  of  phenomena,  but  of  reality.  Hence,  the 
assignment  of  consciousness  to  an  evolved  physical  organism 
is  regarded  by  me  as  a  solution  of  the  problem,  so  far  as  meta- 
physics is  concerned.  There  are,  however,  certain  further 
difficulties  of  a  more  specific  character  which  must  be  cleared 
away  before  the  absorption  of  consciousness  by  the  physical 
world  can  be  thought  without  seeming  contradiction. 

It  may  be  asserted  that  what  is  active  cannot  also  be  con- 
scious. Since,  however,  it  is  the  very  nature  of  consciousness 
according  to  modem  views  to  be  associated  with,  and  expressed 
in,  conduct,  there  can  be  no  difficulty  as  regards  activity  in 
general.     The  objection  constantly  raised  concerns  a  supposed 


75  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?  235 

divergence  in  the  type  of  activity  characteristic  of  each. 
Consciousness,  it  is  said,  is  purposive  and  recognizes  values, 
while  the  physical  is  mechanical  and  is  blind  to  worth.  Many 
of  the  keenest  thinkers  proclaim  this  contrast  to  be  ultimate 
and  irreducible.  Busse,  for  instance,  maintains  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  give  the  physical  correlate  for  all  psychical  processes. 
The  mechanization  of  the  psychical  processes  is  the  logical 
result  of  the  attempt  to  find  parallels.  The  attitude  taken 
by  Ziehen  {Outlines  of  Physiological  Psychology)  or  the 
special-science  view  of  psychology  adopted  by  Miinsterberg 
is  the  result  of  the  pressure  exerted  by  the  exact  sciences. 
Granted  the  validity  of  the  usual  mechanical  theories  of 
association  on  the  neurological  side,  and  it  certainly  seems 
impossible  to  understand  how  there  can  be  correlates  of 
judgment.  Wundt  places  stress  on  values,  but  I  see  no  reason 
why  judgments  of  values  should  be  regarded  as  more  difficult 
to  explain  than  other  kinds  of  judgments.  (Wundt,  Phil- 
osophische  Studien,  Band  10.)  May  not  the  difficulty  be  that 
Psychology  has  been  too  submissive  to  the  other  sciences? 
Instead  of  accepting  neurological  theories  obviously  domi- 
nated by  ideals  unsympathetic  with  her  material,  she  should 
have  insisted  on  the  probability  that  association  involves 
more  than  the  mechanical  hypothesis  of  pervious  paths 
and  drainage  accounts  for.  That  a  science  should  evis- 
cerate itself  because  of  undue  modesty  is  not  a  good  thing, 
unless  it  be  knoA^vnti  that  it  really  has  no  subject-matter  of  its 
own  on  which  it  can  rely.  I  see  no  reason  why  psychology 
should  not  dictate  to  neurology  or,  at  least,  make  suggestions 
to .  it.  Only  through  the  relative  autonomy  of  the  sciences 
can  adequate  concepts  be  developed.  Thus  we  may  conclude 
that  only  he  who  can  prove  that  the  physical,  no  matter  how 
it  is  organized,  must  act  mechanically  has  a  right  to  assert 
that  consciousness  and  the  physical  conflict  irreconcilably 
in  their  type  of  activity.  But,  if  evolution  is  more  than 
appearance,  it  surely  implies  a  change  in  the  mode  of  activity 
of  parts  of  nature;  that  is,  nature  is  not  a  dead-level  system. 
Instead,  it  develops  grades  of  causal  activity  as  it  evolves. 
The  full  treatment  of  this  view  must  be  postponed  until 
the   category  of   causality  is   examined.      (See,  however,   a 


236  CRITICAL  REALISM 

brief  resume  of  the  position  in  the  Journal  of  Philosophy, 
Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  VI.,  p.  323.)  Suffice  it 
to  assert  that  there  is  no  adequate  reason  to  deny  that  the 
physical  world  rises  to  the  level  of  purposive  activity,  and  that 
consciousness  is  an  immanently  produced  variant  in  such 
a  physical   world. 

Let  us  continue  to  remember  that  the  physical  sciences 
which  investigate  nature  on  the  basis  of  our  thing-experiences 
cannot  perceive  values.  That  does  not  enter  into  their 
material.  Even  when  they  consider  the  conduct  of  a  man,  they 
can  only  judge  that  his  behavior  is  as  though  he  gave  heed  to 
values.  To  talk  of  the  physical  world  as  blind  to  values 
would  be  justified  only  if  organisms  acted  as  stones  do.  Surely 
man  is  a  part  of  nature.  Only  the  thinker  who  degrades 
nature  finds  naturalism  degrading.  Much  of  the  difficulty 
that  is  being  found  with  the  view  that  every  process  in  con- 
sciousness has  its  physical  correlate  comes  from  the  special 
turn  given  to  it  by  parallelism.  Hence,  we  must  examine 
parallelism. 

Parallelism  has  two  meanings,  the  empirical  and  the 
metaphysical.  The  metaphysical  goes  back  to  Spinoza. 
Mind  and  body  are  supposed  to  be  two  aspects  of  the  same 
substance.  To  every  soul  there  is  a  body  and  to  every  body 
a  soul.  Thus,  there  must  be  the  most  minute  correspondence 
between  these  attributes,  since  they  are  grounded  in  one 
substance.  To  the  Spinozistic  position,  we  can  but  reply 
that  it  has  insuperable  difficulties  to  face  and  does  not  seem 
to  agree  with  the  empirical  facts  so  far  as  we  can  determine 
them.  How  are  these  attributes  related  to  the  one  substance? 
As  attributes,  why  should  they  correspond  in  the  peculiar 
way  that  mind  and  body  do  ?  Does  it  not  further  involve  the 
extension  of  mind  to  all  parts  of  nature  in  a  purely  deductive 
fashion?  We  remember  that  the  theory  of  Spinoza  was 
founded  on  the  two-substance  theory  of  Descartes,  and  we  have 
already  denied  the  validity  of  the  Cartesian  formulation. 
The  essence  of  the  physical  is  not  extension.  Instead  of 
having  two  apparently  alien  realities  to  unite  by  making 
them  attributes  of  an  unknown  substance, — -a  formal  or 
logical  union  at  its  best, — we  have  challenged  the  premises, 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   237 

or  matrix,  out  of  which  Spinoza's  position  was  developed.* 
When  we  come  to  examine  modem  metaphysical  paralleHsm 
more  closely,  we  begin  to  wonder  what  it  means.  Is  it  more 
than  a  metaphor?  To  speak  of  consciousness  and  the  body 
as  two  sides  of  the  same  thing,  or  as  comparable  to  two  lan- 
guages, or  to  the  concave  and  convex  sides  of  a  sphere  is  to 
appeal  to  imagination.  Does  it  mean  that  the  elements  and 
relations  of  one  correspond,  point  for  point,  with  the  elements 
of  the  other?  If  so,  the  mind  is  a  duplication  of  the  brain  in 
another  stuff.  You  simply  have  two  stuffs  where  one  would 
do,  and  nature  has  sinned  in  its  inmost  depths  against  the 
principle  of  economy.  So  far  as  parallelism  condemns  inter- 
action, it  stands  for  the  independence  of  each  separate  realm 
and  for  the  claim  that  the  physical  can  be  explained  only 
through  the  physical,  and  the  psychical  through  the  psychical. 
Moreover,  it  holds  that  such  explanation  is  satisfactory  to 
the  reason.  To  this  construction,  it  should  be  replied  that 
consciousness  is  not  a  stuff  or  substance.  This  we  have  shown 
in  some  detail.  Therefore,  it  is  nonsense  to  speak  of  the 
elements  and  relations  of  the  one  as  corresponding  to  the 
elements  and  relations  of  the  other.  It  is  of  the  very  nature 
of  consciousness  to  be  temporary  and  unconserved.  To  this 
the  advocate  of  parallelism  may  reply  that  consciousness  is 
like  an  electric  illumination  which  temporarily  takes  on  the 
form  of  the  letters  which  the  bulbs  spell.  But  this  is  to 
acknowledge  that  consciousness  comes  and  goes.  The  con- 
sequence is,  that  reason  asks  why  it  comes  and  goes  and  why  it 
takes  this  form.  If  mind  is  distinct  from  consciousness  and 
is  a  stuff,  it  is  unknown  except  through  consciousness.  It 
performs  the  function  of  a  soul  only  in  so  far  as  it  produces 
consciousness  and  is  open  to  all  the  epistemological  objections 
that  have  discredited  that  entity.  And  if  mind  is  different 
from  consciousness  and  is  unknown,  why  not  call  it  matter 
and  escape  an  uneconomical  duplication.  In  truth,  we  move 
here  in  a  mass  of  concepts  and  dilemmas  which  have  no  episte- 
mological foundation.  Parallelism  belongs  to  pre-Kantian 
metaphysics. 

i"The  one  substance  which  is  supposed  to  manifest  itself  in  two  attributes,  the  physical 
and  the  psychical,  is  nothing  but  a  word  which  expresses  the  desire  to  escape  from  dualism,  but 
which  does  not  really  bridge  the  gulf  for  our  understanding."  (Stumpf.  Leib  und  Seele,  p.  i6; 
quoted  from  McDougall,  Body  and  Mind,  p.  i6o.) 


238  CRITICAL  REALISM 

Let  us,  then,  keep  to  consciousness.  Since  conscious- 
ness is  given,  we  can  ask  ourselves  whether  it  contains 
elements  and  relations  corresponding  to  the  atoms  and  mole- 
cules or  electrons  or  cells  of  which  science  speaks.  To  ask 
the  question  is  to  answer  it.  The  empiricist  knows  that 
continuity  and  wholeness  is  the  characteristic  of  consciousness. 
Granted  the  usual  mechanical  view  of  the  physical  world,  the 
parallelism  of  consciousness  to  it  is  absurd.  Yet  there  is 
a  sense  in  which  the  demand  for  parallelism  has  meaning: 
consciousness  must  fit  into  the  physical.  Later  we  shall  show 
that  it  does  fit  into  the  physical  and  is  absorbed  by  it.  But 
with  such  an  absorption,  parallelism  disappears,  since  dualism, 
which  is  its  premise,  is  forsaken.  Again,  as  interactionists 
have  shown,  the  physical,  as  this  is  conceived  by  scientists, 
cannot  account  for  all  events  in  its  domain.  Only  he  who 
is  ridden  by  a  dogma  can  believe  that  the  acts  of  a  man  are 
explained  by  physics  and  chemistry.  Let  us  stop  a  moment 
to  consider  this  point  before  we  examine  the  theory  of  inter- 
action. 

There  is  an  order  in  human  conduct  which  demands 
explanation.  All  that  occurs  in  nature  involves  quantities 
and  is  so  far  known  by  science;  all  brain-events  involve 
chemical  processes  and  are  theoretically  knowable  by  chem- 
istry. But  these  chemical  events  have  a  context  of  conditions ; 
and  the  question  is,  whether  or  not  this  context  which  acts  as  a 
control  is  properly  reducible  to  a  series  connected  only  exter- 
nally. Until  organic  chemistry  faces  this  problem  of  control, 
it  cannot  be  said  to  deal  adequately  with  the  peculiar 
characteristic  of  behavior.  As  a  special  science,  has  it  not 
limited  itself  ?  Therefore,  it  has  not  the  right  to  dictate  to 
biology.  In  short,  the  categories  of  the  special  sciences 
reflect  their  point  of  view. 

We  criticised  parallelism  of  a  metaphysical  sort  mainly 
because  of  its  meaninglessness.  If  mind  and  body  merely 
duplicate  each  other  and  both  are  capable  of  doing  what  the 
other  does,  their  coexistence  is  a  marvel.  Moreover,  meta- 
physical parallelism  is  deductive  in  character  and  goes  far 
beyond  what  experience  justifies. 

Now,  interactionists  are  more  empirical  than  parallelists. 


75  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAU   239 

They  try  to  keep  to  the  differences  between  the  action  of  mind 
and  the  action  of  the  physical  as  these  have  ordinarily  been 
conceived.  The  interactionist  accepts  the  mechanical  view 
of  nature  and  shows  that  nature  must,  therefore,  be  supple- 
mented by  mind  in  order  to  accoimt  for  human  conduct. 
If  we  grant  the  premises,  the  conclusion  appears  to  follow 
inevitably.  We  shall  not  lay  stress  on  the  hackneyed  argu- 
ments against  interactionism  based  on  the  principle  of  the 
conservation  of  energy.  Were  this  principle  all  that  stood 
in  the  way,  it  could  not  be  adjudged  a  sufficient  obstacle. 
The  real  obstacle  which  interactionism  must  meet  is  the 
justification  of  a  soul.  We  know  nothing  of  a  mind  or  soul 
substance  coordinate  with  the  physical  world.  Experience 
indicates  consciousness,  the  mind,  and  the  physical.  The 
question  is:  How  are  these  related?  Until  it  is  proved  that 
they  cannot  be  united  without  a  dualism,  theories,  like  parallel- 
ism and  interactionism,  are  out  of  order. 

We  pass  next  to  what  we  have  called  the  empirical  meaning 
of  parallelism.  I  have  always  been  inclined  to  call  this  a 
temporal  parallelism  while  the  metaphysical  parallelism  has 
seemed  to  me  to  be  founded  on  spatial  concepts.  Now,  the 
facts  appear  to  indicate  that,  to  a  series  of  pulses  of  con- 
sciousness, A  B  C,  Si  series  of  brain-states,  X  Y  Z,  correspond. 
In  this  sense,  they  are  mathematical  functions  of  each  other. 
We  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  each  brain-state  is 
unique  and  that  each  pulse  of  consciousness  is  likewise  unique 
and  irrecoverable.  This  belief  is  founded  on  the  facts  which 
point  to  the  relative  localization  of  sensory  areas  and  on  the 
part  played  by  the  association  tracts.  Such  an  empirical 
parallelism,  which  is  essentially  temporal  and  bespeaks  a 
correspondence  of  brain-states  (and  not  of  material  elements 
and  their  relations)  to  the  temporally  coincident  phases  of 
the  individual's  consciousness,  is  a  scientific  hypothesis  which 
has  so  far  been  supported  by  investigation.  It  is  free  from 
the  absurdities  of  the  older  metaphysical  forms  of  parallelism. 
It  does  not  assume  that  consciousness  is  a  substance  or  that 
it  is  an  evanescent  copy  of  the  physical  world.  The  psychol- 
ogist does  seek  to  show,  however,  that  to  such  a  mental 
activity  as  association,   which  lies  back  of  such  temporal 


240  CRITICAL  REALISM 

processes  as  memory,  recognition,  and  reasoning,  there  cor- 
responds the  spreading  of  excitement  along  the  association 
fibres  of  the  brain.  There  is  thus  a  correspondence  of  method 
in  the  two  domains. 

The  clearest  denial  of  this  empirical  form  of  parallelism  is 
to  be  found,  not  in  interactionism,  because  this  is  opposed 
to  metaphysical  parallelism,  but  in  the  position  of  M.  Bergson 
who  flatly  denies  that  there  is  a  unique  series  on  both  sides. 
"If  we  take  a  given  brain-state,"  he  says,  "I  believe  that 
many  psychological  [psychical]  states  are  able  to  graft  them- 
selves on  it."  {Bulletin  de  la  SocUt^  Francaise  de  Philosophie, 
May  2,  1 90 1.)  This  view  claims  to  be  founded  on  observation, 
although  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  conceive  how  observation 
can  perform  the  task  assigned.  Let  us  glance  at  the  method 
he  adopted.  He  passed  to  the  most  complicated  part  of 
nature,  the  brain,  and  concentrated  his  attention  on  the  part 
of  the  brain  which  conditions  a  certain  function  of  speech. 
On  the  mental  side,  he  abstracted  from  the  higher  and  more 
complex  mental  processes  and  sought  to  analyze  the  memory 
of  words,  especially  the  memory  of  the  soimds  of  words.  "I 
was,"  he  asserts,  "this  time  on  the  frontier;  I  was  almost 
touching  the  cerebral  event  in  which  the  auditory  vibration 
continues  itself.  And  yet  there  was  a  separation.  I  saw, 
at  the  precise  moment  when  the  psychical  fact  is  going  to  double 
itself  with  a  cerebral  concomitant,  why  and  how  the  thought 
has  need  to  develop  in  movement  in  space  all  that  which  it 
encloses  of  possible  action,  all  that  which  it  has  of  motor 
quality."  {Ibid,  pp.  48-49.)  Introspection  and  theory  are 
strangely  mingled  in  this  description,  so  that  theory  almost 
masquerades  as  fact.  What  have  we  here  more  than  the 
statement  that  every  psychical  fact  has  motor  consequences, 
that  images  and  ideas  are  qualified  with  kinaesthetic  meanings, 
and  that  the  purely  sensory  is  an  abstraction?  How,  indeed, 
from  the  very  nature  of  the  case  could  M.  Bergson  know 
that  the  psychical  fact  is  at  first  alone  and  only  later  takes  to 
itself  a  cerebral  state  to  express  its  motor  nature?  The  basis 
of  this  position  is  determined  by  a  theory  of  matter  and  a 
theory  of  perception.  The  brain  for  M.  Bergson  is  a  system 
of  possible  reactions  on  things,  and  consists  entirely  of  paths 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   241 

along  which  a  stimulus  may  travel.  The  result  is  that  the 
sensory  correspondence  of  the  brain  is  eliminated  from  the 
start.  It  is  no  wonder,  then,  that  many  thoughts  may 
connect  themselves  with  one  cerebral  event.  If  we  grant  his 
interpretation  of  the  brain  and  of  perception,  all  that  is  needed 
further  is  the  acknowledgment  that  many  trains  of  thought 
may  express  themselves  in  the  same  overt  action.  But  this  fact 
is  accepted  by  parallelism  of  the  empirical  type  also.  The  parts 
of  M.  Bergson's  hypothesis  do  not  stand  alone;  we  have  to  do 
with  a  system  which  is  in  nearly  every  detail  different  from 
that  which  we  have  felt  ourselves  forced  to  construct.  What 
M.  Bergson  has  brought  out  excellently  is  the  fact  that  there 
are  different  levels  in  consciousness  and  that  the  higher,  more 
abstract,  levels  are  built  upon  the  levels  of  sensation,  perception, 
and  imagery.  But  introspection  cannot  decide  that  only  the 
lower  levels  have  a  cerebral  concomitant.  The  ideo-motor 
view,  which  has  become  almost  a  fact  in  psychology,  asserts 
that  the  bare  idea  of  a  movement's  sensible  effects  is  its  suffi- 
cient mental  cue;  but  trains  of  thought  involve  apperceptive 
systems  corresponding  to  systems  of  association,  and  these 
only  gradually  settle  down  into  a  conclusion  which  has  a 
motor  basis.  The  aroused  energy  of  the  brain  is  at  first 
kept  in  longitudinal  tension,  as  it  were,  and  only  after  an 
interval  does  a  system  form  which  is  longitudinally  stable. 
When  this  occurs,  the  energy  sinks  downward  and  passes  into 
action.  We  shall  therefore  accept  an  empirical,  temporal 
parallelism,  i.  e.,  the  position  that  every  pulse  of  conscious- 
ness has  a  physical  correlate.  We  see  no  reason,  however, 
to  hold  that  the  reverse  is  the  case. 

Yet  another  problem  confronts  the  absorption  of  conscious- 
ness by  the  physical.  Suppose  it  to  be  admitted  that  the  facts 
require  a  more  flexible  view  of  physical  activity  through  the 
levels  of  nature  which  are  correlated  by  the  theory  of  evolu- 
tion than  mechanism  can  supply,  there  still  remains  the  task 
of  harmonizing  extension  and  consciousness.  Can  that  which 
is  extended  be  conscious?  That  which  is  extended  must, 
in  that  case,  be  conscious  throughout  its  extension.  Does  not 
this  involve,  however,  that  extensiveness  is  a  character  of 
consciousness?     If,  for  example,  the  whole  cortex  functions 


242  CRITICAL  REALISM 

during  any  pulse  of  consciousness,  must  not  that  surge  of 
consciousness  be  in  some  sense  itself  extensive?  Before  an 
attempt  can  be  made  to  answer  this  question,  a  clear  idea 
must  be  attained  of  the  exact  meaning  of  extension  when 
applied  to  consciousness  and  to  the  physical  respectively. 

Consciousness  is  a  manifold  as  well  as  a  unity ;  its  parts  are 
notionally  separable  even  if  not  so  existentially  or,  as  logicians 
usually  speak  of  it,  physically.  It  has  depth,  or  an  organiza- 
tion of  levels,  and  extensiveness,  or  the  breadth  of  the  field 
of  objects  and  ideas  experienced  together.  For  both  these 
aspects,  psychology  has  pointed  out  a  cerebral  parallel. 
Its  continuity  at  any  one  time  is  that  of  a  functional  system 
dominated  by  a  purpose  or  a  conflict  of  purposes  instead  of 
that  of  a  seamless  garment  passively  continuous,  that  is, 
untom.  It  is  an  intensive  manifold  whose  unity  is  conative 
and  based  on  a  synthesis  of  a  peculiar  kind  in  which  the 
elements  have  no  prior  existence.  The  psychologist  is  con- 
vinced that  consciousness  is  partially  expressive  of  habits, 
tendencies,  associations,  apperceptive  systems,  past  syntheses, 
and  that  these  control  much  that  appears  in  experience  from 
time  to  time.  He  is,  however,  also  convinced  that  these 
relative  unities  are  undergoing  change  according  to  the 
situations  in  which  the  individual  finds  himself,  and  that 
consciousness  plays  a  decisive  part  in  this  process  of  maintain- 
ing and  reconstituting  the  individual.  Thus  consciousness  is 
a  synthesis  whose  parts  have  no  preexistence  although  they 
have  a  source.  We  must  reject  all  theories  tending  towards 
mental  chemistry,  for  these  shade  into,  and  are  sympathetic 
with,  mind-stuff  hypotheses  and  their  ilk  —  views  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  are  founded  on  the  misapplication  to  conscious- 
ness of  the  category  of  substance.  Consciousness  is  not 
directly  conserved.  Hence,  we  may  conclude  that  the  con- 
tinuity of  consciousness  is  not  additive  but  functional.  The 
unity  is  bom  with  that  which  is  unified.  Let  us  look  at  the 
brain  to  see  if  we  can  discover  anything  analogous  in  its 
working. 

If  we  are  to  follow  modem  theories  in  regard  to  the  local- 
ization of  cerebral  functions,  certain  kinds  of  experiences 
are  quite  definitely  related  to  particular  parts  of  the  brain. 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   243 

Parts  of  the  brain  seem  to  possess  specific  energies,  that  is, 
capacities.  The  question  as  to  the  innateness  or  the  acquired 
character  of  these  capacities  is  irrelevant  to  the  present 
problem.  The  important  point  to  consider  is  this :  Do  cerebral 
centres  have  a  unity  ?  We  have  already  broached  this  problem 
from  the  side  of  causality.  We  are  interested  now  more  from 
the  side  of  space,  although  the  two  aspects  are  not  finally 
separable.  Does  space,  as  some  hold,  necessarily  involve 
complete  externality  of  parts  in  the  sense  that  wholes  are  mere 
additions  of  self-sufficient  units?  There  seems  to  be  a  con- 
fusion in  the  minds  of  those  thinkers  who  hold  such  a  view 
between  mathematical  and  real,  or  physical,  space,  that  is, 
reality  as  extended.  Positions  in  mathematical  space  are 
external  to  one  another  because  they  possess  no  other  property 
by  reference  to  which  they  can  be  distinguished.  It  is  in 
this  sense  that  mathematical  space  is  homogeneous.  Internal 
relations  in  a  homogeneous,  non-qualitative  continuum  would 
be  meaningless,  since  they  would  have  no  basis.  Externality 
follows,  then,  as  a  deduction  from  the  nature  of  the  system. 
Physical  extension,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  distinct  from 
the  things  and  processes  which  are  spatial,  and,  hence,  can- 
not dictate  characteristics  to  things.  It  follows,  then,  that 
a  priori  reasoning  from  the  nature  of  mathematical  space 
cannot  determine  the  non-existence  of  internal  relations  and  of 
dynamic,  synthetic  unities  in  the  physical  world. 

Since  we  are  concerned  at  present  more  with  the  general 
outlines  of  the  mind-body  problem  than  with  a  justification 
of  the  details,  we  shall  assume  the  correctness  of  the  criticism 
we  have  passed  upon  the  universalization  of  mechanical 
principles  and  shall  hold  to  the  position  that  the  brain  develops 
systems  which  are  functional  unities.  What  more  we  shall, 
perhaps,  say  upon  this  question  will  be  in  the  way  of  suggestion. 

In  what  sense  can  we  speak  of  consciousness  as  extensive? 
It  has  for  so  long  been  the  custom  to  consider  consciousness 
as  unextended,  that  this  question  may  at  first  strike  the 
reader  as  absurd.  Surely  consciousness  cannot  be  measured 
with  a  foot-rule  or  divided  into  parts  which  exclude  one 
another.  How  could  such  a  division  be  made,  since  con- 
tinuity is  one  of  the  chief  characteristics  of  consciousness? 


244  CRITICAL  REALISM 

It  would  be  as  ludicrous  to  attempt  to  separate  a  feeling  from 
a  perception  as  to  endeavor  to  perform  an  operation  upon  a 
ghost.  These  are  not  physical  things,  and  we  should  not 
apply  to  them  the  categories  and  concepts  which  we  apply  to 
physical  things.  In  an  earlier  part  of  the  chapter,  we  saw  that 
consciousness  was  not  a  thing  which  sought  position  alongside 
of  other  things.  It  is  a  variant,  and  not  a  substance.  You  can- 
not superpose  a  standard  unit  of  measurement  upon  a  variant, 
nor  can  you  deal  with  it  after  the  fashion  of  the  external  sci- 
ences. The  parts  are  more  than  organic  to  one  another  and 
are  temporal;  hence,  they  are  not  divisible.  Thus  all  our  asso- 
ciations with  the  extension  of  physical  things  are  at  fault-  if 
carried  over  to  consciousness.  Consciousness  is  not  extended 
after  the  manner  of  a  physical  thing,  for  the  very  simple  reason 
that  it  is  not  a  physical  thing.  Let  all  this  be  granted;  yet 
in  a  very  real  sense  consciousness  is  extended.  As  a  variant 
of  the  brain,  it  is  in  the  brain,  not  as  an  ivory  sphere  is  encap- 
sulated in  another  in  those  curious  products  of  Chinese  patience 
which  we  see  in  museums,  but  in  a  unique  way  which  it 
requires  reflection  to  make  clear.  This  uniqueness  follows 
from  the  genuine  uniqueness  of  consciousness  or,  what  is 
the  same  thing,  the  essential  difference  between  consciousness 
and  the  physical  as  this  is  known  by  the  physical  sciences. 
Now,  the  relation  indicated  by  the  preposition  "in"  is  thought 
of  in  terms  of  the  presence  of  one  measurable  physical  thing 
in  another  which  is  larger.  Thus  the  smaller  object  is  a  part 
of  the  larger  or  occupies  a  part  of  the  space  included  by  the 
larger.  A  cell,  for  instance,  is  a  visible  part  of  organic  tissue. 
Undoubtedly,  this  is  the  meaning  which  we  give  to  the  word 
"in" ;  and  its  basis  in  perception  and  in  the  concepts  of  physical 
things  which  we  are  forced  to  construct  is  evident.  I  wish  to 
point  out  that  this  meaning  and  its  associations  should  not  be 
transferred  to  the  quite  different  sphere  of  the  relation  of. 
consciousness  to  the  physical.  Consciousness  is  existentially 
present  to  that  part  of  the  cortex  which  is  functioning,  and 
the  brain's  space  is  its  space.  It  is  where  it  arises  and  where 
it  acts.  When  we  call  it  a  variant  of  the  brain,  we  imply 
that  it  is  inseparable  from  the  brain  and  penetrates  it  with 
right  as  a  part  of  the  reality  of  the  brain.     Consciousness  is 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?  245 

the  brain  become  conscious;  it  is  a  highly  evolved  part  of 
reality  flowering  out  into  that  unique  and  non-substantial 
variant  which  forms  our  experiencing.  Evidently,  it  is  not 
in  the  physical  as  one  physical  thing  is  in  another,  and  to 
conceive  it  properly  we  must  revise  our  unduly  limited 
notion  of  what  "being  in  a  thing"  may  mean.  Let  us  see 
whether  we  can  create  a  clear  and  definite  idea  of  what  this 
new  type  of  "inness"  is. 

The  best  experiential  basis  for  a  comprehension  of  the  inness 
of  consciousness  is  the  feeling  which  we  all  have  of  the  penetra- 
tion of  our  body  by  the  vital  feelings  and  by  pleasure  and  pain. 
Our  body  fairly  tingles  at  times  with  emotion.  This  is  why 
the  ancients  assigned  consciousness  to  the  heart  or  the  liver. 
Such  empirical  localizations  had  their  foundation  in  a  felt 
presence  of  part  of  our  experiencing  in  the  body.  It  is 
from  this  datum  that  animism  took  its  rise.  Primitive  man 
simply  took  it  for  granted  that  other  things,  like  trees  and 
stones,  were  penetrated  by  a  vital  self  as  his  body  was. 
Animism  of  this  form  is  not  dualistic;  there  are  not  two 
separable  things,  the  body  and  the  vital  self.  The  body  is 
animated,  that  is,  the  body  is  experienced  as  animated.  It  is 
only  later  that  reflection  makes  a  soul  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
term;  the  soul  is  a  hypothesis  to  account  for  certain  mis- 
understood facts,  such  as  those  of  dream-life  and  of  trance. 
It  is  this  reflective  animism  alone  that  is  dualistic.  And, 
strange  to  say,  its  clumsy  dualism  lingers  yet  in  psychological 
and  philosophical  circles.  Make  an  entity  out  of  consciousness 
or  its  source,  the  soul,  and  the  tantalizing,  because  unsolv- 
able,  mind-body  dualism  appears.  What  I  have  been  endeav- 
oring to  prove  is  that  this  is  a  pseudo-problem,  that  the  brain 
contains  consciousness.  To  take  consciousness  from  the  brain 
is  to  degrade  it,  to  rob  it  of  part  of  its  reality.  It  is,  then,  this 
experiential  animism  which  furnishes  us  the  most  satisfactory 
foundation  for  the  proper  conception  of  the  presence  of  con- 
sciousness in  the  brain.  Yet  we  must  not  rest  in  the  experience 
itself,  but  must,  instead,  use  it  as  an  aid  and  an  aid  only.  We 
do  not  feel  consciousness  in  the  brain  where  reason  tells  us 
that  it  is.  Thus  its  whereabouts  is  not  given  as  a  matter  of 
intuition.     But  why  should  it  be  so  given  ?    When  we  come  to 

17 


246  CRITICAL  REALISM 

think  of  it,  such  an  intuition  would  be  impossible.  It  would 
involve  a  distinction  of  consciousness  from  the  brain,  that  is, 
knowledge  of  itself  and  of  the  brain  and  of  the  relation  between 
the  two.  But  consciousness  cannot  know  the  brain  unless  it 
be  represented  as  an  object  in  consciousness,  that  is,  unless 
it  stimulates  the  brain  and  thus  controls  the  rise  in  con- 
sciousness of  a  percept.  But  the  brain  cannot  stimulate  itself 
through  the  sensory  nerves.  It  follows  that  consciousness 
knows  where  it  is  only  indirectly.  We  may  say,  then,  that 
the  presence  of  consciousness  in  the  brain  is  not  the  relation 
of  one  thing  to  another,  but  the  immanence  of  that  part  of 
reality  which  is  our  changing  field  of  experience  to  the  rest  of 
the  same  existential  part  of  the  physical  world.  Unfor- 
tunately, there  is  no  adequate  word  to  express  what  we  think. 
To  call  consciousness  an  aspect  of  reality  is  to  court  the 
danger  of  falling  into  the  quagmires  of  the  double-aspect  theory. 
It  is  not  an  aspect  of  reality;  it  is  reality,  although  not  the 
whole  of  reality.  In  consciousness  we  are  reality,  although  not 
the  whole  of  it.  Hence,  to  speak  of  it  as  an  aspect  is  wrong,  if 
the  association  of  appearance  to  an  external  knower — the 
traditional  association — is  maintained.  Nor  is  consciousness 
the  inner  side  of  reality  while  that  which  we  learn  through  the 
physical  sciences  is  the  outer  side.  The  distinction  between 
an  inner  and  an  outer  does  not  hold  for  reality.  The  transfer- 
ence of  such  spatial  contrasts  to  reality  should  be  discouraged. 
Because  a  certain  class  of  information  about  reality  is  gleaned 
by  means  of  the  material  controlled  by  the  external  organs  of 
sense,  that  is,  the  organs  concerned  with  stimuli  coming  from 
outside  the  body,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  knowledge  thus 
obtained  deals  with  an  outer  aspect  of  reality.  Were  this  so, 
we  should  be  forced  to  judge  that  the  proprio-ceptors,  that  is, 
the  organs  concerned  with  stimuli  arising  within  the  body, 
give  us  knowledge  of  the  inner  aspect  of  reality,  which  is 
evidently  nonsense.  Consciousness  is  not  in  the  cortex  as  one 
thing  is  in  another,  nor  is  it  the  inner  aspect  of  the  brain. 
Consciousness,  we  have  said,  is  a  part  of  reality,  although  not 
a  measurable  part.  With  this  "givenness"  of  a  part  of  the  total 
nature  of  reality  must  be  contrasted  the  knowledge  about  reality 
gained  through  the  physical  sciences.     This  knowledge  is  as 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?  247 

complete  as  we  can  obtain  in  this  fashion.  But  it  remains 
knowledge;  it  is  not  reality.  When  we  come  to  examine  the 
knowledge  thus  obtained,  we  find  that  it  deals  with  reality  as 
a  measurable  substance  whose  parts  have  a  certain  structure, 
and  function  in  certain  ways.  Now,  we  have  every  reason  to 
regard  the  knowledge  which  we  gain  in  physics,  chemistry, 
and  biology  as  valid;  yet  it  is  not  knowledge  of  consciousness. 
It  is  evident,  then,  that  consciousness  does  not  exhaust  the 
whole  nature  of  the  brain.  When  the  cortex  functions, 
consciousness  forms  part  of  the  nature  of  the  brain,  of  what  is 
existentially  there.  It  is  simply  a  part  of  the  whole  nature 
of  the  brain  which  cannot  stimulate  the  sense-organs  and, 
hence,  cannot  be  known  by  the  physical  sciences.  We  can 
now  see  more  clearly  what  is  the  matter  with  panpsychism. 
It  makes  consciousness  the  whole  reality  of  the  brain,  and  is 
forced  to  regard  the  knowledge  acquired  by  the  physical 
sciences  as  not  knowledge  of  reality.  Our  position  is  that 
this  knowledge  is  of  reality  and  that  it  does  not  conflict  with 
the  inclusion  of  consciousness  in  the  physical  world. 

We  can  now  return  to  the  question  which  has  dominated 
the  discussion  for  the  last  few  pages :  In  what  sense  can  we 
speak  of  consciousness  as  extended?  We  have  tried  to  prove 
that  consciousness  is  in  the  brain  in  the  sense  that  it  is  part 
of  the  nature  of  the  brain  when  it  is  functioning ;  it  is  what  we 
have  called  a  functional  variant  of  the  cortex.  As  such,  there 
is  no  valid  reason  to  deny  that  consciousness  is  an  extended 
manifold.  It  arises  in  and  is  effective  in  the  physical  world. 
Its  unity  is  that  of  the  integrative  activity  of  the  brain  which 
it  helps  to  direct.  Hence,  it  is  as  extended  as  the  brain  is. 
Let  us  try  to  interpret  this  logical  conclusion  of  our  analysis 
of  the  mind-body  problem. 

The  reason  why  thinkers  have  asserted  that  consciousness 
is  unextended  is  that  it  cannot  be  treated  like  a  physical 
thing.  To  speak  of  the  size  of  a  sensation  in  terms  of  milli- 
meters is  absurd.  One  cannot  superpose  units  of  measurement 
on  images  as  one  can  on  things.  It  is  true  that  images  have 
apparent  size;  but,  since  images  cannot  crowd  out  things,  this 
space  is  looked  upon  as  imaginary.  By  contrast,  real  space 
is  the  space  occupied  by  physical  things  and,  as  we  have 


248  CRITICAL  REALISM 

said,  images  are  not  things  in  this  space.  The  reason  is,  of 
course,  that  they  are  not  physical  things.  But  we  have  seen 
cause  to  assert  that  this  space  which  things  are  conceived 
by  science  to  occupy  is  a  conceptual  creation  of  the  mind. 
Instead,  physical  realities  are  extended.  Real  space  is,  there- 
fore, not  space  as  this  is  conceived  by  mathematics,  it  is 
the  physical  thing  known  by  us  to  be  extended.  Hence,  if 
consciousness  is  in  the  cortex  as  a  variant,  it  must  be  extensive ; 
yet  it  does  not  follow  that  mathematics  is  applicable  to  it  as 
it  is  to  the  physical  thing  as  a  whole.  Mathematics  is,  strictly 
speaking,  applicable  only  to  that  which  is  measurable;  and 
consciousness  is  not  measurable  — for  two  reasons.  In  the 
first  place,  a  physical  standard  cannot  be  applied  to  it;  in  the 
second  place,  it  cannot  cause  perceptions  referable  to  itself. 
Hence,  the  extent  of  the  cortex  in  which  consciousness  is  at 
any  one  time  can  be  known  only  indirectly.  We  must  bear  in 
mind  what  we  proved  above,  that  consciousness  has  no  intui- 
tion of  its  whereabouts. 

There  is  another  point  to  which  attention  should,  per- 
haps, be  drawn.  An  image  or  a  percept  has  extension  as 
an  attribute,  that  is,  it  is  experienced  as  extensive.  For 
instance,  my  image  of  the  Louvre  certainly  looks  larger  than 
my  head.  How,  then,  can  it  be  inside  my  head,  as  it  must 
be  if  consciousness  is  a  variant  of  the  cortex?  Very  easily, 
since  the  size  oj  presentations  in  the  field  of  the  individuals 
experience  has  nothing  to  do  with  real  space.  Images  must  not 
be  thought  of  as  stretched  out  in  the  brain  or,  if  they  are  too 
large,  curled  up  in  it.  The  same  holds  of  thing-experiences. 
A  house-experience  which  I  have  when  I  look  out  of  the 
window  is  many  times  larger  than  my  other  thing-experience 
which  I  call  my  head.  True,  but  what  of  it?  I  certainly 
am  not  inviting  the  reader  to  believe  that  one-thing  experi- 
ence is  in  another.  Is  the  space  of  objects  in  experience 
therefore  unreal?  Assuredly  not;  it  is  simply  a  mistake  to 
take  it  for  what  it  is  not.  An  image  does  not  give  us  an 
intuition  of  the  part  of  reality  with  which  it  is  existentially 
connected.  The  thing-experience  which  we  call  the  brain  is 
in  the  reality  we  call  the  brain,  whose  size,  relative  to  the  meter- 
stick,  we  know.     We  know  nothing  of  absolute  sizes  of  parts 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?  249 

of  reality;  yet  we  do  know  the  absolute  size  of  our  images, 
while  we  also  know  their  relative  sizes  in  relation  to  one 
another.  In  short,  a  pulse  of  consciousness  has  an  intuition 
neither  of  its  whereabouts  in  reality  nor  its  extent  in  reality. 
We  cannot  tell  by  introspection  how  many  cells  and  association 
fibres  must  function  to  produce  an  image.  Cerebral  localiza- 
tion can  be  known  only  indirectly.  Were  consciousness  to 
contain  an  intuition  of  its  own  extent,  that  would  be  tanta- 
mount to  an  intuition  of  the  extent  of  reality  of  which  it  was 
a  variant.  But  we  have  already  seen  that  consciousness  is 
self-contained,  and  that  extent  is  not  an  attribute  experienced 
as  holding  of  the  total  field  of  the  individual's  experiencing. 
Hence,  we  may  conclude  that  consciousness  is  extensive  but 
that  we  should  not  try  to  form  an  image  of  its  extension. 
Consciousness  is  not  a  stuff  whose  parts  are  side  by  side  and 
exclude  one  another,  but  a  unity  of  a  high  order.  Dominated 
as  we  are  by  concepts  and  images  resting  on  our  thing-expe- 
riences, it  is  extremely  difficult  to  restrain  ourselves  from 
attempting  to  picture  consciousness  as  an  object  with  an 
extended  surface.  A  little  reflection,  however,  shows  us  what 
nonsense  such  an  outlook  is.  Consciousness  is  the  total 
changing  field  of  the  individual's  experience  and  is  as  it  is 
experienced.  Its  manifoldness  and  continuity  are  the  aspects 
which  most  nearly  reflect  the  complexity  and  functional  unity 
of  the  cortical  system  in  which  it  is. 

The  problem  of  the  efficacy  of  consciousness  involves  a 
detailed  analysis  of  the  probable  nature  of  causal  systems  in 
reality.  While  we  have  hinted  at  the  solution,  a  justification 
of  it  would  be  impossible  apart  from  a  thorough  examination 
of  the  categories.  Two  points  alone  can  be  touched  upon. 
First,  if  consciousness  is  absorbed  by  the  physical  world  as  this 
must  be  conceived  by  metaphysics,  the  efficacy  of  conscious- 
ness would  not  conflict  with  the  principle  of  the  conservation 
of  energy.  This  assertion  does  not  mean  that  consciousness  is 
a  form  of  energy,  for  energy  is  a  measurable  quantity  in  its 
primary  meaning  and  consciousness  is  the  part  of  reality 
which  we  live  —  not  simply  know  about.  In  the  second  place, 
if  consciousness  is  to  be  effective  in  the  cortex,  the  cortex 
must  be  more  than  a  mechanical  system ;  it  must  be  capable  of 


2SO  CRITICAL  REALISM 

forming  and  maintaining  functional  unities  which  are  veritably 
wholes  irreducible  to  a  mere  sum  of  elements.  If  this  be  the 
case,  the  efficacy  of  consciousness  cannot  be  set  aside  as 
unthinkable,  because  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  how  a  feeling 
of  pleasure  can  produce  motion  or  an  idea  loosen  the  attractive 
force  between  two  molecules.  Instead,  how  best  to  think  the 
processes  which  occur  in  such  systems  becomes  a  problem  for 
both  philosophy  and  science  to  face.  In  our  theory  of  causality 
we  must  take  organization  more  seriously  into  account. 

Our  main  purpose  has  been  to  prove  that  consciousness  is 
not  alien  to  the  physical.  In  a  general  way,  this  conclusion 
has  been  justified.  While  the  physicist  does  not  meet  with 
consciousness  either  in  his  facts  or  in  his  theories,  that  circum- 
stance is  due  to  his  subject-matter.  He  attains  true  knowledge 
of  reality,  but  this  knowledge  does  not  conflict  with  the  presence 
of  consciousness  in  nature.  We  have  seriously  considered  the 
reasons  customarily  given  for  the  exclusion  of  consciousness 
and  found  them  based  either  on  dogmas  or  on  mistakes  in 
logic.  Materialism  and  panpsychism  are  both  extremes  which 
are  based  on  a  denial  of  the  validity  of  part  of  our  actual 
knowledge;  and  this  denial  is  due  in  part  to  the  narrowness  of 
specialism  and  in  part  to  a  false  theory  of  knowledge. 

At  various  times  we  have  hinted  that  mind  cannot  be 
simply  identical  with  consciousness.  Consciousness  is  a  flux 
which  comes  and  goes.  It  is,  moreover,  by  no  means  com- 
pletely self-sufficient.  A  stimulus  which  enters  consciousness 
is  able  to  do  so  only  after  it  has  been  interpreted  by  mind  in 
the  light  of  past  experience.  Thus  there  are  conditions  which 
partly  determine  what  shall  be  perceived.  A  recent  psy- 
chologist has  emphasized  the  part  played  by  types  as  rela- 
tively flexible  mental  forms  which  interpret  an  incoming 
stimulus.  (Pillsbury,  The  Psychology  of  Reasoning.)  In  a 
similar  manner,  other  psychologists  stress  the  importance  of 
the  purpose  which  dominates  the  mind.  This  purpose  may 
be  only  vaguely  present  in  consciousness,  yet  it  is  functionally 
active.  We  may  say,  in  fact,  that  consciousness  contains 
only  a  minor  part  of  the  factors  which  account  for  the 
consciousness  of  the  next  moment.  In  the  discussion  of  the 
self  in  Chapter  IV,  we  pointed  out  the  evident  complexity  of 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   251 

the  individual's  character:  his  habits,  slowly  acquired  upon 
the  basis  of  heredity;  his  ideals;  his  knowledge,  which  is 
largely  potential  at  any  one  time;  and  his  natural  aptitudes 
along  various  lines,  trained  as  a  result  of  the  experiencing 
process  which  works  back  into  the  conditions  that  partly 
control  it.  Again,  we  must  not  forget  that  the  structure  of 
the  field  of  the  individual's  experience  is  due  to  an  organiza- 
tion which  rests  on  the  past.  Consciousness,  as  we  experience 
it,  rests  on  mental  capacities  which  are  apparently  the  result 
of  evolution.  - 

It  appears,  then,  that  consciousness  arises  within  a  system 
which  must  be  studied  ontogenetically  and  phylogenetically. 
This  system  is  what  we  call  mind.  In  it  we  have  epigenesis 
and  preformation  harmonized  in  a  true  development.  Expe- 
riencing leaves  its  trace  in  mind  and  is  thus  indirectly  con- 
served. We  all  feel  that  our  minds  broaden  and  gain  a 
wider  reach.  We  achieve  more  adequate  apperceptive  sys- 
tems, and  these  play  into  our  conscious  life  in  the  most  intricate 
fashion. 

Although  we  would  not  identify  mind  and  consciousness, 
we  would  not  separate  them.  Mind  somehow  flowers  into 
consciousness,  and  consciousness  seems  to  function  as  the 
means  to  the  growth  of  mind.  Mind  is  conserving  and 
enduring,  while  consciousness  represents  the  moment  of 
■adaptation  and  change.  We  may  say,  then,  that  conscious- 
ness is  fundamentally  conditioned  by  mind  as  well  as  by  the 
stimulus  which  comes  to  the  organism  from  the  environment. 
So  far  as  reality  is  concerned,  its  newness  is  a  relative  new- 
ness which  always  has  a  ground.  Because  this  ground  carries 
along  with  it  the  past,  memory  and  growth  in  general  are 
possible;  it  is  in  this  sense  that  the  self  is  relatively  the  same 
through  time.  We  must  remember,  however,  that  this  would 
not  help  us  much  did  we  not  feel  ourselves  to  be  the  same  in 
consciousness.  As  Locke  saw,  the  sameness  of  a  soul  would 
not  make  immortality  worth  while. 

Let  us  glance  for  a  moment  at  the  problem  of  memory. 
There  are,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  only  two  theoretical  possibilities. 
Either  experiences  exist  in  a  sort  of  mental  cold-storage  and 
memory  is  a  literal  participation  in  the  past  experience  as  it 


252  CRITICAL  REALISM 

again  enters  consciousness;  or,  memory  is  a  new  experience 
qualified  by  the  present,  for  empirical  reasons,  as  giving  us 
knowledge  of  the  past.  The  first  possibility  seems  to  me  to 
sin  against  the  essential  characteristic  of  consciousness,  its 
temporary  nature.  (One  of  my  friends  has  designated  this  its 
volatility.)  Consciousness  does  not  possess  a  dur^e  r^elle, 
beyond  the  specious  present,  but  seems  to  be  more  like  a  song 
which  dies  away  only  to  be  renewed.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  memory  be  a  new  experience  based  on  memory  as  a  func- 
tion of  a  conserving  organ,  this  conserving  organ  must  be  the 
mind.  That  the  mind  should  be  capable  of  producing,  under 
certain  conditions,  an  experience  similar  to  that  which  it  pro- 
duced once  before,  seems  to  me  quite  within  the  boimds  of 
naturalness. 

But  what  is  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the  brain?  Much 
of  our  present  argument  has  concerned  itself  with  the  relation 
of  consciousness  to  the  brain  as  a  physical  reality.  We  tried 
to  show  that  consciousness  is  not  alien  to  the  physical  when  this 
is  rightly  conceived.  But  this  result  would  have  no  point  if 
we  could  not  establish  some  sort  of  identity  between  the 
mind  and  the  brain.  This  identity  cannot,  however,  be  that 
of  two  substances,  since  the  mind  seems  to  be  a  developed 
system  of  capacities  or  functions  based  on  evolution  and 
educed  and  given  concrete  filling-out  by  that  process  which 
we  call  "learning  by  experience."  Instead  of  appealing  to, 
psychical  dispositions,  we  are  led  to  suppose  that  the  brain 
achieves  intricate  organizations,  which  grow  richer  and  more 
flexible  as  time  goes  on.  The  psychologist  calls  these  "apper- 
ceptive systems"  and  holds  that  they  are  the  ground  of  mean- 
ings and  concepts.  The  mind  would  thus  seem  to  be  the 
tremendously  complex  system  of  sub-systems  gradually  built 
up  during  the  lifetime  of  the  individual  upon  the  foundation, 
and  with  the  assistance,  of  congenital  capacities.  It  is 
evident  that  we  look  upon  the  brain  as  the  organ  of  the  mind. 
When  neurology  frees  itself  from  bondage  to  the  current 
mechanical  views,  I  feel  sure  that  it  will  come  to  understand 
the  part  played  by  organization  in  the  organic  world  and  will 
no  longer  seek  to  over-simplify.  Just  as  physics  is  beginning 
to  shake  itself  loose  from  the  childish  idea  of  matter  so  long 


IS  CONSCIOUSNESS  ALIEN  TO  THE  PHYSICAL?   253 

dominant,  so  biology  and  neurology  will  soon  come  to  admit 
that  the  brain  surpasses  the  neat  system  of  distinct,  neural 
drainage-paths  which  has  been  assigned  it.  The  mind's  unity 
is  the  unity  of  the  brain  as  an  organ.  It  is  the  unity  of  the 
mind  which  gives  unity  to  the  stream  of  consciousness;  and 
the  unity  of  the  mind  is  the  unity  of  the  brain  as  a  function- 
ing system. 

Such  a  view  could  be  regarded  as  the  modem  interpretation 
of  the  idea  of  the  soul  to  be  found  in  Aristotle  when  he  is  at  his 
best.  The  mind  is  a  part  of  the  soul,  and  the  soul  of  the 
individual  is  indissolubly  one  with  the  organism.  "The 
soul  is  the  completed  realization  of  the  body."  For  us,  of 
course,  nothing  is  finished,  but  everything  is  in  process.  I 
presume  that  I  need  not  warn  the  reader  against  taking  this 
comparison  with  Aristotle's  position  too  literally.  His  notion 
of  "form"  is  no  longer  tenable. 

This  solution  of  the  mind-body  problem  opens  up  meta- 
physical vistas  which  I  would  gladly  explore.  But  I  must 
postpone  this  exploration  until  another  time.  We  are  engaged 
at  present  in  giving  a  firm  foundation  to  epistemology,  and  it 
was  in  pursuance  of  this  task  that  we  found  ourselves  obliged 
to  justify  the  implications  of  the  Advance  of  the  Personal. 
The  conclusion  at  which  we  have  arrived  enables  us  to  meet 
the  problems  which  confronted  empirical  mental  pluralism: 
Minds  are  distinct,  while  reality  as  a  whole  is  continuous. 


CHAPTER  X 
TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

|_Ty /TANY  thinkers  have  discussed  the  nature  of  truth  without 
^^^  a  prior  examination  of  the  meaning  of  knowledge ;  and 
this  procedure  has  led  to  controversies  more  or  less  barren  of 
results.  We  must  ask  ourselves  whether  the  question  of  truth 
does  not  so  revolve  around  that  of  knowledge  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  tell  what  truth  means  and  is  unless  it  be  first  known 
what  knowledge  is.  This  closeness  of  connection  between  the 
two  terms  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  the  expression  "true 
knowledge"  is  felt  to  be  a  tautology.  It  is  like  speaking  of  a 
round  circle.     Why  is  this? 

This  problem  ot  the  connection  of  truth  and  knowledge 
can  be  approached  m  two  ways,  the  analytic  and  the  genetic, 
and  these  should  lead  to  the  same  general  conclusion.  When 
I  assert  that  it  is  nonsense  to  speak  of  a  round  circle,  I  do  so 
because  the  adjective  might  suggest  that  there  are  circles  which 
are  not  round.  I  know  that  the  definition  of  a  circle  includes 
roundness.  Is  the  case  the  same  with  true  knowledge?  Yes 
and  no.  It  certainly  does  seem  to  outrage  our  sense  of  pro- 
priety to  speak  of  true  knowledge  as  though  knowledge  could 
be  other  than  true  and  still  be  knowledge.  Truth  would  seem 
to  be  the  criterion  of  knowledge  so  that  no  information  could 
be  knowledge  unless  it  were  true.  Trueness  would  be  a  stamp, 
or  seal,  placed  by  judgment  upon  ideas,  theories,  propositions, 
data,  etc.,  without  which  they  would  be  held  in  doubt  or 
considered  not  to  be  knowledge  at  all.  In  the  same  way,  we 
might  consider  roundness  a  sign  of  a  circle  so  that  no  figure 
that  did  not  possess  this  characteristic  would  be  adjudged  a 
circle.  Trueness  and  knowledge,  roundness  and  a  circle  would 
thus  be  inseparables.  We  would  be  able  to  state  that  what- 
ever is  a  case  of  knowledge  is  true,  and  whatever  is  true  is  a 
case  of  knowledge.  And  this  relationship  we  shall  find  to  be 
very  suggestive.  But,  in  a  very  real  sense,  we  can  say  that 
knowledge  is  not  always  true.     Were  knowledge  always  true, 

254 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  255 

it  would  be  unlikely  that  we  should  have  the  term  "true,"  for 
this  is  a  contrast-word  implying  its  antithesis,  "false."  It  is 
evident  that  much  that  makes  claim  to  be  knowledge  is  denied 
its  claim.  It  is  finally  considered  false  knowledge,  and  false 
knowledge  is  looked  upon  as  no  knowledge  at  all.  Hence,  the 
opposite  of  false  knowledge  is  not  true  knowledge,  but  simply 
knowledge;  and  this  is  the  reason  why  "true  knowledge" 
strikes  us  as  tautology.  Does  not  this  situation  imply  that 
trueness  and  falsity  are  reflective  meanings  assigned  by  judg- 
ment to  what  has  claimed  to  be  a  case  of  knowledge?  Ideas, 
theories,  beliefs,  and  propositions  claim  to  be  knowledge  and 
to  give  knowledge.  But  experience  has  made  us  aware  that 
individual  instances  of  these  classes  have  failed  to  justify 
themselves.  The  result  is  that  we  are  more  wary  and  our 
reception  of  ideas  which  present  themselves  as  knowledge  is 
more  inquisitorial  and  tentative.  Ideas  may  be  true  and, 
again,  they  may  be  false.  We  may  conclude  from  this  analy- 
sis that  the  claim  to  knowledge  and,  accordingly,  the  meaning 
of  knowledge  logically  precedes  that  of  truth  and  its  opposite, 
falsity. 

The  genetic  approach  will  likewise  confirm  us  in  the  opinion 
that  truth  is  a  reflective  meaning.  It  has  often  been  pointed 
out  that  a  child  believes  everything  it  is  told.  So  long  as 
there  is  no  contradiction,  or  so  long  as  the  child  does  not 
realize  that  there  is  a  contradiction,  it  accepts  statements  as 
knowledge.  Man's  primary  attitude  is  belief,  not  doubt. 
The  predominance  of  an  idea  carries  belief  with  it,  and  at 
first  predominance  is  the  rule.  Only  after  frequent  disappoint- 
ment is  a  more  hesitant  attitude  toward  idea  developed. 
Philosophers  and  psychologists  of  diverse  schools  have  agreed 
upon  this  fact ;  and  since  it  is  one  of  the  few  things  upon  which 
they  have  agreed,  let  us  note  it  joyfully  and  pass  on.  The 
term  "belief"  has  a  more  personal  flavor  than  has  "knowl- 
edge. Reflection  has  already  entered  in  to  cast  doubt  upon  the 
necessary  validity  of  what  we  believe.  Leaving  aside  for  the 
time  being  the  contrast -meanings  which  have  grown  up  aroimd 
the  word,  I  think  we  have  a  right  to  say  that  belief  involves 
the  experience  of  knowing.  Knowing  as  an  attitude  of 
acceptance  is  more  primitive  than  that  which  we  now  call 


2s6  CRITICAL  REALISM 

belief.  It  follows,  then,  that  knowledge  as  a  meaning  and 
experience  precedes  doubt  and  the  hesitation  and  uncertainty 
which  accompany  it.  But  it  is  only  after  disbelief  has 
succeeded  belief  that  what  was  looked  upon  as  knowledge  is 
qualified  as  not-knowledge.  When  this  exigency  arises,  the 
distinction  between  true  and  false  beliefs  is  developed.  Belief 
differentiates  out  from  the  knowledge-attitude  and  takes  to 
itself  the  contrast  with  doubt  and  disbeUef.  What  is  believed 
rightly  is  a  true  belief,  and  a  true  belief  gives  us  knowledge. 
Thus  the  previous  analysis  applies.  It  follows  that  the 
analytic  and  the  genetic  ways  of  approach  confirm  each  other 
and  assure  us  that  knowledge  as  an  experience  precedes  truth 
as  an  experience.  Hence,  we  must  examine  the  knowledge- 
experience  as  closely  as  we  can  in  order  to  prepare  the  way 
for  an  understanding  of  what  is  meant  by  truth. 

Vague  as  the  term  "knowledge"  is,  it  is  apparent  that  it 
implies  an  apprehension  of  some  sort  and  that  truth  and  its 
opposite  refer  to  what  is  apprehended  and  thus  presuppose  the 
apprehension.  Before  we  can  go  a  step  further,  we  must  come 
to  a  decision  in  regard  to  the  meanings  of  the  word  "knowl- 
edge." The  critical  investigations  we  have  already  made  in 
the  preceding  chapters  should  stand  us  in  good  stead. ^ 

The  nature  of  knowledge  can  be  understood  only  after  an 
adequate  standpoint  has  been  reached ;  that  is  why  we  have  been 
forced  to  postpone  discussion  of  it  until  now.  He  is  mistaken 
who  thinks  he  can  understand  the  various  meanings  of  knowl- 
edge by  a  hasty  inspection  of  the  cognitive  attitude  alone. 
We  have  already  realized  that  this  supposition  was  the  primary 
mistake  made  by  the  new  school  of  realists.  The  position 
adopted  in  common  by  Stout  (Aristotelian  Society,  Pro- 
ceedings, 1910-11,  p.  188)  and  Russell  (ibid.,  p.  119),  that 
ideas  do  not  intervene  between  reality  and  the  subject  knowing, 
is  due  to  this  hasty  inspection-view  of  knowledge.  The 
result  is  a  confusion  between  the  necessary  distinctions  of 
logic,  of  common  sense,  and  of  epistemology.  To  understand 
the  nature  of  knowledge,  we  shall  be  obliged  to  see  what  it 

*  Whfle  not  a  pragmatist,  I  heartily  agree  with  the  protest  voiced  by  James  against  the 
usual  assumption  that  the  meaning  of  knowledge  is  clear  in  the  current  philosophies.  Were  it 
clear,  I  feel  certain  that  idealists  would  no  longer  feel  that  they  are  justified  m  denying  the 
right  of  the  mental  to  know  the  non-mental. 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  257 

means  for  common  sense  and  for  logic  and  then  to  point  out 
how  this  meaning  contains  in  germ  the  significance  which 
critical  realism  must  assign  to  it. 

For  common  sense  there  are  two  kinds,  or  types,  of  knowl- 
edge; these  are  knowledge-of-acquaintance  and  knowledge- 
about.  Both  terms  have  a  definite  empirical  meaning  which 
it  is  not  difficult  to  indicate.  We  say  that  we  have  knowledge- 
of-acquaintance  when  the  object  has  been  present  in  the  field  of 
our  experience.  For  instance,  I  state  that  I  have  knowledge- 
of-acquaintance  of  a  particular  person.  This  assertion  means 
that  I  have  met  him  and  thus  know  at  first  hand  what  sort 
of  man  he  is.  I  know  something  definite  about  hihi  and  this 
knowledge  is  based  on  my  own  observation.  Thus  knowl- 
edge-of-acquaintance is  knowledge  acquired  directly  by  the 
individual  by  means  of  the  presence  of  the  object.  The 
knowledge  gained  in  this  way  may  be  largely  conceptual,  but 
it  is  felt  to  involve  immediate  contact  with  what  is  known. 
It  is,  moreover,  less  general  than  knowledge-about  usually  is, 
although  it  contains  conceptual  elements.  Knowledge-about, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  indirect  knowledge.  Such  knowledge  is 
conceptual  and  has  its  source  in  inference  or  in  communication. 
A  detective  may  possess  knowledge  about  the  author  of  a  crime 
founded  on  the  traces  left  behind.  He  may  be  sure  that  the 
criminal  is  a  strong  man  or  a  man  of  considerable  ability. 
Again,  he  may  be  told  b}^  a  witness  that  the  criminal  is  so-and- 
so  and  is  engaged  in  a  certain  business  in  the  city.  It  is 
evident  that  knowledge-of-acquaintance  is,  primarily,  knowl- 
edge due  to  acquaintance,  and  knowledge-about  is  knowledge 
due  to  inference  and  communication.  While  the  English 
language  possesses  only  the  word  "know"  to  designate  these 
two  kinds  of  knowledge,  many  other  languages  employ  two 
words.  Thus  knowledge-of-acquaintance  in  Latin  is  cognoscere, 
knowledge-about  is  scire.  In  French,  there  are  the  two  corre- 
sponding words,  connaitre  and  savoir;  in  German,  kennen  and 
wissen.  This  distinction  was  emphasized  by  Grote,  and, 
since  his  time,  has  become  one  of  the  recognized  contrasts  in 
knowledge.  The  greater  part  of  the  knowledge  of  the  world 
possessed  by  any  individual  is  knowledge-about.  We  depend 
upon  books  and  conversation  and  interpret  the  information 


258  CRITICAL  REALISM 

thus  acquired  by  means  of  our  own  experiences.  Hence,  we 
know  about  many  things  with  which  we  are  not  acquainted. 

This  contrast  between  the  two  kinds  of  knowledge  of 
things  which  we  possess  has  been  employed  by  psychologists 
and  epistemologists  as  a  basis  for  what  they  regard  as  a 
necessary  distinction.  Unfortunately,  this  difference  in  use 
has  led  to  confusion.  Theories  have  crept  in  which  have  no 
place  in  the  empirical  meanings.  The  plain  man  who  occupies 
the  standpoint  of  Natural  Realism  does  not  for  a  moment 
doubt  that  the  things  which  he  has  knowledge  about  exist  in 
the  same  way  that  things  of  which  he  has  knowledge-of- 
acquaintance  exist.  Always  they  are  independent  of  his 
knowledge;  the  difference  lies  in  the  kind  of  knowledge  he 
has  through  his  direct  or  indirect  relation  to  them.  They  are 
present  or  absent;  and  this  presence  or  absence  does  not 
affect  them,  but  does  affect  the  knowledge  of  the  individual. 
The  plain  man  accepts  the  difference  in  the  kind  of  knowledge 
which  ensues,  but  does  not  seek  to  explain  it  except  in  the 
most  general  way.  He  feels  that  it  has  something  to  do  with 
his  sense-perception.  This  common-sense  contrast  is  really 
complex  and  contains  two  distinctions:  first,  presence  to,  and 
absence  from,  the  thing  known;  second,  two  levels  of  knowl- 
edge— casual,  immediately  given  knowledge  and  knowledge 
gained  by  investigation.  The  meaning  of  knowledge  is  still 
dominated  by  Natural  Realism  and  is  thought  of  as  a  direct 
or  indirect  apprehension  of  the  object  known. 

The  psychologist  is  interested  in  the  knowledge  an  individ- 
ual possesses  of  certain  classes  of  sense-data.  He  points  out 
that  certain  experiences,  such  as  sounds  and  colors,  may  be 
lacking  in  the  consciousness  of  particular  individuals  and  that 
this  lack  cannot  be  made  good  by  any  amount  of  knowledge 
about  sounds  and  colors.  Knowledge  about  the  function  per- 
formed by  colors  and  about  their  physical  causes  remains 
distinct  from  the  immediate  experience  of  the  sense-qualities. 
It  is  as  though  knowledge-of-acquaintance  of  certain  things 
in  the  physical  world  could  not  be  acquired  by  particular 
individuals.  But  it  is  discovered  by  the  philosopher  that, 
when  an  individual  is  limited  in  this  way,  his  knowledge-of- 
acquaintance  of  physical  things  varies  in  a  corresponding  way 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  259 

from  that  of  the  normal  man.  This  fact  led  thinkers  like 
Hume  to  stress  the  primacy  of  sense-qualities  in  knowledge. 
This  and  other  facts  have  caused  us  to  refuse  to  regard  the 
outlook  of  Natural  Realism  as  adequate.  But,  while  the 
psychologist's  use  of  the  empirical  distinction  helps  to  force 
home  the  problem  of  knowledge,  it  is  a  mistake  to  substitute 
it  for  the  empirical  meanings  of  common  sense. 

The  epistemologist  may  desire  to  analyze  the  exact  nature 
of  the  two  kinds  of  knowledge  and,  impressed  by  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  application  of  the  contrast  made  by  the  psy- 
chologist to  his  field  of  investigation,  may  seek  to  universalize 
the  application.  Knowledge-of-acquaintance  for  the  psychol- 
ogist is  founded  on  the  real  presence  to  the  introspective 
subject  of  the  sensations  known.  Knowledge-c/-acquaintance 
is  founded  on  knowledge  hy  acquaintance;  that  is,  by  the 
presence  of  that  which  is  known.  To  know  is  to  be  conscious 
of  that  which  is  known.  And  that  which  is  known  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  introspective  attitude  called  "being  conscious 
of."  Why  not,  thinks  the  epistemologist,  apply  this  analysis 
of  knowledge  to  all  knowledge  so  far  as  this  can  be  done  ?  But 
that  is  precisely  what  the  plain  man  has  already  done.  He 
asserts  that  he  is  aware  of  things  in  the  physical  world  or  that 
he  perceives  them,  while  he  is  conscious  of  his  feelings.  In 
both  cases,  the  natural  view  of  knowledge  is  the  presence  of 
the  thing  known.  Investigation  enforces  this  view  for  the 
psychical  and  interposes  weighty  objections  for  the  physical. 
Much  of  our  task  has  been  an  evaluation  of  these  objections 
and  our  conclusion  was,  that  they  were  well-founded.  Knowl- 
edge of  the  physical  world  does  not  involve  the  presence  of 
that  which  is  known.  The  problem  which  confronts  the 
epistemologist  is:  How  can  these  two  kinds  of  knowledge  be 
explained?  The  danger  which  threatens  to  vitiate  his  con- 
clusions is  the  confusion  of  various  standpoints.  We  shall 
try  to  bring  this  out  by  a  criticism  of  the  analysis  of  knowl- 
edge made  by  contemporary  thinkers. 

Mr.  Russell  regards  the  distinction  between  knowledge-by- 
acquaintance  and  knowledge-by-description  as  of  fundamental 
importance  for  epistemology.  Let  us  examine  his  use  of  these 
expressions.     "I  say  that  I  am  acquainted  with  an  object," 


26o  CRITICAL  REALISM 

writes  Mr.  Russell,  "when  I  have  a  direct  cognitive  relation 
to  that  object,  i.e.,  when  I  am  directly  aware  of  the  object 
itself.  This  direct  cognitive  relation  is  simply  the  converse 
of  the  relation  of  object  and  subject  which  constitutes  presenta- 
tion. That  is,  to  say  that  5  has  acquaintance  with  O  is  essen- 
tially the  same  thing  as  to  say  that  O  is  presented  to  S." 
Now  the  plain  man,  as  we  have  seen,  believes  that  persons 
and  physical  things  are  presented  to  him.  Not  so  Mr.  Russell. 
He  has  worked  out  a  theory  of  knowledge  for  which  only  cer- 
tain things  can  be  presented  to  the  individual.  Chief  among 
these  are  sense-data,  the  **I,"  and  universals.  Now  these 
are  looked  upon  as  non-mental  and  independent  of  the  act  of 
apprehension.  We,  on  the  contrary,  have  been  led  to  hold 
that  the  word  "mental"  has  two  different  meanings  and  that 
the  subject-self,  universals,  and  percepts  are  mental  in  the 
sense  that  they  must  belong  to  a  stream  of  consciousness  or 
the  field  of  an  individual's  experience.  We  pointed  out  that 
the  meaning  of  "aware  of"  is  not  epistemologically  primitive, 
but  arises  out  of  the  characteristics  of  the  field  of  the  individ- 
ual's experience.  It  is  essentially  a  reflection  of  the  outlook 
which  we  have  labeled  "Natural  Realism"  {cf.  Chap.  IV). 
The  fault  that  I  have  to  find  with  Mr.  Russell,  as  with 
Mr.  Stout,  is  that  he  takes  this  construction  as  revelatory  of 
the  nature  of  knowledge.  He  seems  to  think  that  an  episte- 
mology  can  be  founded  on  simple  inspection.  But  this  is  not 
the  case.  The  view  of  knowledge  which  inspection  gives 
is  a  fimction  of  the  standpoint;  and  the  attainment  of  the 
proper  standpoint  is  no  easy  matter,  as  we  have  found.  The 
conclusion  we  reached  was  that  all  that  is  experienced  as 
together  with  the  self  in  one  field  of  coexistence  is  mental  and 
that  this  coexistential  field  has  a  developed  structure  which 
may  be  characterized  as  the  subject-object  duality.  The  object- 
side  obtains  such  meanings  as  "commonness"  and  "perma- 
nence" and  "reappearance,"  and  the  subject-side  is  forced  to 
develop  the  meaning  "aware  of,"  to  account  for  the  coexistence 
of  subject  and  object.  Nevertheless,  that  which  is  actually 
present  together  with  the  subject  is  mental.  We  shall  seek 
to  indicate  how  this  analysis  enables  us  to  conquer  epistemolog- 
ical  difficulties  which  have  seemed  insuperable.     In  the  first 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE         ,  261 

place,  it  follows  that  the  individual  can  be  acquainted  with  the 
mental  only,  if  acquaintance  involves  the  actual  presence  of 
that  which  is  known;  yet  that  which  is  mental  may  he  expe- 
rienced as  a  physical  thing.  Let  us  apply  this  result  to  the 
distinctions  advocated  by  Mr.  Russell. 

What  Mr.  Russell  would  call  a  group  of  sense-data,  I 
should  call  a  thing-experience.  Such  a  thing-experience  is 
mental,  although  the  plain  man  regards  it  as  a  physical  {i.e., 
non-mental)  thing.  Thus  the  objects  in  the  field  of  the 
individual's  experience  which  are  qualified  as  common,  inde- 
pendent, non-mental,  permanent  are  actually  personal,  mental, 
transient,  and  not  separable  from  the  total  field.  Natural 
Realism,  we  saw,  broke  down  and  the  Advance  of  the  Personal 
led  to  the  extension  of  the  meaning  "personal"  to  the  whole 
field.  The  world  is  somehow  my  world.  Now,  Mr.  Russell 
accepts  the  Advance  of  the  Personal  for  the  whole  field  so  far 
as  universals  are  not  involved.  But  there  is  no  justification 
for  this  exception.  Universals  are  conceptual  objects  in  the 
field  of  the  individual's  experience  connected  genetically  and 
analytically  with  the  rest  of  the  field.  We  labored  this 
point,  however,  long  enough  in  the  third  chapter  and  can  now 
afford  to  be  dogmatic.  It  follows  that  all  objects  which  are 
present  in  the  field  are  mental,  even  though  they  may  be 
experienced  as  physical  or  mathematical  or  ideal.  Thus  we 
have  knowledge,  by  acquaintance,  of  whatever  is  in  the  field. 
Certain  objects  may  be  qualified  as  absent,  but  as  objects 
to  which  we  take  the  cognitive  attitude  they  are  present. 

Let  us  pass  next  to  what  Mr.  Russell  calls  knowledge  by 
description.  This  type  of  knowledge  holds  for  the  rest  of 
reality  that  can  be  known  so  far  as  it  cannot  be  known  by 
acquaintance.  By  a  description  he  means  any  phrase  of  the 
form  "a  so-and-so"  or  "the  so-and-so."  The  first  form  gives 
us  an  ambiguous  description,  the  second  a  definite  description. 
Thus  an  object  is  known  by  description  when  we  know  that 
there  is  one  object,  and  no  more,  having  a  certain  property. 
(Aristotelian  Society,  Proceedings,  p.  113.)  In  indefinite,  or 
ambiguous,  descriptions  we  seem  to  deal  with  a  class;  in 
definite  descriptions,  with  a  single  individual  or  thing.  When 
we  come  to   consider  the   contrast   between   knowledge   by 

18 


262  CRITICAL  REALISM 

acquaintance  and  knowledge  by  description  which  Mr.  Russell 
has  in  mind,  we  find  a  confusion  between  the  empirical  distinc- 
tion between  knowledge-of -acquaintance  and  knowledge-about, 
and  his  own  epistemological  antithesis.  Let  us  examine  some 
of  his  statements.  We  shall  find  ourselves  involved  in  a 
discussion  of  the  nature  of  objective  reference,  or  denotation. 

Knowledge  by  description  consists  of  judgments  of  which 
the  thing  known  is  not  a  constituent.  {Mind,  Jan.,  19 13, 
p.  77.)  Yet  we  often  intend  to  make  our  statement,  not  in  the 
form  involving  the  description,  but  about  the  actual  thing 
described.  That  is  to  say,  when  we  say  anything  about 
Bismarck,  "we  should  like,  if  we  could,  to  make  the  judgment 
which  Bismarck  alone  can  make,  namely,  the  judgment  of  which 
he  himself  is  a  constituent."  (Russell,  The  Problems  of  Phil- 
osophy, p.  88.)  We  certainly  wish  to  m,ake  a  true  judgment 
about  Bismarck,  but  I  very  much  doubt  that  this  is  a  judg- 
ment which  Bismarck  alone  could  make.  There  seems  to  be 
a  confusion  between  Bismarck  as  a  person  of  a  certain  character 
and  political  position  and  a  self  which  he  alone  could  intuit.^ 
The  object-self  is  as  much  a  conceptual  construction  for  the 
individual  as  it  is  for  others,  and  our  friends  may  know  us 
better  than  we  know  ourselves.  Now,  the  plain  man  speaks  of 
his  knowledge  of  persons  just  as  he  speaks  of  his  knowledge 
of  physical  things.  He  believes  he  can  think  of  them  when  they 
are  not  present  and  make  true  statements  about  them.  As 
we  shall  see,  it  is  upon  this  foundation  that  the  distinctions 
of  logic  have  grown.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  logic  is  essen- 
tially realistic.  What  Mr.  Russell  is  really  struggling  for  is 
a  new  basis  for  logic  in  accordance  with  his  own  epistemology. 
His  criticisms  of  the  usual  view  of  denotation  can  be  understood 
only  when  looked  at  from  this  point  of  view. 

In  place  of  the  proposition,  "Julius  Caesar  was  assas- 
sinated," which  seems  to  claim  Julius  Caesar  himself  as  a 
constituent,  Mr.  Russell  is  led  to  substitute  the  proposition, 
"The  man  whose  name  was  Julius  Caesar  was  assassinated." 
Julius  Caesar  is  now  merely  a  name,  that  is,  a  shape  or  sound, 

}  It  will  be  remembered  that  we  distinguished  between  the  enjoyment,  or  immediate  exper- 
iencing, of  the  subject-self  as  a  part  of  the  total  field  of  the  individual's  experience  and  the 
knowledge  which  the  individual  may  gain  through  reflection  of  his  capacities  and  character. 
Mr.  Russell  does  not  emphasize  this  difference,  if  he  recognizes  it.  I  may  have  knowledge  of 
Bismarck  in  this  latter  sense  as  valid  and  direct  as  that  which  Bismarck  himself  possessed. 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  263 

and  all  the  rest  of  the  terms  stand  for  concepts.  Thus  the 
proposition  is  reduced  to  constituents  with  which  we  are 
acquainted.  But,  in  order  to  accomplish  this  result,  we  must 
be  sure  that  the  phrase,  "the  man  whose  name  was  Julius 
Caesar"  is  not  a  constituent  with  a  unity  of  its  own.  So 
we  must  interpret  this  as  meaning  "One  and  only  one  man 
was  called  Julius  Caesar,  and  that  one  was  assassinated." 
This  process  of  finding  equivalents  so  that  the  denotation  of  a 
judgment  may  disappear  may  strike  the  reader  as  absurd;  it 
seems  so  like  the  attempt  of  the  ostrich.  And  I  must  confess 
that  it  so  impressed  me  at  first.  It  is,  however,  the  logical 
result  of  his  view  of  denotation.  I  shall  attempt  to  show  that 
this  theory  of  denotation  leads  logically  to  solipsism. 

Let  us  examine  critically  this  theory  of  denotation.  It  will 
be  best  to  give  his  own  words  and  then  point  out  the  implica- 
tions. "The  denotation,  I  believe,  is  not  a  constituent  of  the 
proposition,  except  in  the  case  of  proper  names,  i.e.,  of  words 
which  do  not  assign  a  property  to  an  object,  but  merely  and 
solely  name  it.  And  I  should  hold,  further,  that,  in  this  sense, 
there  are  only  two  words  which  are  strictly  proper  names  of 
particulars,  namely,  'I'  and  'this.'"  (Aristotelian  Society, 
Proceedings,  1910— 11,  p.  121.)  But,  if  this  be  the  case,  the  in- 
dividual's knowledge  is  limited 'to  acquaintance  with  partic- 
ulars, which  are  private;  to  concepts  or  universals,  which,  I 
have  shown,  are  likewise  personal ;  and  to  propositions  involv- 
ing these  particulars  and,  therefore,  as  personal  as  they  or  com- 
posed of  concepts  which  also  are  personal.  How,  then,  can 
the  individual  make  a  reference  beyond  his  own  experience  or 
claim  to  know  other  persons  and  things  ?  Is  not  his  knowledge 
essentially  that  of  the  acquaintance  type,  and  does  not  the  term 
'  'description' '  become  a  misnomer  ?  Knowledge  by  description 
consists  of  judgments  of  which  the  thing  known  is  not  a  con- 
stituent. The  problem  is,  to  show  how  judgment  gives  knowl- 
edge about  a  thing  if  it  cannot  indicate  what  thing  it  means. 
There  would  seem  to  be  a  chasm  between  the  judgment  and 
the  thing  which  makes  them  absolutely  indifferent  to  each 
other.  It  would  require  an  absolute  mind  to  know  that  the 
judgment  contained  knowledge  of  the  existent.  Thus  Russell 
seems  to  me  to  be  dangerously  near  such  a  position  as  that 


264  CRITICAL  REALISM 

advocated  formerly  by  Royce  in  The  Religious  Aspect  of 
Philosophy.  So  long  as  he  will  not  become  an  absolute 
idealist,  he  should  consider  himself  an  epistemological  solipsist. 

The  more  we  analyze  his  theory  of  knowledge  in  its  relation 
to  his  logic,  the  more  convinced  we  are  that  his  difficulty  lies 
in  a  false  view  of  denotation.  He  denies  denotation  to  the 
propositions  which  are  descriptive  because  he  believes  it  would 
conflict  with  the  fundamental  principle  in  the  analysis  of 
propositions ;  viz. ,  * '  Every  proposition  which  we  can  understand 
must  be  composed  wholly  of  constituents  with  which  we  are 
acquainted."  {The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  p.  91.)  Now,  in  the 
Advance  of  the  Personal  we  have  accepted  a  similar  principle 
of  an  even  more  radical  trend.  The  problem  of  reference 
faces  us  as  definitely  as  it  does  Mr.  Russell.  Perhaps  his 
position  will  show  a  lack  of  flexibility  in  his  theory  of  knowl- 
edge where  ours  does  not. 

The  words  "denotation"  and  "connotation,"  "extension" 
and  "intension"  have  had  various  interpretations.  There  is, 
besides,  the  question  of  usage  to  lead  to  confusion.  The  best 
tradition  has  kept  the  terms  "extension"  and  "intension"  for 
class-terms.  The  extension  of  a  class-term  refers  to  the 
species  included  by  the  genus.  Thus  the  term  "mammal"  has 
the  extension  given  it  in  zoological  classifications  as  covering 
all  the  higher  vertebrates.  This  does  not  mean  that  there  is 
in  nature  an  entity  called  mammal  and  that  this  is  somehow 
found  in  the  species.  It  does  mean,  however,  that  many  small 
groups  have  attributes  in  common  which  enable  us  to  classify 
them  together  as  related  genetically.  The  individual  animals 
exist  and  possess  certain  attributes,  some  of  which  are  shared 
with  a  small  group,  others  with  a  larger  group  including  this 
and  other  small  groups.  Our  classifications  as  objects  of  knowl- 
edge also  exist,  and  so  do  our  concepts,  which  reflect  these 
classifications.  Hence,  when  we  speak  of  the  extension  of  a 
class-term,  we  think  of  the  species  which  come  under  it  in  a 
classification.  When  we  refer  to  the  intension,  we  think  of  the 
defining  attributes  of  the  class.  Another  usage  has  extended 
the  application  of  extension  to  the  individuals.  It  is,  however, 
better  to  speak  of  denotation  when  we  are  thinking  of  par- 
ticular existents.    Proper  names  and  singular  names  thus  have 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  265 

denotation.  They  are  signs  of  particular  things  which  we 
mean  when  we  use  the  signs.  When  I  am  thinking  of  Walter 
Scott,  I  have  the  name  in  mind  because  it  is  associated  with 
all  that  I  know  about  this  individual ;  it  has  served  as  a  nucleus 
for  my  information  about  the  individual  who  was  named 
Walter  Scott.  Hence,  when  I  conceive  the  person  and  wish  to 
tell  others  that  I  am  doing  so,  I  say  that  I  am  thinking  about 
Walter  Scott.  In  this  sense,  the  name  "Walter  Scott"  has 
denotation.  It  has  social  currency  as  a  sign  of  a  particular 
person  about  whom  we  can  all  think.  That  is,  each  of 
us  can  have  a  conceptual  object  in  the  field  of  his  experi- 
ence, which  is  labeled  "Walter  Scott."  Instead  of  saying 
that  a  name  has  denotation  when  it  is  used  as  the  sign  of 
a  thing  or  to  show  that  we  mean  a  particular  thing  or  are 
thinking  of  an  individual  object,  certain  writers  prefer  to  say 
that  the  name  has  objectivity.  As  Wolf  rightly  points  out, 
the  main  function  of  a  name  is  this  reference  to  something. 
This  is  the  truth  Mill  had  in  view  when  he  wrote  that  names  are 
"the  names  of  things  themselves,  and  not  merely  of  our  ideas 
of  things."  (Wolf,  Studies  in  Logic,  p.  23.)  Now  the  name  de- 
notes, or  is  the  sign  of,  something,  and  as  such  has  objectivity; 
but  this  logical  function  of  the  name  is  founded  on  our  ability 
to  think  of  or  conceive  objects  and  to  give  names  to  them. 
Language  aids  our  thinking,  but  its  function  is  determined  by 
our  thinking.  Hence,  logic  reflects  the  realistic  structure  and 
meanings  which  characterize  our  natural  outlook  on  the  world. 
It  is  a  mistake  to  mingle  logic  and  epistemology  and  seek  to 
correct  logical  distinctions  by  means  of  epistemological 
doctrines.     But  this  is  precisely  what  Russell  does. 

Let  us  examine  the  basis  of  empirical  reference  or  the 
objectivity  of  names.  When  I  perceive  an  object,  the  denota- 
tion is  given  by  the  presence  of  the  object.  I  am  more  apt  to 
say,  "It's  a  good  book"  than  "This  is  a  good  book."  Com- 
munication forces  me  to  make  my  reference  selective.  Thus 
the  physical  thing  which  is  present  is  the  subject  of  my  judg- 
ment, and  the  question  of  what  physical  thing  I  am  judging 
about  has  no  meaning  for  me.  If,  however,  another  person  is 
present  and  I  make  the  judgment  verbally  and  socially,  I  must 
indicate  by  my  eyes  or  by  a  gesture  what  object  I  am  making 


266  CRITICAL  REALISM 

the  subject  of  my  judgment.  If  that  is  not  sufficient,  I  add 
a  description  to  make  the  reference  more  definite.  I  say 
that  I  mean  —  that  is,  am  referring  to  or  talking  about  or 
thinking  of  —  that  red  book  at  the  end  of  the  table.  My 
companion  thus  attends  to  the  same  book  or,  to  put  it  more 
critically,  in  accordance  with  the  Advance  of  the  Personal, 
attends  to  a  corresponding  book-experience.  When  I  go  down 
stairs,  I  take  it  for  granted  that  we  can  continue  to  mean  the 
same  book.'  Why?  Because  I  can  think  of  what  I  regard  as  a 
permanent  thing  which  was  present  to  me.  I  can  assert  where 
it  is  and  what  it  is  like  and  test  these  assertions.  I  have  done 
this  so  often  that  I  do  not  doubt  my  ability.  Because,  again, 
my  companion  has  imderstood  me  and  has  thought  of  the 
same  book  I  was  thinking  of  and  this  fact  has  been  tested. 
Thus  reference  is  developed  by  communication,  and  for 
physical  things  is  based  on  spatial  position  and  on  descriptive 
qualities.  I  am  thinking  of  a  thing;  yes,  but  what  thing? 
Then  I  describe  it  until  it  is  selected  and  stands  out  from  all 
other  things.  Thus  empirical  reference  consists  of  two 
features:  (i)  The  ability  to  think  of  what  is  not  present;  and 
(2)  the  ability  to  distinguish  this  thing  from  other  objects. 
And  these  two  features  develop  hand  in  hand.  Gradually  the 
individual  builds  up  a  construct  of  the  world  in  which  things 
are  placed  in  spatial  and  temporal  relations  to  one  another. 
Now,  the  difference  between  proper  names  and  singular  names 
concerns,  not  the  ability  to  think  of  what  is  not  present — for 
that  is  common, — but  the  means  by  which  the  attention  of  a 
companion  is  led  to  the  thing  of  which  you  are  thinking.  A 
proper  name  is  primarily  a  sign  socially  recognized.  It  is  for 
this  reason  that  it  can  be  said  to  have  denotation  or  objectivity. 
A  singular  name  is  a  means  of  accomplishing  this  selective 
reference  where  an  unambiguous  sign  has  not  been  created. 
The  absence  of  description  in  the  modem  proper  name  is  made 
possible  only  by  the  conditions  of  its  application;  its  back- 
groimd  is  always  one  of  social  agreement  and  mutual  under- 
standing; and,  when  this  is  removed,  descriptive  epithets 
must  enter  in  to  supplement  it.  I  suppose  every  community 
has  its  big  John    Smiths   and   little   John    Smiths,    its  old 

iThis  is  what  I  have  called  indirect  apprehension,  or  presence-in-abscnce. 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  267 

Mr.  Brown  and  young  Mr.  Brown.  We  have  here  the  selective 
feature  of  reference.  Are  these  singular  or  proper  names  ?  To 
ask  the  question  is  to  see  both  kinds  in  their  logical  context 
or  universe  of  discourse.  It  is  unfortunate  that  the  influence  of 
formal  logic  has  led  to  blindness  in  regard  to  such  distinctions. 
But  have  proper  names  meaning?  Certainly.  Their 
meaning  is  this :  They  are  the  socially  accepted  sign  of  a 
particular  individual.  Thus  the  meaning  of  a  proper  name 
is  a  function  of  its  use,  and  denotation  and  meaning  are 
inseparable.  Besides  this,  which  is  its  primary  meaning,  it 
usually  acquires  associations  with  information  about  the 
individual  which  it  denotes.  A  singular  name,  on  the  other 
hand,  acquires  its  denotation  through  its  meaning;  more 
accurately,  the  process  of  selection  which  we  explained  above 
is  reflected  in  the  words  which  are  grouped  together.  The 
person  who  creates  the  singular  name  must  be  capable  of 
thinking  of  the  thing;  his  knowledge  of  it  may  be  much  or 
little, —  that  does  not  matter, —  but  he  does  not  know  a 
proper  name  which  applies.  How,  then,  can  he  direct  the 
thought  of  others  to  this  thing?  Only  by  taking  a  class-name 
that  means  or  denotes  a  large  number  of  things  of  the  same 
type  without  meaning  anyone  of  them  as  such  and  adding 
attributes  which  select  from  these  until  only  one  is  meant. 
In  this  way,  indefiniteness  of  denotation  passes  to  definiteness, 
while  the  concept  which  the  words  reflect  becomes  more 
complex.  Suppose  we  define  definiteness  of  denotation  to  be 
reference  to  one  thing,  no  matter  how  little  is  known  about 
that  one  thing,  and  indefiniteness  of  denotation  to  be  reference 
to  a  class  of  things;  that  is,  to  many  things  without  a  selection 
among  them.  Then,  so  long  as  the  thought  is  carried  by  a 
group  of  words  to  one  thing  in  contradistinction  from  other 
things,  that  group  of  words  has  a  definite  denotation  and 
is  a  singular  term.  When  so  used  as  a  unity,  the  singular  term 
denotes  an  individual,  and  its  meaning  is  the  thing  which  it 
denotes  or,  as  the  conceptualist  would  have  it,  the  concept  of 
the  thing  which  it  denotes.  The  difference  between  it  and  the 
proper  name  is  one  of  genesis.  The  proper  name  acquires  its 
meaning  arbitrarily;  it  is  created  for  a  purpose.  The  singular 
name  as  a  unity  acquires  its  denotation,  and  thus  its  meaning, 


268  CRITICAL  REALISM 

because  its  parts  already  had  their  meanings  and  their  appHca- 
tion  to  the  world  of  things,  qualities,  and  relations.  To  put 
it  another  way,  the  singular  name  is  composed  of  the  words 
it  is  composed  of  because  these  words  already  had  their 
objectivity,  and  these  objectivities  were  the  ones  possessed  by 
the  thing  to  denote  which  the  singular  name  was  constructed. 
Thus  "the  author  of  the  Waverly  Novels"  is  a  singular  term 
denoting  the  individual  who  wrote  the  Waverly  Novels.  Its 
meaning  is  the  object  of  thought  which  it  calls  up  in  the  mind 
of  the  individual  who  uses  it  or  understands  it.  Ordinarily, 
the  mind  is  carried  to  what  is  experienced  as  the  individual. 
The  words  lead  us  to  think  of  the  individual  who  wrote  the 
Waverly  Novels;  but  we  hesitate,  we  want  to  know  who  he 
was,  i.e.,  what  his  name  was  and  where  he  lived.  Until  we 
do,  our  curiosity  is  not  satisfied.  We  do  not  have  enough 
knowledge  about  the  individual  to  think  of  him  adequately. 
A  single  property  like  authorship  does  not  select  the  individ- 
ual to  the  degree  that  the  plain  man's  realism  demands. 
Thus  reference  for  common  sense  is  a  very  simple  matter. 
The  world  is  potentially  spread  out  before  our  mind's  eye,  and 
a  group  of  words  actualizes  some  part  of  it.  They  are  like  a 
wand  which  points  to  a  part  and  that  part  becomes  clear, 
somewhat  as  a  bit  of  landscape  does  when  a  fog  breaks  in 
front  of  it.  Now  it  is  only  when  logic  is  studied  at  this  level 
of  common  sense  that  its  distinctions  become  clear.  The 
mistake  of  many  logicians  has  been  to  mingle  theory  of 
knowledge  with  empiricism. 

The  epistemological  logician  will  reply  that  this  realism  is 
impossible.  When  we  think  of  things,  the  things  are  not 
actually  the  objects  of  our  thought ;  the  object  of  our  thought 
is  the  concept  of  the  thing.  Very  true;  but  this  concept  of  the 
object,  as  you  call  it,  to  escape  Natural  Realism,  is  experienced 
as  the  object  while  you  are  actually  thinking  of  the  object, 
i.e.,  not  reflective  on  the  nature  of  your  thinking.  Moreover, 
if  you  wish  to  revise  the  outlook  which  is  reflected  in  logic 
you  must  maintain  also  that  you  cannot  have  acquaintance 
with  things;  you  can  have  only  percepts  of  things.  How, 
then,  do  you  get  reference  to  things  at  all? 

Empirical  denotation,  as  we  saw,  is  founded  on  the  outlook 


.     TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  269 

of  common  sense — that  things  are  actually  present  to  appre- 
hension. It  is  because  of  this  structure  that  we  are  able  to 
make  reference  to  them,  to  think  of  them,  to  have  ideas  of 
them.  Destroy  this  basis,  and  denotation  seems  to  be  left  in 
the  air,  like  a  dream-ladder  which  does  not  touch  the  ground. 
The  problem  here  is  fundamental.  Logicians  like  Bradley 
and  Bosanquet,  who  have  idealistic  tendencies,  allow  their 
theory  of  knowledge  to  enter  their  logic  and  assure  us  that 
Reality  is  the  ultimate  subject  of  every  judgment.  But  how 
this  Reality  is  present  to  the  judgment  they  do  not  tell  us  very 
clearly.  They  say  that  Reality  appears  to  us  in  perception  or 
that  we  have  contact  with  it  in  feeling.  Very  good;  but  this 
does  not  explain  the  logical  distinctions  which  our  language 
reflects.  When  I  assert  that  this  typewriter  needs  oiling,  I 
am  judging  about  the  typewriter  and  do  not  concern  myself 
with  a  more  ultimate  reality.  In  other  words,  logic,  as  a 
science,  should  try  to  understand  the  distinctions  reflected  in 
judgment  and  in  the  field  of  experience  in  general,  rather  than 
create  new  ones  on  its  own  responsibility. 

Now,  the  point  I  wish  to  make  in  contrast  to  the  idealists, 
Bradley  and  Bosanquet,  and  the  realist,  Mr.  Russell,  is  that 
the  denotation  worked  out  by  common  sense  can  be  used  by 
critical  realism.  The  one-to-one  correspondence  between 
thing-experience  and  physical  thing  makes  this  possible. 
The  pencil  which  I  handle  is  a  physical  thing  corresponding 
to  the  thing-experience  which  it  partially  controls.  These  are 
identified  by  common  sense,  but  reflection  forces  us  to  distin- 
guish them.  In  place  of  the  physical  thing  we  then  say  that 
we  have  a  percept  caused  by  the  thing  and  a  concept  of  the 
thing.  This  concept  may  be  expressed  in  terms  of  several 
propositions  which  state  our  knowledge  about  the  thing.  It  is 
evident  that  the  mechanism  of  denotation,  or  reference,  arises 
within  experience  and  does  not  require  the  actual  presence  of 
the  object  denoted.  Neither  knowledge-about  nor  reference 
necessitates  a  mysterious  cognitive  connection  of  the  mind 
with  physical  things. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  compare  our  own  theory 
with  that  advocated  by  Mr.  Russell.  Denotation  is  for 
Mr.  Russell  the  real  presence  of  the  thing  denoted.  But  only 
19 


«7o  CRITICAL  REALISM 

the  "  I "  and  the  ' '  this"  can  be  so  present.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  he  speaks  of  the  judgment  which  Bismarck  alone  can  make 
and  sets  this  up  as  an  ideal  which  our  propositions  attempt 
to  describe.  If  he  were  right  in  this,  how  could  we  ever  be 
sure  that  our  propositions  were  correct  in  their  descriptions? 
My  own  position  is  that  denotation  depends  on  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  objective  sphere  of  our  field  of  experience.  If  there 
is  no  locus  there  for  the  reference  of  an  idea,  the  idea  of 
reference  cannot  develop.  This  means  that  ideas  are  secon- 
dary to  thing-experiences.  When  we  once  realize  that  we 
actually  handle  physical  things,  the  one-to-one  correspondence 
between  them  and  the  thing-experiences  which  gives  meaning 
to  this  critical  development  of  reference  becomes  clear. 

There  are  three  facts  which  should  be  kept  distinct.  The 
first  is  mere  presence  in  the  individual's  field  of  experience. 
We  have  tried  to  prove  that  nothing  which  is  not  mental  in 
the  larger  sense  of  that  term  can  so  be  present.  This  fact  is 
the  truth  of  idealism.  Now,  that  which  is  present  and  thus 
mental  is  not  necessarily  known.  The  second  fact  is  the 
existence  of  the  attitude  called  cognitive,  in  distinction  from 
the  attitude  called  practical,  taken  by  the  subject-self  toward 
a  part  of  the  field  called  the  object.  This  object  is  a  construct 
within  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience.  If  the  object 
has  the  marks  which  mean  to  us  a  physical  thing,  it  is  expe- 
rienced as  common  and  independent  and  permanent.  There 
are,  however,  many  other  kinds  of  objects  toward  which  the 
self  takes  the  cognitive  attitude.  Concepts  or  universals, 
ideas,  propositions,  mathematical  objects,  fairyland  may  in 
this  way  be  contrasted  with  the  subject-self.  In  the  inclusive 
sense  of  the  term,  all  such  objects  are  mental.  Let  us  call  this 
knowledge,  consisting  of  the  presence  of  the  object,  intuitive 
knowledge.  I  have  tried  to  prove  that  we  cannot  have  intui- 
tive knowledge  of  physical  things.  Natural  Realism  takes 
this  contrast  within  experience  naturally  enough  as  one 
between  the  individual  knowing  and  an  independent  reality 
known  when  it  deals  with  physical  things,  certain  ideal  objects 
and,  perhaps,  mathematical  objects.  There  is  vacillation  when 
other  objects  are  concerned,  for  common  sense  is  sure  only  of 
the  extreme  cases.     States  of  mind  and  concepts  are,  on  the 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  271 

other  hand,  looked  upon  as  not  independent  of  the  individ- 
ual knovdng,  although  independent  of  the  knowing.  Science, 
we  have  shown  in  the  chapter  "Natural  Realism  and  Science," 
works  within  this  outlook  but  lifts  the  thing-experience  from 
the  perceptual  to  the  conceptual  level  and  seeks  to  remove 
the  personal  perspective  by  means  of  measurement.  It  thus 
obtains  what  it  regards  as  objective  data  and  interprets  this 
by  hypotheses,  organizing  concepts,  and  theories.  But  there 
is  another  fact  in  regard  to  knowledge  which  is  equally  impor- 
tant. I  say  that  I  know  a  thing  when  I  take  a  cognitive 
attitude  toward  it  as  an  object;  but  I  say  that  I  have  knowl- 
edge of  an  object  when  I  have  what  I  consider  a  true  idea  of 
the  object.  Now,  the  possibilities  of  these  two  kinds  of 
knowledge  are  different.  The  first  kind  is  limited  to  what  is 
supposedly  actually  present  along  with  the  subject;  it  is  a 
knowledge  of  apprehension  or  of  presentation.  We  have 
seen  that  both  science  and  common  sense  take  this  contrast  — 
which  exists  only  within  experience  —  to  hold  between  the 
individual  knowing  and  an  independent  reality. 

The  second  kind  of  knowledge,  that  in  which  an  idea  or  a 
series  of  propositions  taken  as  a  unity  is  referred  to  an  exist- 
ence, implies  the  separateness  of  the  knowledge  possessed  by  the 
mind  and  the  existence  known.  It  is  this  kind  of  knowledge 
that  is  given  us  by  ideas  of  things  or  by  judgments  about 
things.  In  Chapter  V  we  traced  the  genesis  of  this  contrast. 
We  saw  that  it  consisted  of  the  distinction  between  two 
elements  of  which  one  is  present  and  is  called  the  idea,  or 
content  of  the  judgment,  and  the  other  is  qualified  as  absent 
and  is  called  the  reality  known.  These  two  elements  are 
cognitively  relative  in  the  sense  that  one  means  the  other 
which  it  knows,  while  the  other  is  known  by  the  idea  which 
means  it.  This  cognitive  contrast  between  idea  and  thing, 
in  which  the  idea  is  qualified  as  present  while  the  thing  is 
qualified  as  absent  yet  meant  by  the  idea,  is  the  basis  of 
knowledge  which  is  not  intuitional.  The  idea  means  the 
thing;  it  is  the  idea  of  the  thing  (which  are  two  ways  of  stating 
the  same  fact),  but  this  does  not  imply  an  existential  relation 
between  them.  In  truth,  the  thing  known  is  regarded  always 
as  independent,  for  its  existence  and  nature,  of  the  idea  which 


272  CRITICAL  REALISM 

"means"  it  and  gives  knowledge  of  it.  The  thesis  which  I  shall 
seek  to  maintain  is  that  this  second  kind  of  knowledge  furnishes 
the  basis  for  knowledge  referred  to  existents  which  are  not  in 
the  field  of  the  individual's  experience.  This  thesis  furnishes 
the  epistemological  foundation  for  a  mediate  realism. 

We  have  seen  that  Mr.  Russell  scorns  the  supposition  that 
ideas  can  furnish  knowledge  of  things.  '  *  The  relation  of  mind, 
idea,  and  object,  on  this  view,  is  utterly  obscure,  and,  so  far 
as  I  can  see,  nothing  discoverable  by  inspection  warrants  the 
intrusion  of  the  idea  between  the  mind  and  the  object." 
(Aristotelian  Society,  Froc^^JiMgs,  1910-11,  p.  119.)  Mr.  Stout 
agrees  with  him  on  this  point  and  bases  his  position  on  the 
impossibility  of  explaining  truth  and  error  unless  reality 
itself  is  the  immediate  object  of  thought.  (Ibid,  p.  189.)  I 
do  not  see  that  they  have  succeeded  very  well  with  their 
intuitionalistic  views,  and  I  believe  that  the  problem  of  truth 
and  error  solves  itself  when  ideas  are  admitted.  To  the  state- 
ment of  Mr.  Russell,^  I  can  only  reply  that  the  distinction 
between  ideas  and  things  is  an  empirical  one  which  everybody 
is  aware  of.  Thus  Professor  Dewey  analyzes  out  the  con- 
trast— the  idea  which  is  cognitional  and  the  thing  which  it 
means.  For  instance,  I  have  an  idea  of  the  Louvre,  an  idea 
which  means  the  Louvre.  The  Louvre  is  absent  while  the 
idea  is  present.  The  denotation  of  the  term  "Louvre"  is 
thus  given  by  the  object  which  my  idea  means.  When  I 
assert  that  the  Louvre  has  a  side  facing  the  Seine,  I  do  not 
ordinarily  realize  that  this  is  my  judgment  about  the  Louvre, 
a  building  existent  in  Paris;  I  think  of  the  Louvre  and  see, 
as  it  were,  that  it  has  a  side  facing  the  Seine.  In  the  preced- 
ing treatment  of  denotation,  we  saw  that  logic  is  founded  on 
this  common-sense  outlook;  and  it  is  this  which  Mr.  Stout 
supports  on  the  foundation  of  inspection.  But  in  my  more 
reflective  moments,  I  repudiate  the  presence-in-absence  of  the 
Louvre  and  hold  that  I  have  an  idea  of  the  Louvre  (an  idea 
which  means  the  Louvre)  and  that  I  believe  that  this  idea  is 

•  In  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Mr.  Russell  asserts  that  Berkeley  had  the  right  to  say 
that  "thought  of  a  tree  must  be  in  our  minds."  So  far  as  I  can  gather  from  the  context,  he 
uses  the  word  "thought"  as  synonymous  with  idea.  I  am  not  quite  certain  what  Mr.  Russell 
means  by  "thought.  Common  sense  and  logic  and  psychology  mean  by  it  an  idea-object  or 
concept.  If  this  is  what  Mr.  Russell  means,  the  statement  that  we  are  not  aware  of  anything 
between  the  "mind"  and  the  object  is  refuted. 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  273 

true.  This  idea  is  expressed  in  the  assertion  which  I  have 
made.  Or,  to  put  the  same  analysis  in  a  different  form,  I 
make  a  judgment,  assent  to  a  proposition  which  is  the  object 
of  my  thought,  and  then  interpret  this  judgment  by  means  of 
interpretants  which  make  expHcit  the  object  about  which  I 
am  judging.  I  shall  assume  in  the  rest  of  the  argument  that 
men  do  possess  the  empirical  distinction  between  a  cognitional 
idea  and  the  thing  which  it  means.  (See  the  excellent  article 
by  Dewey  entitled,  "The  Experimental  Theory  of  Knowl- 
edge," Mind,  Vol.  XXXI.) 

The  next  question  we  must  ask  concerns  the  status  of  such 
a  cognitional  idea.  Professor  Dewey  asserts  that  "from  a 
strictly  empirical  point  of  view,  the  smell  which  knows  is  no 
more  merely  mental  than  is  the  rose  known."  It  is  time 
that  the  scandalously  inadequate  treatment  of  the  terms 
"mind"  and  "mental"  ceased.  For  instance,  Mr.  Russell 
admits  that  "the  word  'mental'  is  one  which,  so  far  as  I  know, 
has  no  well-defined  meaning."  {Mind,  Jan.,  1913,  p.  78.) 
How  can  we  hope  to  solve  problems  in  theory  of  knowledge 
unless  we  work  out  definite  meanings! 

In  the  preceding  chapters  we  analyzed  several  definite 
meanings,  which  we  shall  now  seek  to  apply.  The  meaning 
of  the  word  "mental"  is,  first,  a  function  of  the  point  of  view  of 
the  psychologist.  It  signifies  the  psychical  as  a  state  of  mind. 
Psychology,  as  a  special  science,  deals  with  consciousness  as 
something  of  which  the  individual  is  introspectively  conscious, 
while  the  external  sciences  are  supposed  to  study  the  physical. 
At  least,  this  is  the  meaning  which  custom  has  assigned  to  the 
psychical  or  merely  mental.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  psy- 
chologist of  the  present  day  is  quite  certain  what  he  means  by 
the  psychical.  The  mental  is,  next,  the  mind  as  opposed  to 
the  objects  known.  This  is  the  epistemological  meaning 
of  the  term.  Unfortunately,  the  immediate  realist  takes  the 
first  meaning  of  knowledge  literally.  The  object  known  is 
supposed  to  be  present  to  the  mind  even  when  it  is  non-mental. 
We  saw  that  this  sense  of  knowing  is  founded  on  a  contrast, 
within  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience,  which  is  expe- 
rienced as  one  between  the  individual  as  knowing  and  the 
object  known.     This  contrast  is  left  vague  by  common  sense, 


274  CRITICAL  REALISM 

and  the  epistemologist  who  tries  to  investigate  it  gets  either 
a  subject-self  inseparable  from  the  object  side,  or  not-self 
(Bradley,  Ward,  and  the  idealists  generally),  or  a  mysterious 
act  of  apprehension,  or  consciousness  (Moore,  Russell,  and 
the  immediate  realists).  But  we  have  shown  that  this  distinc- 
tion is  within  the  field  of  experience.  Thus  the  epistemological 
mental  is  a  subspecies  of  the  mental. 

A  third  meaning  of  the  term  is  that  indicated  by  Professor 
Dewey.  An  idea  as  an  object  of  thought  is  mental  in  so  far  as 
it  exercises  an  intellectual  function.  Thus  a  concept  is  mental 
in  so  far  as  it  is  thought  of  as  mediating  knowledge  of  things, 
although  it  is  an  object  of  our  thinking.  But  an  object  of 
thought  when  so  used  can  be  qualified  by  reflection  as  personal. 
We  have  tried  to  show  that  reflection  cannot  escape  such  a 
result.  It  is  my  idea;  and  the  reason  for  this  qualification  is 
the  personal  character  of  ideation.  I  have  found  by  inter- 
course with  my  fellows  that  the  idea  of  a  supposedly  common 
and  independent  thing  which  I  cherish  is  different  from  that 
cherished  by  others  and  that  this  difference  is  explicable  in 
terms  of  my  past  experience.  The  personal  quale  enters  and 
forever  after  attaches  itself  to  ideas  of  things.  This,  like 
truth,  is  a  reflective  meaning.  The  result  is  a  contrast  between 
my  idea  and  the  thing  which  is  common  and  independent. 
But  the  very  motives  which  have  convinced  us  that  the 
idea-object  is  personal  have  forced  us  to  connect  it  existentially 
with  the  rest  of  the  field  of  experience.  Hence  the  idea-object 
is  mental  in  the  fourth  and  most  inclusive  sense.  This  fourth 
meaning  is  the  one  which  I  have  taken  such  pains  to  distinguish 
from  the  psychical  in  the  subjectivistic  interpretation  of  that 
term.  It  is  within  the  mental  in  this  larger  sense  that  all  the 
other  contrasts  arise. 

But  we  must  distinguish  between  two  kinds  of  knowledge- 
of.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  we  possess  knowledge  of 
thing-experiences.  While  we  are  resting  at  the  level  of 
Natural  Realism,  we  employ  the  contrast  between  the  presence 
of  things  and  ideas  of  them  when  they  are  absent.  Again,  the 
distinction  between  acquaintance-with  and  knowledge-about 
is  an  empirical  one  which  everyone  recognizes.  The  empirical 
realism  of  certain  recent  writers  is  based  on  the  fact  that  this 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  275 

distinction  has  significance  within  experience  and  involves  no 
transcendence.  Knowledge-about  is  more  conceptual  than 
acquaintance- with,  and  it  is  soon  realized  that  the  presence 
of  the  object  in  its  perceptual  form  does  not  give  this  knowledge 
which  science  emphasizes.  The  artist,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
primarily  interested  in  the  knowledge-about  which  terminates 
satisfactorily  upon  the  knowledge  given  by  acquaintance-with. 
At  this  point  a  parting  of  the  ways  is  imminent.  It  is  time 
for  the  epistemologist  to  realize  that  the  level  of  Natural 
Realism  has  been  outgrown  and  that  science  possesses  a 
selected  sort  of  knowledge-about  which  claims  to  be  valid  of 
existents,  which,  as  such,  cannot  enter  the  field  of  the  individ- 
ual's experience,  but  which  control  the  construction  of  thing- 
experiences  and  determine  the  data  collected  by  the  scientist. 
When  the  scientist  asserts  that  this  table  has  a  certain  size 
relative  to  a  meter-stick,  is  made  of  wood  of  a  certain  texture, 
which  is  composed  of  cells,  which  themselves  have  a  peculiar 
structure,  and  so  on,  he  is  asserting  knowledge  about  the  table 
as  an  existent  independent  of  his  mind.  How  must  we 
interpret  this  knowledge  ?  So  far  as  the  form  of  the  proposi- 
tions is  concerned,  there  is  no  difference  between  these  judg- 
ments and  those  of  common  sense.  If  you  ask  the  scientist 
what  table  he  is  judging  about,  he  will  usually  reply,  "The 
one  I  see  in  front  of  me."  But  we  have  seen  how  ambiguous 
this  answer  is.  "The  table  I  see"  may  mean  that  I  am  able 
to  intuit  a  physical  thing,  or  it  may  mean  that  the  physical 
table  is  causally  connected  with  my  present  percept  or  thing- 
experience.  In  the  first  instance,  I  occupy  the  standpoint  of 
Natural  Realism  and  believe  that  my  thing-experience  is  the 
table ;  in  the  second  instance,  I  believe  that  my  thing-experience 
is  controlled  by  the  physical  thing  and  that  there  is  thus  a 
one-to-one  correspondence  between  them.  This  one-to-one 
correspondence  is  unique  and  is  built  up  around  the  body. 
The  microcosm  of  mind  and  the  macrocosm  of  reality  are  like 
universes  which  radiate  from  the  same  centre.  Thus  the 
denotation  in  the  one  selects  existents  in  the  other  without 
essential  readjustment.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  judg- 
ments of  common  sense  do  not  need  to  have  their  form  changed 
when  they  are  interpreted  by  science.     It  is  also  the  reason 


276  CRITICAL  REALISM 

why  science,  although  its  outlook  is  that  of  mediate  realism, 
is  not  always  aware  of  it.  In  his  moments  of  placid  naivete 
the  scientist  will  inform  you  that  matter  is  that  which  he 
feels. 

The  difference  between  Natural  Realism  and  critical 
realism  does  not  lie  in  the  form  of  the  judgment,  for  that 
remains  of  necessity  the  same.  We  have  seen  how  realistic 
is  logic — a  characteristic  which  has  always  bothered  idealism. 
The  natural  realist,  as  well  as  the  critical  reaUst,  believes 
that  he  is  thinking  of  something  which  the  subject-term 
denotes  and  that  he  is  making  assertions  about  this  thing. 
But  the  critical  realist  goes  further  and  defines  scientific 
knowledge  of  the  physical  world  as  knowledge  about  that  which 
can  never  be  literally  within  the  field  of  an  individual's 
experience.  Knowledge  consists  of  assertions  in  regard  to 
behavior,  structure,  and  relations  which  we  cannot  help 
making  and  referring  to  an  existent  corresponding  to  the 
thing-experience  which  it  causally  controls.  Thus  critical 
realism  employs  the  logical  structure  built  up  by  Natural 
Realism,  but  goes  a  step  further  as  the  result  of  the  contrast 
between  percept  and  physical  thing. 

We  are  at  last  in  a  position  to  consider  the  question  of  the 
relation  of  mind,  idea,  and  thing.  Within  the  individual's 
experience  the  only  difference  between  idea  and  thing  is  one 
of  function.  Both  are  objective ;  but  the  idea  means  the  thing, 
and  the  thing  is  known  by  the  idea  which  "means "  it.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  ordinarily  assume  that  the  reality  itself  is  the 
object  of  our  thinking.  This  is  the  basis  of  denotation.  The 
word  denotes  that  which  it  leads  us  to  think  about.  We  have, 
then,  the  subject-object  structure  within  our  experience,  and 
no  idea  intervenes  between.  It  is  to  this  fact  that  Russell  and 
Stout  refer  when  they  assert  that  ideas  do  not  come  between 
the  mind,  or  the  subject,  and  the  object.  True;  but  other 
reasons  may  lead  us  to  judge  that  the  object  of  our  thought  is 
not  actually  the  thing  which  we  take  it  to  be.  When  reflection 
forces  us  to  adopt  this  position,  we  may  call  the  object  on  which 
our  thought  terminates  an  idea  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from 
the  existent  which  cannot  be  present.  It  is  our  idea,  or 
concept,  of  the  existent,  yet  it  is  the  object  of  our  thought. 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  277 

Mr.  Stout  finds  this  view  indefensible  because  it  seems  to  him 
to  involve  the  impossibility  of  something  owing  its  whole 
being  to  its  relation  to  something  else.  (Aristotelian  Society, 
Proceedings,  1910-11,  p.  187.)  But  this  objection  is  founded 
on  a  radical  misimderstanding.  An  object  of  thought  is  not 
experienced  as  dependent  on  the  thought.  The  object  is 
qualified  as  of  a  certain  kind.  Now,  when  it  is  reflectively 
qualified  as  an  idea,  its  character  is  not  changed,  but  its  sphere 
of  existence  is.  It  is  now  considered  mental  but  not  dependent 
on  our  thought  of  it.  Logically  speaking,  an  idea  is  just  as 
objective  as  any  other  object  of  thought. 

Those  who  hold  that  ideas  cannot  be  the  objects  of  thought 
in  judgment  do  so  for  another  reason  as  well.  Once  separate 
real  being  and  being  for  thought,  say  they,  and  it  is  impossible 
to  explain  truth  and  error.  Let  us  see  whether  this  dictum  is 
justified. 

Two  questions  must  be  distinguished  from  the  start. 
The  first  is :  What  do  we  mean  by  truth  and  its  opposite,  error  ? 
The  second  is:  What  is  the  criterion  by  means  of  which  we 
judge  that  any  particular  belief,  judgment,  or  idea  is  true  or 
false?     These  questions  are  at  least  relatively  separable. 

The  truth  we  are  concerned  with  is  the  truth  of  our  beliefs 
and  propositions.  Hence  we  shall  not  speak  of  the  Truth 
with  a  capital  and  identify  it  with  Reality.  Such  a  tran- 
scendental or  metaphysical  truth  is  often  contrasted  with  the 
inadequacy  of  our  conception  of  it.  It  is  evident  that  the 
assumption  here  is  that  something  which  transcends  our 
experience  is  true  in  its  own  right  and  that  it  thus  furnishes 
a  measure  of  the  degree  of  truth  of  our  halting  and  finite 
knowledge.  I  see  no  good  reason  why  such  an  independent 
reality  should  be  called  the  Truth.  Certainly,  no  solution  of 
the  problem  of  truth  is  possible  while  the  term  is  used  in  two 
senses.  Try  as  we  will,  confusion  inevitably  results.  For 
the  realistic,  non-idealistic  system  which  we  have  developed  in 
these  pages,  there  is  no  ground  for  a  Transcendental  Truth, 
so  we  shall  quietly  omit  all  identification  of  truth  and  reality. 

Truth  is,  then,  a  reflective  qualification  of  those  ideas, 
beliefs,  and  judgments  which  we  regard  as  giving  us  knowledge 
about  some  sphere  of  reality.     Its  opposite  is  error,  or  falsity. 


278  CRITICAL  REALISM 

We  saw  that  the  supposition  of  knowledge  comes  first  genet- 
ically and  analytically.  We  believe  or  judge  or  have  ideas  and 
we  consider  these  cases  of  knowledge-of.  But  we  find  that  we 
are  mistaken  frequently  enough  when  the  affair  comes  to  the 
test.  The  result  is  reflective  comparison  within  experience 
between  the  object  which  we  meant  to  characterize  and  the 
characterization  which  we  had  before  our  minds.  Such 
reflection  has  its  birth  in  disappointment;  therefore,  we  may 
say  that  error  as  a  meaning  logically  precedes  that  of  truth. 
As  the  consequence  of  our  unpleasant  experience  of  knowl- 
edge-of, which  failed  to  agree  with  the  field  to  which  it 
pointed,  we  are  led  to  realize  that  we  are  not  infallible  and 
that  that  which  we  take  to  be  knowledge  is  not  knowledge. 
To  express  this  discovery,  the  term  error  is  used.  But  the 
very  characterization  of  some  knowledge-of  as  erroneous 
implies  that  other  examples  of  knowledge-of  are  not  erroneous 
and  the  contrast-meaning  "truth"  grows  up  to  describe  these. 
Naturally,  we  desire  our  knowledge  to  be  true  and  not  false. 
The  premium  is  placed  on  truth,  and  it  becomes  a  meaning 
attachable  to  what  claims  to  be  knowledge  in  anticipation  of 
the  test  which  alone  would  completely  assure  us.  Hence,  the 
question,  Is  it  true  or  is  it  false?  is  theoretically  present  in 
adult  experience  along  with  every  belief  or  judgment  or  idea. 
But  our  experience  is  not  only  a  growing  one;  it  is  also  a 
conserving  one.  Many  ideas  and  beliefs  have  been  tested 
over  and  over  again,  so  that  trueness  is  attached  to  them. 
These  ideas  and  beliefs  are  like  coins  which  have  stamped 
upon  them  a  mark  assuring  their  genuineness.  We  may  say, 
then,  that  truth  is  a  meaning  which  grows  up  within  experi- 
ence to  characterize  cases  of  knowledge-of  which  have  made 
good  their  claim.  Human  nature  being  what  it  is,  this  mean- 
ing is  often  attached  to  beliefs  and  ideas  which  will  not  stand 
a  complete  test.  Since  its  application  is  premature,  it  must 
frequently  be  removed  and  its  opposite  reluctantly  attached. 
The  conclusion  we  have  come  to  is  that  truth  is  a  meaning 
applied  to  cases  of  knowledge  when  these  have  been  tested. 
It  means  that  this  idea  or  judgment  is  an  instance  oj  knowledge. 
Now,  the  usual  theories  of  truth  have  neglected  this  connection 
and  have  sought  a  definition  of  truth  apart  from  the  nature  of 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  279 

knowledge-of .  It  seems  to  me  that  much  of  the  misunder- 
standing which  has  fed  recent  controversies  is  dtie  to  the 
neglect  of  this  relation.  For  instance,  the  coherence  theory 
has  grown  up  on  the  palpable  fact  that  any  theory  or  belief 
is  in  part  judged  by  its  harmony  with  other  theories  and 
beliefs  which  have  already  been  accepted  as  true.  This  is 
certainly  one  of  our  usual  ways  of  testing  ideas  and  beliefs 
which  have  no  adequate  immediate  test.  We  believe  that  ideas 
which  are  true  must  be  coherent.  This  belief  is  founded  on 
the  principle  of  non-contradiction,  which  is  a  law  of  our  thought. 
But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  belief  that  a  system,  because  it 
is  coherent,  must,  therefore,  be  true.  That  would  be  an 
example  of  false  conversion.  If  not,  we  cannot  treat  coherence 
as  a  universal  sign  of  truth  and,  therefore,  as  a  part  of  its 
definition.  We  are  forced  to  discard  coherence  as  a  theory 
of  truth,  although  we  may  retain  it  as  one  of  the  criteria  of 
particular  ideas  and  hypotheses.  It  may  be  of  interest  to 
note  that  this  conclusion  turns  us  aside  from  the  strange 
leap  into  an  Absolute  Experience  which  is  usually  made  by 
the  advocates  of  the  coherence  theory.  Let  us  glance  at  an 
example  of  the  leap  to  which  I  refer. 

In  his  study  entitled  The  Nature  of  Truth,  Mr.  Joachim 
points  out  that  the  coherence  which  the  theory  has  in  mind 
is  not  that  of  formal  logical  consistency.  "The  systematic 
coherence,  therefore,  in  which  we  are  looking  for  the  nature 
of  truth,  must  not  be  confused  with  the  consistency  of  formal 
logic.  A  piece  of  thinking  might  be  free  from  self-contradic- 
tion, might  be  consistent  and  valid  as  the  formal  logician 
understands  those  terms,  and  yet  it  might  fail  to  exhibit  that 
systematic  coherence  which  is  truth."  (p.  76.)  As  I  under- 
stand formal  logic,  it  does  not  concern  itself  with  the  question 
of  truth,  but  with  that  of  validity  of  inference.  In  contrast  to 
bare  intuition  of  truths  and  their  consequences  and  to  the 
ideal  of  formal  consistency,  we  have  put  forward  the  "relative 
self-dependence"  of  the  organized  whole  of  a  science.  But 
Joachim  swerves  suddenly  aside  from  this  line  of  approach, 
which  has  relevance  to  human  truth  because  it  stresses  the 
growth  of  human  knowledge,  and  we  hear  of  a  significant  whole 
which  is  "an  organized  individual  experience,  self-fulfilling 


28o  CRITICAL  REALISM 

and  self -fulfilled."  But  "there  can  be  one  and  only  one  such 
experience;  or  only  one  significant  whole,  the  significance  of 
which  is  self-contained  in  the  sense  required"  {ibid.y  p.  78). 
It  is  evident  that  we  have  left  behind  human  experience  and 
truth  as  these  develop  in  science.  But  science  concerns  itself 
with  knowledge  about  a  reality  which  it  does  not  literally 
include..  Hence,  it  can  never  be  self-sustaining.  In  other 
words,  the  metaphysical  theory  of  coherence  finds  no  groimd 
in  the  truth  of  human  knowledge.  Logical  truth  with  its 
dualistic  implications  is  alien  to  Transcendental  Truth.  One 
must  praise  Mr.  Joachim  for  his  evident  sincerity  and  at  the 
same  time  grieve  that  he  does  not  see  the  implications  of  his 
argimient.  We  have  here  a  beautiful  example  of  the  mingling 
of  logic  and  metaphysics  and  of  the  confusion  which  results 
from  it. 

Another  theory  of  the  meaning  of  truth  which  has  much  in 
its  favor  and  many  admirers  is  that  of  correspondence.  Does 
truth  consist  in  som.e  form  of  correspondence  between  ideas 
and  beliefs  and  reality?  We  have  said  that  knowledge-of 
does  involve  an  agreement  between  ideas  and  that  which  the 
ideas  mean.  The  kind  and  degree  of  agreement  is  set  by  the 
idea  which  knows.  Suppose  that  when  I  am  absent  I  have 
an  idea  of  a  picture — a  copy  of  "The  Concert,"  by  Giorgione, 
which  hangs  in  my  study ;  this  idea  means  the  object  hanging 
on  the  wall.  Its  truth  concerns  the  agreement  of  the  salient 
features  of  the  idea-object  with  the  corresponding  features  of 
the  object  which  I  later  experience.  The  one  fits  on,  harmon- 
izes with,  that  which  it  means  when  the  picture  again  comes 
into  view.  We  then  say  that  it  was  a  tni£  idea.  Now  we 
all  know  what  such  a  harmony  or  agreement  is.  It  exists 
when  we  pass  from  one  object  (the  idea)  to  the  other  (the 
thing)  without  a  necessary  correction  of  the  idea.  * '  Trueness ' ' 
or  "truth"  is  the  meaning  which  expresses  to  us  the  fact  of  this 
agreement.  When  applied  in  anticipation,  it  stands  for  our 
conviction  that  the  idea  does  contain  knowledge  of  the  thing 
of  which  it  claims  knowledge.  Such  a  correspondence,  which 
can  be  empirically  tested,  is  open  to  none  of  the  objections 
ordinarily  urged  against  the  correspondence  theory.  The 
reality  is  only  momentarily  absent  and  can  again  be  present. 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  281 

It  is  evident,  also,  that  truth  cannot  consist  in  a  static  relation 
between  idea  and  thing,  since  "knowledge,"  which  is  the 
more  elemental  term,  does  not. 

But  the  situation  which  we  sketched  above  is  a  very  simple 
one.  The  idea  is  true  so  far  as  it  goes,  but  it  very  often  does 
not  claim  to  go  very  far.  Suppose,  however,  I  assert  that  this 
picture  was  painted  by  Giorgione.  My  idea  is  very  complex 
and  can  be  expressed  adequately  only  by  a  proposition  such 
as,  "The  picture  in  the  Pitti  Gallery  called  'The  Concert' 
was  painted  by  Giorgione."  I  denote  an  object  and  make  an 
assertion  about  it.  What  I  assert  is  knowledge  about  the 
picture  and  can  be  tested  only  by  the  external  and  the  internal 
evidence.  If  this  evidence  does  not  agree  with  the  supposition, 
I  judge  that  the  proposition  which  expressed  my  idea  about 
the  picture  is  erroneous;  it  is  in  that  case  not  knowledge  and 
not  true.  Now  the  harmony  or  lack  of  harmony  of  an  idea 
or  proposition  with  the  evidence  or  facts  is  an  empirical  matter 
in  no  wise  mysterious.  Decisions  of  this  character  are  made 
every  day  in  science  and  in  historical  investigation.  The 
relation  of  the  available  facts  and  the  idea,  which  may  be  a 
theory,  is  not  one  of  copying,  but  of  tested  harmony. 

We  may  say,  then,  that,  just  as  knowledge  is  an  achieve- 
ment of  the  mind  involving  no  transcendence  of  the  mind  in 
any  literal  sense,  so  truth  is  a  human  affair.  It  is  a  critical 
affirmation  of  knowledge.  The  tests  of  knowledge  are  those 
of  truth.  In  order  that  we  may  see  this  more  clearly,  let 
us  confine  ourselves  to  knowledge  of  nature.  At  the  level  of 
Natural  Realism,  I  distinguish  between  my  ideas  of  University 
Hall  and  University  Hall  itself.  I  ask  whether  my  ideas  are 
true,  i.e.,  whether  they  give  me  the  knowledge  they  claim  to 
give.  I  test  these  ideas  of  mine  by  an  actual  perception  of  the 
building.  If  they  agree  with  this  perception,  I  assert  that 
the  ideas  were  true,  i.e.,  they  gave  me  knowledge.  But  if  it 
is  scientific  knowledge  which  I  wish  to  obtain,  I  realize  that  the 
perception  is  only  a  part  of  the  means.  My  knowledge  must 
consist  of  propositions  which  are  referred  to  an  existent.  I 
must  allow  this  existent  to  control  my  percepts  and  data 
according  to  adequate  methods.  If  these  harmonize  with  the 
propositions,  I  assert  that  the  latter  are  true.     It  is  evident 


282  CRITICAL  REALISM 

that  here,  as  elsewhere,  the  tests  are  within  expenence,  although 
they  involve  a  control  of  experience  by  that  which  is  outside. 

I  should  like  to  stress  the  fact  that  not  all  ideas  or  proposi- 
tions claim  to  give  knowledge  about  that  which  is  extra-experi- 
ential. When  my  ideas  claim  to  give  me  knowledge  of  the 
world  only  as  it  appears  to  me,  the  way  to  test  them  is  to  go 
again  to  immediate  experience.  In  this  way,  I  am  able  to 
compare  the  idea-object  with  the  object  which  it  claims  to 
know.  What  is  this  but  correspondence  ?  But  it  is  an  empiri- 
cal correspondence.  The  test  is  of  this  face-to-face  sort. 
There  can  be  a  comparison.  At  the  level  of  mediate  realism,  it 
is  realized  that  such  a  comparison  between  physical  existents 
and  propositions  which  are  supposed  to  contain  knowledge  is 
impossible.  The  test  is  immanent  and  concerns  the  harmony 
between  data  and  propositions  based  on  them  according  to 
inductive  and  deductive  methods.  When  we  realize  the 
difference  between  the  knowledge-references  in  these  two 
cases,  we  see  that,  while  correspondence  may  be  the  correct 
ideal  of  one,  it  is  not  that  of  the  other.  This  conclusion  agrees 
with  our  decision  that  the  mental  can  know  the  non-mental. 

Our  conclusion  can  be  brief.  We  have,  I  hope,  simplified 
the  problems  of  knowledge  and  truth  and  extricated  them  from 
the  misleading  contexts  which  various  schools  of  philosophy 
have  thrown  around  them.  We  have  shown  how  Natural 
Realism  passes  naturally  to  critical  realism  through  empirical 
motives  which  burst  the  old  shell.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we 
have  at  times  over-simplified  Natural  Realism  and  given 
it  a  unity  and  internal  harmony  which  it  does  not  possess  in 
actuality.  I  hope  I  have  made  it  evident  that  critical  realism 
exists  already  preformed,  as  it  were,  in  Natural  Realism,  that 
is,  in  the  plain  man's  outlook.  Our  task  has  been  to  clarify  it 
and  make  it  conscious  of  itself.  Knowledge  is  an  achievement 
and  possession  of  minds  as  these  have  evolved  under  the 
stimulus  of  their  environment.  As  a  meaning,  knowledge 
precedes  truth,  which  is  a  reflective  deepening  of  the  sense 
of  knowledge  in  the  light  of  an  awakened  doubt.  The 
criteria  of  truth  are,  therefore,  the  same  as  those  of  knowledge. 
Truth  is  thus  accepted  and  tested  knowledge.  To  say  that 
an  idea  is  true  is  to  say  that  it  is  actually  a  case  of  knowledge 


TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  283 

as  it  claims  to  be.  Truth  is  knowledge  triumphant  instead 
of  knowledge  militant;  yet  it  is  knowledge,  as  can  be  seen 
when  we  combine  the  two  terms  and  speak  of  true  knowl- 
edge. Knowledge  militant  is  opposed  to  ignorance,  and 
knowledge   triumphant   to   error. 


This  book  is  BtJE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 


^/^rt  i  6  1934 
'OCT  a  0  193(1 

MAY  1  4  1935 


MAY  ^  8  1935     iAR  2  5  1954 
JAN  7      1936    ,;JUN  ^      iU54    . 


i^.^ 


MAR  2  3  1937 

NOVd    1942 


♦inv  4    WM 

MAk  1  8  .343 

OCT  Z  •  «' 


"EC  2  31949   , 

£7  135? 


DEC  tl  ^95«» 
lOEC  2  2  1954 

»||AV2  919$7 

WftRS    1959 
JUN  1  2  1959 

JAN  2  5  1«0 


RECD  LDURt 
FEB    61967 

gtCD  ID-UM. 

FEB  2  61368 

FEB  28 1968 


Form  L-9-10m-2,'31 


APR  2  3  1962' 


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